TASK FORCE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES APPENDIX I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000900010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 121
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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TASK FORCE. REPORT
f
F C LL .a^ i1 Jt M i T
APPENDIX I
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APPENDIX I., PART .
'REPORT OF SURVEY OF-NATIONAL SECURITT-AGENCY
BY
RICmm P cJVENSHINE, Bala? CENo2 U.S. Am y.0 mmift-m
AND
ROBERT J FOL
16 PENDIX I, PART 2
REPORT OF SURE '0F COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS
BY
eg~T~tt
z,~T a~+ To S ~t7~/f BtJ "JQ LanTr~o G/7V9a, V ~~,.IRED
TERENCi:r J
e~ULL 6 U.S. Ai71SC .~p FtJ.:r A
=3 , :J .1JJ Vusa..ra+.i vVai a YJ11iv 4vFJE-401i1J lll.d L` tILiV
W'_
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T O P S E C R E T
f 3f ~-n: k r ~,
Report on
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVIT
in th
FEDERAL GO VER'4TENT
Prepared for the
CO 'ISSION ON ORCUMTZATION OF T ME
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN'-EZL
byh
T .SK .DRCsE ON s?'+TELLIGEHECE ACTIVITIES
APILI' 33X I
Pet
THE NATIONd L SECUP'J T AGENC
MAY 3.955
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APPE017 I
Part I
THE NATIONTAL SECURITY AGENCY
TABLE OF COATTO S
Pam
I
GENERAL
I
II
ORGANIZATION AND O:'EMMONS
8
.ICI
SECURITY
19
IV
RESEARCH ND PLMTh ING
24
V
PERSONrETA MID TIPt^TiNINQ
27
VI
LOGISTICS
?
VII
ELECT-ROJNTIC i IPNTEt L t.GENCE
1
VIII
I OUM PENDATIONS
6
IX
GLOSSARY OF TEEMS AND AaBR EVIATION
56
L92 ' SE CT
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l O'iPSI ~,
S of Siw. 'vo1i
This survey covers cor,~rrruarnicaU0ns intelliger : a coTra - ca ,9 ons
security, electronics intelli. en.es,, and their relationship to th-
intelDence eo: munityo The substance of this report is classi. 'icd
as a special category of TOP SECRET and the contents must not be 4,*vealed to anyone who has no to been specifically clewed and indoctrin-
ated to receive communications intelligence, These papers should be
handled and 3 toyed separately fm,.-2 ;;-har TOP SECRET materialo
in aecompl3 Whim the survey,, the teak a ;rce endeavored to.assese
the value and necessity of the ccr:'mamicatios i.ntelltgenoe er oa
now sing qua tad by the United States and identify and analyze major
'u'_5 ,.-.Jle tt 4Yhoss zolul.i vn required eevS Win A avt. cns to be t&en in c deep
/ar' $i '1 -maximum, results a 1th minimum expk'iisdl'{.tzareo of ti :ep p %manni'a }
acid i orsyo
I.n the course of this su 'ey.~ a staff t>m =d the National
Security Agency, the Army Security Agency,, ' :3e Nave] Security Croup
the Office of Special Operations of the De ;ar ent of Defense,, the
O: fice of Assistant Chief of Staff a C-}2, of t. ,f rriy., the Office of
N--:.7a" . Ik? telligen eD m d the Of-:;` a c;of Air Force In'' s?ligesmse in Wasah,-
tngton, D, Co; the Vint Hill Farm Station in Virginia; the Air Force
Security Service at Kelley Air Force Base at San Antonio., Tex . ; and
t'hha Air r i-0 orco Techrical Intel'i once Center a' W iiht Paste sof A-Ir
E'o. ca 3nee at Dayton, Ohio, Ons m amber of t;-Z-3 team ix 3 a trio to
of tie "';oak #oia `;e' 77;,; r'Ous briefings were given
wi pally
um tie arid a far greater nu bbea of individu .m are i. Pdk
ro as fe-~ do The turn spent most of its ti: with NSA, .sit ar all
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echelons from the Director to V le mios king 'lo eels o In eli, ntoc a dhan
talked to the teem in vying dograae a-& sre inter=
viewed by the teens
Definition of Communications Intelli.?
Eefore proceeding further, we should def Ins the subject of this
discussion. "Comrunications intelligences," co7mmonla ? :own as CCMINT,
as used herein, is defined to mean all procedures and rie thods used -i
the interception of teleco-ir :unicationsm the obtaining of information
from such communications by other than the intended recipients, sea
the product thus obtained
PA~relo t o K r~ T
Historical
The COtYT effort of the United State *day is a vast urdertskth 5
chose estireted C;"t`3+ approx:trmatns an annual e: p ndi`G"i?r:e of r
This modes: has r through
natural evolution from quite modest be g ..uninge - 11i Is an of: sprint,
of our electrical and electronic aged Rudiman is of th.s as- -;ere
developed in the Civil barite the secret tapping, by both sides; of
tolegraph lines i The use of radio cota+.munications, h wevar, in Wor A
ar I probably ; arked the beginning, of. modern COMINT"
Following World War S, the Army end Navy's in separate operati nsc
beg= to intercept radio communications of foray nations and to
Study end develop the related f eld of. cry-ptologyo ' These operations
t7ere continued on a very modest scale anti the ou hraa'_-c of World
War II when tkya Army and Na-,fy each rapidly e wpand:d 1t3 ef.?Qr 4a is e
1a'#:r'Lll ,yt: Tits t
';tea' s:i':e e.Tob v f7 tltda. i u :'t gly s ?=:x33>16ul anad C07
valuable element of ntlitax7 intelligence. The wartir e eriaracee
pointed out, ho eur, the need for coordination be we n the two ssrvicee
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 A . FQKRi ezW/046%IdQWIRe 6? 2 ft&090fttOO &'k change
of technical.: ormawion of value in the decryption of intercepted
MOS.Sagcso
11,
Such voluntary cooperation as was developed during the war was -
-vi- ously inadequate. After the cessation o. hosti:_i ties p the Army said
Navy co abined forces to fora the Armed Forced Security Agency (AFZA)a
This was a rather loose feddreuion in which the' dli:: ector did not have
operational cortro1o- Despite his lack of authoritya considerable
progress was made in bringing about Some coordination of effort b t an
the t aervi:caso As the experiences of AFSA indicated greater benet-
':its to be derived from a truly unified operation which AFSA was unabl :,
to develop with its limited authority, and in view of the development
of -an Air Force C( IN b activity which was cc +iple te:! y dissociated Zrota
A, 7A., a sur 3y of ? the situation was made by a special c.o inittee ap-
poin d by the Fiiestdent~ knv'in as the 3i:x zi-all Ccmi i V eeo The -=
Spiv l.d~va W7 o ~ f that y~/`;~d ~C..Vt tYYe wet. ~i' t Cx so~7al x :a at 2:a;D:L 1 9valo . i into tinto Ti~L? $ ?t'.a': to
has not disclosed that y increase in efficiency o r economy could ba
effected throt: ?h ccmbinin the three schools into one schoolfl or
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ihro'~g ~ mategra~? sag the separate schools into one unified school
P1 Y ~a IQ
In." addition to the schools conducted by the three aervioesa raS.A
also conducts a school for the orientation and indoctrination of all em--'
plod ss, military and civilian, and for tha cr ologic training
languages (intercepts are made in, approximately forty-three age
clerical and management trairingn From tirr t-o time,, NSA . conduct
special courses for a particular purpose, and one such courts, is nord.
being conducted for radio-telephone intercept eparatora0 This course
is 4e ink; conducted as a pilot model and instructors 11royd the Array are
no* being trained to the end that his coarse ,-ill be transferred to
the Army school in tae near future. Among various special courses con-
ea, r ducted in 'the 5115A school is:'one 'or. riapid `s? cdib o the pug a; of
training 3 loyees whose ddu t..Cs rewire t2! "i. 1-0y sc`:?`?'! e la:,---go "iolti '
of mines sage3o
The special language couz-'ess conducted by NSA are riors aocncnival
than would be the use of general l +ng-uage schools because th y a
ointed to:'ard the specific obj: curve, established by the m a'c Wpt prob-
lem., " In these la . cage couressfi effort is not rude to teach the. student
speak the langua's, but only to grasp so nruch of it as is rzc ssary
for a pa ti ulaar task. Couress- w-e also conducted in certain languages
wtilch are not gersrally taught . in the United States, such as Am y i 4
NS has availed itself of personhsl -wit in the diplcmatic co-i ,unity or
living in ~rJashir~g+r ~n. to awesassist in conducting so?~ os ~,:css a
el s a'Swhs.4.. of t+
rare coua',aesa sieranbl'y,, to ci- one e: 4srploo there. has been a haad for
many more linguists in Vietnamese than are a- ai.lable for employ en:LO
In addition to the full-time language courses conducted in ths NSA
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s whool, short-- Tie courses are a:Lso' conducted in the Office of r ro-
`.~1.{: o NSA ;, which student3 attend for one hour at a t:L i3 in conj3::'_"i?;1~.
the
tion with their normal work in Urdu to gain greater proficiency in
lengua a- with which they are wor1dzig,~
It is obvious that the COIINT effort of TYS.A and the three cryptologic
services auffeae from the general., ovsrall shortage of ungulate both in
the military services and in civil life. From . a: long-range Viewpoint, the services would benefit 3rru easurably J _f fluency in one or more foreign
languages were made a requirement for graduation from .high 's ehools a
college.. and if the Armed Forces p ,paced greater emphasis one than, rem
qulrement< For e: amplef, a large.-fraction of the ,1x ed Forces are" now-,
se, Bing overseas, If those individuals were required -to" a qu .re a high
de ree of flue y in the ].nvx; .tape of the co -itb y in which they sei yea r
would n time build up a 1inr u st . r revC*"oi of tremendaouc pot ant -
value? This is merely mentio l d as part of a mach broader subject' then
eoxrmunic^at_ions intelli?:ence o
The many etnent* courses are con~'i~cte for the spaci.?:ic 'purposes of
training individuals to fill super rieory poz-iti.one w thin 11,9A. - The
baslo course of instruction and indoctrination conducted by NSA for
net-7 et plc aee' lasts four weeks,, ' Folio ring that basic couraes aelec '
students urdirgo further instruction or trairiin,,, depending .,upon the
particular job which they have' been selected to fill.
During fiscal year 1954p a total of 809 pea sons studied languageri
in ti: NSA school, In addition to 't : students in attendance '.at the NS~~
been made to pek'cra sd1aQ.'c.ed Greed' atployees to
attend ursrer itiea on scholarships and, fell owshi,ps in order to achieve
z ci7a n-t d training and thus increaee their proficia cy and v ue to NSA.
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,Se s ued ciYaili nO of NSA also attend the National War College and the
.r d ,w' rig College of the rz cl Fo re3 o
The total number of students of NSA and the t', -ree c'ypto o.g. ser-
virea" .t.o attended courses in 195h follows:
Conrzenced iln l9!1:r
Completed to be campleta ed
j--, i954
Amy
Navy
Air Force
NSA
The courses conducted by NSA do not duplicate those conducted by
the three cryptologic services,, and wither are, not available elsewhere
or a: not available in such form as to suit tone
schools appear to be well eonducted0
VI L:CGIS TI S
The National Security Agency budgets for civil-5-an per ;aonnol, supp : ca ,
materials,, equiprnant,, and sons o'er er requirements (such as part of t ha
cost, of Courier sea vice) required in direct suppoitt, of the ag ncyo
Most administrative requirements are budgeted by the security aea rice`q
of the three mili:,a..ry departments and military personne`$:i are paid by
;psis ~?espec tine deoa; fi?*rents o
The budgets of the three cr yptolog c services are all hurdled
diffax-ontly,) and it iso refores difficult to make direct cor^pariso-na
be a xr ar. the budge, y data of those services,, The AM, -Or !33?vrity Agency
l~ta r; :'~ .for o s :tin C X` '?3:i73ael suuoiieep z~tat W:~ ~ ~ and e pment in
d ~~ o support of its cr jptolog x c nizsion., but other reTairenlente,L in-
clu:iin aci: inia ?aratic?a~ ccrosmunicec onea and pay of rnili w ry personnel
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`'' 'e N 4 f S ectr 1. y Group
a: budgeted by other elementa of the Army The ~~ ark
"_in. . R3_se budgets for civilian par:eonrel;, supplies; nA eria , raid
equ " :o re 'ih direct support, of i c fi7 e oI?1 e~ ss aria bu other z -
qu3.renen s, including logistical Support of the or;yptolcg ch additional. spun 9bii ty for a a IT stem, ~' ;i the fear t at
objection to the epac1 ?ic plans proposed o is object? rns to charging
the creation of a new agency. Lack of cons der.ation of- CIA is' apt added
the lack of economy in 'piers hnel- and funds ul-11 oh -vrou"ld 'u3 -inheren% in
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ELIAIT, were added, it would require faarless augmat.tion to the already
operating staff, and R and I) of NSA than would be ra. uired for the over
bead of a completely separate ELNT ageltcyq tr" rmo , VISA has demon-
of policy control over ELIIT by USCIB
The considerations i h re nr to _ SA are deemad" ;~-
3o `li nto it now comprises three major divisions Security (COMSEC)
a
production (G1 I ii )., and research and de~ sa1 o e ~,o a fourth division.
strafed a responsiveness to the 00M -NT require-manta of the rnili'e de-
parlane.:i ts and should lake' ee be :expected to gi V-e full cuppo ?k? to -their,
ELINT equ re rents a5 um-11 ec the ELItIT requi n ,: ante of CIA. The re=
qui;:'ensn,s of CIA certainly m rat not be bysrloo'ced3 they &.. he ev+ rD
require clear. definition. Although :' 'spons`?sa .i` y for ELThT would . un-
questionably i. poi e other h-ovy urdon on the Direc' r, NSA, end h e
~ro vt n of e'ta f~ :i t is believed they ISLLI?~ would, no'l su::' r f 2 lack of anent cno
NSA has now been In cperaticn -long enough so t 'hat, the multitudinous- prc -
lens of a now organization have begun to diminish in n3aynbar and m gnii
.
,
national agency would be of estimable velva in bringing a related mea bs
of th. electronics co . = .ty i ato a coordinated national effort
this .aatuni to determine and delineate th'B exact degree of int3gratian
or dceent.rali. at?on of intercept op2raviCYn.1.o
I
the a erien of SA
tulle. On the other hand
in the creation of tto
Although it is believed that- :ELINT :a v-,aoy operations should ntota
at the present stage of dsT~c .o Tht, be as tulle TI-.ererat.- d as area tha
current CO I NT intercept eae at ons, it-is impracticable- - n a survey of
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:"z NaWio al Security Agency _1s basically -;ell corcei.d d'q well
! organinc cia and e fici.ently ooe. a do Much, mus b i Br to it
Director, whose intense interest and outstanding abi1ity.h mow greatly
contributed to the o, ra`eiono
Although attempts to discern USSR intenn
-ions unfortunately have not been successful9 COI?` contribution to
the intelliRence effort has enabled those responsible to better
estimate probabl? courses of army action, has greatly assisted in our
g a r. rid gad military
w, ot
negotiations of agr en. ente with oilier na ,i
-commanders wit'a intelligence not otherwise obtainable.
ti
-v Thera is need. for x"ux~~e r` . o~ro~..rfsi.>n of e~hs G;it .'~IT- effort and
'economy -motives alone should not .result in c?? ta l ir, 'W11i3- means of in
su +ance during an era when not only our na:ticnaJ security but ou:r
national sa rivsl as well may depend on u^' equa'v'sl ~ tal 7 g nce
The present organiseti orl, wher In the Director, NSA, has delegated
operational. control and responsibility for processing the intereept in
some instances to a major cryptologic organization and in. which he con-
temolates further decentralization as raoidly as the crypto logic ele re-,n s
in the field are sufficiently trained mid e ;uipp. d, is sound in concept
and should be "yontinuadc.
Renme?~;ia.-viort ~Qo ~.
THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECT TJSCIB TO EST,13LISH COMIHT
REQUIREMENTS IN THE LIGHT '''F COMMIT REAL TIEIS P D C`}MSIDER.ATION OF
C A?X:BILIT S flF UT.H ,R INTELLIG21CE SOURCES, TFEES n'f RATIC{ T7.y ?, *Gv'ID~sj'y,JCZ 14 -1 TO !~.1 i.:
l'i: S1,10 W LD 2317Z 30 CL'E AR JIM-) ,J~ C0 t,l9C.~ ASS TO 7 11- t'1 JN 11~TI:.t.S11. REV '
TION BY THE DI ECTOR, NSA, OF WHAT IS REQUIRED AND ITS DEGREE OF
46
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U1,3018 SHOULD BE PRIMARIEV CONCERNED 1.1ITH END PRODUCTS A2101
1~.'1S .'+.+;.Cl'a~ N'3A; SITYOUJL UL~5E 2'I.~~`i t{E } S'a'`2~ ,1,k 7. OF P9ODUCT1AG THE END
PIY)DUCT. IF USCI3 FAILS AFT`r'. A P~EASON.n_3Ls:f LENGTH OF TD TO PROVIDE
MORE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE TO WE DIRECTO NSA, THE 41 TT., I~" 1`TE~t; S:-!G1Ja.,D BE
VIA.DE A MEM3ER OF THE 1NTEI1IGENCL
NSA. is a collector of intelligence m d in some respects a producer
as a"#ello The Director of NSA has not received the guidance which he
mu? t have from USC13 to make his product moat useful.. USC1f3 hae not
id: twified intelligence requArenen which can ba 'beat filled by 0?',1TN'T'
and has taken little notice of the capa ili ios or limit-atioc s of IVES *
T17 Diroctor,, NSA needs to kn what is important and wh: t less :in-
portan' , but the comprei?ansive lists of reg3.Iiremente e rtaablieted by
or , NSA
USC13 rail to make eufficicnt dd f or h n"'i at' orso Thuuz th : U5:-act I
3.;s r;, qui red to walgh one cormi * z , aga.+.nst ran o l erg Ue3: d.:; . an prior-
ity, and prcgram accordingly. He haq not south ,iris responsibility,
but rathsr,p lank g adequate gpuidanceg has been forced to anoume It.
His task is i,iade et-.n morre - dif icul.v because no. being a T- Fine. of the
Intelligs ce Advisory Ccm is tsea he feels sealed off frc:nn tha delibera-
tions which ultimately reeu3t in ea bl Leming intelligen4a requic^enrlentso
He bell. 'ves `that, since spa 'I ic n a quid ce 3 a not for &Lng from
D CI3, a partite. -_ medy, at least, would be WS A membership on hm IAC0
The task force does not believe at this ti to that the remedy is NSA
member:'sh ip cn the Intellig'nce Advisory Ccmmi-ttee. It fesls, r atherp
? hat pr per direction can be attained through revision of present USd13
s ...M 4i l%r tat? i; .C'Sa cv s ~r:'s t ',+.LC C iiili'i d Gi] d S `a; d.%;' a i d1d 1 x
the i-nt:A l`g ncs ob;)ectijres fon'stulsted by ti.w 1ACo USC13 procedures
should be designed to produce results rather then being concerned ' -''`. h
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ir~pi ~rr ..on, USCIB should also. look to tii Direc'0x'9 USA for adsraas
to the effect of 'equirerzsnts l; vi5d on VISA to-_hn..^ al
of e: ations Tochnict. considerations involved in the 113A operation
Should not become paramount in torte production of intelligence,, C-;^id3
tharaforeb the tank force believea that he present composition of
DSCIS membership should remain. substantially the sai ratbar than 3r
eluding conm~unications or other cia3.iets., although there is no cb-
jecztion to establishing appropriate svscoi nittees to advise USCIB with.
respect to technical matterac (Pages 5-9)
R cormnendation Nob 2
T} T THE DIRECT040 NSA. BE, GIVEN CLEARCUT DItEGTIM WHICH WilL L ,A, E
Hsi TO MAKE RUCH GREATER AND WNTMUING EFFORT TO PRODUCE HiQ LEVEE 4X3 -
M .I CATIONS INT'ELLIQCWICE0 T}II IS OF SUCH 0 . =LT I ORMCF, TMAT 1!O ETI:R"i
CONSIDERATIO 3 SHOULD DE WAIVED AT AN EFFORT AT 3.E AST E U -., TO THE x?" i-
HAT,N PROJECT SHOULD BE E FEED AT ONCE .
NSA has not produced the amount of high-level COMIM concerning the
Communist orbit which i desired by the intelligence community. The Ci. ?
effort should be directed primarily to tasks for -ohich it has a unique
capability and NSA should not be asked to produce infoa ma' .ion of marg:thal
value or to duplicate unnecessarily information which can be collected
through lose critical sources o In this reape o f a major difficulty 3t,
from the in- ell igence agencies O i i llingness to accept less day-to-day
int;,llig ,we and c eir inrsist nce that 14SA ccmn t :LT-3 efforts on t1mas
ph ea ;s of COMINT -which are irmaedia-tely productive, The Director, NSA, ha:o
an i.ndufficient number of capable personnel for a maximum :mod contirniouc
effort on long-range cryp tanalysia if he. at:bempts to sauefy all requireco n .o
ri urthe r pore , h is unable to allocate enough intercept Positions for
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operation againc t the more important foreign traffic read at the see
time 'fulfill an other re uir??nteo Another imporU consa.d oa
1 --
twat the prinoip .. l ,-jitation i.3 not, I.M. Money or t .ach .nea. bixt rat' Mr in
Opp-roaches to this problem rapt be explored
hum brains Al,i.pass9ble
with the objective of
This is a primary c-b-
25X1
jectiva and must be pursued even though it m:lght rest in some reduction
the production of
Recommendation No. 3
THAT MINT AND
UNDER NSA FOR ANALYSIS Or THE PRODUCT ASD GUIDANCE AM a)ORDINATION IN
THE 0011ECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF DINT o TIM AJ HORI' ' OF QP.ER&TIONA
CO MAND S OVER THEIR INTEGRAL ELM T RESOURCES,, WJWEVER, S;OLD MOT RE
The present. separation of ELINT from COMIN-T and the division of
operations between the Army Navy Electronics Evaluation Group (. i'' )
and tha Jkir Force in the FLINT field ccnot be j'ustificd n;hare national
intelligence is concerned. The irn2arent relationship between WHINY,
and FLINT has been recognized by every non-Crn;r.unist country engaged in
t RTDG 90 USCIB OR THE COM211rD BOARD WHICH la 1E(TC, IN 3, 3 k IN TH F' 'f
TO L iCF IT SHOULD EXERCISE ONLY POLICY CONTROL OVER I T :W7 , -
?a9
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ELIt-T produces better results National and depar~ntal interests Nil-l.
be :.better served, and a more a :onomical and efficient operation ldll
result, if ELINT is placed under PISA for anaLysi of the product and
guidance aged coordination in the collection and diesemina-don of EaLn4T0
the collection of ELF except the United States, and experience to
date demonstrates that an integration of the anal.yeia of COMINT and
(pegs 18) = 255X1
GDMI4T BE INTEGRATED `, TW EXIT OF PLACING EL`Wr
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At the eyrie tine the direct, interest of each of the military serv:icea
i
Amount off ELNT which d,~,-e not require laboratory or 114-e3.^ ecl lon"
analysis in order to be i isdia ely valuable to t ho military comm. d xr
in the area where the interception is made o: No syste in of centralized
should not be abridged... (Pages l a-145)
ity of operational corrwianders over their integral ELINT resources
control of analyai or collection shouidq thereforea be permitted to
delay the receipt of such ELINT by the corm, ander concerned. The. author-
c i5TT; o ndat`. i0.i'3 11 o o ,
TI AT HE MILITARY SLRVICES AND NSA Cr'??TTI't UE TO S'.' T-TZ1. FOR A HIG??aCR
-I I E OF CI 'f'TOGIi~l'HIC SECURITY; 'T'HAT T_ : PR03LEK OF CO?'E2.11PNICATIONS
SECURI T , INCLUDIN T- 11IN TEXT M SSA.GES A.i~?T T PFFIC ANALYSIS OF ENCrtYp7E
MESSAGES, BE RESTUDIED BY USCS't_3 (OR THE COMBINED BOARD AS a- MY ' DKO
IN TIES REPORT) WII#I A VVE'd TOIFTAXIO :.EDUCL G TO `!", LOWEST PRACTICABLE
LEVEL THE QUANTITY OF INFRMIATION i ELEASE T. :)UGH TE :~ C;u^?a_%UNIC aTIO~iSm .
AND RIAT NSC 168 BE REEXNM'ED TO , SCERTAIN IF T DIREC`t R,~ NSA., HAS
SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT H?~S COOMSEG REST OMSIBILITI o
The cryptographic s ?st.ems used by the mi:?i:v 'y md civil elera ntm
of the Federal Government afford adequate secui i1.y when properly used,
etr , ;,ed rrxr~ssQ, o. (Pa ss l9 2~)
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very emell percentage oft total number of encrypted messages, is cuff
ficiont to pex-lm t the possible acquisition of irate ligcmoe by a foreign
po:war.. A much greater source of intelligence is available a ''Crain
Lnit-ler'caption o. a. laxg n17171 eL of Plain text in ssagez
originated by military and civil interesU, and tr affid analysis of
The number of probable compromises of encrypted meesa es,, 91though a
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- ,';i!!T A SIN LE B RD WITH APPROPR: TE rl-C-1NICAL SUBC/ U-iITzEE3 HA Z
POLICY Ca)GNIZj1*'CE OVER COM' TI ATT'121S INT L~.iG' NC MID Cf~'r'CT?1ICA ^t!T .
SECUPt:I 'a IF TEE RECOIOTENDATIO?d TO PLACE THE E 1LUATION AND ANALYSIS
`1' ELIPIT UNDER NSA IS ADOPTED, Mal PO rLICY GUIDANCE IOR ELIAt T AS WELL
AS COMINNT AND CONSEC SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY V ,-FE PR-)POSED SINGLE BOARD..
That desirability of the present separation of policy guidance co
earning communications intelligence and corununications security thiough
two boards is questionable since both functions are re1atGd aapects of
telscc: un1cations6 A single board ha rIng policy cognizance over com-.
munica.tions intelligences cc ttmtriicatiora necurity, and elec"t. onie8 in-
tell4!,en e (ELINT) would provide improved coordination and better
direc.tIon of NSA and would also inoure that each of t--se functions rem
ceives ps ca r emphasie and attentions 3ecause the whole n'. =s:! licence
and cacri1'Lni cati ores security operations are so intimately related to the
comsmzni c~ationa lec: ~;roni cs field., it would be essential that, appropriate
ssubco:rmt tees composed of .technically and operationa3l..y qualified per.
ztonnel be established to advise the boa-,do Both USCIB aid U5053 a
nubs tats i idly comprised of the same agency membership, although USCSB
also includes AEC and Treasury. These latter agencies, however, do not
have as substantial interest as the other depart ents and their interest
probably would be just as well served through > mba ship on supporting
ae?P 0 (Pages 5-9, 19-22)
?om ni t?
11
R cca ae :dJtion No. 6
n? r t ~r
t.y,. R
Xi'- I
'~ .t i-l, ,1; , rji`l t IDN a.;~ OF D G,~ 1 cTZ . S Ltr. t cl ; ORu~1MAIS C i_
STRT.U`!'C,RE AND s RfPER POSITIONING WITHIN ITS BHS?EC? - SERVICES OF .s!
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T E GR PTOLCGIC AGiCIES A.S, ASA, AND NSC W=H A VIEW T F.AR9
I MPRO O THEIR PRESTIGE DID EF!C'TIVE I SS, ?'HEREBY S'H, Ea1GTi :'Ni G - IH;
--'s'oNNEL A SS.I iN T POLICES ,tti~1D L ISTICAL SUPPORTO
The success or failure of the ()PINT oparation ultima ely rests
with the cryptologic services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. For
this reason alone, the organizational structure and proper positioning
of t-be ASA, ?VSO, and AFSS within their respective services deserve' care
fug. ate dy0 Mrreover, in order to do an adequate job the cr-yptoiogio
services must be in a position properly to recru Lt, train, and reward.
personnel who intend to make (DMI a career,, This they cannot be ex-
pected to do if they are forced to compete with other branches of the
service without having "top-level" appreciation and support. Cur?entil.y,
the organizational. structure sd positioning of the Ai z, Forca Security
Service seers most nearly to meet these qual3.ncationa,, while the at us
of the Navy -Security Group. with a divided suborc ation, appears least
conducive to effective operation( (Page 14)
r Reco a : e n d ati.on No 0 7
THAT THE MILITA
RY SERVICES GIVE GREATER ATT NTION TO SELECTING
4FFICEI?S FOR COMIIPIIT DUTIES, ASSIt REGULAR OR ?)CAREER4? RESERVE OFFICER
TO T MXIM EXTENT POSSIBLE, INDOCTRINATE OI?ICERS ODMI$4T PRIOR
TO SM1 11NG THEM TO CUMNRND F=IELD STATIONS, MD ESTABLISH CAREER OPPORTUN.q
ITIES AM SPECIALISTS FAUAL TO THOSE OF HE LINE OR GENERAL SERVICE OF-
+?CC .SO ROTATION AND R.EPLACEEA. IT PROCEDURES SHOD BE I~VEwD, `L '
FE SIB ILIT! OF USING CIVILIAN INTERCEPT OPERATORS S1) ULD BE TI )ROUCHLI
IT IS ALSO REODMME1mED 'RI&T THE CONGRESS ENACT LEGISLATION TO At=RMZ
TI NATIONAL SECU T'Y A V C'I TO EMPLOY SPECIALLY" QUALIFIED RETIR HILITA?:p
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d EI 0i O F.E,L AS I'1ti. SEN U Y .A LJ' j0 RICO L IJI!, CENTRAL :ENT ELL -1 GEd CE AGENCY END
n _ "1'i WO 1u ST !: CTIG 3 '-N THE NUMBER SO a uG IS s :...~C'i7 ,...Ot t
E
fJ 5O 1" E-a ! ~. T' THE SE GPE TAR'_ OF DEFENSE TO HENALL RE TIRED 0 F'FI C2 RS TO AM
D UTI. WITH NSA AND HAVE. MOSE Ow FICEFZ COUNTED AGAINST T "t. AU'.-!F RIZED
H OE ' BUT NOT O HE RE?SPETCTIVE MILITARY SERVTCE-So
SThENGT
A dissar7ice is done to the CO+ I NT effort by as.ign5rig officers who
do not have an aptitude or interest I this field; by assigning Reserve
officers who do not intend to :sere on actin, a duty any longer th.-= re-
c aired. by sending officers to co-mmand field stations without first
tr aini-ig and indoctrinating them in COI4TT; by not gig.: ing equal career
opp?.: un s to .3pecialists; and., 1 ?off: c
servi e0
the -f i& Ld9 the two big probbi.:iifsa are rotation i1d the low reen-
listment rate which cause: not only breaks in conti.nuityp but va="- 5
lev is of efficiency. Acbninistrati- e procedures should be devised whinh
would reduce the notability' and consequently Io3aened effec6,iveneseo
For ertample., in one station there have been at least three almost cone
plet-e :urncrers of pereon el during a nr e~ ea period. In additions
tie 'ii-me la be w a n detachment and _.u'plaza7ro, n s o'_l U o apps 1a* ~
decreased, The week est link I the CT.-ENT chain is the ? ter ept
cp'e:S r toi'6 due to the rapid rate of turnover.
Al bough the enlisted intercept operator is doing an Inadequate
jobs th-n prow
e
y
ti.:':i opt l;j a ...s~.:s J 1:ia IC iik iik5l what
n aka it d_ `f cult to GONIN.l Wit? atti =arc b "7 career
53
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'or military persoan,9l will not be sof recl through ,pio ng rive.! arm
'.??? ; r,bfy the beet solution is to emp oy a a~xff .yen 'i be:~ of e:mss -
? 1:`ed c i v i l i1 n:s at, t h e .Mr, :r ,ng level to pro vide gu:i d ea&d e5uab s
at .darde for enlisted operators by worlklaig alongside them at statioa
which require bolstering, The pilot operation for empiQ rent of ors
hundred .vil.ian operators. which was recsntl.y initiated by the ASA,
under. NSA guid ce, should be continued and carefully r tudi do,
(P,age. 27-31)
6
/.icomrnenaatign Nca
' :SID.EPsATION TO T ,E.
TY TIE SECRETARY FEINIS t;~~s :H.1.ls T~ M.L
1 iT ~!t'cl:i ' -~' 1}.~i __:as'J.., GIVE ~~ ~lJS'.
ALLOCATION r )F AN A M01FRIATE NIT'.h SERB '? 6 SU?E11 G.ZIDF,5" AND POSITIONS,
0 DER PU31,IC LAW 313 TO NSA. TO TM; PO 5SIMLIT : C "URTH.E'R :'1;D' CEs'?`_E sTS
OR HIGHER PAY TO S 'I CTFI) CO iSULTA.I T?S AND 1 PRIVILEGES XT ND D
CIyfl IA'S OVERSEAS. The caliber of civilians working for NSA is g~nerafly e cedUent.,
particularly those in the professional a? egorie All of NSA ci .li nn
e;plo3es are placed in Schedule A. Although this does not in its: if
solve all of the administrative problems created by the security re-
strict-Ions which necessarily surround NSA, it, c ?k atss a generally satin-
factos y situation, except with regard to the 2.llocnition of "super grades"
and positions under Public La. 313 which NSA should have. Neither hl
Department of Defense nor the Civil. Service Cci ission Leas assumed ful-I
responsibility for the allocation of such grades to NSA, but each has
al" Board some super ,z adsso NSA is in a le:3s advantageous position
than the Atomic Energy Commission in the cmol,o mieTl t; 0-11 a o'i entjf 'T ecn -
sultan , since the latter a.gancy is able to give the ri kig2 r yaya NSA
civilian per 3anna1 who are staticned overseas should., in general, enjoy
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the. aa?me pr1vi.`!egas, or 11f inge benefits ,," as Cent,z-a1 In`te7_liie:ma l9
aAig," 1- or other gover-men . ei o o Aso in this sae area. (Pagee 32Q3lii
:and. ation No Og
TIT.W T USCI3 OR ITS SUCCESSOR 3O1RD CLARIFY THE OR ECTIVES A4])
FU! CTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON DETACF ENTS TIT' NSA, ESTABLISH UNIFORM
PROCEDtl E-S TO 3E FOLLOWED SY :.UCH DETACHM TTS IN THEIR IAATIONSHIP
taTI TH THAT AGENCY, ACID SPECIFY I l iUVI i`J K1 IBERS OF PERSONNEL TO BE ASSICN1'.iS+
FOR LIAISON DUTIES AFTER 1iMiI'i'.TIPNG THE EXTENT OF INTEREST OF EACH DE-
PARTMENT OR AGENCY CONOERNED, I , TA S _.IGENC.i L ERSO-NINLE , ASSIGNED TO
LIAISON DUTY WITH NSA SHOUlD BE RY.,UIRED TO ATTEND AN INDOCTRINATION
COURSE CIMDUGTED BY NSAo
Each of the p_rancipal raripientS of COMANT, i.e.;, the intelligence
o.eganiZationh of the State in ~ avy, and Air Force Depar-'`5ents nd
C,V maAmtaLne a liaison dot: a h ent *i Jh NSA, These de ath .ruts,
particularly t rose of the three military services., have groin into
large ope?ratn., organ isatIons yid a better underztanding of the proper
relationship between these groups and NSA is needed0 Current s" v' ns
at the working `levels of NSA and the liaison dstaZ ants stem. largal y
from misunderstandings which in turn are at(aSibut h e. somewhat to
compartrzantation, but more to Ignoran?e of the respective nseds and
probler of NSA and the intelU.gerce agencieso
Personnel assigned to liaison duty at NSA should not only be highly
o~'"" zsu ,r~i i mlai Gas d;s it ~aa+VU+ llgrM-ae t'h Q1,-, iq zsp 0a , should have an
r C3?"e?: ~~ 'u7_o of GOMI T techniques a s eral T is c *m be accompli shed and
a. better relationship established if it were made mandatory for ;hoss+
zele(.tsd for liaison duty to attend are indoc4r:LnaLion course co; acted
by the TS.xO In addition, USCI3 should;, of eb study, define the Dirtctions
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expected to be performed by liaisons detachr nts id the purpos3s for which
-hose detaciments are establish-ado This numbers of personnel assigned
jj,eu, i:m detiaci nts at NSA appeared to be excess:6. ' in S0 r.-- inotes1Ca51
and probably could be reduced following clarification . of the mission
d description of duties (Pages 15-17)
Reeonmen ation No,, 10
THAT NSA AND TIE THREE CRYPTOLOGIC SERVICES GIVEE GREATER Ett'HASLS
TO., AND CONTINUE TO DEVELOP .?IUTUA1 COOPERATION INa D-1PRO11TIG TIME
TECHNICAL FEATURES OF INTERCEPT STATIONS
In order to attain rnaxirrum efficiency in co mm r .cationm in-ieree$,
greater consideration should be given to engineering and tech.-n-14 a`L
aspects of stations. Although the problem is mcognL-v d by N;SA and t
cryptologiw services,, unilateral actions to influence both station
locations end layouts have evidently been h d:iccp.d by insufficient
appreciation or uxnderstar4ing of some r c q u i r e n , ents by I adgt arter3 a=1
field commarnda, especially in the earlier rears of dowaloprien '41d NSA
has only comparatively recently 'given cons ideb a' im-1 to -the-m-, phasem of
COMI.4 ". NSA should step up its efforts in this fields in cooperation
with -the cryptologic eervieeso (Page 13)
Recce e d ation No
THAT'MORE THOROUGH PERIODIC REWVESTIGATIOIS OF P RSO"rlEL BE MADE.
0/
PARTICULAR EFFORT SHOULD BE CONCENI` A .ON PERSONS OCCUPYING TH MORE
`
ONSO
S 1\TSTME POST
The security procedures follaved by NSA are ad-qua y with ;,. Mt-
.aept lon of periodic reinvestigations to deternan if perso;~ PT e o u l '
? er z ified as havi.n clear reeordZ ha=ire not in the in.'ter .ra ba=me security
r kso T 1,z security records,, including a National .geney Check, are
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ravie fed at f; we-3:sar inter :tats, but complete field reinvestigation
' bNSA
f:~~t"3'.',-] s!3`.. lb '~