REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNISTS INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 7, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

DP91 `T?Q,y172R000400200010-6
JOINT U iILckTIoI6 COMMITTEE
Report of Indications of Soviet-Comanunist Intentions
TOP SEC ?9 Chang" I:t G:Wsa. ^
^ C4,c,'?:sslfied
-------------- rom: 31 August 1950
.-.ss. Chan^c:1 to: TS S
:.,xt ii':~'w! Eh : ---------
f 70FEB 1979
No- 5
1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
o ; 6 September 1950
ssistant Chief of Staff, o-2
epartmont of the Arr4Y
Washington 25, D? C.
I september 1950
25X1
JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on
File
a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced s one of
readiness for war and could initiate offensive operat with
no additional warning. There are no indications of im,ninent
Soviet hostilities.
b. There are no firm indications ressbutematerial mssistanceito
intentions to intervene in
the North Koreans is evidently continuing.
c . There are no indications of an jzominent attack on Formosa.
Although weather and sea conditions will probably be less
favorable for an attack after mid-September, the period from
late September through. early October may not be too unfavorable.
After mid-October sea conditions will probably become
unfavorable for an attack. However, an attack after
this date is not precluded by weather and sea conditions.
d. There are continuing indications of increasing preparedness of
Soviet and Satellite forces in Eiropo, particularly of logisti-
cal buildup.
2. BOVIET -COL4fuNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD
a. St ry?-Tham are no additional reports of a Chinese Co zmist
build-up in Manchuria. Work on airfields . for North Korean forces
is continuing. Preparations by the Viet Minh for an attack on
French lines of c,ommunicatcion are increasinge large shipments
of equipment to Soviet forces in the southwestern portion of the
Soviet Zone of Germany have been reported. A tribal revolt in
Iran. does not appear to be indicative of general Kurdish uprisings.
CONFIDENTIAL
1 T01172R000400200f}?f- 6
 Approve elease 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T 1G 172R000400200010-6
b. Operations of enemy component elements.
(1)
KOREA.---See current situation reports. Soviet supply of
the North Koreans appears to be continuing although the
extent of current assistance is not known. Work on air-
fields for North Korean forces is continuing. There are
no additional indications of a build-up of Chinese
Communist forces in Manchuria and reports that Chinese
Communist reinforcements have arrived in Korea are not
confirmed.
(2) CIIINA.--There are no indications of an imminent a :tack
on Formosa.
(3) INDO-CHINA.--.Possible movements of Chinese Coma ,.,3t
forces somerdiat closer to the Indo-China border have
not materially increased their capabilities to -4.nvade.
Recent rumors that a Chinese Communist invasion is
imminent are not confirmed, Viet Minh preparations for
an attack on French lines of communication have increased.
(4) GERANY.---There are additional indications that Soviet
forces are preparing for large-scale maneuvers in the
near future. Reports of unusually large shipments of
equipment and supplies into the southwestern portion
of the Soviet Zone during August indicate either pre-
parations for large-scale exercises or a further build-
up of Soviet stockpiles.
(5) SOUTHEAST EUROPE.-Shortages of gasoline and unusual
conservation measures are not general throughout
Southeast Europe, but shortages continue in Rumania
where gasoline has been rationed. There have been no
indications of unusual troop activity in the area,
(6) GR " CE.-.There are indications of increased guerrilla
infiltration into Greece for subversive purposes, but
present information does not indicate that intensified
Greek guerrilla military operations are imminent.
(7) IRAN.--A Kurdish tribe which is in revolt against a
government order to surrender its arms has long been a
troublesome element. Recent Soviet propaganda inciting
Kurdish revolts in the Near that many have contributed
to the indident, but it does not appear to indicate
general Kurdish uprisings.
3. See Tab "A" attached.
4. 00Pd3ITNIST CAPABILITIES.--No significant change is evident, but
maneuver preparations in Germany are increasing the 'Soviet
capability for combat operations.
Approved FaaTe
 Approve F ,Tr I
ia
In
P91 T'2R000400200010-6
TAB "A"
REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF S011Ib'T-COIWNIST INTENTIONS
Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
6 September 1950
1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.
a. There is little new information on Soviet and Chinese
Communist activities which is indicative of intentions in Korean
(1) It is evident that North Korean operations on the
current scale could only be sustained with outside
logistical assistance. Soviet supply of the North
Koreans thus appears to be continuing althcAc;h con-
crete evidence of the extent of current ase -i stance
is lacking. There have been recent reports of the
movement of convoys into Korea from Antunga ,lnchuria.
(2) There have been additional reports that work on air-
fields for North Korean forces is continuing. The
shooting down of a single Soviet bomber in the area
of military operations in Korea is not in itself an
indication that the Soviets intend to employ their
own forces in Korean
25X1
(3) No new reports have been received on a build-up of
Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria.. There is no
confirmation of a report that
Chinese Communist armies 'have entered Korea. It is
evident that North Korean units are kept well sup-
plied with poorly trained but adequate replacements,
but there have been no indications of the organization
of well trained strategic reserves in the rear areas.
b. Available information continues to show no indications of
an imminent attack on Formosa. Although weather and sea conditions will
probably be less favorable for an attack after mid-September, the period
from late September through early October may not be too unfavorable.
After mid-October sea conditions will probably become increasingly
unfavorable for an attack.
25X1 c. a Chinese
Communist invasion or Indo-China is scheduled to begin about 10
September and that local Chinese Communists and the Soviet Legation
are talking of an imminent "big surprise." have re-
ported a movement of Chinese Communist forces someimat c oser to the
border of Indo-China, but this information does not indicate a major
redeployment of Chinese Communist forces or a material increase in
their capabilities to invade Indo-China. There have been no other in-
dications that the Chinese Communists are planning to invade, although
Approved FoRQe- 2
W(719TM TU
P91 T01 172R000400200010-6
25X1
 Approved Fob- Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP91 W2R000400200010-6
~~ TOP MEN
an attack with virtually no advance notice is possible. There have
been increased preparations by the Viet Minh for an attack on French
lines of comrcunication, particularly in the Caobang-Iang$on area
d. The Soviets are reported to have ordered five vjaseU,
described as transports, to depart from Odessa for the Far East during
the first two weeks of September. Although this report is not confirmed,
Such a movement would be consistent with other indications that the
Soviets are increasing their shipping facilities in the Far at, proms
ably-because of the inadequacy of rail transport.
e. There is no new information with regard to Chinese Commaznist
intentions towards Tibet or Burma.
f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1)
There are no firm indications of a Soviet o:.- Chinese
Communist intention to intervene in Korea, although
material assistance to the North Koreans is evidently
continuing.
(2) Available information does not indicate an imminent
attack on Formosan
(3)
Capabilities of the Viet Minh have continued to in-
crease but there are no reliable indications of an
imminent Chinese Communist offensive in Indo-China.
2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.
a. Reports from Eastern European countries indicate that
shortages of gasoline and unusual conservation measures are not general
throughout the area but appear to be confined to Rumania and the Soviet
Zone of Germany. Gasoline rationing was imposed in Rumania on 30 August.
In Hungary, a subterranean fuel depot has been transferred from Hungarian
to Soviet Army control, but no gasoline shortage has been noteds
b. In Germany there are additional indications that Soviet
forces are preparing for larger scale maneuvers in the near future,
with the attendant increased capability for combat operations. In the
Ohrdruf Eisenach area (in the southwestern portion of the Soviet Zone
near the boundary of the U. S. Zone), unconfirmed reports indicate
that there was an unusually large build-up of equipment and supplies
during the first wo weeks of August. Shipments into the area are re-
ported to have included 60 carloads of spare parts, 18 carloads of
building equipment, 65 carloads of ammunition, and 300,000 gallons of
gasoline. Some of these items are considered to be far in excess of
needs for present training activity, and the stockpiling of gasoline in
the area has been reported, although the shipment mentioned is not in
itself an excessive quantity for maneuver purposes. This area now
I r-01P BE CRET
Approved For Rblease 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400200010-6
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP91 tJ72R000400200010-6
%WW"'T T
op SE(M
contains the largest concentration of Soviet forces in 0ermaflya
i soviet
as the area in which a CPX was conducted in June, involving l the a armies in German. It appears that the increase of sum ents a furtherea maneuvers or
i3 probably intended for large- scaleContinued shipments of this type
buildup of stockpiles in Germany there hinto forward areas could be a preliminary to hostilities but
Gt there have
been no reports of a general forward movement of supplies
(k soline reserves in the Soviet Zone have been increased, homevero
c. At the recent National Front Congress in East Germany,
;anouncement was made of the Communist program to be directed against
West Germany. The program includes: (1) the incitement of strikes,
or
especially in ports and heavy industries; (2) attempts to convP~'t former
t.rny officers to the Communist cause; (3) masse deed (4)tions - esets
(;ermant cities in defiance of legal regulaons; sharP
against recruits for the planned expansion of the West German police
forces.. This program is a continuation of policies laid down at the
July Communist Party Congress rrlinsand does not represent any oInge
in announced Fast German
d. There have been no indications of unusual military activity
in Southeast BUrope. Rwnors of the movement of Soviet equips nt inners,
Hungary are believed to be the result of Hungarian AruY
some of which have been observed in southwestern Hungary.
nrudi tribe is reported to-have
a
J
av
fe In Iran, the Kurdish
Soviet
refused compliance with a government order to turn in its arms.
propaganda designed to incite the Kurds against Iran has continued de?
spite the present Soviet policy of friendliness towards the Iranian
government. The Javanrudi tribe has been particularly troublesome in
the past and has resisted several previous efforts of the govern that
to disarm them. Because of this background, it appears pr
the current trouble is similar to previous difficulties and not the
beginning of general Kurdish uprisings in the Near East. Soviet propa-
ganda may have contributed to the incident, however.
g. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1) There are no conclusive ostilities in Western Europe., the oBal~nort Soviet
Y~ the
Near East o
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400200010-6
3
 Approved Fo s DP91 jal '2R000400200010-6
(2) There are continuing indications of Soviet military
preparations, particularly of logistical build-up.
t
(3) An attack in any of these areas could occur without
additional warning.
0/y, irctO;
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee
Colonel E. F. Adams, G-2
Colonel J. K. Baker, G-2
Colonel S. A. Blair, USAF (DA-USAF)
Colonel C. V. Bromley, 0-2
Colonel R. E. Hommel, USDE (ONI)
Colonel F. P. Jhinson, JIG
Colonel H. H. Smith, 0-2
Colonel B. B. Talley, 0-2
Colonel T. J. Wells, 0-2
Lt Colonel J. C--Brewer, USAF (D/I-USAF)
Commander E. G. Ca.rdner, Jr.,USN (ONI)
Lt Colonel W. F. Jung, G-2
2 5X 1 A Major R. C. Burn, 0-2
Captain J. L. Sutton, USAF (D/I-USAF)
CIA
25X1 A CIA
Mr Samuel McKee,
Miss Cynthia Grabo, 0-2 (Secretary)
`l
Approved For Release 2002/08/ : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400200010-6