INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL HAMMOND AND DR. MCKEE OF ID/GSUSA CONCERNING THE WATCH COMMITTEE PROPOSAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003600050020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 2, 1950
• Content Type: MFR

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2 February 1950
Interview with Colonel Hammond and Dr. McKee of
ID/GSDSA concerning the Watch Committee Proposal
REFER CE: Memorandum for the DCI from the DDI/GSUSA dated
20 January 1950, Subjects Proposed Watch Committee
1. On Wednesday, 1 February 1950, I interviewed Colonel Hammond
and Dr. McKee of ID/GSUSA to get the Army point of view which had
prompted the proposal in the reference memorandum. Y.T. McKee is
the senior civilian consultant in ID and is also the Army Check
List Officer. He turned out to be the guiding light for the pro-
posal.
2. I discovered that ID does not want to do away with the L
the much broader program. As currently conducted, ID feels that
instructions, without an outlet for its findings, and without
recognition as a task which should receive a high priority in d'ach
participating; agency. If CIA knows what it: wants to receive in the
way of proceeds from this operation, the knowledge is not shared
elsewhere, as there has been no meeting of minds. Dr. McKee has
missed two (if I remember correctly) meetings, because they were
called on very short notice for days and hours when he could net
be present. Hence, although he is highly interested in the success
of the operation, he has been unable to participate as fully as he
wished and has been proceeding unilaterally. By the way, the fact
that Dr. McKee was designated as the Army Check List Officer indi-
cates the importance attached by ID to this operation, since he is
very highly regarded and is quite senior.
3. What ID does desire is to establish machinery which will
set in motion the whole cycle comprised by the G-2 Estimate/G-2._._
Plaza concept. The proposed =etch Committee would consist of sent ar7
key representatives from each participating agency, who wou1dd me
the foci within their respective agencies for all the activities re-
quired to keep the cycle in motion. Collet vely as the Watch
Committee,, they would become a sort of rstchboard to centralize
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and coordinate the inter-agency communication and collaboration re-
quired as the impulse for the cycle. The Check List operation would
become the tool of the 1katch Committee, along with all the other
facilities of the various agencies. The Watch Committee, as ID sees
it, should have a definite mission with a high priority, based on a
meeting of minds.
1. In discussing the DCI/IAC relationship,, I brought out very
emphatically that it is the responsibility of the DCI, not the IkC,
to produce national intelligence, I also pointed out T a7 machinery
is already provided for the production of coordinated national intel-
ligence estimates, hence if any authorized agency desires periodic
estimates on a certain subject as envisaged in the reference memoran-
dum, all that is required istb submittal of a request upon CIA.
Furthermore, in meeting his responsibility, whether in a crisis
situation or otherwise, the DCI should be able to count on the advice
and support of all the members of the IAC, who, for individual support
have all the facilities of their own agencies, severally. In the
sense of this line of reasoning, I showed that a Watch Committee would
be an unnecessary adjunct.
5. In reply to my argument, Colonel Hammond and Dr. McKee began
by acknowled;in.g its truth but questioning its conclusions. They
added that they had no designs upon the prerogatives of the DCI. They
went on to develop a line of thought based on the concept that what we
all want is a system that works. They feel that the creation of a
cycle of observation, spec= a on, and prognosis aimed at our most
likely enemy is deserving of considerable emphasis which cannot be
obtained by relaxiiig into the routine. Specific individuals in each
agency must be designated to keep the cycle in motion as a primary
duty and as an inescapable commitment) otherwise the cycle will simply (,,-
come to a halt, at least as a common effort, for lack of emphasis.
These individuals must get together frequently, under the leadership
of CIA, to exchange views and to collaborate. The concrete existence
of an appropriate committee, created as the result of a meeting of
minds, is the only way to achieve this. Conversely, a refusal to
create such a committee can be interpreted only as a refusal to admit
the importance of the purpose. Again, a committee such as ID proposes
would, they believe, have the virtue of maintaining a meeing; of-minds-,,
throughout the operation of the cycle, as opposed to the routine method ,
h
i
w
ere a CIA op
nion or draft would be submitted at intervals for inter-
en
id
ti
i
o
J`
ag
cy cons
era
on
n cold bl
od. Moreover, the maintenance of a
continuous meeting of minds would facilitate the evaluation of crisis
information because a common machinery for evaluation would provide
the means for consideration. Each IAC member would, at all times and
any t.me, be able to consider information against the background pro-
vided by all the facilities a1t.rided by the agencies pertaining to the
others.
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6. Although ID feels that the Watch Committee should be es-
tablished by agreement, they are not adamant on form, and are of the
opinion that a document of a lower grade than a DCID should suffice
to record the agreement.
7. All in all, it seemed to me that the ID attitude was most
reasonable, Their point of view emphasizes the necessity of a meet-
ing of minds to produce team work for the purpose of attacking the
most important problem of the national intelligence structure. In
addition, they feel that purism should not be allowed to defeat the
pragmatic, as long as the latter leads to sound results.
25X1
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3.
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