MANAGEMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS AT PLANT NO. 393, KRASNOGORSK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001500260009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 11, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

/-
INTELLU 'A 4A
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-00810A04459026Q,009-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
25X1 I
USSR (Moscow Oblast)
Management & ad Wo.x kd' n at
Plant No, 393, Kranog'orsk
25X1
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
25X1
MANAGEMENT Al PLANT NO. 393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d.
Planning Procedures x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01
11
Party Activities o 0 0 0 o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WORKING CONDITIONS AT PLANT NO0 39: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Labor Controls and Incentives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
a
Salaries and Wages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 "U
Employment Controls o o e o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 .7
Paramilitary Training 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 u o 0 0 0 0 0 o s
Capabilities of Soviet Worker. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
MANAGEMENT AT `PLA 1~5O e ? 7
25X1
25X1
11 August 1953
9 25X1
1. Plant No0 393 (it was also caiiel the S .irk:`1 Zavod) was = der the control of a
ministry for machine onstruction0 The Soviet employee' always used this term
in referring to the ministry which Jepe-r rjg0ee~:d, the plant?
9j
LPN
25X1
(Note: Washington oistkptprove`ct or Release 2005/05/24:# CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 '"' 2X1
Approved-For-Release 2005/05t24-:.-C--fA-RDP80=0081?0A001'50OZ60009-8
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
there
is more than one ministry f machine c-nstruc ion in the soviet
Union. In this connection, a certain
.S: was a high ministerial official who vis a the plant on
several occasions.
2. The German specialists at Plant No. 393 were grouped together
in a single shop after 1948. The German shop, engaged primarily
in developing experimental optical equipment operated quite in-
dependently from the rest of the plant.
The shop chief, his administrative as-
sistant% and several workers were the only Soviets employed in
the shop.
Monthly production plans for the German shop were drawn up in
the plant's planning office. These,plans were based on orders
submitted directly from the ministry as well as from other ,shops
within the plant. The plans were drawn up only on a monthly
basis. None of the projects undertaken by the.German shop were
of along enough duration to warrant quarterly or yearly pro-
duction plans.
Once 4, plan was established, it was forwarded to the Soviet
shop chief for execution. He was primarily responsible for
supervising plan fulfillment within the various sections of
the German shop. Party representatives were also charged with
certain plan control functions.. When it became apparent that
the shop or aparticular section was not keeping up with its
production schedule, the workers were called to a meeting where
they were addressed by the shop chief, and the Party and trade
union representatives within the shop. They usually announced
that we would have to work overtime if the plan were to be ful-
filled. The question of overtime was then put to a ,vote of the
assembled workers. Needless to say, it was always unanimously
approved. In theory, a Soviet supervisor could not order a
worker to work overtime without the approval of the plant zavkom.
This was a mere formality,as in reality it was simply necessary
for the shop boss to give the order and the work would be done.
Some sections of the German shop,as well as Soviet elements with-
in the plant,frequently failed to meet their monthly production
goals. This was primarily due to delivery failures. German and
Soviet sections within the plantp which were engaged in assembl-
ing optical equipments, seldom received the necessary-raw material
or parts to begin their operations at the beginning of each
month. Manufacturing sections within the plant generally failed
to deliver parts until the middle of a monthly production period.
As a result, the workers employed in these assembly sections sat
around with nothing to do for the first two weeks. When deliver-
ies were finally made during the remainder of the month, they
had to work furiously in order to fulfill their production quotas.
Faulty planning and organization were to blame for this situation.
When a particular section failed to keep up with its production
schedule, the the operations of other sections (such as assembly
lines) which were dependent on its output were slowed down.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RI)P80-00810A001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP 0-00816AO01500260009-8 25X1
SECRET
-3-
6. On several occasions, a vital part was unavailable in any quantity
at the time of the assembly of optical instruments. The instru-
ments were assembled without the part and shipped out as they
were. The missing part was sent to the receiving agencies two
or three months later.
Failure to procure necessary raw materials caused even more ser-
ious production breakdowns. This was particularly true of copper
and tube aluminum. This situation was probably the result of a
faulty procurement system, as this material was obtained from
outside agencies. On the other hand, it is entirely possible
that there was a general shortage of copper and tube aluminum
in the USSR. A shop boss received a bonus for the fulfillment
or overfulfillment of mohth.ly plans. He, therefore, had a vest-
ed interest in plan fulfillment by his sbopo, This system
led to a great deal of collusion and mutual. aid among the
various shop bosses. The chief of the Soviet optical shop
was in a favorable position in this respectcas he had at
his disposal large amounts of industrial alcohol. He
frequently distributed alcohol as favors to other shop bosses
who helped him out in fulfilling rush orders. Unfortunately,
he also imbibed heavily of the stuff himself and, in addition,
sold it for personal profit. He was apprehended and was
demoted to janitor. However, his good contacts evidently
paid off as he was 'back in another leading post in the
plant within three months.
25X1 8. his system of planned production on a
monthly a a robably the best arrangement for Soviet
25X1 indusstr . fill ccor 1ng To inis ,
25X1 each shop chief was solely responsible for production
within his shop. This responsibility was expressed in
specific concrete production figuresswhich prevented a
shop boss from shifting blame to someone el sees shoulders.
The latter point was reinforced by the fact that all shops
operated according to production schedules based on a
calendar month.
The lack of conscientiousness of the average Soviet nachaln.ik
was the principal factor necessitating this system. "neon-.
s cien.tioussno ss also necessitated the establishment of con-
crete production norms for each individual worker, The norm
system related wages directly to quantity of production and
thus -,Utilized the sole concern of the average Soviet worker
to earn an extra ruble. Otherwise, the average worker would
simply not exert himself and would "pass the buck" when he
failed to produce.
10. Certain inefficiencies were created by the inflexibility.
of Soviet planning procedures. The planning system was
also heavily bureaucratic. There was an enormous excess
of Soviet employees in our plant who were engaged in
supervisory or control functions of one type or another.
So-Viet management was concerned with checking many petty
operations which would never be given a second thought in
a German plant.
Part Activities
11. There was a Party committee at Plant No. 393 which was
respons.ble r the operations of the Communist Party within
25X1 the plant.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved Fo?-'Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA0015002600dM1
12. There was a Party representative in each shop with in the
plant. Engineers or zamn.achalniki generally filled these
post;; a The a. anachal.ri i1 was
Party reps sentative in
our shop. However, a, zamnachalnik Was not necessarily a
Party representative. An indivadual in the former position
acted as an expeditor for the entire shop. He was re-
sponsible for maintaining the.r.equired stocks of materials
and. parts. If a part was not on hand or was not being
delivered, he made efforts to break the bottleneck. He
also chocked on the plan fulfillment progress of the
various sections within his shop.
13. In addition- to the local Party representative, there was a
Party committee, or aktiv, in each shop. A Party aktiv
was composed. of three; or four Party members who genera ly
were engineers or office workers. An aktiv was a .cerned
with all workers within a shop and not simply with other
Pa-arty members.
14, The holding of shop meetings was the primary function of
the Party aktiv and representative. These meetings were a
joint endeavor of the shop boss, the Party representative,
and the trade union representative. They served the
primary purpose of informing the workers of production
plans and arousing them to greater production efforts.
A normal meeting stated out with a brief political talk
dealing with the events of the day, such as the war in
Korea or the latest price seduction. The shop boss or
Party representive then came forth with a, series of
criticisms of shop operations and suggestions for improve-
ment. A meeting ended with an appeal to workers to fulfill
their plan. Actually, these meetings were infrequently',
held in t:he Soviet shops of the plant. Due to the over-
ambitious efforts of certain members of the Antifa
(Autifaseh.ister Arbeitskreis) within our group, Me German
s op was far more sac ive in this respect than Soviet sec-
tions of the plant.
15. The Party representative and aktiv also held special
cermonies on a shopwide basis oche occasion of major
Soviet holidays. They saw to it that the shop was
decorated with political banners and slogans a week before,
the holiday. Then the shop was thoroughly swabbed down
and cleaned on the day preceding the holiday. Propaganda
leaflets and other printed material were also distributed
at this time. In fact, printed propaganda was only
distributed on such occasions. The preparations were
climaxed on the holiday itself by a one- or two-hour
meeting which consisted of speeches on political and
production themes.
16. The Party (presumably the plant committee) also conducted
political courses for Party members on an obligatory basis
and for non-Party members on a voluntary basis. Shop
Party representatives also participated in,but did not
direet,the annual State loan drives. The collection of
these "volunteer contributions" was the responsibility of
a shop boss and his assistant The Soviet workers and
employees "volunteered" on the aver one month's salary.
25X1 to each State loan. 9 no Soviet worker or,
employee failed to contribute,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-008.40AOO0150O2,60009-&:
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-00810A001500260009-$25X1
25X1
25X1
-5-
17. Each shop within Plant No. 393 also issued its ovn so?--
c,%J.l.led wall newspaper. A wall new t :a cr ,.icas co. -rr.posed
and published by an office worker in a shop and not by
the Party akti-y These wall newspapers were published at
prom two `,Meeks to three months.
SECRET
WORKING CONDITIONS AT PLANT NO. 393-
18. platxt ;fop 393 normally operated on a schedule of eight
hours per day, six days per week. Sops in the Soviet
sector of the plant engaged in producing parts worked
in two c ig l:.i.t-hour shifts, morning and evening. Many, if
not most, Soviet workers in the plant were required to
work overtime. This was particularly true at the end of
each month~vtrb.cn special efforts had to be made to fulfill
production plans.
19. Tardiness was seldom, a. problem at Plant No. 393, at least
not in, the German shop.
25X1
ardiness worked to the detriment
25X1 of an offender in respect to the distribution of bonuses.
25X1 A shop chief had a limited amount of funds at his disposal
which could be distributed as bonuses. In deciding the
distribution of such funds, the shop chief naturally
disqualified those from consideration who had received a
black mark a ;ainat them in one form or another in the,
25X1
Course of a month's operations.
20. Despite indications to the contrary, which might be
re;cei..ved in casually reading the Soviet press, "socialist
competitions" were not a frequent occurrence at Plant No.
393. There were two general types of competitions which
were carried out at our plant. Eithor brigades, sections,
or shops engaged in contests with one another; or
individual brig;ades, sections, or shone pledged. on an
individual basis to :fulfill their plans ahead of schedu..le,
to reduce cos?tQ,. etc. These measures were
announced at shop meetings which were held at periodic
intervals. The were convokect by a shop chief, or
the shop's Party or trade union representati ire, depending
on the circu.mst aces. A resolut16n to engage in a given
competition was "put 'to vote" of the assembled workers and
was always unanimously "approved".
25X1 21' . no change either in the p,, ?oduction efforts of
Soviet wor leers or in. their attitude toward work which could
be attributed to socialist competitions . Soviet workers
evidently regarde3. such measures as merely part of the
daily routine. In general, socialist
competitions had neither a positive nor negative effect on.
operations at Plant No. 393, even w ..en bonuses were
awarded. to the winning brigades or shops. The average
worker evidently felt that his own efforts would be of no
importance in. determining the outcome of such contests.
As a result, the$e measures served the primary purpose of
furnishing a. job chief with. a propaganda stick which could
be used to keep the workero on the Job.
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
25X.1
25X1
25X1
-60
'It is difficult to cite average or tvp`%,ca.l wages of
Soviet workers at Plant No, 393. First, the Soviet
workers were assigned to various wage categories
w hi ch determined wage differences on a broad scale.
l ri e,s anc W
e-condly, the wages Of all Soviet workers varied
p
A few skilled workers earned as little as 400 rubles
per month. This was true of lazy individuals as well
as inefficient workers whose products were frequently
rejected by plant inspectors. Soviet skilled workers
rarely earned as much as '1300 rubles per month.
Perhaps no more than four or five Soviet skilled
workers at Plant No. 393 earned as much'as 2000 rubles
in a month. f 1
the average Soviet i3the'operat.or or
k seIR er received from 600 to 800 rubies
er mouth
25X1 ema e workers and
employees rec ive e same wages or salaries as men
performing the same work.
23. A Soviet shop chief was paid from 1200 to 1400 rubles
per month, a relatively low basic salary. However, the
average shop chief probably received from 1000 to 1500
rubles per month in bonuses, over and above his basic
salary.
24. Soviet workers designated as Stakhanovites generally:
worked longer hours and did better work than the
average worker. They received extra--large bonuses
on the occasion of major Soviet holidays. Otherwise
they were given no special treatment. Their produc-
tion efforts evidently had. no effect in raising norms,
as this matter was determined by a norm commission
within the plant. However, some workers complained to
me that Stakhanovites were favored by the plant
management, that they received overly large bonuses
while other workers received nothing.
2a Production norms were established by norm engineers
who were assigned to each shop within Plant No. 393.
From one to three norm engineers were employed in a
shop, depending on the size of the unit and the
regularity of its work. For unrepetitive and unique
work (for example, machin~ng a part for an experimental
optical. instrument), the norm engineer compared the
blueprint with its nearest equivalent in the norm code.
This code or catalog established the norms for repeti-
tive and standardized work. in the optical and precision
mechanics industry. Inasmuch as these industry-wide
norms could not cover all possible types of operations,
the engineer in such cases as these merely used the
norm code as a guide. He was responsible for the final
determination of the norms.
26d A worker who received such an assignment and found that
he had only earned 200 rubies by the middle of the month
could sometimes persuade the norm engineer that
hi
evaluation.. of the norm had been incorrect and that it`
should be lowered. On the other hand, if the norm
engineer observed that a worker had already earned
900 rubles by the twentieth of the month, he juggled
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-00810A001500260009--8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
SECRET 25X1
-7-
the p.or^m in such a way as to reduce the worker's earn-
ings in the last 10 days of the month. Such ek step was
cif ten. :followed by a long and noisy quarrel between the
norm engineer and the worker concerned. .However, these
ti c,~.,.a.bbles were gl.,iick.l y forgotten the next day.
270 The norms for repetitive and ,tandardized work which
closely conformed to work operations covered in the
norm code were more easily established and kept in
ba.Ian g.e.
28. An o 4't ice, in. Plant yo. 393 dealt with the questions of
level. Norm engineers from the
norms on plant-wide
various shops within the plant were periodically summoned
to n .iaee'ting;, by office in order to discus o the
question of raising production norms. Norms were never
lowered. to ,army knowledge. Although it appeared that
norsas were directly or indirectly established in
accordance wfith in..dustry-wide standards, Plant No. 393
was evidently the only Soviet plant engaged in certain
_ope-r?ati..one of the optical industry. This fact may
explain the apparent contradiction between the establish-
ment of norms according to an industry-wide code and
local decisions to raise norms,
29. Soviet workers frequently complained. about the increas-
i llq of r7r?odxi.ction norms. To my knowledge p 'the. money
wages of Soviet vrrorkers of Plant No. 393 decreased
after the currency reform due to the policy (introduced
after 1947) of raising production norms. Soviet
work-ors as well as German specialists were also aware
of the f ti,ct that -norms were frequently raised at Plant
N. '. 93 shortly a. 'ter the introduction of price
reduction laws.
30. A bonus was distributed to a Soviet shop whenever it
fulfilled its monthly production plan ahead of schedule.
The shop boss and his administrative staff decided how
a bonus was to be distributed among 'the various workers
and employees. The shop kollektiv was not consulted
on these mati;ers. A few woker received a. share of
these a.onus es, although the bulk was distributed to the
shop boo,-, his assistaciat, other staff and office work-
er_4 and eng..ineers . However, 950/E of all workers and
e !in,_,o :ee in a Soviet shop received bonuses on the
occasion of May Day, the anniversary of the October
Revolution and Stalin's birthday. Even shops which
had not distinguished themselves in th'e given month
under oo!aa.side4 ation received bonuses on such occasions.
They were given credit for production successes in
previous months . During the other nine months of the
year, perhaps -only 10% of the workers in a shop which
overfilled. its plan received bonuses. Bonuses for
i.nd.ivid.ual workers ranged from 100 rubles to 500 rubles
per -Fllonth.
Ere l rnent Controls
31, According to law, Soviet workers and. employees were
free, to select their place of employment. This was not
the case in practice. First of all, the average worker
Approved For Release 2005/05/24 CIA-RDP80-00810A001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-00810A001500260009-250
25X1
25X1
25X1
wrwwas not able to save enough money to hove from one job
to another. Some Soviet workers at Plant No. 393 did
not even have enough money to travel to Moscow, 25
kilometers away. Secondly,, an individual also had
great difficulty finding housing when taking up new
employment in another city.
2. More a plant manager was empowered to veto
the transfer of one of his employees. A statement from
the plant management that it had important production
plums to fulfill and that the individual worker's
departure would lessen the possibility of their. ful-
fillment was all that was required to justify such a
veto. In such cases, a Soviet worker was theoretically
entitled to lodge a complaint with the trade union.
However, such a "step was senseless, as the local trade
union committee was for all practical purposes a part
of management.. Evil. ntly the management of
Plank No. 393 seldc n found it necessary to take such
a step. Few workers de ^onstrate l any intention of
elci_n; < job elsewhere. There was a low turnover of
Soviet workers ...ra.d. employees at Plant No. 393.
':. Finally q the supervisory ministIT sometimes ordered
or7 c rs at Plant Ho. 393 to change their place of
omployment. Plant No. 3939 originally located at
Krasnogersk, was moved to Novosibirsk during the war..
:rorke ond employees at the plant were also evacuated
at this tire. 1"then the plant was reestablished in
Kra::uegorl after the war, only some workers were
allowed to return. These were supposedly Party members
and others .a a. ?gocd standing with the plant management.
Soviet workers at the Krasnogorsk plant rere
cccu oionally transferred to Novosibirsk by order of
the z .r?.i :,try. d.-a.-ring my period of employment there,
Workers receiving such orders seemed to accept theft
without complaint or at least fatalistically.
:i;.., Some civilians, presumably plant workers, engaged in
military training after working hours at Krasnogorsk.
?;,_I., .s,.... ." .1.,a it r. y .. t, ion, which was w:i t..L Li4. 1,J~,., d4"1"a~ c'.~... ZVc7..~ ].nit'L.r".Lt[...r..e. in about 1 95Q ,,
was carried out under the supervision of military
officers. his training unit had a
tank:,,, artil_ ery, a.nd an airplane (which did not fly) at
its disposal for instruction purposes. The trainees
also took part in infantry maneuvers in nearby forests.
Most of the training was conducted during the summer,
The group met at y irryegul.arintervals, sometimes every
evening, at other times twice a week.
3a?
abilities o Soviet workers
at Plant N o0 393 were capable of carrying out work
assignments independently. The other 90% of the
workers had to be guided and supervised in their, roduc-
tion efforts. However, it
is extremely difficult to generalize about , such a
matter, as the Soviet workers were by no means uniform
in respect to their professional capabilities*
only 10% of the Soviet workers
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-00810X001500260009-8 25X1
SEGRET
36. The reates i, a set of Solriet workers was their ability
to work long !ours at teaks requiring strenuous physical
effort, sustained by perhaps just a salted piece of
brescl at lunch. Some workers on the normal daytime shift
occasionally worked as late as 0400 hours, slept three
hours or so at the plant, and were back at the job again
at 0830 hours.
37. The w R'(-Ot characteristic of the average worker was
his i )a1 lity to perform precision mechanical work.
His orl~ 1` as sloppy and inaccurate. This was probably
not due to any innate lack of conscientiousness on his
part. He simply could not learn that accuracy and not
vlurrie v~ls inpori ant a .r? the oDatieal industry. The
Soviet engaged in mechanical work learned more
quickly than their -isle coo a.terparts. They could master
an operation after a single explanation. When matters
went wrong, they never failed to find the &nswer from
someone who knew. The Soviet male workers seldom
di. ~.~ .o.,5red such initiative.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA=RDP80-0O81,OA001500260009-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001500260009-8