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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
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DOS review(s) completed.
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December 4, 1975
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
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CONTENTS
December 4 1975
USSR-US-Angola: Soviets Rap US on Angola . . . . 1
Polish Zloty Declines in 'value on Black
Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
No Surprises at Polish Pai?ty Congress. . . . . . 6
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USSR-US-Angola: Scv:Lets Rap US On Angola
The Soviet contra? press is giving heavy play
to allegations of extensive US military interven-
tion in Angola on behalf of the Popular Movement's
rivals. This may be fic,-scow's way of responding to
Secretary Kissinger's recent public warnings that
continued Soviet and ';uban 5apport for the Popular
Movement could have s-arious consequences for de-
tente.
The Soviet media have concentrated on re-
playing charges made by various American and Af-
rican journals. Pv.vda however, broke stride ear-
lier this week by r'.:nning an article which asserted
that US (and NATO) "servicemen," along with weapons
and other military equipment, were being "rushed"
to Angola to reinforce the ranks of "foreign inter-
ventionists" fighting thee::.
In an apparent effort to justify Soviet in-
volvement in Angola, Kremlin propagandists are con-
tinuing to refer to US-Chinese collusion in the
former Portugues;! territory. Pravda, for example,
has speculated Hiat Angola might be high on the
agenda in the talks this week between President
Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and Chinese leaders in
Peking. The Cc,?r,.rmunist Party daily had earlier
charged that tl..-~ Chinese had approached the US to
suggest "paral:?,el or joint efforts" against the
Soviet-backed 1-opular Movement.
Soviet commentators are also going to great
lengths to emphasize that detente with the West in
no way precludes Soviet support for national lib-
eration struggles elsewhere in the world. In an
editoral on the limits of detente, Izvestia on
December 2 said that "some people would like to
have us believe that the process of easing tension
in the world and support for the national libera-
tion struggle are incompatible things. They have
December 4, 1975
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tried to assert this in the past but in vain." The
editorial closed by noting that "the detente process
does not mean-and never has meant-the freezing of
the socio-political status quo in the world."
Some of Moscow's East European allies are also
weighing in against Secretary Kissinger's remarks
on Soviet involvement in Angola. An editorial, for
example, in a quasi-official Warsaw newspaper on
December 1 portrayed alloged imperialist efforts to
counter the Popular Movement. regime as part of a
strategy of concentrating on "new regions" in the
face of defeat in Indochina, the overthrow of
"Frankists" in Portugal, and "symptons of democratic
reforms'" in Spain. The editorial observed that, at
a time when the Secretary is addressing "so-called
warnings" to states supporting the Popular Movement,
the American press itself is reporting a CIA air-
lift to Zaire. It coi-clud9d by arguing that moral
and physical assistance provided to the "Angolan
Government" is nothing more than a barrier against
"the shifting fronts of militarism and aggression."
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Polish Zloty Declines in
Value on Black Mar ce
Polish citizens are apparently becoming in-
creasingly concerned that the regime will soon de-
value the zloty. As a result, black market rates
for foreign currency have skyrocketed. A dollar,
for example, is now worth from 120 to 150 zloty com-
pared to its previous value of 85-95.
Rumors of devaluation circulated so widely this
fall that Prime Minister Jaroszewicz was forced to
deny them publicly. The skeptical public, however,
is obviously hedging its bets.
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No Surprises at Polish Party Congress
The seventh congress of the Polish Communist
Party that opens on Monday will enthusiastically
endorse party leader Edward Gierek's economic poli-
cies and approve his programs for the next five
years. Just below the surface, however, there is
considerable concern within the leadership that the
volatile and demanding population is still not satis-
fied and is prepared to express its unhappiness in
word and deed.
Since 1971 party chief Gierek has moved the
Polish economy into high gear. The goals of the
current five year plan--already raised twice--will
for the most part be significantly exceeded. Much
of this advance is due to Gierek's successful cam-
paign to use Western credits and technology to
modernize the economy.
The Polish consumer has fared well. Average
real wages have increased 40 percent since 1971,
and both the quantity and quality of consumer goods
have improved dramatically. The average citizen,
however, has tasted the good life and is prone to
forget how much has changed since 1971. He has
become increasingly concerned about inflation and
the failure of supply to meet the rising demand for
many consumer items, particularly meat. Consequently,
the regime this year has had to contend with mounting
public tension. The party has made special efforts
to see that stores are well stocked in the pre-
Congress and Christmas season, and the US embassy
reports that tensions have decreased since their
ntid-October high.
The Polish people believe, and with good reason,
that the rapid progress they have experienced will
be slowed down by various austerity measures, in-
cluding widespread price increases. Gierek's chief
domestic policy aide, however, recently told a US
embassy officer that early next year Warsaw would
decide "at leisure" when and on what items prices
would be increased.
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For the longer term, the Gierek regime will
find it increasingly difficult to continue the re-
cent pace of economic growth. Warsaw will have to
search harder and pay more for essential Western
credits and technology. Soviet raw material de-
liveries will fall further behind in meeting Polish
needs and will be more costly. Wage increases will
have to be more closely tied to increases in produc-
tivity, and consumer prices are sure to go up.
Gicrek's political tenure may well depend on how he
manages the difficult problems without alienating
the Polish population.
No wholesale changes within the leadership or
in its policies will be made at the congress. In-
deed, Gierek's aide told a US embassy official t''iere
would be "no surprises." Despite the numerous
rumors of policy disputes within the leadership,
there is no serious challenger to Gierek. He still
probably has considerable popular support and appears
to have the party bureaucracy firmly in hand as a
result of his reorganization of the administrative
bureaucracy earlier this year.
Some personnel changes are expected a'-, the
congress. The former number-two man in the party,
Franciszek Szlachcic, who was demoted last year
for excessive nationalism and personal ambition,
will leave the Politburo. The ailing Mieczyslaw
Jagielski has partially recovered from a heart
attack and will reportedly remain. The new planning
commission head and Gierek associate, Tadeusz
Wrzaszczyk, is a likely candidate to move onto the
Politburo.
The congress itself will last five days. Gierek
will kick it off with a nationally televised speech
that will highlight past accomplishments while
making clear that there are limits to what can be
done. On foreign policy he will recite Poland's
full allegiance to the Soviet Union. Prime Minister
Jaroszewicz will outline the 1976-80 five year
plan.
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Soviet party first secretary Brezhnev will
witness the Polish pep rally. The leaders of Po-
land's East European allies--with the exception of
Romania's Ceausescu--will also be on hand.
In private disc'issions, the Polish leadership
will undoubtedly try to sound out their Soviet guests
on any impending personnel changes in Moscow. The
Poles are reportedly concerned that changes at the
Soviet party congress in February could involve
Brezhnev, whom they consider to be sympathetic to
their problems. Gierek, for his part, will un- 25X1
doubtedly try to allay Moscow's concerns about the
westward drift of the Polish economy.
December 4, 1975
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