REVIEW OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008300650006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
25X1A
COUNTRY Burma
DATE DISTR.
SUBJECT
Review of Communist Activity in Burma.
NO. OF PAGES
8
25X1A
C
?'XD rr 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
General
1. There has been little change in the general situation during the period
under review. Ligal political parties have mainly been preoccupied in
ca maigning for the first installment of the General Elections. These
were held in about 70 constituencies on 12 and 19 June. No official
results have yet been announced by the Government but the outcome of
the elections in 43 constituencies, as published in the press, is as
follows :
Anti Fascist Peoples Freedom League 26 (:including the Burma Socialist Party)
i
Burma Workers and Peasants Party 3 _j
Union of Bursts. League
(U AU G THAN and Peoples Volunteer 0rgani ..tiara)-
Independents
2. The Government has claimed success in limited operations, mainly in the
Delta, designed to clear small areas of insurgents. They have also
successfully resisted a series of tirly heavy attacks by Communist insur-
gents in Yamethin district which were a particular feature of insurgent
activity during May. In the meantime the insurgents' sabotage campaign
against communications continues unabated.
3. Total surrenders of insurgents since 10 Mar 1950, when the Government 'a
amnesty was announced, are lust under 10,000. The amnesty was withdrawn
on 4 January 1951, but a steady trickle of surrenders has continued at
a rate of about 20 per week including a fair proportion of Burma Conrtuniat
Party (EDP) adherents. At the and of June there was a negotiated surrender
in Pyapon district of a party of some 300 insurgents, of whom about one
third were BCP followers or Party members. These signs of falling morale
in the insurgent camp contrast with evidence of greater determination on
the nart of the PCP leaders, but it is unlikely that the Governr,ent can
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offset any major improvement of its pre eat position because of the lack
of manpower to retain control of arV f her considerable areas which may
be cleared. Government experiments in rearming surrendered personnel are
proving risky in that a group of surrendered PPOs who were rearmed for
village defense purposes in Pegs district have again gone underground,,
and nearly 100 members of a newly raised battalion have recently deserted.
The new Soviet Ambassador and his staff arrived in Rangoon on 16 April.
BOP StrateSt
5. At the BOP Central Committee meeting in September 1950 a four-point plan
was laid down for future operations comprising:
a. Liberation of Central Burma
b. Expansion to the north
a. Concentration on the "East Line" (i.e. the Rangoon-Mandalay
Road axis)
d. The establishment of a base in the Shan States.
6. 'Subsequent events show that some progress has been rade towards its
implementation. Reports have indicated the withdrawal of BCP forces
from western Central Surma towards the hills to the west of Pyimnana and
Yamethin and in May Paukkaung, 25 miles east of Promo, which had been
in insurgent hands for over two years, was reoccupied by the Government
without opposition. Party organization has been stepped up in the Shan
States with the appointment of district officials for a new district
headquarters in the Southern Shan States and of Peoples Administration
officials for the States of Pwehla, Maw, Yengan, and Pangtara. In April
the existence was reported of a BCP headquarters for Haipaw; a concentra-
tion of about 200 BCP insurgents has been in the AsuJnghkio area for several.
months. These developments follow on earlier reports of groups of BOP
insurgents moving into the Western Shan States. Attempts are also being
made to raise a 4 Division of the Peoples Army in the Shan States, but
have so far apparently had little success.
7. In Yamethin district, where concentrations of BOP troops have been
reported, attacks against smell towns, in particular Pyawbwe and Lowe,
were intensified during May and in some apses the attacking force was
estimated at about 1,000. These attacks have hitherto been successfully
resisted by Government forces. That an offensive was imminent had been
indicated in a report of a meeting of BOP-leaders which took place on
27 March, in the course of which Thakin THAN TUN announced that sufficient
arms were available to arm the BCP forces In about 15 districts. At the
same time be ordered a revmrsal of the previous policy of dispersion and
concentration of forces under district arrangements as a preliminary to
rearming. When the distribution of arms had been completed an offensive
was to begin in Psrinmana, in Yamethin District, and in Tbungoo District.
8. At a later meeting held on May Day at which leaders of the Army Mutineers,
PVOs and Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) were also present,
THAN TUN claimed that the number of arms collected up to that date exceeded
the number of their fighting personnel and instructed district representa-
tives to submit their requirements to the Central Committee. Unless there-
fore the BOP have become discouraged at their initial lack of success a
continued and possibly more widespread offensive must be expected.
9. The sources from which this apparent increased supply of arms was obtained
is still in doubt. The possibility that a proportion of them were
supplied from China is dealt with in paragraph 23 below.
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BCP-PDF Policy
10. At an Upper Burma PDF conferences on 17 March 1951 Thakin TRAP TUN made
an Important speech in which he reviewed the whole of BCP policy. He
remarked that the Upper Burma Conference was to consider the preparatory
steps for the convention of an All Burma Congress which would announce
the formation of a Peoples Democratic Republic of Burma. Be claimed
that the national liberation struggle in Burma was directly connected
with the World Peace movement because the American expansionists were
turning Burma into a military base for an attack on New China. Burma
was in the front line of American expansionism and Upper Burma was a
key'area where events would be a deciding factor in the revolution in
Southern Asia. It was therefore essential for the BOP to establish an
.impregnable stronghold in Upper Burma.
11 Thakin NTI'a neutrality policy, THAN TUN demonstrated, was h po-aritica1
and NtT was in fact whole-heartedly on the side of the Americans and
disseminating anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet propaganda. It was not true
that THAN TUN had signed an agreement with MAO Tee-tong; the two had
not yet met nor had anT agreement been signed.. It was also untrue to
suggest that China had any designs on Burmese territory. On the contrary,
the Americans were planning to attack China and Thakin NU was assisting
them. Thus it was the particular task of the BOP in opposing American
expansionism and working for world peace to overthrow the Thakin NU
Goverment and establish a Peoples Democratic Goverment in Burm.
These airs formed common ground between the forces of peace in the
"liberated areas" and elements with similar ideals which were emerging
in Goverment-held areas, with whom they were ready, to unite.
12. The key points in the Party's program, he continued, were,
a. The establishment of a Peoples Democratic Government in which
all groups and nationalities would have democratic representation.
b. The unity of all revolutionary forces.
c. The organization of the "liberated areas" into a single unit with
a centralized Peoples Aiministration which would prepare the way
for the creation of a Central Government; the creation of a Central
Peoples Administration Board must be attempted before the end of
1951.
d. The protection of the rights of minorities and the abolition of
feudalism in the minority areas, though this latter aim must take
second place to the campaign against American expansionism.
e. Improvement of social conditions including education, public
health and suppression of crime, the creation of a self-supporting
economic system, and the issue of a "Peoples Currency".
f. The implementation of an agrarian revolution with the agreement
of the masses; this would secure the support of the peasants and
thus create a source of reserves for the military forces.
g. Intensive mobile offensive warfare aiming at the permanent occupa-
tion of small towns, thus strengthening control over local cations as a preliminary to the occupation of major town,
13. Three principal factors for the success of the Peoples Democratic
or Revolt
'o i gdoo?lf igaU jo j ij] u~ oSier o~ tt~rmed nt
and the strengthening of the leadership of the working classes, that is
the Cosmamist Party. The creation of a single Communist Party was of
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14.
fundamental importance and unity with the Communist Party (Burma) (CP(B))
was the key to the unification of Marxist forces; the Burma Workers' and
Peasants' Party (20P) which claimed to be Narxiat, and the Peoples
Volunteer Organization which represented itself as the Party of the row.
letariat, should also join in the single Communist Party.
In reviewing the progress made in the BCP's relations with other revolu-
'tionary groups, as a result of the revised policy adopted by the BOP
Central Committee in September 1950, THAN TUN explained that:
a. A truce had been declared with KNDO troops in Tbungoo, Pegu,
Thaton, and the Delta areas and it had been agreed to cooperate
in military operations; the BCP was now attempting to come to
terms with the leaders of the KNDO Central headquarters. This
agreement with KNDQ troops was important since it converted the
former racial warfare into class warfare.
b. With the CP(B) the BCP had agreed to stop fighting each other,
to collaborate against the Government, to work for the expansion
of the United Front and the establishment of a single Communist
Party. The time had come to give substance to this agreement but
difficulties were expected owing to the vacillating policy and
unorthodox organization of the CP(B), which was more anarchist
than Om mnist,
a: Truces on a regional basis had been reached with the PTO: but
agreement had still not been reached for joint military operations
and they must strive to secure the return of all POOs to the United
Front.
d. The emergence of the BM was a favorable omen and the BCP would
support all their anti-expansionist and anti..AFPPL activities;
the intensification of the peace campaign,, the struggle for
democratic rights and the improvement of mass organization in
the "unliberated areas" was of great importance.
a. There were other elements emerging who were opposed to the
AFPPL, among Members of Parliament, writers and journalists,
and these must be organized into a single body.
15. The BCP, he said, was at all time ready to discuss measures of unification
and would attempt to hold a conference before the end of 1951 with the
KNDO forces, the CP(B), and the PVOS towards the formation of a single
Army. The constitution of the United Front, on which opinions varied,
would also have to be carefully discussed.
16. Since this speech was madein March there have been further developments
in the BOP's relations with other insurgent groups, the most important
of which is the reported announcement by Kawthulay radio on 30 June that
the Karen: bad decided to throw in their lot with the BCP. No further
details of this announcement are available but it comes at a time when
it is known from other sources that the Karen: have been giving active
consideration to their future. They argue that since China, the strongest
purer in the Phr East, is already Communist their beat chance of securing
their aims of an autonomous state and the protection of their interests
now lies in whole-hearted support of the Burmese Communists rather than
lukewarm support for or resistance to them which might prejudice their
case when Communism came into power in Burma.
19. Despite the fact that members of the CP(B) Central Committee signed an
agreement with the BCP which committed the CP(B) to support the major
part of BCP policy and collaborate in the unification of the two parties,
there is every indication that Thakin SOE is still pursuing an independent
line and is critical of the BCP and its United Front policy. It seem
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that the most that the BCP can hope for in the i=nediate future is to win
over individual leaders and groups to the United Front and possibly absceb
them in to the BOP as opposed to uniting with the CP(BS as a whole. The
same is likely with regard to the PVOs who are disorganized and politically
unstable.
18. The relations between the BCP and the BWPP appear to have reached a stage
from which any further:development mast be on the initiative of the latter.
An approach was made by. BCP representatives to Thakin CHIT IAUIG, General
Secretary of the BWPP,i in March 1951 to sound out the views of the BWPP
on collaboration between the two parties. Thakin CIIIT MAUNG explained
that the BWPP was not prepared to jeopardize its present position since
it felt that it was well placed to secure complete control of labor in
Rangoon; ar7 agreement with the BOP would involve going underground and
this the BWPP was not prepared to do. Such an attitude is logical while
the BWPP has ar y reasonable chance of gaining influence. by legal and
constitutional means; there is some confirmation that it is authentic in
the statement of a leader of the World Peace Congress (Burma) (WPP..
controlled) that the time bad not yet come to merge its peace movement
with the BCP*s World Peace Congress (Burma) in the insurgent-held areas.
19. There has recently, however, been evidence of overt collaboration between
pro-BCP`and pro!.3JPP elements in student circles. At the beginning of
1951 both groups independently set up committees to reorganize an
"All Burma" students organization (none has existed overtly since the
All Burma S+udents Union went underground in March 1949); these two
groups have now agreed to corbine and a National Ibstival Committee
recently formed in connection with the forthcoming World Youth and
Student Festival in Berlin is largely a joint affair (see paragraph 32).
BOP Attitude to the General Elections.
~.r~~r r ra
20. Prior to the first installment of--th, General Elections, the BCP made
its attitude towards them known in ae'eries of instructions. Every
effort was to be made to prevent the elections being held in those areas
where the BOP had influence, but in areas where the Government was strong
enough to prevent arci- interference, different tactics were to be adopted.
Party members and sympathizers should if possible contest the elections;
otherwise BOP supporters should cast their votes for opposition candidates
who might support the policy of the BOP. A final instruction issued at
the end of May ordered district:; 'eadquarters concerned to instruct its
members to cast their voteip.for BWPP candidates. In view of this it
seems unlikely that aragr BC:secret Party member or sympathizer stood for
election and none has bepnidentified among the numerous candidates
nominated.
21. Party propaganda on the subject has consistently mainta-1.ned that the
elections would be rigged and were purely an artifice through which
the AFPFL Government, on reelection: aright claim mass support in intensifying
its pro-American activities.
Links with Chian.
22. The interrogation of-a number of insurgents who surrendered at the begin-
ning of January 1951 hr-.s thrown fur"her light on the extent of the liaison
between the BOP and'the China Corvmmist Party. It is now known that a
party of 24 PDF officials traveled to China in December 1950 for a course
of political and military training which, it is said, will last two years,
and it is probable that there is an additional body of 100 PDF combatants
undergoing a shorter period of military training. Clearly some prior
direct liaison must have taken place before these courses could have been
arranged but how and when has still not been confirmed, nor has it been
possible to confirm the earlier report that Thakin THAla TIP dt heLf
been to Peiping to meet MAO Tee-tong. It will be notion
speech, paragraph 11 above, he denied that array such meeting had taken
place). In addition to AUNG WIN, who islmown still to be*.- in Peiping with
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the Asian and Australasian Trades Union Liaison Bureau, it appears almost
certain that Thakin AUNG G'!I, a senior well-educated Party leader, and
THAN SAWE are also in Chinas but the nature of their functions there and
their whereabouts have still to be ascertained.
23. A report that small quantities of arms had begun to arrive for the BOP
from China still lacks confirmation. Investigations are however proceeding
into the source of supply of a dump of about 100 assorted arms, together
with quantities of rold and opium, which was seized near Nawnghkio on
12 June and which is reported to have been smuggled across the border.
It seems possible that these arms were the property of the BCP in that
on his way back from seizing the dump the Army officer in charge of the
operation was killed by BCP insurgents, of whom there is a small concen-
tration in the Nawnghkio area,
C~anist_ .Pa .
24. Mention has been made in paragraph 17 above of Thakin SOE'e attitude
towards 'the BOP and the th-ited Front. It was noticeable that in a batch
of some 13 documents, seised in March from a CP(B) courier who was on his
Bur from Rangoon, there was only one mention of the United
way to upper
Front and that couched in derogatory terms. These same documents, several
of which ware from Thakin SOE himself' revealed that CP(B) officials had
been active in penetrating the Burma Muslim Congress and student circles
and that they were planning to extend their student activity into the
districts. The documents also revealed that Thakin SOE had little effective
control over the Upper Burma CP(B), among whom considerable dissension
existed between the regional leaders and leaders of two. front organizati? a
known as the Anti-Bureaucracy Council and the Ex-Red Flag Soldiers Union.
Burma Workers and Peasants Paarty
25. A Peoples Parliamentary Democratic Front (PPDF) was initiated by the EWPP
in March 1951 so a body which they hoped would attract the support of anti-
LFPFL members of Parliaments in particular U RUNG THAN, brother of the
late RUNG SAN, and PVO personalities. The HWPP.hoped through this body
to coordinate leftist groups with a view to mobilizing effective opposition
to AFPFL candidates at the forthcoming elections. The PPDF ~~~ a~ ,
short-lived because of the unwillingness of other groups
with the BM, so that in the event the BWPP contested the elections
alone under the title of the "Peoples Democratic Front". which was srmalyy
inaugurated with Thakin LWIN as President on 15 May. Of the
far known, the Party has won the seats of Tharavaddy, te and Letpadan.
They also claim that the Peoples Peace Front candidate el'eoted in Nludon
Constituency supports them.
26. In the districts the BWPP has continued its organizational activities and
further branches have been established in Mandalay, 7baton. guo
Minble.
Burma Trade Union Congress =22 1
27. The EWPP's labor organization, the Burma Trade Union Congress, has been
active throughout the period in an attempt to secure further support among
the workers in Rangoon and in the oilfields. Their technique with regard
to small and inexperienced unions has been. to start agitation on straight-
forward issues such as wages and working hours. Four such incidents are
known in Rangoon where at the instance of the BTUC, workers presented a
list of high-sounding demands to their employers and threatened to strike
if these were not granted by a given date. In no case so far, however,
have the BTt1C incited a successful strike and there is evidence in at
least one case that the "demands" were only submitted under pressure and
did not in fact reflect the workers' views. At their May Day celebration,
however, the BTUC secured an attendance of about 4,000 workers as compared
with some 10,000 who attended the perall01 celebration sponsored by the
Burma Socialist Party's Trade Union Congress (Burma).
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28. Resolutions passed at the BTOC May Day celebrations called for the forma-
tion of a "Peoples Democratic Front" (paragraph 25 above) to fight against
imperialism, feudalism, and bureauoraer, condemned the acceptance of
foreign aid from the imperialists, denounced American aggression in Korea,
and demanded the negotiation of a Peace Treaty between the Big Five, and
the cessation of America's rearming of Japan,
29. At a meeting at the end of May, resolutions commended Iran's decision to
nationalize the oil industry and called on the Goverrmient to take similar
action' in Burma. A motion of censure was also passed against the Govern-
ment of Nov Zealand for its "fascist action against stevedore labor" and
'a sub-oouuittee was appointed to find ways and means of giving
to the striking New Zealand laborers and boycotting New Zealand shy this
arriving in Rangoon. But there is as yet no sign of any activity
direction.
The World Peace Congress (Burmg.) (WPC (B.) )
30. The BWPP?s World Peace Congress (Burma), in which some pre-BOP elements
are active, has continued its campaign on orthodox lines and is now busy
with the signature campaign in support of the appeal of the World Peace
Council for a peace pact between'the five great powers. July is to be
made a month of special effort in this respect. Further branches have
been opened at Moulmein, That on, and Akyab.
31. A leading official of the WPC(B) has commentedth..tp"cop"complete understanding"
existed between the WPC(B) and the peace ede
Democratic League (Burnes.) but that the time had not yet cote to merge
their movement with that of the BOP in the insurgent areas,
Berlin World Youth and Student Festival
32. Pro-BCP elements among'th~ Rangoon students have been in touch with the
Secretariat of the World Festival Committee and announcedd their intentiioonn
to send a delegation to the Berlin Festival. A preliminary meeting,
on 3 June at the Headquarters of the Burma Trades Union Congress to consider
the formation of a National Festival Committee, was attended by representa-
tives of the pro-BOP All Burma Students Federation Organization Committee,
the BWPP Youth Commission, the All Burma Indian Youth League, the World
Peace Congress (Burma), and local Chinese youth organizations. In
addition there were representatives of the non-political group in the
Rangoon University Students Union and of such bodies as the Christian
Youth Council.
33. On 17 June the National Festival Committee was formed and a Central
Working Committee appointed consisting of 12 officials, of whom four are
1-nown BCP supporters, and another four BWPP supporters. Acvaluable opoint
was gained by the Communist elements in securing the
President of the
U TI'Y, Vice President of the All Burma Youth League
Central Working Committee. The All Burma Youth League is she strongest
youth organization in the country; over past three insisted on keeping clear of all domestic and international political
issues - a position wh4ch it still professes to maintain.
34. The National Festival Committee has decided to send 6 delegates to Berlin,
but no nominations have yet been made. In the meantime an intensive
campaign is being conducted to collect funds to fin tit the bearing
primarily through the sale of locally made paper It~ theacre
of the International. Union of Students. In this, pro-China assistance
League (CM) youth and student organizations are giving act
by making collections among the Chinese community in Rangoon. ive The Burma
National iity Comittee
Fund provided proalso been vided the delegation proceeds to Berlin.
International Solidarity
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35. Burmese representation in Prague, the headquarters of the International
Union of Students, has probably increased in that TUN SHEIN who has been
there since August 1949 as accredited representative of the All Burma
Students Union and the BCP, is believed to have been joined in September
1950 by YE RIOT (aka TUN KYI) another Burmese student. At the end of
June 1951 TUN SHWE, who had been the communications link in India between
TIM SHEIK and his associates in Burma, succeeded in evading the Indian
police who were to serve a deportation order on him and flew to Europe
via Ceylon.
Local Chinese Activities - China Democratic League (Burma)
36. The main weight of the CDL(B) campaign to secure control of the Chinese
caminunity has been directed at local Chinese schools, the objective being
to secure the adoption in all educational establishments of text books
aprroved by the China Peoples Government. In April special classes were
held during the vacation by the Burma Chirese Teachers Union, a CDL(B)
controlled organization, to instruct teachers in the use of the new text
books and to standardize the method of teaching in schools. At the same
time the Burma Chinese Students Union was holding simmer classes, the
purpose of which is believed to have been political indoctrination.
37. As the start of the new term approached a campaign of abuse, in which most
CDL(B) controlled organizations eventually played some part, was developed
against the headmistress of a Chinese Girls school who had announced her
intention to use new Chinese Nationalist text books which she was expecting
from Singapore. The opening of this school was prevented by a picket of
pro-CM students and a parallel institution using the school's name was
set up by some of the other teachers who had gone over to the CDL-controlled
Burma Chinese Teachers Union. Friction between CDL and pro-Kuomintang
elements became so serious over this incident that on 5 June the Burmese
authorities had to step in and seal both the official end unofficial
school premises.
38. On the following day CHAN Soon-sick, a leading personality in the local
CDL circles and in the Chinese conmunity as a whole, was murdered in the
street. The CDL-controlled press and demonstrations organized by pro-CM
organizations immediately emphasized that CHAN Soon-siok had been opposed
to the headmistress' proposal to introduce the new Chinese rationalist
text books and attributed the crime to RMT elements in Rangoon. CHAN
Soon-siok's funeral on 12 June was made into a major demonstration depicting
CHAN soon-siok as a martyr who had died for New China, and the Chinese
Ambassador, supported by various Chinese organizations, was insistent in
demanding of the Burmese authorities that certain KflT leaders should be
immediately arrested, regardless of the fact that there was no evidence
to connect them with the crime. (Be thus made himself even more unpopular
with the Burmese authorities A major anti-KMT propaganda campaign has
been developed from the incident and the situation is arising where a3
Chinese educational establishment not firmly under the control of one side
or the other is liable to become a political battleground.
39. CDL youth and student organizations, with the assistance of the IG1T
Revolutionary Committee, have been seeking to persuade the students to
return to China to complete their education, and in mid-June a party
of sixteen, including seven under the age of fifteen, sailed from Rangoon
for China. It is reported that a number of these students travelled
without their parents' permission.
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