CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001400090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

24 December 1953
Copy No.
8 f"
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[J D1 CLASSIrIED
CLASS. CHAWCE:D TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH; HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER: _I
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOPSECRET
2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79TO09
 Approved FeIease 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Burmese trade negotiations with Communist China and USSR
reportedly well advanced (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Thimayya says Nehru confused and indecisive over Korean prisoner
issue (page 3).
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SOUTH ASIA
4. Britain informs India of nature of contemplated American military
aid to Pakistan (page 5).
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. French stand on EDC not resolved by presidential election (page 7).
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 GENERAL
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1. Burmese trade negotiations with Communist China and USSR
reportedly well advanced:
The American ambassador in Rangoon was
informed by the Burmese ambassador to
Moscow that the general principles of a
Soviet-Burma agreement had already been
settled and that the entire arrangement
would soon be made public.
Comment: The unusual rapidity with which
negotiations have proceede since the Burmese first broached the
possibility of trade to Moscow and Peiping on 8 October reflects the
Sino-Soviet interest in expanding political influence in Southeast Asia
through commercial ties.
The two Burmese ambassadors are influential
members of the ruling Socialist Party. They are noted for their anti-
Western bias and will support those in government who favor expanded
relations with the Orbit.
FAR EAST
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2. Thimayya says Nehru confused and indecisive over Korean prisoner
issue:
ing and full support they had previously shown.
prisoners. According to Thimayya, the prime minister's messages
had become "misty" in recent days compared to the clear understand-
General Thimayya informed Ambassador
Briggs on 22 December that Prime Minister
Nehru appeared to be getting more confused
and indecisive over the release of Korean
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Thimayya said he had made it clear to his
government that failure to release the prisoners would inevitably
provoke riots and a mass breakout, forcing the Indian troops to kill
hupdreds or surrender control and stand humiliated before the world.
He was greatly concerned over Krishna Menon's presence in New
Delhi at this critical time.
Comment: The Indian foreign secretary told
Ambassador Allen on 22 December that in the absence of a UN direc-
tive or a new agreement between the Communists and the UN Command,
the Indian custodial force might simply declare itself no longer com-
petent to hold the prisoners after 22 January and might allow them to
go where they please.
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India's indecision therefore probably is
of the United Nations in advance, rather than over whether the prison-
ers should-be held beyond 22 January.
over the manner of re ease and the desirability of gaining the sanction
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SOUTH ASIA
4. Britain informs India of nature of contemplated American military aid
to Pakistan:
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it seemed to consist merely of a gift of $25,000,000 in military aid,
that this could not materially alter the strength ratio of the Indian
and Pakistani armies, and that India would do well to play down the
matter.
The British Commonwealth Relations Office
subsequently told an American embassy officer that it was prepared
to repeat these views as occasion warranted.
Comment: ; Indian diplomatic representatives
in both London and Washington have now been officially apprised of the
nature or quantity of aid contemplated, and on the latter point India
may be even better informed than Pakistan. Continued official Indian
agitation on the subject accordingly seems to be willful misrepresen-
tation for they purpose of preventing any aid whatever from reaching
Pakistan.
On 18 December Foreign Secretary Eden told
the -Indian high commissioner in London that
contemplated American military aid to
Pakistan apparently involved no bases, that
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. French stand on EDC not resolved by presidential election:
The election to the French presidency of
the relatively obscure Rene Coty, member of the conservative Inde-
pendent Republicans and vice-president of the upper house of parlia-
ment, leaves unresolved the underlying differences over EDC which
have almost hopelessly divided the National Assembly, Coty was
probably picked because in his 30-year parliamentary career he has
avoided strong stands on controversial issues and has taken no pub-
lic position in the present contest over EDC ratification.
Prior to the establishment of the Council
of Europe in May 1949, however, Coty played an active though not a
prominent part in the "European Movement," the "umbrella" organ-
ization of various groups interested in furthering European unity;
he is still listed as head of the Movement's French parliamentary
group. In February 1949 he represented Paul Reynaud at the organ-
izing conference in Brussels which voted, among other things, for a
resolution to invite West Germany "forthwith" to join the new community
of Europe.
While this was before there was any question
of German rearmament, as late as the fall of 1952, when Coty was a
member of the French delegation to the Council of Europe, he impressed
an American observer in private conversation as "reasonably enthusias-
tic for a Frenchman" in support of the Community of Six.
On the other hand, however, there is some
doubt as to Coty's present attitude toward the EDC, since part of his
support in yesterday's election came from rightist deputies who had
rejected earlier candidates because they were too closely associated
with the defense community.
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