THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050061-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 61
• Content Type: REPORT

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CHAPTER 1
NT. t}DUCTION
t e I r e h ted St - .
Before considering the adequacy and effectiveness
of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its
relations to our other intelligence agenci s, a brief word of
background may be helpful.
Though the CIA is largely an outgrowth of our
nee in world War II, it would be wrong to proceed from
premise that prior to the war our Government had operated
hout intelligence as to the capabilities and intentions
of possible enemies or prospective ~.llies. The Department
of State had long maintained a widespread information gather-
ing service. The Army, the Navy and certain other depart-
of government had maiat .ined their own systems of collect-
ing formation and producing intelligence.
Prior to World War II, however, we had no integrated
intelligence service. We had nest adequately exploited
tie v
e sources of overt intelligence. We had no central
to coordinate intelligence collection and production,,
and to assemble the best available intelligence for expression
ational estimates to guide in the formulation of foreign
icy and the preparation of our defense plans.
State Department review completed
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In World Wars I and II our Eurspe;n A
Britain in particular, had placed the product of their intelli
Bence services largely at our dispos~lw While we can
in the future assistance from the intelligence service;,- o.
lends and all
have rightly concluded
depend on them for our intelligence to the extent we
forced to do in World War . and during the early days of Yorlt
War
It was World War II which showed both our deficiena
in intelligence and also what we could accomplish under pressure.
Through the expansion of the facilities of the
Department
and the military services, through the Office of Strategic
Services -- our first move towards a central intelligence agency through enlisting the best personnel that could he found, in and
out of Government service, we were turning out a very creditable
pe,rforrance in many phases of intelligence work well before
the ead of the war.
We now recognize that if we are to have adequate
intelligence in times of crisis, we must prepare in time of
peace, and we have seriously turned to the task of building up
a central intelligence organization. The country has now accepted
the verdict, even If somewhat reluctantly, that peace--time
Intelligence is essential to security arid., as many of our
Lary leaders have said, our first line of efense,
ginning to get over our suspicions of intelligence and
,nay to confuse it with intrigue and the more lurid
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side of espionage. We are beginning to accept it
and honorable work and essential to our defense*
the difficult organizational period since the war the future
well to recognize, however, that an efficient
Lgence organization cannot be built overnight.
It will require years of patient work to provide
skilled personnel to do the Job. Blueprints and organization
, even legislation and ample appropriations will not
take the place of competent and highly
Without them we shall have neither effectiv
ed men anti ''omen
operations nor sound intelligence estimates. Unfortunately,
elligence :..s a career has seemed so uncertain that many
war-trained and competent men have left the service
been particularly difficult to find recruits to take the
place*
of highly favorable factors. America has the potential
inst these debit items we could cite a lo
resources, human and material, for the best intelligence service
the world. Within our borders we have every race and
ality, loyal sons speaking every language, travelling
dent in every foreign country. We have the
of
ious
t has
reservo
'.c and technical skills. We have important allies
abroad who are ready to join their knowledge to ours and to
the benefit of their years of experience in intelligence.
have P. wide: geographical be for the development of intell
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in dealing with our main Intel
advan.
oh today are behind the Iron Curtain, we have one
tags, proven in history; namely, that intelligence work', which
re u'
high degree of individual initiative, skill and ingenue
vastly more effective than those working for
system.
These are some of our gir a ,,t assets; our problez
to mobilize them.
There are real elements of urgency in seeing t
task is accomplished.
(1) America, today, as never before in time of peace,
vulnerable to sudden and possibly devastating attack. To most an
ia:l attack there are no sure military weapons Of defense and
ell be that our best protection lies in adequate advance
knowledge of the character and timing of the danger.
River in
(2) vast area of the world stretching from the
curtain where the normal sources of information are partially
rmany to the Yangtse in China is largely behind an
or wholly l.c sing. The techniques of n intelligence service
ought to be one o
curtain.
ortant means of penetrating this iron.
(6) A whole new area of knowledge in the field of
science has become vital for our defense. This field cuts across
the functions of various Government departments and presents new
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roblems from the viewpoint of intelligence collection and
coordination.
(4) The far-flung activities of the fifth column, both
and abroad, present a new type of threat to our security and
we require a concerted Intelligence program to counter this
danger
These are only a few of the developments which glue to
intelligence an importance in our defense system which- it has never
had in the past in time of peace. Fortunately, thes* facts are
now becoming well understood, and the Administration, the Congress
and the people share with deadly seriousness the determination
that the United States here and now shall build the best intelli-
gence service that our national genius and our great resources
can provide.
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.
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gHARTEF-t JjIll
CQNC4LUS
At the outset of this report we gave a brief summary
and at the various chapter endings we have added the precise
conclusions which were applicable to the subject matter of the
chapter. It seems unnecessary to repeat our conclusions here.
We have been critical of the direction and adminis.
tration of CIA where we felt that there had been failures to
carry out its basic charter. At no time, however, have w4
overlooked the great difficulties facing a relatively new
and untried organization which was viewed with some suspicion
and distrust even by those whom it should serve. We relieve
that some measure of this suspicion and distrust is being
dissipated and that what is needed today is for CIA to prove
it can and will carry out its assigned duties.
CIAts progress in doing this should be continuously
tested by the NBC against the standards set in the legislation
which constituted it, that is to say, CIA should be prepared
to show what is being accomplished:
(i) To coordinate the intelligence activities of
the Government;
(2) To provide, in close collaboration with other
governmental intelligence agencies, national estimates for the
guidance of policy; and
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(3) To carry forward the intelligence and related
service of common concern assigned to it by the NS+.
In these fields the CIA has the duty to act. It has
been given., both by law and by NBC directive, wide authority
and. it has the open invitation to seek from the NBC any addi-
tional authority which may be essential. It must not wait to
have authority thrust upon it. Its basic mandate is clear.
We recognize that it will. require initiative and vision to
carry It out, If this is done, we will have made a satisfac-
tory start toward achieving one of our most essential defense
requirements, an adequate intelligence service.
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CUAPTER 71-11
THE 1AjFLLjGENgFd I 2NB OF TAL _p ; N' 0,9 . S
The state Department is assigned dominant interest
the collection and production of political, cultural, and
sociological intelligence by the National Security Council. It
necessarily follows from this allocation that the State Depa
meat is the agency to which CIA, and the Armed Service Depart-
ments should turn to secure the reports and estimates in these
ds of intelligence which they may require.
Possibly we can best explain our ideas o#' the State
Department's role by a concrete but hypothetical illustration.
We shall assume for example that the Secretary of the Navy, to
prepare himself to meet his responsibilities in connection with
a visit of naval units in the western editerranean, desires a
report on political conditions in Spain. To secure it,, the
Secretary of the Navy would turn to his Chief of Naval Intelli-
gence. The latter in turn should seek the desired information
from the State Department, either directly or through CIA. He
should not try to get it from his own ittelligence analysts, any
more than he would expect the State Department to furnish from
its own resources a report on the Spanish Navy. The reason is
obvious. The State Department is the main repository of political
information about Spain. It is also the final arbiter of our
ide with respect to Spain and for the Navy, our policy in
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;cation is a fact, and a. vital fact, to be taken into
ake another hypothetical case, the National
Security Council felt the need for an overall estimate of the
nish situation, -- an estimate that would in.c.ud+e no,""' only
political information from the State Depart-sent but military
and strategic elements as well, -- then, as indicated more
fully in Chapter .__,_... a national estimate should be prepared in
for review and approval by the IA.C Here would be brought
together the intelligence resources of State, of the military
service, of CIA, and of any other agency peculiarly equipped to
make a real contribution on the subject, The State Department
representatives on IAC would, of course, share in the responsi-
bility for the final estimate.
Because of the intelligence contribution which the
e Department should be prepared to make to the NBC and to
other government agencies, including CIA, the Department is called
upon to assume an important role in the field of intelligence,
even apart from its task of supplying the information required by
its own policy officers o We have examined the intelligence. func-
ti.ons. of the State Department, and particularly the specialized
intelligence organization of the Department, known as the Research
and Intelligence staff, solely to determine how effectively the
e Department is organized to meet these outside intelligence
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quirements, particularly those of CIA.
i2s2apch and Intelligence Staff
The Research and Intelligence Staff, as the State
Department's specialized intelligence unit is called, is unique
among the departmental intelligence agencies for at least two
reasons. In the first place, it is an intelligence agency within
intelligence agency, since the collection and interpretation
of all information bearing on our foreign relations is a primary
objective of the Department as a whole and of its officers in the
field. In the second place, the, Research and Intelligence staff
was not established by the Department in response to keenly felt
needs. It was the result of the transfer to the Depar
ment in 1945, of the Research and Analysis and the Presentations
Branches o
At the head of the Research and Intelligence staff is
a Special Assistant to the Secretary. The staff is divided into
.three unitst the Office of the Special Assistant, comrising
several personal assistants and a rather substantial unit conduct-
ing research in special. source material; an Office of Libraries
and Intelligence-Acquisition (OLI), and an Office of Intelligence
Research (CIR).
adel
The research analysts are for the most part persons of
background, and many of them are of high quality.
general, however, the Calibre of personnel has declined since
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1946, and recruitment of first-rate intelligence analysts and
other specialists has become increasingly difficult as the future
of the Research and Intelligence staff became more and more tom-
certain in recent months.
The fufetions of the Research and Intelligence staff,
ciaily defined, are to develop and Implement a "comprehensive
coordinated intelligence program for the United States;" and to
develop and implement a similar coordinated program for "positive
foreign intelligence" for the Department., including procurement
of information and the production of intelligence studies and spot
intelligence. In addition, Research and Intelligence is authorized
to initiate field instructions, and to determine which information
ng into the Department is required for the production of
el.y intelligence".
This definition of functions and responsibilities does
not indicate the particular kind of "program for positive foreign
intelligence" which Research a and Intelligence will perform. In
particular, it does not clearly distinguish between factual studies
.and intelligence estimates,, and it does not give the staff any
unique authority or responsibility in collecting and reporting
intelligence, such as the intelligence agencies of the armed
service occupy in their respective departments. The charter is
both broad and vague, and invites a variety of interpretations.
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The intelligence reports which Research and Intelligence
prepares and circulates within the Department are of several
different kinds. They include intelligence memoranda, which
comprise a brief analysis of information on current subjects;
information notes, which are factual reports involving little
interpretation or estimating; OI.R studies, which are exhaustive
es of .vailabie information on. subjects of considerable
significance; periodical reports, which are confined to factual
reporting on subjects of continuing interest; and situati
reports, which comprise reviews of the political,, economic and
social situations on foreign countries or areas.
With the exception of situation and periodical reports,
the OIR.studies are prepared, zit least in theory, at the request
o policy or other officers of the department. Actually, many of
ten on OIRts own initiative. A majority are tech-
nically requested by other offices in the Department, but generally
result from proposals which OIR has made and which have elicited
an indication of interest which can serve as a ftrequest#. The
several periodical reports of OIR were reviewed within the Depart-
ment earlier this year, and reduced in number. The situation
reports have ordinarily not been prepared in response to requests,
but are. now integrated with the ISIS program in which Research and
ence is extensively participating.
The quality of the OIR reports varies greatly. The
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main criticisi.s against them are that they tend to be scademi
are unrelated to immediate policy problems, and are often too
lengthy and detailed to influence busy policy officers. It has
been observed that GIR often produces 9Ph.D.
gence,"
scholastically admirable, but of somewhat limited use in the
day-to-day formulation of policy.
The Policy Planning Staff and the political (geographical
desks) and economic affairs offices of the Department are th
principal recipients and users of such reports. As indicated
these offices request a relatively limited number of
reports on their own initiative, &nd for the most part do not
consider them essential to their work.
e :t?~te Denartm nt
It is open to question whether Research and Intelligence
occupies a position in the State Department which permits it to
play an effective and necessary role in the overall intelligence
picture of the government. As we have stated, ; esearezh and
Intelligence was, in effect, superimposed upon the existing organ-
ion of the department. There was no large body of opinion
n the department or the foreign service which keenly supported
the contributions which an intelligence staff could make
policy decisions. In fact there was substantial feeling that the
ctions importantly called "intelligence". were at least parallel
to, if not inclusive of, many of those already performed by the
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in
icy offices. For these reasons many members of the department
e originally reluctant to make use of the physically separate
once staff.
This aloofness was confirmed by the failure to brig
the intelligence organization into important policy councils.
In view of the special nature of the Department's work where
oughout, intelligence and policy are closely jointed this
understandable. In any event? the effect was to establish the
intelligence staff not as the sole source of intelligence analysi
but merely as one possible source which could be employed if the
policy authorities so desired. The intelligence staff, in the
opinion of many policy officers, did not seem to offer the Depart-
gular and intensive employment.
any uniquely significant contributions which would justify
The precise function, of Research and Intelligence in
producing intelligence reports has never been adequately defined.
not been made clear whether Research and Intelligence
should limit its activities to preparing exclusively factual
udies at the request of policy officers, or should produce
intelligence estimates.
Whatever the theory of its functions, Research and
:eliigence has moved Increasingly during the past year in the
.direction of intelligence estimating. In this respect it has
sought to assume a responsibility long accepted by the other
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departmental intelligence agencies. but its very movement in
this direction has brought it into conflict with the policy
es of its own Department who consider it their function to
be the analysts of current problems as well as the formulators
of policy.
Accordingly, Research and intelligence enters the field
of the policy offices when it presents estimates of its own,
which appear to analyze the policy implications of a given prob-
The cbnfl,ct over this aspect of the Research and intelli-
gence role is most evident in regard to Intelligence Memoranda
prepared by the organization on more or less `current developments.
Although such reports may represent a high degree of analytic
skill:, they are likely to be regarded by the policy officer as a
useless repitition of information with which he is already familia
an unwarranted attempt to tell him what he should think about
a problem under his consideration.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the departmen
view toward the Research and Intelligence reports is the line
ch appears in the printed heading of each: #The conclusions
expressed herein are based upon research and analysis by the
.li;ence Organization, and do not necessarily represent the
views of other offices of the Department of State.
in fact, Research and Intelligence does prepare
e is the possibility that on certain matters two
or more separate studies or estimates covering the same subject
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may exist simultaneously in the Department. The Policy Planning
Staff or the geographical desks, for example, are accustomed to
draft their own estimates quite independently of Research and
.igence. Yet Research and Intelligence, knowing that
par :..
!ular matter is one of general concern to policy
may prepare an estimate of its own. So long as.these remain in
the State Department, no direct harm may result, although th
duplication of effort and- the existence of unreconciled points of
view on the same subject may be undesirable. If, however, as may
well occur, the separate estimates are used outside the Department
ying the needs of the NSC, the CIA, or the Services, the
possibility of confusion is obvious.
the future, -- particularly if action is taken on our
.endations for the elimination of much of the miscellaneous
political intelligence work now done outside of the Cute Depar
meat, --- the letter will be called upon. more and more to
intelligence contributions to the Services and to CIA and to
canal Intelligence estimates. Then it will be doubly important
that the responsibility for the State Departmentta contribution
be more clearly, fixed within the Department.
One possible solution might be to limit the Research
and Intelligence staff to factual reporting and to place on the
policy officers of the Department the responsibility for passing
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upon any political intelligence estimates used outside of the
Department. Alternatively these estimates might be prepared by
rch and Intelligence and, then passed upon by the appropriate
policy officers of the Department before they go to CIA or to the
other Government Departments. A third solution might be to allo-
cate the personnel of Research and Intelligence among the policy
offices (geographical desks) of the Department or attach them to
the Policy Planning Staff and then place on the policy officers
or Planning Staff the responsibility for. State Department esti-
mates for CIA or for other outside Government agencies.
The State Department should, of course, be protected
from burdensome and unreasonable demands for political estimates
from other agencies. If such call should create a problem, the
on which the Department will be represented, should exercise
aordirnating function to reduce the demands to manageable
proportions.
Furthermore, the Department has a primary responsibility
vise its intelligence functions for the purpose of forma-
sting its own policies. It must adopt the methods and techniques
ch will best meet this primary responsibility, and. how this is
done is not within our competence. However, in working out it
Internal procedure, it Is important to the overall intelligence
t-up and particularly to the proper functioning of CIA, with
which our Report is Immediately concerned, that the State Depart-
ment should equip itself to meet the legitimate request for
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political intelligence submitted by CIA or other Government
intelligence agencies and to effect the closer liaison with CIA
which we have recommended in our Report.
To meet these requirements we recommend that the State
Department give consideration to assigning to some senior offi-
cer of the Department the functions of Intelligence Officer.
Such. officer should have the prestige, the authority, and the
access to operational and policy matters which would equip him
to guide the production and control the dissemination of State
Department intelligence estimates. The Special Assistant
Research and Intelligence and this Staff do not today have such
powers. Whether, in a given case, the intelligence estimates
would emanate srom the Policy Planning Staff, the political
offices (geographical desks), or from a combination of the two,
plus the R&I Stagy f, is a matter for internal State Department
determination.
The appointment of an Intelligence Officer, with the
powers and functions we have indicated, and with a small but
highly trained staff, in our opinion, would result in a more
efficient system whereby the Department could meet any legi.tima
needs of CIA and of other Government agencies for political
intelligence. In this way the Department could also effect closer
liaison with the CIA and the Service agencies. This Intelligence
Officer would presumably serve as the Departmentts representative
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constituted Intelligence Advisory Committee, described
in Chapter He could also act as the Department's principal
)n officer for other matters concerning CIA, including
,n with OPC as provided by the NSC and with other covert
zf CIA as suggested in this Report.
cognize that in recommending that the political
intelligence reports and estimates be passed upon by the policy
officers of
Department, there is the risk, which we discussed
above in the chapter on national estimates, that these reports
be colored, possibly even distorted, by the policy prejudices
of those who prepare them. As between this danger and that of
having the reports prepared by a group which is not thoroughly
acquainted with the operational and policy decisions of the
Department, we choose the former. We do so in the hope that if
the IAC functions as we believe it should, an opportunity will
be afforded to challenge departmental estimates and reports and
to compare them with reports available to IAC from other sources.
Bence there may be the chance of correcting estimates of any
single department which have gone "overboard" for a particular
policy line which from a broader view of available facts may be
shown as unsound.
Con c a .a
(1) The State Department, to which the NBC has assigned
dominant interest in the collection and production of politics
cultural and, sociological intelligence, should equip itself to
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meet the legitimate requirements of CIA and of other Government
intelligence agencies for such intelligence.
The specialized intelligence staff in the State
Department, the Research and. Intelligence Staff,, does not now
have sufficient current knowledge of departmental operations and
policies to furnish, on behalf of the Department, the basic esti-
mates which may be required by CIA and by the Service intelligence
agencies.
(3) The liaison between the State Department and CIA
should be closer and put on a continuing, effective basis.
(4) To meet the foregoing requirements, consideration
duld be given by the Department to designating a high officer
of the Department, who has full access to operational and policy
matters, to act as intelligence officer. This officer, with a,
small staff, should process requests for departmental intelligence
received from CIA and other agencies and see that legitimate
requests are met through the preparation of the requisite intel-
ligence reports or estimates by the appropriate departmental
officers. He should also act as continuing Intelligence liaison
officer with CIA and the Service intelligence agencies.
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