Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A002500190001-3
Body:
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
[1OCUMENT NO. -
15 April
Copy No.
NO CHANGE IN CLt
DIT-GI_A3O(F!ED
CLAS3. C#1ANC f:1) TO:
NEXT R VIEW DATE: -
Al1T
03
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X
25X'1/
25X?/
F
!
~
DOS REVIEW /
COMPLETED
DIA review(s) completed.
e 209W/1tY~t~9T009
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Approved Forrele
flse 2004/03/15: CIA-RDP79T0
CONTENTS
975A002500190001-3
25X1A
2. USSR OFFERS ARMS TO LEBANON
3. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES WILLINGNESS
TO ACCEPT SOVIET AID
25X1A
25X1
5. CAPTURE OFHOA HAO DISSIDENT LEADER BA CUT
25X1
15 Apr 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 2
Approved 4hleas 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975 002500190001-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Approved For W lea
25X1A
25X1A
2. USSR OFFERS ARMS TO LEBANON
saying that Lebanon did not have funds for this purpose.
Met o stall. Chehab stated he had declined the offer by
975N02500190001-3
The Soviet military attache in Beirut
offered in early April to supply Lebanon
with antitank weapons, tanks and planes,
according to General Chehab, Lebanese
On 13 April, Chehab informed the Ameri-
can military attache that Lebanon urgently needed 24 recoiless
105 or 106-mm. antitank guns and 50 to' 100 rounds of am-
munition per gun. He indicated that price was no object as
the Lebanese military budget for this year had just been in-
creased by 7 million Lebanese pounds to permit additional
procurement.
Comment The Soviet offer of military assistance to
the Lebanese was probably made in an
attempt to encourage Lebanon to identify itself more closely
with the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian bloc, which is now receiving
arms from the Soviet bloc. The USSR may have estimated
that the new Lebanese cabinet headed by Prime Minister
Yafi, who is known for his anti-Western sentiments, would
be more open to Soviet offers than previous governments.
15 Apr 56 25X1Qurrent Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
Approved For Releas - 5AO02500190001-3
25X1A
Approved ForIe
09702500190001-3
3. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES WILLINGNESS
TO ACCEPT SOVIET AID
25X1A
Comment
Indonesian foreign minister Abdulgani
told the press on 12 April that Indonesia
had agreed" in principle to accept a re-
cent Soviet offer to extend economic and
technical aid. Abdulgani said the proposal,
had not yet been studied in detail so that
the amount involved, and whether it would
be a grant or a loan, were not yet clear.
Presumably negotiations to define the of-
fer are in progress. The Soviet ambas-
sador said on 10 April that the aid might be applied to any
fields. including agriculture and industry.
Previous Soviet offers have been ignored
by the Indonesian government. Its present receptiveness
has probably been influenced by recent examples of Burma
and India in. accepting Soviet aid.
(Concurred in by ORR)
25X1A
1.5 Apr 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T009175A002500190001-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Approved For Releao
?702500190001-3
25X1A
25X1A
5, CAPTURE OF HOA HAO DISSIDENT LEADER BA CUT
The capture of Hoa Hao leader Ba
Cut by the Vietnamese army on 13
April is an important victory for
President Diem in his long campaign
against wa' lordism in South Vietnam.
Since'thr, surrender`of_HoalHao rebel
Tran Van Soai in February, Ba Cut
had. been the last prominent figure in
militant opposition to the government.
ecen efforts o obtain his surrender, had failed despite
heavy military pressure against him.
Ba Cut's followers were recently esti-
mated at up to 3,000, about a third of whom were armed
and active. The Viet: Minh, having infiltrated the rebels,
has been using Ba Cut's dissidence as a cover for its own
activities and as an auxiliary arm of its clandestine organi-
zation in the south.
Hoa.Hao elements remaining at large.
Although Ba Cut's capture rer: roves an
important asset to the Viet Minh's subversive apparatus,
the Communists will attempt to retain control over those
25X1A
15 Apr 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page. 3
Approved For R se - 75A002500190001-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02500190001-3