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PROPOSED DCID ON TRAVEL SECURITY POLICY

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82M00591R000100090019-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 18, 2005
Sequence Number: 
19
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 30, 1977
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP82M00591R000100090019-3.pdf [3]209.81 KB
Body: 
CONFIDENTIAL Approved For F'(ease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000100090019-3 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Security Committee DCI/IC 77-1939/1 30 November 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community Acting airman SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy June 1976 Board meeting. 4. Your signature on the proposed memorandum to the DCI is 1. Attached is a proposed memorandum from you to the DCI recommend- ing his approval for NFIB vote sheet action on a draft DCID on the above subject. The proposed revision of Community security policy on the travel and assignment of persons with access to compartmented intelli- gence was considered by the NFIB at its 17 June 1976 meeting. Faced with strong NSA objections, the Board remanded an earlier draft DCID on this subject to the Security Committee for determination of a legal aspect and a more precise definition of especially sensitive information. 2. The necessary legal comments were provided by the CIA Associate General Counsel in late January 1977. Those comments, and the previously written definition, were used by the Security Committee in completing by mid-February 1977 a revised draft DCID. Various considerations delayed getting the revised draft back before the NFIB. 3. Since much time has elapsed since the NFIB last considered this subject, it seems desirable to circulate a fresh draft for formal Community consideration. NSA's previous opposition to the proposed new policy may be reversed, since Admiral Inman spoke in favor of the change at the recommended. Attachment: . Memo to DCI DOCUMENT DOWNGRADED TO OFFICIAL. USE ONLY WHEN REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591.R000 - CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/Q R?iA f P82M00591R000100090019-3 DCI/IC 77-1939 5 DEC, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon Acting Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security. Policy REFERENCE: Memo for USIB (USIB-D-9.6/6), dated 1 April 1963, Subject: "Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel Possessing Special Security Clearances" 1. Action Requested: Approval for NFIB vote sheet action on a draft DCID setting security policy on travel and assignment of personnel with access to compartmented intelligence. 2. Background: Restrictions on the travel or assignment of persons having or having had access to compartmented intelligence have been in effect for some twenty years. Current Community policy on this subject dates from 1963 (see reference). A perception that the circumstances which justified the policy had changed, questions about the legal enforceability of travel restrictions, and diverging implementation of the policy by different agencies, prompted a proposed revision of the policy. NFIB consideration of that proposal resulted in the Board remanding an earlier draft DCID to the Security Committee for (1) exploration with legal counsel of enforceability questions, and (2) more precise definition of particularly sensitive information, access to which should trigger more travel restrictions than might otherwise be appropriate. The legal issue bears on authority to restrict the unofficial travel of persons having access to sensitive national security information in the interests of better protecting that information. 3. Staff Position: a. The consensus of Community legal staffs is that, while U.S. citizens have aConstitutional right to travel, the courts would quite possibly uphold agency restrictions against private travel to risky areas if there was a "strong factual situation; for example, current practices of a country of detaining, harassing or provoking... persons [with access to sensitive information] for the purpose of extracting information from DOCUMENT DOWNGRADED TO OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT 25k1 Approved For Release 2005/Q]909IDt;tg-82M00591R000100090019-3 Approved For Release 20051Q610 D.~CIA-RDP82M00591 R000100090019-3 L SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy them." There are no recent cases documented in which persons with access to compartmented intelligence were detained, harassed, or provoked during private travel to Communist countries to try to force or trick them to divulge sensitive information. The harassments and provocations occasionally encountered by Americans in Communist countries have other objectives--warning local citizens against contact with Americans, trying to frustrate possible intelligence activi- ties by the Americans, and seeking to identify weaknesses in the Americans which could be exploited for espionage recruit- ment. The application of travel, restrictions is very incon- sistent. They are waived by some agencies, stringently applied by others. However private travel of cleared persons to risky areas has been handled, it has not contributed to any known compromise of sensitive intelligence. Thus, there does not appear to be any demonstrable need to restrict private travel for security reasons, or any likelihood of supporting in court a stringent policy restricting such travel. b. Prudent security, however, argues that persons with access to sensitive intelligence should be briefed on potential dangers that might befall them during travel to or through countries adverse to the United States. The policy proposed in the attached draft DCID would require such persons to: (1) give advance notice of planned travel, (2) receive a defensive security briefing before leaving, and (3) report to official U.S. authorities any security incidents affecting them during travel. The proposed policy would apply more rigorously to those few persons with access to exceptionally sensitive information on the specific sources and methods 9f compartmented intelligence (e. ., c. This subject has been dealt with at considerable length by the Security Committee and the Community. All Community agencies except NSA have been pressing for a more realistic policy which would balance known circumstances of travel against limits on authority to restrict travel, operational requirements, and prudent security precautions. NSA's opposition to a change has been strong. Their posi- tion may have changed. When Vice Admiral Inman was Director of Naval Intelligence, he actively supported a change in security policy along the lines of that in the attached draft DCID. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005P0&9ENIAARDP82M00591 R000100090019-3 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For F ease 2005/06/06': CIA-RDP82M00591VQ 0100090019-3 SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy 4. Recommendation: That you approve circulation of the attached draft DCID to the NFIB for vote sheet action, and if this should not result in Community agreement, schedule this subject for discussion at an NFIB meeting with a view towards resolving this issue. Attachment: Draft DCID APPROVED: ee r ot Central Intelligence V DIS PROVED: Director of Central Intelligence Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000100090019-3 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/0? I KJtIFk&82M00591 R000100090019-3 SUBJECT: Proposed DCID on Travel Security Policy Distribution: DCI/IC 77-1939 Orig. - Rtn. SECOM w/att. 1 - DCI w/att. 1 - ER w/att. 1 - A/D/DCI/IC w/att. I - IC Reg w/o att. 1 - D/OPP w/att. 1 - SECOM Subj. File w/att. SECOM Chrono w/att.. - N DCI/IC/SECOM Approved For Release 2005/O f PI lj P82M00591 R000100090019-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000100090019-3 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000100090019-3

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[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82M00591R000100090019-3.pdf