SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001400250001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 28, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
trZLE lflE
9 0
0
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Secret
170
July 28, 1975
No. 0749/75
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CONTENTS
July 28, 1975
Soviet Views on Schlesinger. . . . . . . . . . . 1
Belgrade Hopes To Avert Effort To
Oust Israel from the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Private Soviet Comment on India. . . . . . . . . 5
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Budapest Wants the Crown Returned. . . . . . . . 9
Yugoslav-US Petrochemical Joint Venture. . . . . 10
Czechoslovakia: Bilak Is Not Going to
Helsinki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
More EE Delegations to CSCE. . . . . . . . . . . 12
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Q A _ SECRY
Soviet Views on Schlesinger
Moscow has resumed its press campaign against
recent public statements on nuclear strategy by De-
fense Secretary Schlesinger. The new attack, prob-
ably intended in part to offset too rosy an image
of the US created by the extravagantly favorable
coverage of Apollo-Soyuz, appeared in the weekly
news magazine New Times. Although this mass cir-
culation periodical does not carry the weight of
other party and government organs, the author,
Georgiy Arbatov, is one of Brezhnev's most prominent
advisers on US affairs. Arbatov's Institute of the
USA and Canada has long been critical of Pentagon
nuclear policy.
The article by Arbatov broke no new ground in
cataloging Soviet objections to the Secretary's re-
marks. The author reiterated Soviet complaints that
the Secretary is attempting to ensure US superiority
over the USSR in contravention of bilateral agree-
ments on the right of each side to equal security.
Arbatov also took the Secretary to task for his "bar-
gaining chip" tactics regarding new weapons, and his
"advocacy" of limited nuclear war.
Arbatov replayed the standard rejoinder that
Washington cannot prescribe the rules of nuclear war-
fare and cautioned that even a "limited" strike could
result in a launch-on-warning response. He derided
the notion that a policy of "selective response" is
more likely to deter a "limited attack" than one of
massive retaliation.
As have other Soviet commentators, Arbatov tied
the Secretary's statements to anti-detente maneuver-
ings in the US. In a more authoritative commentary
earlier this month, Pravda accused the Secretary of
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being a spokesman for those hewing to "militarist
dogmas of the past" and added that his remarks were
also aimed at winning approval of the US military
budget.
Moscow's continuing attention to the Secretary's
comments suggests that Brezhnev may raise the issue
with the President in Helsinki. Although detente
considerations and diplomatic courtesy dictate that
the Soviets concentrate their attacks on the Secre-
tary of Defense, they almost certainly read his state-
ments as those of the administration. Brezhnev may
argue at Helsinki that such statements undercut his
efforts in the USSR to sell new arms limitation agree--
ments with the US.
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Belgrade Hopes To Avert Effort To
O'u'st T's'r'ael fr'om' the, UN
Belgrade will apparently attempt to steer next
month's nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting in Lima
away from efforts to seek Israel's ouster or suspen-
sion from the UN.
Recent remarks by high-level Yugoslavs indicate
that Belgrade is sampling international opinion to
determine whether the time is ripe to push for a
more balanced line in the nonaligned movement. Last
week, for instance, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry of-
ficial told the Australians that Belgrade sees the
Peruvian chairmanship of the Lima conference as an
advantage for the more moderate states. The official
also said that Yugoslavia was adamantly opposed to
the expulsion of Israel from the UN, and would, for
the first time, break step with its allies by re-
fusing to sign any declaration calling for such a
step.
Premier Bijedic last Thursday expressed the
same thought in more general terms to the US ambas-
sador. Bijedic contended that moderates constitute
a majority in the nonaligned movement, and they want a
dialogue,. not a confrontation, with the developed
countries. Bijedic nonetheless indicated impatience
with Israeli inflexibility and argued for a nonaligned
role in arranging a Middle East settlement.
Yugoslav impatience with radicals in the non-
aligned leadership--especially Algeria--has been
steadily growing since the Algiers nonaligned summit
in 1973. Although still an advocate of "active non-
alignment," Belgrade disagrees with the radicals'
willingness to endanger such common interests as
preserving the effectiveness of the UN for short
term gains. The danger of offending the Arabs and
the risk of dividing the nonaligned movement has,
however, muted Yugoslav complaints.
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The Yugoslav comments in part reflect the fact
that the Yugoslav economy is now seriously affected
by the world-wide recession. As a result, Belgrade
is even more impatient with radical posturing on
negotiations affecting the prices of oil and other
raw materials. With the Israeli-UN issue coming to
the forefront, Belgrade and the other nonaligned
moderates are torn between desires for unity in the
movement and the need for good relations with the
developed countries.
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Private Soviet Comment on India
Moscow seems worried that the US may mount a
discreet effort in support of Prime Minister Gandhi's
opponents in India but at the same time is disap-
pointed that the present crisis has not done more to
damage Indo-US relations. These at least were the
messages conveyed when US officials met recently with
two of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's South Asian ex-
perts in Moscow. These officials repeated the USSR's
public line that Gandhi was forced to act as she did
because India's rightists were intent on fomenting
domestic disorder. They noted that there had been
little effective opposition to her moves in India, but
nevertheless warned against outside interference in
India's internal affairs. The Soviets seemed to be
saying in effect that Washington would fail should it
attempt any move against Mrs. Gandhi.
There was a trace of disappointment that the US
had not stumbled into a stronger anti-Gandhi policy.
The Soviets attempted to elicit the likely US response
should India move even further in an authoritarian di-
rection and, when the US officials were noncommittal,
seemed to draw some satisfaction from the fact that the
US press is decidedly anti-Gandhi. The Soviets have
been worried about the recent improvement in US-Indian
relations because they are not sure how far it will go
and because they fear it might eventually facilitate
a Sino-Indian rapprochement.
The Soviets maintained that their relations with
India are still close, in fact "without a cloud in the
sky." Moscow does enjoy better relations with India
than any other major power, but its claim is somewhat
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overdrawn. Prime Minister Gandhi welcomed Soviet sup-
port for her recent moves but would have preferred
that it was offered more discreetly. She is not going
to be happy when she learns that the Soviets have
again been hinting at their willingness to provide
military aid to Pakistan.
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Budapest Wants the Crown Returned
Hungarian Premier Lazar has officially requested
that the US return the Crown of St. Stephen. The
crown, a traditional symbol of political legitimacy
for the Hungarians, has been in US hands since 1945.
This is the first time that Budapest has directly
raised the matter at this level.
During Ambassador McAuliffe's introductory call
on July 16, Lazar gave a lengthy rationale why the
crown should be returned, pointing mainly to improved
bilateral relations and to the current atmosphere of
detente. He explicitly asked that his oral, but
official, request be relayed to senior US authorities.
Lazar said that the granting of most-favored-
nation status would remove the second major impediment
to normal US-Hungarian relations. He hoped that the
recently enacted US trade law would be rewritten, and
rejected any linkage between bilateral trade and
Hungarian emigration policies. Lazar said his gov-
ernment will not change its law virtually prohibiting
emigration, nor will it yield to pressure on the way
it administers the law. He said Budapest is willing,
however, to consider the "humanitarian needs" of in-
dividual cases, but without publicity,
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Yugoslav-US Petrochemical Joint Venture
Dow Chemical Company and Industria Nafte of
Zagreb signed an agreement in January for con-
struction of a $600 million petrochemical complex
at Rijeka where the Yugoslavian company has a
refinery. Details of the project have just been
released by Yugoslavia.
The complex will be near the deep water port
under construction at Omisalj and adjacent to a
scheduled crude oil terminal. The terminal is
being built in conjunction with the projected
Yugoslav pipeline that will supply Yugoslavia,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia with oil from the Middle
East and Africa.
The petrochemical facilities, to be built in
three stages, will include:
Units for vinyl chloride, polypropylene
and high-density polyethylene scheduled
to go on stream in 1979.
Facilities for styrene and low-density
polyethylene to be completed in 1981.
A 400,000 ton-per-year ethylene plant
and facilities for propylene, benzene and
ethylbenzene to be completed in 1982.
Dow will hold a 49 percent interest in the project
and the Yugoslav company, 51 percent. Petroleum feed-
stock will come from three Yugoslav refineries; Dow
technology will be used.
The petrochemical joint venture--Dow's second
in Yugoslavia--will enable Dow not only to enter
the Yugoslav market, but also to market its products
in other East European countries. Dow will be able
to repatriate one-third of the foreign exchange
proceeds resulting from exported products.
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Czechoslovakia: Bilak Is
Not Going to Helsinki
Vasil Bilak's absence from the Czechoslovak dele-
gation selected to attend the CSCE summit meeting in
Helsinki suggests that he is at least a temporary vic-
time of political infighting in the party leadership.
The absence of Bilak, who is the party secretary
for international affairs, is conspicuous because his
counterparts in the Bulgarian, East German, Polish,
and Romanian parties are attending the gathering in
Helsinki. Bilak does not, however, enjoy the close
relationship with party chief Husak that his counter-
parts have with their respective party leaders.
Indeed, Husak, the leader of the delegation, may
have engineered Bilak's exclusion. The two men have
a history of political and personal differences.
Bilak has also reportedly differed with Foreign
Minister Chnoupek over the formulation of foreign pol-
icy. Chnoupek is an aggressive and self-confident
foreign policy executor, who has excellent contacts
with the Soviets. In addition, there are rumors in
Prague that Chnoupek will be promoted to the party
presidium (politburo) before or at the party congress
next April. Bilak's absence from the Helsinki dele-
gation thus could also be at least a tactical victory
for Chnoupek--with Husak's blessing and support.
If Bilak's position is slipping there will al-
most certainly be further evidence as the Czechoslovak
art prepares for its 1976 congress.
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More EE Delegations to CSCE
Bulgaria
President/Party Chief
Todor Zhivkov
(delegation head)
Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov
Party Secretary for Inter- Konstantin Tellalov
national Relations and
Foreign Affairs
Deputy Chairman of Nikolay Georgiev
National Assembly
Permanent Representative Raiko Nikolov
to UN
Czechoslovakia
President/Party Chief Gustav Husak
(delegation head)
Premier Lubomir Strougal
Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek
Ambassador to Finland Oldrich Pavlovsky
East Germany
Party Chief Erich Honecker
(delegation head)
Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer
Party Secretary for Inter- Hermann Axen
national Relations
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East Germany (cont'd)
Head of Foreign Ministry
Policy and Planning De-
partment
Head of Foreign Ministry
Northern European
Department
Ambassador to Finland
Romania
President/Party Chief
Seigfried Bock
Peter Steglich
Heinz Oelzner
Nicolae Ceausescu
(delegation head)
Foreign Minister
Party Secretary for
Foreign Affairs
July 28, 1975
George Macovescu
Valentin Lipatti
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