DIA INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL INDIA-PAKISTAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010033-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 33
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved FxRqea~2~'411i: tql#bR$P'9B01737A00200001003333..
DIA TNTLLLIGPNCL APPRAISAL
India--Pakistan Situation .
C(c~~s C';i~'
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25X1 D
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1. (TS) Although fighting continues in East Pakistan-, steps to
negotiate a settlement are under way.
3. (S/NrD) meanwhile, according to the US Defense Attache in
New Delhi, an Indian military intelligence officer has 'admitted
that army units remain in East Pakistan. He denied, however,
that New Delhi's forces were involved in actions near Rangpur,
Syihet and Feni but admitted that two infantry battalions and
an armored regiment were in East Pakistan near Jessore and Hilli.
The attache commented that there is a growing credibility gap
between fact and Indian statements regarding the military situa-
ti.on and. estimates' that ,at least one Indian infantry brigade was
involved ''in each area of' fighting.
25X1C 4. (S/NFD) Indian Minister of Defense Jacjivan Ram disclosed 25X10
will become internationalized,
This concern and Pakistani
restraint in ' the ace o provocation is likely prompting the
Indians to reassess their current policy of exerting maximum
military pressure in East Pakistan to resolve the crisis. UN
involvement would tend to disclose the extent of their aid to
the Mukti Bahini and reduce New Delhi*'s control of the situation.
India has consistently refused to consider proposals for UN ob-
servers on its eastern border with East Pakistan, maintaining
that the rebels constitute an internal Pakistani problem and not.
the concern of the;international-forum.
CIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
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Chinese are continuing to encourage a peaceful settlement of
crisis. The amount of media attention devoted to the crisis
by Peking, however, has risen during the past 10 days. The
5. (S/NFD) There has been no significant reaction from either
the Chinese or the USSR, despite recent intensification of the.
the dispute and have em.pressed some support for Pakistani Presi-
dent Yahya Khan's proposal for disengagement. The Chinese have
not tried to play up any threat to their own security, and Indian
actions have been portrayed as "an invasion," "military provocations,"
and even "armed aggression." At the same time, the Pakistanis have
been described as holding their own, implying that they do not need
direct assistance.
6. (S/NFD) meanwhile, the USSR has apparently dropped all pre-
tense of impartiality. Its press is supporting the Indian cause.
A recent TASS release blames the situation on Islamabad and
states that the. Pakistani authorities must stop repressing the.
East Pakistan opulation and create conditions for the safe re-
turn of refugees. Moscow has also criticized US motives in the
crisis.
T:" (S/NFD) India's reported acceptance of the Iranian offer of good
offices as a means to mediate the crisis, represents a radical
departure from their previous course and was unexpected. New
Delhi may have concluded that its strategy of military pressure
to force Pakistani negotiation was not succeeding. Moreover,
they may also have viewed the internationalization of the crisis
as inevitaple. This would have meant a minor triumph for Yahya
and the loss of prestige and control of the situation for India.
The Iranian offer will preclude internationalization and provide`
a means for both sides to retain their prestige by appearing to
be reasonable and sincere in their efforts to solve the crisis.
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2 Dec 71
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PAGE 01
ISLAMA 11740
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OCT-01
SSO?00
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mmNSCEm00 CIAE-00063388
GC0-00
0 270932Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1716
INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DACCA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
~. 2
S E C R E T SECTION 1~ OF 2 ISLAMABAD 11740
EXDIS
cn
rn
REF: ISLAMABAD 8631 (NOT L) ISLAMABAD 10927 PARA 6,:ISLAMABAD
11484 (NOTAL) , AND
1. SUMMARYo CONVERSATION WITH INDIAN HICOMER ATALA REFLECTED HIS
SINCERE DESIRE EFFECT RAP
PAKISTANo HE STATED HE WOULD PROPOSE
LEAGUE REPftESENTATIOESEDGE
AMENABILITY TO IDEA PROSCRIBED
MEETING WITH OOP IVES IN
DIALOGUE
T
PURPOSE INSTITUTING
CO NSIDERSMUJIBUR RAHMAUE~~OEMPHASIZEDPONATNG0IND0ESLNOTEWANT
PRECONDITION TO DIALOGW BREAK?UP OF-PAKISTAN AND THAT
AGREED ITOLINFORMEMENSOONESD OF FOIHS
CONCEPT OF LOOSE FEDERATION.
REACTION. I AGREED TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OUR CONVERSATION TO YAHYA.
END SUMMARY.
2. LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON INDIAN HICOMER J. K. ATAL ASKED TO PAY
INLOCAL TIME SATURDA , NOVEMBER
PROTOCOL CALL UPON 'E AT 0900.IDENURHOURS
27a I MET WITH HIM AT MY
PROPOSED SCHEDULE.
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0 NER J
SUBJ: CONVERSAT ON . K. ATAL
FROM AMBASSADOR
USE ONLY: FILE, CS/RF, DCI,
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3. THE HICOMER BEGAN HIS CONVERSATION BY STATING
THAT HE BELIEVED HE HAD BUT ONE MISSION AND THAT WAS TO EFFECT
RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY AND THE COUNTRY TO WHICH HE WAS
ACCREDITED, AND TO DO THIS SOONEST. HE HAD BEGUN HIS MISSION, HE
SAID, BY A LENGTHY CONVERSATION WITHAZRES. YAHYA, WHOM HE
DISCOVERED NOT RPT NOT TO BE QTE AN OGRE UNQTE AS REFLECTED IN THE
INDIAN PRESS AND AS CHARACTERIZED BY VARIOUS GOI OFFICIALS AT
HIGH LEVELS. RATHER, HE SAID, HE FOUND HIM TO BE, THOUGH BOUND BY
THE COMPLEXES OF A MILITARY MIND, EXTREMELY AMENABLE TO SUGGESTION
AND MOST DESIROUS OF AMELIORATING THE TENSIONS EXTANT IN THE
SUBCONTINENT. AS AN EXAMPLE OF YAHYA?S COOPERATIVENESS, ATAL
REPORTED, HE HAD CONCLUDED
OIS CONVERSATION WITH YAHYA WITH A
DISCUSSION OF YAHYA?S FORTHCOMING EID MESSAGE, WHICH IN FINAL
PUBLISHED FORM CONTAINED CERTAIN STATEMENTS ACTUALLY DICTATED BY
ATAL AT THE TIME FOR INCLUSION THEREIN.
4 . AFTER CAPABLY PRESENTING THE G O I LINE O N CURRENT SITUATION,
ATAL TOLD ME THAT HE HAD DEPARTED ISLAMABAD O N THE 19TH TO CARRY
A REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH YAHYA DIRECTLY TO MRS. GANDHI.
HE SAID THAT HIS CONVERSATION WITH HIS PM HAD NOT BEEN ENTIRELY
SATISFACTORY PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF TIMING AND ADVERSE FAST-MOVING
EVENTS WHICH CONTINUED TO CLOUD THE ISSUE. HE SAID, HOWEVER,
HE HAD RETURNED ON NOV. 25 WITH A MESSAGE FROM MRS. GANDHI WHICH
CONSISTED OF THREE MAIN POINTS: (A) THE GOI DID NOT RPT NOT WANT
AR WITH QGKISTAN; (B) THE GOI WAS NOT INTERESTED IN AND DID NOT
15ESIRE THE PARTITION OF PAKISTAN; AND (C) IT WAS GOI?S CONCLUSION
THAT THE EAST PAKISTANI REFUGEES IN INDIA WOULD RETURN TO THEIR
HOMES ONLY IF THE GOP EFFECTED RECONCILIATION WITH
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE. ATAL PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZED
THE FACT THAT INDIA WAS NOT SEEKING A BREAK-UP OF PAKISTAN AND
SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO MAKE CLEAR THIS POINT WITH SULTAN KHAN
WHEN HE SAW HIM THIS AFTERNOON. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SURPRISED
THAT THE NAME MUJIBUR RAHMAN HAD NOT ENTERED INTO THE MESSAGE
INASMUCH AS BOTH HIS PM AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAD REPEATEDLY MADE
SHEIKH TIUJIBUR RAHMAN?S RELEASE A PRECONDITION TO ANY DIALOGUE
TOWARDS' POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ATAL DISAFFIRMED THIS AS REFLECT-
ING CURRENT THINKING--AND SAID, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT AS FAR AS HE
WAS CONCERNED HE THOUGHT MUJIBUR WAS A QTE STUPID FOOL UNQTE.
HE ADDED THAT, IN HIS OPINION9 MUJIBUR AND BHUTTO WERE PRIMARILY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT DEBACLE. REFERRING TO THE TYPE OF
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RDCONCILIATION WHICH WAS CONTEMPLATED IN MRS. GANDHI'S
COMMUNICATION TO YAHYA, ATAL SAID THAT HE ENVPSAGED SOMETHING IN
THE NATURE OF A LOOSE CONFEDERATION ASBEING TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE,
ADDING THAT IT MOST CERTAINLY DID NOT INCLUDE INDEPENDENCE. IN THIS
CONNECTION I TOLD HIM OF MY CONVERSATION WITH YAHYA ON NOV. 18
DURING WHICH YAHYA HAD ADVIS CD ME THAT PROVISIONS OF THE FORTH-
COMING CONSTITUTION WOULD HIGHLIGHT THE DEGREE OF. QTE FEDERATED
INDEPENDENCE UNQTE WHICH EAST PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE UNDER IT. ATAL
SEIZED UPON THE WORDS QTE FEDERATED INDEPENDENCE UNQTE ,
SAYING THE CHOICE THEREOF WAS PARTICULARLY FORTUITOUS BECAUSE IT
GAVE THE WEST QTE FEDERATION UNQTE AND THE EAST QTE INDEPENDENCE
UNQTE. (ISLAMABAD 11484 PARA 6.)
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1717
INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DACCA
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
S E C. P E T.SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 11740
063902
FRO 1 AMBASSADOR
5. AS THE DISCUSSION MOVED FROM THE CATACLYSMIC HOLOCAUST WHICH A
WAR WOULD BRING TO THE SUBCONTINENT, ATAL SAIF UHAT HE FELT THE
ONLY:. WAY TO PREVENT ITS OCCURRENCE WAS FOR A DIALOGUE TO ENSUE
IMMEDIATELY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOP AND REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PROSCRIBED AWAMI LEAGUE NOW IN INDIA AND ELSEWHERE. I
EXPLAINED TO.ATAL THAT THE U.S., AS A FRIEND TO BOTH PAKISTAN AND
INDIA, HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING, ALBEIT WITH UTMOST QUIETUDE, TO BRING
ABOUT THE INSTITUTION OF PRECISELY SUCH A DIALOGUE, AND THAT I
WAS SOMEWHAT. SURPRISED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE THAT PRES. YAHYA HAD
SPECIFICALLY ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS AGREEABLE TO THE IDEA, AND HIS
REPRESENTATIVES WOULD MEET WITH BANGLA DESH REPRESENTATIVES,
PROVIDED ,THESE HAD NOT BEEN CATEGORIZED AS FELONS. (REFTEL
ISLAMABAD 8631 AND ISLAMABAD 10927 PARA 6.) I WENT ON TO SAY
THAT ATTEMPTS SO FAR TO BRING THIS TO FRUITION HAD BEEN SUBJECT
TO-CERTAIN IMPEDIMENTS WHICH WERE NOT OF GOP ORIGIN.
6.. ATAL THEN STATED THAT HE WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT HIS PM
WOULD ENDORSE THE CON WAIDVQ#ENCOURAG ING CERTAIN OF THE AWAMI
LEAGUE LEADERS TO ENGAGE IN THE SUGGESTED SCENARIO. I TOLD HIM
THAT I HOPED THAT HE WAS RIGHT IN HIS ASSUMPTION, BUT THAT
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MRS. NDHI AND HER ENTOURAGE, DURING THEIR WASHINGTON VISITATION,
HAD BEEN APPRISED OF THE FACT THAT YAHYA WAS NOT ONLY AMENABLE BUT
WAS DESIROUS OF SUCH A MEETING. ATAL?S REPLY WAS TO THE EFFECT
THAT BOTH SHE AND MEMBERS OF HER GROUP, WHILE IN WASHINGTON, WERE
FETTERED BY THE RESTRAINTS OF DIPLOMACY, BUT THAT QTE THINGS MAY
HAVE C (MMGED UNQTE AND, AT ANY RATE, HE WAS TALKING TO ME QTE MAN
TO MAN_UNQTE.
7. THE CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH THE AGREEMENT THAT HE WOULD
IMMEDIATELY CONTACT GOI AND ASCERTAIN WHYAHER OR NOT IT WOUG BE
AMENABLE .TO ENCOURAGING A MEETING AFORESAID, THE LOCALE OF WHICH
COULD BE ANY PLACE AGREED UPON. HOWEVER, ATAL OPINED THAT HE
BELIEVED TEHRAN MIGHT BE THE MOST LIKELY SITUS SINCE THE
S.HAN WAS KNOWN WELLAND FAVORABLY BY BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIA. ON.
MY :PART, I SAID I.. WOULD AT ONCE NOTIFY MY GOVERNMENT AND WOULD
ATTEMPT SOONEST TO .GET IN TOUCH WITH PRES. YAHYA FOR THE PURPOSE
OF CONVEYING TO HIM A SUMMARY OP OUR CONVERSATION. ATAL TOOK
HIS. DEPARTURE VOICING THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD LET ME KNOW
SOONEST OF. ANY REPLY FROM NEW DELHI.
8. COMMENT: WHILE THIS MIGHT BE THE BREAK-THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE
BEEN LOOKING FOR, I COUNSEL AGAINST ELATION SINCE I HAVE A VERY
STRONG SUSPICION THAT ATAL AND KAUL ARE MILES APART IN THEIR
THINKING. (SEE CALCUTTA 2901o) GP-2.
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P 2907402 NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1726
INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DACCA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 11759
EXDIS
C 0 R R E C T E D C 0 P Y (TEXT: PARAGRAPH 2.)
--------------
SUB J YAHYA'S REACTIO N TO IND IAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
J.K . ATAL'S SUGGESTION OF MEETING WITH BANGLA
DESH REPRESENTATIVES
REF ISLAMABAD 11740
1. I MET WITH PRES. YAHYA IN HIS RESIDENCE AT 1930
HRS. LOCAL SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27; THE CONVERSATION
LASTED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 2130 HRS. AMONG OTHER
SUBJECTS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED AND WHICH ARE BEING
REPORTED SEPTELS, I CONVEYED TO YAHYA, FULLY AND
COMPLETELY, THE INDIAN HICOMER J.K. ATAL'S PROPOSAL
TO SECURE FROM THE GOI AN AFFIRMATIVE POSTURE ON'THE
IDEA OF CERTAIN PROSCRIBED AWAMI LEAGUE
REPRESENTATIVES MEETING WITH GOP REPRESENTATIVES IN
TEHRAN OR ELSEWHERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INSTITUTING A
DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. I ALSO
CONVEYED TO YAHYA THE OTHER ASPECTS OF MY CONVERSATION
WITH ATAL AS REPORTED IN REPTEL.
2. YAHYA SAID THAT, IN HIS OPINION, ATAL IS EITHER
QTE AMAZINGLY UNINFORMED OR WAS PLAYING A
QTE MOST MISCHEVIOUS UNQTE ROLE AT THIS PARTICULARLY
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CRITICAL TIME. OF THESE TWO PROPOSITIONS, YAHYA SAID
THAT, I N HIS JUDGEMENT, ATAL IS HONEST I N HIS EFFORTS
AND APPARENTLY HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY BRIEFED BY HIS
GOVERNMENT BEFORE ASSUMING HIS POST HERE. I EXPRESSED
MY AGREEMENT, SAYING THAT I FELT THAT ATAL WAS SINCERE
IN HIS DESIRE TO EFFECT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN INDIA
AND PAKISTAN.
3. RETURNING TO THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE CONVER-
SATION, YAHYA SAID HIS POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED AS
HERETOFORE CONVEYED TO ME, I.E., HE WAS FULLY AGREEABLE
4Tc1 TIIF: IDEA, AND THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVES WOULD MEET
WI l'li L1ANGL.A D1?: GH RE.PRE:3ENFAI1VF::3r PROVIDED THESE
INDIVIDUAL.., HAD NOT BEEN CATEGORIZED AS FELONS. (SEE
ISLAMABAD 8631 AND ISLAMABAD 10926, PARA 6.) YAHYA
ADDED THAT, SHOULD SUCH A MEETING BE ARRANGED, QTE
THEY WILL NOT FIND ME UNRESPONSIVE UNQTE. GP-3.
FARLA ND
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