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7 November 1951
CIA No. 49418
Copy No. 1 .3
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA,
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
DIA review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
2. Four removed from Assembly: On 2 November the National Assembly
approved the rescission of the mandates of deputies Peter Kamenov, Nikola
Pavlov, and Stefan Svetozarov, who were expelled from the Bulgarian
Agrarian People's Union, and of Titko Chernokolev, who was removed from
theCommunist Party. The four were charged with a-ving grossly violated
the ideas and statutes of the Fatherland Front.
Comment: Chernokolev, a member of the Politburo, was removed from
his post as Minister of Agriculture in June, 1951. Peter Kamenov was dis-
missed from his post as Minister of Communal Economy at the same time.
Both Pavlov and Svetozarov were expelled from the BAPU on 5 June 1951.
With the rescission of their Assembly mandates, the four men have
lost their legislative immunity. It is probable that they have already
been tried in camera or that an open trial is now being prepared.
3. FINLAND. Communist Party leadership reorganized: At the recently con-
cluded 9th Congress-of the Finnish Communist Party, the central executive
organs of the Party were reorganized and the typical Central Committee,
Politburo, Orgburo, and Control Commission were formed. In addition, a
Secretary-General, Ville Pessi; a Party Chairman Aimo Aaltonen; and a
Party Vice-Chairman, Yrjo Murto were elected.
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Comment; This reported reorganization of the central executive
leadership of the Finnish Communist Party was undoubtedly motivated by
the reported dissension and split which developed last summer within the
Finnish Peopleos Democratic Union, composed of the Finnish Communist Party
and the Communist-front Socialist Unity Party. Apparently dissidents
within the latter, rebelling against Communist domination, gained some
support from a minority group within the Communist Party. In early Sep-
tember the three leading Finnish Communists went to Moscow, clearly to
receive instructions in regard to this intolerable situation. The solution
has apparently been to create a stronger central executive including the
very important Orgburo and Control Commission.
4. YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav Government agrees to US observation of military aid
program s Embassy Belgrade considers that pending the arrival of General
Harmony it has now obtained sufficiently satisfactory assurances from the
Yugoslav Government concerning outstanding points of difference over the
bilateral military aid agreement. It is believed that General Harmony, as
head of the US military group, will be able to reach an agreement with
Yugoslav officials on the details.
The Embassy reports that the Yugoslav Government has'agreed to accept
a minimum. military assistance staff of thirty, including 15 officers, and
to permit US observation of the use of its equipment in Yugoslav field
exercises. A Yugoslav spokesman has explained that his government fully
understands the purpose of US inspection and pledged assurance that the
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Comment: These Yugoslav concessions meet the minimum US conditions
but the problem of end-use observation of the military equipment will re-
quire further clarification.
5. Feasibility of establishing economic mission in Belgrade under con-
sideration: US officials are faced with the problem of how to administer
the newly enacted Mutual Security Act without endangering our security ob-
jectives in Yugoslavia or flouting legislative requirements.
The legislation explicitly calls for an economic mission in the re-
cipient country. While this requirement could be met in a. number of ways,
ECA believes that the passage of the Mutual Security Act represents the
logical point for the establishment of a conventional ECA (MSA) mission.
The Department of State, however, points out that the establishment of a
MSA mission would undoubtedly arouse strong Yugoslav objections and jeopard-
ize the smooth establishment of our military advisory group. The Department
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of State has suggested the possibility of naming Ambassador Allen as the
MSA mission chief with Embassy economic advisors in charge of day-to-day
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2. ISRAEL. New Soviet activity reDorte in Egypt and in Israel:
The oviet Union is shipping 'arms into Cairo, according to a Turkish
General Staff spokesman,. He also stated that he had "positive information"
that the Israeli Government has agreed nermit USSR e
airfield at Ramleh, near Tel Aviv,
Comment: The US Embassy in Cairo
that in a recent conversation with the soviet Minister, the Foreign Minister
raised the subject of supplies of Czech arms for Egypt. Rumors of Czech
arms for Egypt are currently circulating in Cairo, but there is no evidence
that any Soviet or Satellite military equipment has been delivered or
contracted for.
There is no other information available on the alleged Isrseli-
Soviet deal. It is unlikely that the Israeli Government will make any
air arrangements with the USSR except strictly standard commerdial ones.
3. SOUTH ASIA. Pakistanis and Ceylon le ravel in Communist orbits
Mien Iftikharuddin, prominent fellow-traveler and member of the Pakistani
goodwill delegation which visited Communist China in early October
1951, has recently been in Copenhagen, Denmark, attending a preparatory
conference for the World Economic Conference to be held in Moscow next
25X1 April. He was also to attend the World Peace Council meeting in Vienna.
Ten Ceylonese, who went from Ceylon and England to the Berlin Youth
Festival last August, are proceeding to Moscor and Peiping on a goodwill
mission. accordina to the cavlonese .-press,
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Comments The USSR and Communist China may jointly have developed the
"grand tour as a device for overcoming travel restrictions previously
placed on important South Asian Communists and fellow-travelers by their
respective governments. Heretofore, both India and Pakistan have hesitated
to allow their nationals to visit Communist-controlled Europe, althoulgh they
have permitted them to visit China.
INDIA. Sindri fertilizer factory has started productions The Sindri fer-
tilizer factory in Bihar, repor e y the rges n Asia, has started pro-
duction. The factory cost 230 million rupees (approximately 48 million
dollars) and is expected shortly to reach full production of 1,000 tons of
ammonium sulphate daily. According to the Indian press, the plant's an-
nual production of 350,000 tons will make India self-sufficient in artifi-
cial fertilizers on the basis of present requirements and will save the
ion rupees in foreign exchange each year.
Comment: The Sindri fertilizer factory is one of the few major de-
velopment projects to be completed in India since partition.
. BURMA. Soviet approach for rice reported: A British diplomat and an Amer-
ican businessman told he US Embassy in Rangoon that they had been informed
by unofficial sources that the Soviet Embassy had, on a number of occasions,
expressed interest in purchasing rice from Burma. The Embassy comments
that the significance of this information is not yet apparent, but if cor-
rect it would mean the presence of an additional buyer in a market which
is already in short supply.
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90
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Heavy Viet Minh casualtiess The Viet Minh suffered 39,291
casualties during the month of October, according to the French Press
Agency. A breakdown of these losses shows-. 3,895 killed, 15D871 prisoners,
and 19,525 wounded.
Comments The figure of 3,895 killed corresponds closely with official
daily casualty figures released by the French Command. Other casualty
figures cannot be verified. A recent report by the US Military Attache that
Viet Minh casualties exceed those of the French by four to one would imply
that the French suffered some 10,000 casualties during the same period-.
10. INDONESIA. lawlessness in West Java rows increasin l' worsen A statement
given to a news agency by "'top oecurity authorities" in West Java reveals
that security disturba_aces.in West-Java have become "truly serious." Well
armed, highly mobile and well organized groups are becoming bolder and
more active daily, with demarcation between "secure," "half-secure," and
"insecure" areas becoming meaningless. Formerly independent groups have
combined their forces and are carrying out well-coordinated attacks against
government forces, The statement criticized the government for its "half-
hearted" actions against lawlessness and noted with regret that 800
guerrillas who had responded to the government's surrender offer last
November are still detained in an. inadequate camp in Bandung with their
status and future disposition undetermined.
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The US Army Attache comments that increased lawlessness in West Java
and reduced army strength resulting from withdrawals for the Celebes
campaign point toward. central dissident coordination on a "scale larger
1,____ T_.. ? I w r-- I
Comments There have been no indications to date that guerrilla
disaffection in the Celebes was coordinated with insecurity in West Java,
11. CHINA. Anti-Communist guerrillas harass shipping in China waters. According
to the inese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense-,-
e ense, guerrillas from
two motorized junks landed at Weihaiwei, Shantung Province, on 22 October.
and withdrew after a brief battle.
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Near Shanghai, the British merchant ship Hupeh was boarded on
25 October by pirates from two speedy motor junks. The Hupeh was later
rescued by a British vessel? and the pirates relinquished control of the
merchant ship in exchange for safe conduct back to their island base,
which was only 12 miles north of Nationalisteheld Ta Chen Island? The
US Naval Attache on Formosa suggests the possibility of collusion between
the pirates and the Nationalist navy,
Comment; The Shantung attack is the first indication that anti-
Communa~ s guerrillas have been so bold as to effect landings on the
North China coast, The Nationalists themselves do not officially claim
any connection with these operations,
12. US Military Attache in Hong Kong reports on troop movements.- The US
Military Attache in Hong Kong comments that the trend of all reports
received since mid-October indicates the movement of Chinese Communist
Fourth Field Army units away from Kwangtung, either in the direction
of Kwangsi or northward. The bulk of the reports indicate a move
toward Kwangsi, but to date no reliable information from Kwangsi has
reached the reporting officer confirming the arrival of these units.
The Attache believes that the movement of these troops to Kwangsi,
if true, indicates that ; ....
(1) the Chinese Communists intend to put psychological pressure
on the French in Tonkin;
(2) the Chinese Communists intend to participate in Tonkin;or
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(3
the Second Field Army units are being withdrawn from South China
probably for employment in Korea and Manchuria, and the Fourth
Field Army is extending to cover the gap. The reporting officer
feels that, in view of the presence in Korea of Chen Keng, field
commander of the F' this 16 the.'most likely,
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Comments There have.been several recent reports indicating a movement
of troops of the Fourth Field Army from Kwan.gt:uzg to Kwangsi province.
However, they all remain unconfirmed and are, therefore, not accepted
pending further information.
13. Rail congestion in Manchuria reported;
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line from the USSR is increasingly congested. Shipments of consumer
goods have been banned during some periods.
25X1 by January 1952 it will be impossible
to sip consumer goods from the USSR to Harbin.
25X1 I I 7vhether the volume of war
materiel delivered by rail has changed,, a change in the
composition of freight. Whereas previously the emphasis had been on tanks,
crated planes and cannon, there was more recently a greater variety of
materiel,, includin T
Czech and Russian d trucks and a number of
25X1 rocket-launchers,
Comment, The heavy demand for military transport on Manchuria's
railways has on several occasions resulted in temporary suspensions of
passenger and ordinary commercial freight service. A continuing strain
on the rail net is indicated by the shortage of Soviet shipping and by
difficulties encountered in chartering Western-flag vessels,
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
GERMANY.: East Germans renew unit offers: The latest in the series of
as erman unity proposals is viewed by.US officials in Berlin as a
move to counter the recent Western suggestion that the UN supervise an
investigation of electoral conditions '?hroughout Germany, and as a Commu-
nist ruse to win West German opinion without actually offering any real
concessions,
The proposal, in the form of a letter from East Germany?s President
to the West German President, suggested that the two men meet in Berlin
to discuss preparations for an "All-German Conference"? on the subject of
free elections to unify the country. This statement and accompanying pro-
paganda moves dismiss UN inspection as "no business"" of the UN, and suggest
instead that the conditions for free elections be examined by a commission
of East and West Germans, "under, four power control."' Under such a system.,
not only would the commission be divided, but its findings would be subject
to the Soviet veto.
The latest East German propaganda also emphasizes that the Communists
are drafting an election law for discussion?purposes, and are anxious to
have the meet to discuss the German question.
Comment, In the current stepped-up unity drive,the USSR and East
Germans..vea so far made no real concessions, but have directed their
offers at vulnerable elements in West Germany. So far, the' offers have
been coldly received in West German government circles, and there has been
no reply tothe latest East German note. Nevertheless, Pieck's letter does
embarrass Chancellor Adenauer in his discussions with certain Protestant
leaders anxious for German unification.
AUSTRIA. Soviet authorities permit limited utilization.of German ships
onnanubea Soviet authorities in Vienna have issue navigation. permits to
5 Sa,nu7e Steamship Company authorizing the use of fourteen Austrian and
six German vessels to transport fuel oil from Vienna to Regensburg., Ger-
many. Authorization is conditional upon operation of the German barges
without'flag and by Austrian crews. A separate application for navigation
permits from a German company, Ba erisoher Lloyd, is expected to be re-
jected.
Comments: Soviet approval of the use of German vessels for these oil
shipments was anticipated F__ I The ban on
the German flag indicates., however, that the USSR does no intend to regu-
larize German shipping on the Danube. Special permission was probably
granted in this case to export oil which the USSR cannot use.
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establish the unity of all workers, Mass demonstrations and strikes can-
Communist_Part Congress emphasizes Socialist unity theme.- At the
15th Congress of the Communist Party in Vienna laat week., Party
Chairman Koplenig declared that Austrian Communists seek the coopera-
tion of all people interested in the country's future, and of all pro-
gressive organizations., groups., and movements in the struggle for "peace
and, freedom." The immediate goal of the KPOea Koplenig asserted.. is to
not., he acknowledged, be organized every day., but current issues can and
must be discussed with Socialist workers at every opportunity. Other
Communist orators declared that nothing is more important to Communists at
present than the task of securing Socialist support in "defense of peace."
I I
Comment-. The plea for Socialist unity is a candid admission of the
weakness Austrian Communists when compelled to stand by itself. The
comparatively dismal showing of the KPOee in organizing public protests
against the new rent law in September m? when only discredited Socialist
fringe support was achieved -- emphasized this weakness, Furthermore., it
is to be advantage of the KPOe to take a less militant approach during
the current shop-stewards' elections -- unless., of course., a particularly
attractive opportunity should arise to make trouble,
The US Legation in Vienna reports that the Communist press coverage
of trr party congress omitted all references to assertions by Communist
Ernst Fischer that communism and socialism could not peacefully coexist.
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5, Non-Communist press reacts favorably to British election results.
The Ita ian press repor ing on the i i e ec ions eels. ere will
be little change in British policy under the Conservative government,
Nevertheless, it is believed that Church3.11 will restore "cordial colla
boration" with the US and that the UK may now encourage rather than ob-
struct European unification, Many papers express the hope that Anglo-
Italian relations will improve,
The Communist press affirms that the UK will now favor more strongly
"US war preparations" and voices the hope that Bevan will eventually succeed.
in winning control of the Labor Party and influence its policies in favor
of "peace and friendship rith the U SR.'
In the opinion of the US Embassy in Rome., the Christian Democrat-
25X1 dominated government. feels that it will be easiera to get along with the
Conservatives than with the Labor government and that prospects-for Euro-
ean federation a? oved,.
Commenta. The government-'controlled Rome radio in its press summary
makes no mention of the reaction of the moderate leftist Republicans and
democratic Socialists. These parties., especially the latter., presumably
regard Churchill's victory -s the British counterpart to the trend to the
right that has been steadily developing in Italy and as a further blow to
the future of democratic Socialism in Western Europe,
of re-eq?pp ng to Royal Air Force with modern aircraft sooner than pre-
ciously planned. On the belief that the Conservative government may take
the necessary measures., Air Ministry planning officers are working over-
time to revise schedules-for the earlier introduction of the newest e uip-
ment into operational units,
Comments The adequacy of the equipment of the Royal Air Force has
been queoned on several occasions by Conservative members of Parliament
with some reason. Although ministers of the. late labor government olaimed
superior performance., speed and other capability records for new types of
British aircraft, they neglected to make clear that these aircraft were
vative governments Air-force staff officers feel there is a possibility
UNITED KINGDOM, Royal Air Force equi went position seen aided b Conser-
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prototypes which will not be in operation until. late 1953 and 1954,, and
that they were comparing these aircraft with current operational types
of other countries.
7. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. Government to introduce conscription bill at nett
session of Parliament, The Nationalist government will introduce a con-.
scription bill at a session of Parliament beginning in January,, accord-
ing to a reliable Union Defense Force source. Defense Minister Erasmus
had great difficulty in persuading the Cabinet of the need for this move,,
which envisages a training program beginning in November 1952.
25X1 blemsa.
Comment-, Service in the Union Defense Force has always been on a
voluntary aasis. Without conscription., shortage of trained manpower would
prevent South Africa from promptly fulfilling its commitment for aiding
the defense of the Middle East in case of war, Should Erasmus succeed in
convincing the largely isolationist Afrikaners who provide the bulk of the
government'e support of the need for conscription, not only will it help
solve the manpower problem,, but it may also partially vindicate a Defense
Minister widely criticized as incompetent. Even if the conscription bill
passes, a further legal obstacle to South Africans sending forces to the
Middle East is the fact that no serviceman may be sent outside the Union
without his consent.
25)(8r EN. Government rejects Polish charges,. In a 260O--vord reply to the
o s note of 17 c o erg, the - Weals-9 Government flatly rejects various
25X1 Polish ar usations in the current refugee dispute
as "wholly'unfounded and deeply insultin " and in turn accuses
the poles cf mjustly imprisoning Swedish seaman.
Corfinentt In the last month Sweden and Poland have exchanged a total
of fivers over Sweden?s granting asylum to political refugees from
Poland. Although relations with the Poles are at a low ebb and the usually
phlegmatic Swedes are incensed over the vitriolic character of the Polish
notes, no untoward outcome is anticipated. The Polish notes are designed
partly for domestic Polish consumption and partly as a phase of the gen-
eral Soviet-Satellite propaganda campaign against the'Westp
The US Army Attache comments that the adoption of this bill would
be a great ste forward in solving South Africa's defense manpower pro-
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7 November 1951
CIA No. 49418-A
Copy No.
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
os' support: Deputy Prime Minister
1. GREECE. Liberals hope vto gain PR pa
Venizelos believes that by January his Liberal Party will have the
Parliamentary cooperation of Marshal Papagos' opposition party.
25X1 Venizelos' optimism, the US' Embassy in Athens states, is apparently based
on Papagos' recent offer to discuss cooperation as soon as Venizelos
arranges for the proclamation of elections under the majority systems
Comment: Venizelos' optimism would seem premature. He realizes that
the fall of the present EPEK-Liberal government and the holding of new
elections based on the majority system would strengthen EPEK and the Greek
Rally at the expense of his own party, and he has accordingly been trying
to obtain Papagos' cooperation: Papagos, howevei?, is apparently still con-
.fident that he can win any election held under the majority system, and he
may equally have been attempting to gain Venizelos' assistance in changing
the electoral law. If the new Defense Minister prevents political inter-
ference with the army, Papagos may look with more favor on Liberal-Rally
cooperation.
2. EGYPT. Problems in the Suez Canal area repcrtedlV increasing: An officer
of the US Embassy in Cairo, after a two-day trip through the Suez Canal
zone, reports an increase in the problems facing the authorities there. The
British Commanding General in the zone admitted that about 3,000 Egyptian
families were leaving the zone daily in spite of British efforts to slow down
the exodus of laborers.
The British Naval Commander in Port Said asserts that British
delay.
personnel can keep Suez Canal traffic operating without any real y. In
Port Said, however, the situation is worsening, with normal sources of
employment shut off, food prices soaring and the tempers of 140,000 Arabs
rising. The Egyptian Governor warns that the situation is developing to the
Dint that local E tuns mi ht go "after him as well as the British."
25X1
Comment: While the day-to-day estimates vary considerably, there is
nevertheless mounting evidence that the tension within Egypt is serious and
likely to worsen. Even though. the King and certain moderate elements in the
government have indicated a desire to counteract this trend, it is questionable
whether anything constructive can be done as long as the present emotional
state continues.
3. N. Japanese Government eried on plans for_treatywith China: The
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o it
Department of State has addNatWUS tional~stiandaJapaneserGovernmentshm~ght
sees no reason why the Chinese
not now begin negotiations in order to reach agreement on a bilateral
peace treaty, to become effective at the same time or soon after
Department
effective date of the San Francisco treaty. Consequently, P
thwith inkingereJapanese garding theetimeing
has requested the Political Adviser to
present consult
to determine Prize e sinister Yoshida's p
and nature of such. a treaty. In view of the conflictinnature oo f vthoss
reports on Yoshida+s remarks. before the Japanese Diet, the tep
also requested information on t e r'me IinisterIs plans for trade or other
relations with CoEmunist.China.
Comment: The US has advised the Nationalist Government that it would
endeavor to facilitate a treaty with Japan, provided a satisfaccto formula
could be worked out that would limit the scope of the treaty
territory and people now under control of the Nationalists. The Japanese
Government, for its part, appears reluctant to face the. Chinese recognition
problem, and probably hopes to postpone a decision at least until after the
San Francisco treaty comes into force.
Yoshida's remark before the Japanese Diet that Japan would welcome an
opportunity to establish a trade agency in Shanghai increased Chinese
Nationalist apprehensions over Japanese intentions. Reaction to this
apparently unpremeditated remark later forced the Japanese Government to
explain that it had been made merely to emphasize that
of a trade agency at Taipei had no poli
minor, inon-strategfor ic the
doubtedly is well aware that to development with
foreseeable future, are limited
trade.
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