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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY.. SUMMARY
Special Report
Arms and Security in Latin A :!erica
CIA
DOCUMENT Secret
SERVICES BR,04w.ll
FILE CcW N? 608
00 3T~March
'8=?~qff1972
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In the Juror over the alleged arms race in Latin
America, there is much hypocrisy, maneuvering and
trickery. And a good close of foolishness in the repeti-
tion of disarmatnent cliches wit/tout much attention
to the facts....
AThere o L!eras Carmargo
/ ormer secretary genera!
oJ'the OAS
Latin America spends less on arms than any
otter part of tie world. In fact, in the past 20 tears,
defense budgets as a proportion of 'total expenditures
have dropped 50 percent.
Sol Linowit:
Former US envoy to the OAS
During the past five years, South American countries have purcl,dsed more than a billion
dollars worth of armaments from Western Europe and Canada with deliveries scheduled through the
mid-seventies. While this amount is admittedly small in comparison with the acquisitions of major
world powers, it reflects a growing interest in modern weapons systems and a movement away Trom
traditional US suppliers. Nevertheless, no single European seller has cornered the arms market. Most
of the Latin American countries continue to show a preference for US military missions.
Arms control efforts have been thwarted by political, economic, and institutional factors as
well as by the way major Latin American governments view potential threats to their security.
There is little danger, however, of a serious arms race since internal security and patrol of territorial
seas continue to be the main focus of military operations. Armament inventories will continue to
expand, but there is no indication of a d,-amatic increase in total military expenditures.
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Background
During World War II, the US replaced
Europe as "ie main source of military assistance
and materiel for Latin America. Military equip-
ment from the US, provided at first through lend-
lease aid, was supplied to the major South
American forces at relatively low cost through
surplus sales or loans. The sales of new armaments
to South America consisted mainly of trainer and
transport aircraft, helicopters, and small arms.
After the war, the US continued to domi-
ildte the Latin American arms market for many
years. A little West European equipment was
purc;,ased, largely surplus warships, jet tactical
aircraft, and tanks. These items the US was reluc-
tant or unwilling to supply.
While the smaller Latin American military
establishments, along with Mexico, generally have
welcomed the US emphasis on internal security
and arms limitations, the leading South American
forces have been less receptive. In part, this re-
flects important differences among Latin Ameri-
can military organizations. Those in the larger
South American countries are characterized by a
high degree of specialization, adherence to dis-
cipline. and a hierarchical structure. They are
relatively cohesive, and have well-organized com-
mand, staff, and school systems. They are not
receptive to US attempts to limit their arms sup-
plies. Since the mid-1960s, the six major South
American countries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela-which account
for 80 percent of Latin American military spend-
ing, have turned increasingly to non-US suppliers
for major combat equipment. The smaller Latin
American countries, however, generally lack the
economic resources and technical expertise
needed to suppor~ professional military in-
stitutions, and the acquisition of modern arms is
not a matter of such intense national pride.
Arms Purchases from Europe
In Latin America, as in other areas of the
world, weapons procurement is often dictated by
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economic and political forces rather than by the
strategic realities or by missions created to cope
with those realities. In the 1960s, military leaders
in the major South American countries began to
express concern about the state of their military
equipment. Their inventories dated from World
War II or earlier and were in poor condition.
Replacement parts were in short supply and tech-
nica! skills lacking. In planning to modernize their
holdings of combat equipment, the major South
American services were inclined to set higher
goals than were suggested by their US advisers.
The advisers emphasized low cost and utility
factors, while the Latin military wanted badly to
stay abreast of contemporary military tech-
nology. The US stress on internal security, par-
ticularly, clashed with the nationalistic attitudes
of leaders of the larger South American sere ces.
Before the current round of arms moderni; ition
began, some military commanders compllined
that their outmoded equipment made it dificult
to attract officer candidates.
In the late 1960s, the larger South American
countries were benefiting from better economic
conditions, and in many of them military govern-
ments were determining the allocation of funds.
These factors favored a more generous attitude
toward military re-equipment programs. Brazil,
the country that accounts for about 40 percent of
current arms purchases, is particularly flush as a
result of rapid industrial growth and increased
government revenues. With more cash available
and under pressures to expand and replace aging
inventories, military buyers were willing to !ook
beyond the US for new equipment.
Another factor promoting the sale of non-
US arms to Latin America has been US legislative
restrictions on military assistance to foreign coun-
tries,, particularly the Symington and Conte-Long
amendments to the US Foreign Assistance Act of
1967. These amendments call for a reduction or
termination of US economic assistance to coun-
tries that make "unnecessary military expendi-
tureit" or purchase sophisticated equipment. To
most Latin American leaders, this was an unac-
ceptable challenge to their national sovereignty
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LATI N
AAiNILIZICAN
PRODUCTS
French AMX-I3 (ank assembled in Argentina.
Italian designed Acrmacchi 326 jet aircraft produced in Brasil.
British Mark I() frigate, Nvhich Brasil plans It, huild next vear.
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SECRE J.'
Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia (in that
order). Venezuela's large foreign exchange earn-
ings have allowed it recently to increase its mili-
tary expenditures at a record pace. Major equip-
ment purchases, however, have been made to
refurbish an antiquated weapons inventory.
The naval services used to account for the
bulk of Latin armament acquisitions, but air and
ground forces have greatly increased their share
over the past several years. Latin American navies
are buying the usual mix of principal combatant
22.0+
5.8
90.7
307.0
117.0
Argentina 5.5 16.7 6.4 21.0+
Brazil 6.8 47.2 60.5 52.0
Chile 1.6 5.9
Colombia
Ecuador 0.6
Mexico 2.5
Paraguay 0.4
Uruguay
Venezuela
and prestige, and they preferred to accept eco-
nomic aid cuts rather than abandon their military
modernization programs. European countries, on
the other hand, have been less inhibited by such
political reservations and have exported arms to
Latin America for economic reasons. In many
cases in West Europe, the export of arms helps to
sustain armament industries, which would not be
economically viable without a si