POLICY DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00418R000200020021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 25, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
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COUNTRY
India
Policy Disagreements Within Communist
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
25 May 1955
Party of India
NO. OF PAGES
4
DATE OF INFO.
November 1954
REQUIREMENT NO.
RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KFY SEE REVERSE)
25X1X
The following paragraphs present the reasons for holding an early November 1954
Communist Party of India Central Committee session and summarize the activities
of the session as described in the attachments listed below, which are available
in the CIA Library.
1. An emergency session of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of
India (CPI) was held in New Delhi, 3-7 November 1954, in order to consider a
proposed resolution of the Politburo (PB) rejecting the theses contained in
an article by R. Palme Dutt, "New Features in the National Liberation Struggle
of Colonial and Dependent Peoples," which appeared in the 8 October 195
of For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy.
to tmeo all
2. Rejection of the theses of R. P. Dutaeachtelegraphically was
Central Committee members by the PB and
without fail. The PB wanted immediate approval of its proposed resolution.
In the meantime the PB got a telegram from Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary of the
CPI, then In Moscow. He asked the PB not to be hasty and suggested postponement
of the CC meeting until he returned to India, since there was no urgent reason
for settling the problem. This was not acceptable to the PB.
3. It was brought out at the CC meeting that only five members of the PB were present
when the proposed resolution against Dutt's article was approved by the PB. Pro-
ponents of this resolution were Rajeshwar Rao, P. Sundarayya, S. A. Dange,
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E. M. S. Namboodripad, and Basava Punayya. The drafters of the resolution
were Dange., Namboodripad, and Sundara.yya. Consideration of the draft was the
first business, a draft which can be summed up as follows: Fear is expressed
that the United States is supposed to be the main enemy and that the fight
against the British and. also the Nehru Government will be given up. Therefore,
in order to continue the fight, we should not accept the line set down by Dutt.
The next item of business was placing a second draft resolution before the CC.
This resolution was drafted by Romesh Chandra and S. G. Sardesai and was sup-
ported by Dr. Ahmed, S. G. Sardesai, Dr. Adhikari, S. S. Mirajkar, Sudan
Deshmukh, L. R. K.handkar, Romesh Chandra, H. K. Vyas, Y. D. Sharma, RanenSen
and the Bengal., Bihar, Assam, and Orissa delegates. The essence of this second
draft resolution was:
a. R. P. Dutt has contributed to the Party program.
b. There is no contradiction with the policy of the Third Party Congress held
in Madura. Dutt exhibits a deep understanding of that line.
c. He has correctly pointed out the real danger. We have underestimated the
danger of the U. S. in its economic and political attacks and methods. We
have not learned our lesson from the manner in which the United States
attacked Pakistan and now has control of it. The same applies to Israel.
d. On the other hand Dutt has correctly pointed out that the British are also
trying to maintain their supremacy over colonial and dependent countries.
Their policy of freedom to colonial peoples is bogus, as can be seen from
their handling of Malaya and Africa. Therefore, Dutt has correctly exposed
British imperialism, intrigues, conspiracies and repressive methods for the
maintenance of colonies by force in those cases where it was not possible to
compromise with the upper classes to maintain their sovereignty and economic
domination. Therefore, the tendency of overestimating the United States
strength is checked. The British are also fighting with the United States
to maintain supremacy, which Dutt has clearly stated.
e. There is confusion as to who the main enemy is--Great Britain or the United
States. To assume that only Great Britain is our enemy is wrong, and also
to assume that only the United States is our enemy is wrong. Dutt has
pointed out that both are our enemies and that both should be fought for
freedom and independence.
f. He has correctly pointed out that the struggles against the British and the
U.S. are not two isolated struggles because the objectives of the U.S. are
not limited to war. The U.S. also wants political and economic domination
and, therefore, 'the struggle against the U.S. is not only a struggle for
freedom but also a struggle for peace. Consequently the struggle for freedom
and independence is mainly against the British, but it is also against the U.S.
g. Butt also pointed out that the struggle against the U.S. is also developing
in Britain, although in a very primitive form.. The British people have begun
to think that the U.S. is attempting to make Britain a colony and that they
are dominating the British. This growing feeling against the U.S. in Britain
can be utilized because there is a common principle involved in a common cause.
h. Duttas policy, democratic unity, is not different from the Madura resolution.
Unity with the member of the Congress Party is correctly maintained and is
consistent with the line established at Madura,
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6.
7a
9.
I. Dutt's understanding of an interim government prior to a Peoples' Democratic
government is also correct but he has not stated what form this will take,
the reason being that his article was not written only for India.
The PB observed that their resolution was about to be defeated and threatened
to resign if a vote were taken. Some PB members insisted that a vote should be
taken Consequently, there was a vote on the question of whether or not a vote
should be taken on the above two resolutions. The result of this was twelve in
favor of voting and twenty against. Dr. Ahmed was the principal opponent of the
PB resolution from within the PB. P. Ramamurthi first supported the PB reso-
lution, but later opposed. it. Nearly all CC members were present at this meeting
and all voiced their opinions, except S. A. Dange.
At the suggestion of Sardar Sohensingh Josh, a sub-committee composed of the
following individuals was appointed:' E. M. S. Namboodripad, P. Ramamurthi,
Z. A. Ahmed, Surjit Singh Josh, Basava Punnaya, Jyoti Bose and S. G. Sardesai.
This group was asked to prepare a report on the national and international
situation as it had developed since the last Party Congress. On the basis of
this report the discussion would be reopened and a final decision reached.
P. Sundarayya and Rajeshwar Rao refused to serve on the sub-committee and are
totally opposed to Dutt's line. They even threatened resignation from the CC
if it were adopted. It was felt by the CC, however, that their point of view
should be'represented on the sub-committee and Basava Punnaya, who supports it,
was placed on the sub-committee to give it voice. The Dutt line is meeting
much opposition. Some Indian Communists say that the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union can err and point to the changing line on Tito. If wrong on Tito,
they say,. errors can be made concerning India.
The sub-committee was to meet in Delhi or about a week, commencing
10 or 11 December 1955, in order to prepare the draft of a political thesis to
be presented to the CC meeting tentatively scheduled for 10 January 1955.
The impressions of certain CCM's and some other Communists, who know the details
of the CC meeting, are:
The leadership of the CPI will not improve.
b. A new crisis is rapidly developing within the Party.
c. Internationalism has again undermined the PB and the Party leadership.
Basava Punnaya, for example, said in the CC meeting that the Party should
only consider guidance received from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and the Chinese Communist Party, and should not be concerned with other
Communist Parties. In the meantime General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh may return
from Moscow with instructions.
Attachments. Available in CIA Library:
A: Draft Resolution for the Emergency Session of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of India, 20 October 1954. (4 pages)
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B: Copy of a report (5 pages) of an eye witness of the sessions of the CC and
the CP1, 3-7 November 1954.
C: Copy of a report (15 pages) of an eye witness of the sessions.of the CC of
the CPI, 3-7 November 1954.
Distribution of Attachments:
OCD
CIA Library: Retention
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