WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHANA: A VERY DIFFERENT JUNTA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 21, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Ghana A Very Different Junta
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CIA
DOCUMENT SrRV1PC.ES BRANCH
Secret
N9 625
FILE COPY 21 April 1972
No. 0366/72A
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On 1 January 1972, for the second time in six years, the soldiers took power
in Accra. This time, however, things are different. The new army leaders are a
different breed and have a different view of their role than the older officers who
threw Nkrumah out in 1966. They are much more nationalistic and inclined to be
more authoritarian, but they are much less sure of how to proceed, even organiza-
tionally. They are groping for policies and programs and are listening to n any
diverse voices, some of which favor wrenching Ghana sharply away from the
pro-Western orientation it has maintained since 1966. At this stage, the new leaders,
while more mistrustful of all foreigners, seem well disposed toward the West,
especially the US, and anxious to work out an accommodation on Ghana's major
problem-its foreign debt. But they are, above all, committed to getting Ghana
moving again. They know they must produce results quickly or rely more heavily on
force to remain in power.
The Army Takes Over
Although the leaders of the coup apparently
were motivated primarily by personal grievances,
their action coincided with growing unrest over
the Busia government's failure in its two-and-a-
half years to solve Ghana's economic problems.
The economy was still suffering from nine years
of mismanagement by the Nkrumah regime, there
had been a general decline in cocoa prices, and
the country was saddled with an enormous ex-
ternal debt that had reached nearly $1 billion.
Unemployment had risen steadily since the ouster
of Nkrumah, and inflation, which had been
checked somewhat by the military government
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that had preceded the Busia regime, was again
becoming a serious problem. The fiscally ortho-
dox Busia government had sought guidance from
international financial institutions from which
Ghana has been receiving important aid. Partly
because of this advice the government in mid-
1971 inaugurated austerity measures that signif-
icantly eroded the living standards of many
Ghanaians. Busia's harsh and inept imple-
mentation of these measures, coupled with the
acknowledged priority he gave to rural develop-
ment, gradually alienated key urban elements,
particularly organized labor and the civil service.
Busia made his final mistake when he applied
these measures to the military.
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At the center of the coup plot was Colonel I.
K. ("Ike") Acheampong, a 40-year-old officer
imbued with a profound belief that all politicians
are rr
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The coup swept away the carefully prepared
constitution by which Busia had governed fol-
lowing free elections in August 1969. Political
power is now vested in a nine-man National
Redemption Council that rules by decree. Its key
people are Acheampong and two of the three
majors whose support was critical to the success
of the coup, R. M. Baah and A. H. Selormey.
Ghana's new military rulers clearly are a
different breed from the senior army and police
officials who made up Ghana's first military
junta, which ruled from February 1966 until
October 1969. The current leaders are younger
They are more junior, have rather different mili-
tary 'jackgrounds, and are appreciably more na-
tionalistic
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c eampong s key collaborators were ree
majors who shared his displeasure over military
promotions and assignments. Busia's d;scrim-
ination against the large and energetic Ewe tribe
gave two of the majors, who are members of that
tribe, an added grievance. All three ware second
in command of important army units in the Accra
area. In the early hours of 13 January, they seized
control of these units and took over the govern-
ment.
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More important, however, is the different
perception the new leaders have of their mission,
which they see in grander terms than did the first
junta. The earlier group viewed itself essentially as
a caretaker and saw its mission in terms of lib-
erating the country from all vestiges of the
Nkrumah government. In er:onomic matters, the
first junta sought mainly to halt the slide into
chaos and to sort out Ghana's foreign financial
obligations before turning the problems over to
the civilians. the new leadership hzs made much
of its intention to use its military experience to
redeem Ghana from the mistakes of all previous
governments, to attack vigorously the problems
left essentially untouched by the first junta, and
to get the economy moving again. The middle-
grade officers who dominate the present junta
seem much less qualified to deal with these
problems, however, and none of them has the
experience needed to handle his new responsi-
bilities.
Yet, the new military leaders appear, at least
at this time, to envision a longer tenure than that
of the first junta. There was little doubt but that
the first group fully intended to make good its
commitment to return to civilian rule, and it did.
The current leaders' faint promises in that regard
seem hollow. They have a strong bias against
politicians and seem to hold the first junta in
contempt, not only for its failure to apply in-
dependent solutions to Ghana's economic prob-
lems but also for allowing power to pass to "cor-
rupt" politicians. If and when the current rulers
get around to considering restoring civilian rule,
they are likely to bend every effort to ensure that
power does not devolve on any of the major
politicians who have been active since in-
dependence.
The junta has sought advice from a wide
variety of sources and seems willing to listen to
counsel from virtually any quarter. Judged in
terms of policy decisions thus far, the most in-
fluential advisers have been the experienced eco-
nomic specialists in the civil service who were
named to an Economic Review Committee im-
mediately after the coup. This group apparently
drafted Acheampong's debt policy statement an-
nounced on 5 February, the major economic
action so far. These advisers seem to be doing a
fairy effective job of guiding the junta through
Ghana's tangled financial thickets and in ac-
quainting the soldiers w;+h the realities of the
country's economic problems.
The junta has been more reluctant to accept
advice from the private sector. Several old-line
economic specialists outside the government serv-
ice, who were initially tabbed to serve on a high-
level National Advisory Council, were forced to
resign after only three days in office. The council
included Robert Gardiner-the able and respected
Ghanaian who heads the UN Economic
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Commission for Africa-and several of the most
prominent and experienced business leaders in
Ghana. During their brief tenure, the Council's
members were subjected to a barrage of harsh
criticism in the government press, which leveled
charges that they were "burnt-out old men"
whose loyalties and ideologies were out of tune
with the younger generation of "African revolu-
tionaries." The junta's abrupt reversal on these
appointments reflected a determination to seek
fresh approaches to Ghana's problems.
The soldiers have received advice from other
sources, which have urged a return to the pro-
Communist positions espoused during the
Nkrumah era. Several former men-hers of Nkru-
mah's government and political party have sub-
mitted policy proposals that would drastically
alter Ghana's domestic and foreign orientation.
The greatest impact so far of these people
has been in terms of the rhetoric of the new
government.
owned newspapers, which have. increasingly re-
flected a neo-Nkrumahist stance. These papers
have been calling for revolutionary change and
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have sharply criticized Ghana's close ties with the
West. The papers have also carried biting criticism
of conservative elements in Ghana and have urged
the new leaders to resurrect Nkrumah's political
party as the only viable alternative to the banned
Progress Party of Dr. Busia. At present, such a
resurrection seems as unlikely as a political
comeback by Nkrumah himself. Acheampong has
repeatedly stated that his coup was not under-
taken for the benefit of this or that political
party, rnd exiled Nkrumahists have been warned
that they must still answer any outstanding
criminal charges if they return to Ghana. There
are, however, indications the junta may allow
Nkrumah, who apparently is near death in a
cancer institute in Romania, to return to Ghana
to live out his last days in his home village.
The new leadership has generally kept
former opposition politicians at arms' length
despite their persistent offers of help. In late
March, however, the junta appointed two prom-
inent civilian politicians, Komla Gbedemah and
Joe Appiah, to serve as roving ambassadors.
Gbedemah, a major figure in the Nkrumah regime
until he was purged in 1961, was Busia's main
opponent in the 1969 elections; Appiah at the
time of the coup was chairman of the now
banned opposition Justice Party. Acheampong
may have decided it is safer to keep Gbedemah
and Appiah busy working for the junta, fre-
quently abroad, than to allow them to become
the focus of discontent. Gbedemah was once a
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highly effective finance minister and could
provide the junta needed e>?pertise.
The new junta has not gotten off to a very
auspicious start. Its first three months in power
have been marked by indecision and delay both in
organizing an administration and in developing
policies. There has been much backing and filling
on appointments-beginning with the membership
on the governing council itself-and decisions
have been taken on an ad hoc basis. The military
officers finally appointed to head the various gov-
ernment departments are all inexperienced and
the abilities of most appear limited. Under these
circumstances, coordination within the bureauc-
racy is minimal.
The new leaders' indecision and confusion
reflects in part a failure to give much thought
'-':fore the coup to what they would do once in
power. A preoccupation with security has further
hampered their ability to make policy decisions.
Acheampong, an Ashanti tribesman, and some of
his non-Ewe associates seem to have become
inordinately fearful of plotting by Ewes who
emerged from the cost-coup scramble as the
largest single ethn;c bloc in the new junta. Sub-
sequent maneuvering by- some Ewes bent on
advancing their own fortunes or that of tribal
brothers has apparently led Acheampcng to
suspect the tribe is out to regain the decisive
The new regime's concern with security is
reflected in its evident determination to ruin,
politically as well as financially, all members of
th-a ousted Busia government and possibly many
of the former opposition politicians as well. After
releasing all but the biggest fish in the old govern-
ment, the junta ordered their re-arrest. Some 500
Ghanaians who held positions under Busia are
now in prison. At the same time, a wide-ranging
probe of the financial holdings of members of the
old regime has been launched.
In economic policy matters, the junta has
lifted some of Busia's harsh austerity measures,
but has discovered that its options are more
limited than appeared at first glance. The new
leadership has restored ft Inge benefits for the
military and civil servants, canceled some special
taxes, revalued Ghana's currency, and instituted
subsidized price controls on essential food items.
Economic necessities have forced the junta to
impose import controls and continue an essen-
tially austere budget, which to some degrec will
offset the former measures.
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Although the junta has attempted to make
life easier for urban dwellers, it has also chosen to
continue the Busia regime's priority interest in
rural development. The main thrust of this policy
is the junta's highly touted "operation feed your-
self," an attempt to encourage Ghanaians to
:ncrease agricultural production. It is likely to be
some time before this operation produces real and
tangible benefits. Ironically, the regime may soon
benefit from Busia's emphasis on rural develop-
ment as the country is expeL;.::-i soon to become
self-sufficient in some current,; imported com-
modities.
The junta's most popular economic move
thus far has been its 5 February pronouncement
repudiating some Nkrumah era debts to the UK
and unilaterally altering the payment schedules of
others. The details remain negotiable, however,
and the move was basically a bid for longer term
relief. The junta believes-and there is con-
siderable supporting evidence-that many of the
Nkrumah era debts were fraudulent in that sharp
operators took advantage of Ghanaian officials to
saddle the country with expensive loans for
unviable projects. Many Ghanaians view the re-
schedulings and attendant interest surch,:rges as
onerous and unfair, and they consider the con-
ditions imposed by the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund beyond the political endur-
ance of any Ghanaian government.
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In foreign affairs, the junta has already
begun to move toward a nonaligned position.
Acheampong has on several occasions remarked
that past governments unreservedly accepted
guidance from the West. He says he intends to
right this. The new government has re-established
relations with China-suspended several months
after the ouster of Nkrumah-and is looking into
the possibility of importing certain commodities
from other Communist states in the event that
current sources in the West dry up. The junta is
also seeking to reactivate several industrial proj-
ects begun with Communist aid under Nkrumah.
The Soviet Embassy and East German Trade Mis-
sion have been augmented and are certain to be
more active in the future.
Acheampong has denounced the Busia gov-
ernment's sympathetic attitude toward dialogue
with white-ruled southern Africa and indicated
his regime will be more actively involved in sup-
porting African liberation groups. The soldiers
will also be more wary of those states in Africa,
such as next-door Ivory Coast, which are con-
sidered too heavily influenced by the former colo-
nial power. Acheampong and his fellow officers
seem particularly to admire the nationalistic mili-
tary government of Nigeria, black Africa's largest
country, and may to some extent be influenced
by Nigerian policies in both foreign and domestic
affairs.
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In all fields, the junta's performance has
carried a common theme-that of tackling prob-
lems in a brusque, military manner. The result is a
heady impression of movement, including inten-
sive press coverage of trimly attired soldiers out
beating the bushes and getting things done. In the
process, the soldiers have not been very sensitive
to Ghana's legal traditions, which have been
flouted, for example, by procedures adopted for
the assets probe of Busia's people. While loudly
denouncing the Busia regime's occasional forays
against the civil rights of citizens, the junta itself
has created a general tone of authoritarianism and
regimentation unequaled since the days of Nkru-
mah. The junta has been extreme:y sensitive to
criticism and has fostered an atmosphere that has
clearly intimidated Ghana's wary journalists.
Among new controls is a requirement tnat all
Ghanaians who travel overseas must have exit
permits. The junta's attempts to intimidate busi-
ness and labor include a demand for a 20-year
industrial truce. The soldiers' response to a minor
strike was to double-time the strikers around the
plant until they agreed to go back to work. Vir-
tually all orders and decrees ire accompanied by
threats of severe reprisals if they are not followed
to the letter. Typical is the junta's currerr' re-
sponse to developing food shortages. Last week,
Acheampong declared queuing unpatriotic,
threatened to inflict harsh punishment on those
who persist in lining up for goods, and warned
that shops attracting queues will be put out of
business.
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The situation is fluid and the future murky.
At present, Acheampong's junta is in control of
the country, and no organized opposition is in
sight. The initial apathy with which the junta was
met has gradually given way to cautious approval
and pride at least in the new leaders' nationalistic
posture. This could quickly sour if the junta is
unable to make some early progress in raising
living standards. Thus, the junta has only limited
time to settle down and develop an effective
administration that can come up with solutions,
as new and more severe economic pressures are
already building. The failure to arrange for suf-
ficient imports of foodstuffs and raw materials
may soon lead to shortages that will heighten
general public discontent. In addition, Ghana
could lose some important foreign aid if the junta
is unable soon to resolve the impasse on the debt
problem.
The junta will also have to resist its incli-
nation to regiment the Ghanaian people if it is to
maintain the apprc:; ! it cu. rently enjoys. Even if
a majority of Ghanaians turn against the govern-
ment, there is little they can do other than
provide a pretext and base of support for future
coup plotters in the army, the only credible
threat to the junta. The Ureakdowri in military
discipline that has occurred as a result of two
successful coups in six years will have to be dealt
with gingerly. Acheampong cannot but be aware
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that indiscipline led directly to the abortive lieu-
tenants' coup a year after the ouster of Nkrumah
and that the threat of a similar action remains.
There seems io be a growing realization in the
officer corps that further coups could destroy the
army as it exists and plunge Ghana toward chaos.
Given the frustrations that the inexperienced mili-
tary leaders are l;'