THE VIETNAM CONFLICT: FACTORS BEARING ON THE ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500080084-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: October 9, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved--Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R0'1T20R000500080084-3
TOP SECRET
9 OCT 1907
25X1
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Vietnam Conflict : Factors Bearing on the I s sue
of Negotiations
This memorandum presents, in outline form, an analytic summary
of the major factors bearing on the issues involved in arranging a
negotiated settlement to the Vietnam conflict, particularly those factors
which derive from the Vietnamese Communists' concept of the struggle
and their assessment of its present status. The judgments made of
current Vietnamese Communist attitudes and intentions are based primarily
on the following pieces of evidence:
(1) The documentary record of
2) The NLF poli t ical program publi shed by Radio
Hanoi on 1 September 1967;
( 3) The article by Lao Dong Politburo member General
Vo Nguyen Gi ap (Defense Mi nister of the DRV) Seri ale zed
in Nhan Dan on 14-16 September and broadcast by Radio Hanoi
on 17, 18 and 20 September 1967;
1. The Differi n Concepts of the Vietnam Conflict: Central to
the whole i s sue of negotiate ons i s the fact that the U. S. Government's basic
concept of the Vietnam conflict and what that conflict involves i.s radically
different from the Vietnamese Communist Party' s concept of the struggle
and the issues at stake.
TS #188944/67
Approved For Release 2004/09/
TOP SECRET
01720R000500080084-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved Ptf Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RDP80ROfr OR000500080084-3
TOP SECRET
a. The U.S. concept holds that those Vietnamese who
live south of the 17th Parallel have the right to independence and
separate political existence, that the conflict derives from North
Vietnamese aggression. In U. S. eyes, North Vietnam is attempting
to acquire political control over and dictate the political future of
South Vietnam by force of arms. In simplest terms, the basic
U. S. objective is to persuade or compel North Vietnam to leave
its, neighbor alone.
b. The Vietnamese Communist Party, which controls and
essentially is the government of North Vietnam, rejects the thesis
that South Vietnam is entitled to separate political existence. Its
concept of the struggle is rooted in the notion that "Vietnam is one.
By definition, therefore, there is no issue of North Vietnamese
aggression. The only foreign intervention is U.S. intervention
(plus that of America's allies or, in North Vietnamese terminology,
"satellites"), the U.S. is the only "aggressor." All that the
Vietnamese who live north of the 17th Parallel are doing is helping
their southern compatriots liberate the southern part of their country.
c. These radically different concepts of the basic issues
involved not only complicate communication between Washington and
Hanoi, they produce a situation where each party's concept of a
minimal acceptable settlement is something the other party would
regard as defeat or surrender.
2. Hanoi and the National Liberation Front: For all practical purposes,
the National Liberation Front (NLF) is under Hanoi's absolute political control
and parrots Hanoi's line with only those cosmetic variations essential to support
the fiction of the NLF's political independence.
a. As Giap puts it, South.Vietnam is the "great frontline of
the Fatherland" and the South Vietnamese people (i. e. , the Front)
have shown themselves "worthy of the confidence of the whole
nation and of President Ho. "
b. In its September 1967 program, the NLF pledges itself
"to strive, shoulder- to- shoulder with the Vietnam Fatherland Front
to fulfill gloriously the common task of fighting against U. S.
aggression to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed
toward the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland. " This implied
TS #188944/67
25X1
?? Ec ~
Approved For elease20/09/ 3: CIA-RDP80R 1720R000500080084-3 25X1
 Approver Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R20R000500080084-3
TOP SECRET
parallelism with the Fatherland Front is significant and
revealing. The Fatherland Front (li,: :al descendent of the
Viet Minh and Lien Viet Fronts) is the Communist Party's Front
structure in North Vietnam, just as the NLF is the same Party's
Front structure in South Vietnam.
c. All of our available evidence indicates that the NLF is
under the absolute control of the Peoples' Revolutionary Party
(i. e., the southern branch of the Lao Dong) and that the PRP
takes its orders from the Lao Dong Politburo in Hanoi. Thus
the Vietnamese Communists have essentially only one political
position and program: Hanoits. There is no significant separate
southern voice, position or program.
3. The Communist View of the Issues: In Vietnamese Communist eyes,
the objectives of the current strugg}.e are (in Giap's words) !'to protect the
north, liberate the south, and proceed toward reunifying the country" /i. e. ,
putting all of Vietnam under Communist Party control/. This same litany is
echoed in the NLF program;' which id Ion j objectives of theme by spelling out the
the South Vietnamese people.
following as the immediate tasks a
a. "To unite the entire people,
b. "resolutely defeat the U. S. imperialists' war" of
aggression,
c. "overthrow their /i. e. the imperialists', lackey
puppet administration /i. e. , the GVN/,
d. "establish a broad national union and democratic
/i. e., Communist/ administration and build an independent,
peaceful, neutral and prosperous South Vietnam /i. e. , a
'progressive, socialist state'/, and
e. "proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the.
Fatherland. "
TS #188944/67
TOP SECRET/
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000500080084-3
 Approvedidr Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R0020R000500080084-3
TOP SECRET
4. Reconciliation and Coalition: Despite U.S. dissatisfaction with the
overtures the GVN has been willing to make in the direction of reconciliation
and possible future cooperation with nationalist elements in the NLF, in point
of fact both Hanoi and the NLF are much more obdurate and much less forth-
coming on these issues than the GVN has been.
a. Both Giap's speech and the NLF program refer
consistently to Saigon's leaders as "imperialist lackeys" and
"country-selling traitors. It
b. The NLF program explicitly notes that to achieve
its goal of "a broad and progressive democratic regime" it will
be necessary to "abolish the disguised colonial regime established
by the U. S. imperialists in South Vietnam, to overthrow the puppet
administration, hireling of the United States, not to recognize
the puppet national assembly rigged up by the U. S. imperialialists
and their lackeys, to abolish the constitution and all anti-national
and anti-democratic laws enacted by the U. S. imperialists and
the puppet administration. "
c. Recent Hanoi and NLF statements, in short, contain
no hint of any genuine Communist interest in a modus vivendi
with the U. S. and the Saigon Government or in any political _
settlement other than the acceptance of NLF /i. e. , Communist/
control over South Vietnam.
5. The Communist Assessment of the Present State of the Struggle:
a. The Vietnamese Communists see the struggle in Vietnam
as an integral -- and, presently, the crucial -- aspect of the
worldwide "national liberation struggle" of "progressive peoples"
(including U. S. negroes) against the forces of imperialism and
"neo-colonialism" headed by the United States. No American
proponent of the domino theory could be more emphatic or explicit
on this point than Giap or the authors of the new NLF program.
TS #188944/67
TOP SECRET/
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000500080084-3
 Approvedo&br Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RDP80 OR000500080084-3
R0 2
TOP SECR:ETI(
b. The Vietnamese Communists acknowledge U. S.
power and the fact that this power has c eate opr bleh s, but they
voice complete confidence in their ability
military might and inflict a political defeat on the U. S. in o
f Vietnam and, eventually, throughout t doh adopt ~ orol~ idO ne would, po s e,
course, expect the Communists
but a close examination of the available evidence indicates that
this air of confidence in ultimate political success is not feigned.
c. In no small measure, this confidence derives from
Hanoi's conviction that it has111C~1ad nalys o th UJSr halitico
three
military defeat on the U. S. 7 p s a
basic strategies for pursuing its a waW and'general lwar colonialist
imperialism special ~ defeated
argues that the Vietnamese Communists have already
America's "special war" in Vietnam aand ththis at the d 65finj ecrion
of U. S. troops into the struggle signalled He e
argues that the U. S. has neither
Vietnamese Cornmunistsocan win
initiate general war. Thus,
if they prove themselves able to cope with Amer which i imit ned war. This is the basic theme of Giap's whole speech,
"The Big Victory; The Great Task. "The "b g,gre ory, " "i she
defeat of the imperialists' "special r"; the at task
coping with their "limited war.
d. Giap argues, with apparent conviction, that .espite the
difficulties created by American might, the Vietnamese are in
fact successfully coping with the ~ pe created ""limited
problems" rialists' He contends that the Vietnamese which "are puzzling and very to Westmoreland, Y" impercoialintists.nue s ,
From Johnson and McNamara
"they have all clearly realized their nbogge olutiond and dead ockad
situation but have not yet found any
erican
>'F "Special war" involves the use of American troops
"general war" means global military conflict.
TS #188944/67
25X1
s~.f~RUV4TV97F 25X1
Approved For RerVLQ'e~z :CIA-720 000500080084-3
 Approved- Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80RO 0R000500080084-3
last, resorted to the troop-reinforcement measure. However,
they are encountering big difficulties with this problem. If
small reinforcements are sent in, it will be impossible to remedy
the situation of the U. S. troops who are endangered on the battle-
field. If large reinforcements are sent in, this will greatly
influence the U. S. people's political and economic life and the
U. S. strategy in the world and will not succeed in saving the U. S.
imperialists from complete failure.
e. Giap also argues another point central to the Vietnamese
Communist assessment: that the prolonged struggle is generating
ever stronger political problems for and pressures on the U. S.
Government. As Giap puts it: "In the international arena, the
U. S. imperialists are also confronted with new difficulties ...
In the United States itself, the Johnson government is confronted
with the contradictions among the U. S. ruling clique and the U. S.
people's increasingly stronger protest. The U. S. Negroes' boiling
and widespread struggle is a fierce offensive blow dealt both at the
Johnson clique's domestic and foreign policies. Never before has
U. S. President Johnson been so deadlocked as he is now. On
14 August 1967 U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT admitted that war,
racial conflict, the growing budget deficit, and troubles with the
Congress, with the allies, and with the dollar are bad news which
are pressing the government from all directions. Suddenly, the
situation at the White House has become like that of a building
whose roof is about to cave in.
f. The themes explicitly claborated.by Giap are echoed
throughout the new NLF program. The basic Communist position
on the present state of the struggle seems to be that the Communists
can win because, despite U. S. power, the Vietnamese Communists
can prolong the military struggle until political pressures force the
U. S. to accept political defeat. The Communists' private assessment
is almost certainly somewhat more complex than this since the
COSVN high command must recognize -- as must Hanoi if COSVN
reports honestly -- that all is not going well for the Communist cause
in South Vietnam. This peeps obliquely through the lines in the
NLF boast that,
TS #188944/67
25X1
TOP SECRETI I 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/091Z: - 1DR000500080084-3
 ApprovedWr Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R020R000500080084-3
"The liberated areas have continuously
expanded and now make up four-fifths of
the South Vietnam territory with two-thirds
of its population. "
Not only is this claim patently false, it is also no sign of "progress,
since this is what the NLF was claiming two years ago. The avail-
able evidence suggests that Hanoi's private net assessment is that
erosion of the U. S. domestic and international political position
is proceeding faster than erosion of the Communist military and
political situation in South Vietnam, thus even if all is not going
well in the south, Washington will still have to fold its hand first.
6. Current Communist Objr.