Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82M00591R000100090019-3
Body:
CONFIDENTIAL
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
DCI/IC 77-1939/1
30 November 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
Acting airman
SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy
June 1976 Board meeting.
4. Your signature on the proposed memorandum to the DCI is
1. Attached is a proposed memorandum from you to the DCI recommend-
ing his approval for NFIB vote sheet action on a draft DCID on the above
subject. The proposed revision of Community security policy on the
travel and assignment of persons with access to compartmented intelli-
gence was considered by the NFIB at its 17 June 1976 meeting. Faced
with strong NSA objections, the Board remanded an earlier draft DCID on
this subject to the Security Committee for determination of a legal
aspect and a more precise definition of especially sensitive information.
2. The necessary legal comments were provided by the CIA Associate
General Counsel in late January 1977. Those comments, and the previously
written definition, were used by the Security Committee in completing
by mid-February 1977 a revised draft DCID. Various considerations delayed
getting the revised draft back before the NFIB.
3. Since much time has elapsed since the NFIB last considered this
subject, it seems desirable to circulate a fresh draft for formal Community
consideration. NSA's previous opposition to the proposed new policy may
be reversed, since Admiral Inman spoke in favor of the change at the
recommended.
Attachment:
. Memo to DCI
DOCUMENT DOWNGRADED TO OFFICIAL. USE ONLY
WHEN REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT
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CONFIDENTIAL
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DCI/IC 77-1939
5 DEC, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
John N. McMahon
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security. Policy
REFERENCE: Memo for USIB (USIB-D-9.6/6), dated 1 April 1963,
Subject: "Procedures for Foreign Travel of
Personnel Possessing Special Security
Clearances"
1. Action Requested: Approval for NFIB vote sheet action on a
draft DCID setting security policy on travel and assignment of
personnel with access to compartmented intelligence.
2. Background: Restrictions on the travel or assignment of
persons having or having had access to compartmented intelligence
have been in effect for some twenty years. Current Community policy
on this subject dates from 1963 (see reference). A perception that
the circumstances which justified the policy had changed, questions
about the legal enforceability of travel restrictions, and diverging
implementation of the policy by different agencies, prompted a proposed
revision of the policy. NFIB consideration of that proposal resulted
in the Board remanding an earlier draft DCID to the Security Committee
for (1) exploration with legal counsel of enforceability questions, and
(2) more precise definition of particularly sensitive information,
access to which should trigger more travel restrictions than might
otherwise be appropriate. The legal issue bears on authority to
restrict the unofficial travel of persons having access to sensitive
national security information in the interests of better protecting
that information.
3. Staff Position:
a. The consensus of Community legal staffs is that, while
U.S. citizens have aConstitutional right to travel, the courts
would quite possibly uphold agency restrictions against private
travel to risky areas if there was a "strong factual situation;
for example, current practices of a country of detaining,
harassing or provoking... persons [with access to sensitive
information] for the purpose of extracting information from
DOCUMENT DOWNGRADED TO OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy
them." There are no recent cases documented in which persons
with access to compartmented intelligence were detained,
harassed, or provoked during private travel to Communist
countries to try to force or trick them to divulge sensitive
information. The harassments and provocations occasionally
encountered by Americans in Communist countries have other
objectives--warning local citizens against contact with
Americans, trying to frustrate possible intelligence activi-
ties by the Americans, and seeking to identify weaknesses in
the Americans which could be exploited for espionage recruit-
ment. The application of travel, restrictions is very incon-
sistent. They are waived by some agencies, stringently
applied by others. However private travel of cleared persons
to risky areas has been handled, it has not contributed to
any known compromise of sensitive intelligence. Thus, there
does not appear to be any demonstrable need to restrict
private travel for security reasons, or any likelihood of
supporting in court a stringent policy restricting such
travel.
b. Prudent security, however, argues that persons with
access to sensitive intelligence should be briefed on potential
dangers that might befall them during travel to or through
countries adverse to the United States. The policy proposed
in the attached draft DCID would require such persons to:
(1) give advance notice of planned travel, (2) receive a
defensive security briefing before leaving, and (3) report
to official U.S. authorities any security incidents affecting
them during travel. The proposed policy would apply more
rigorously to those few persons with access to exceptionally
sensitive information on the specific sources and methods 9f
compartmented intelligence (e. .,
c. This subject has been dealt with at considerable
length by the Security Committee and the Community. All
Community agencies except NSA have been pressing for a more
realistic policy which would balance known circumstances of
travel against limits on authority to restrict travel,
operational requirements, and prudent security precautions.
NSA's opposition to a change has been strong. Their posi-
tion may have changed. When Vice Admiral Inman was Director
of Naval Intelligence, he actively supported a change in
security policy along the lines of that in the attached
draft DCID.
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SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy
4. Recommendation: That you approve circulation of the attached
draft DCID to the NFIB for vote sheet action, and if this should not
result in Community agreement, schedule this subject for discussion
at an NFIB meeting with a view towards resolving this issue.
Attachment:
Draft DCID
APPROVED:
ee
r ot Central Intelligence
V
DIS PROVED:
Director of Central Intelligence
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SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy
Distribution: DCI/IC 77-1939
Orig. - Rtn. SECOM w/att.
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1 - ER w/att.
1 - A/D/DCI/IC w/att.
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SECOM Chrono w/att..
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