Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R001500220022-4
Body:
co,1/Oi7g1r) GP-/q ~~"L~-s
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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Situation at the Port of Haiphong
Secret
Copy No.52
ER IM 68-19
February 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FNOM AUTOMATIC
DOH NUIIAUINO AND
D[CLAP)IFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation at the Port of Haiphong
Summary
The extent of congestion at the port of
Haiphong during the past year has been almost
wholly a function of the volume of seaborne imports
rather than of the inability to discharge cargoes
and clear them through the port area.
Since June and July 1967, when congestion at
the port reached its peak, Hanoi has successfully
carried out measures to relieve the situation.
The volume of seaborne imports has risen each
month since Se tember and reached a record level
in January of this year. Concur-
rently, the average layover time for ships in the
harbor area declined monthly from a record high
in August of 33 days to 15 days in December and
January. The accumulation of cargoes in open
storage, which fell off in October, has risen
slowly as imports increased. However, the
continual turnover of these cargoes is evidence
that the North Vietnamese are clearing the port
and that the goods are being distributed inland.
probably experience longer delays in unloading
than 15 days, and the accumulation of cargoes in
open storage will probably increase. Neverthel:,ss,
Hanoi seems to have improved the organization of
the port and to be capable of holding congestion
below the high levels experienced in mid-1967.
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It
was prepared by the office of Economic Research.
1 85T00875R001500220022-4
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QEID
If continued, the marked
surge in
seaborne
imports noted during January
1968
may
revive some
of the earlier congestion.
Some
shipping will
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SECRET
Problems in Discharging Import Cargoes
and high numbers o ship arrivals during
March-June 1967 led to severe congestion in
Haiphong during June and July.* This congestion
greatly increased the layover time of ships
calling at the port and added to the cargo
accumulated in open storage near the wharfs.**
The discharge of cargo has been aggravated further
by persistent silting in the port and its approaches.
2. Average layover times for departing ships
skyrocketed from 12 days in April to a record high
in August of 33 days. Layover times decreased
steadily after August as imports returned to lower
and more normal levels during the summer months.
By December, layover time was only 15 days or
slightly above the monthly average for 1966. The
decrease in layover time occurred despite the
destruction in September of the bridges linking
Haiphong with the interior.
Although the average layover El-me--UF
ships departing in January was the same as in
* Ninety-.nine percent of North Vietnam's seaborne
imports of 1.3 million tons in 1967 moved through
the port of Haiphong.
Large concentrations of cargo in open storage
adjacent to the wharf area of Haiphong and its
warehouses were not uncommon by mid-1967. It is
possible that some of this material is stored in
the open because of the safe haven provided by
the proximity of foreign merchant ships.
Approved For Release 2005/01I3E (OPWP85TOO875
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December, an increase is likely in February. The
congestion, however, probably will not become as
serious as that during the worst months of 1967,
because North Vietnam's fleet of lighters and barges
was expanded during 1967. The additional lighterage
is used both to speed the discharge of cargo from
ships at berths and to increase the number of ships
that can be unloaded at anchor.
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