CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002900440001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

AOL
6 February 1957
.Copy No. 131
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
f', DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED '1 O: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H D,?~~
ng ` REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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CONTENTS
1. USSR SLOWS RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR 1957
rP4. SINO-CEYLONESE COMMUNIQUE
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. U NUS POLITICAL OPPONENTS FEAR HE WILL MAKE
PEACE WITH COMMUNIST INSURGENTS
(page 8).
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Y6. MOSCOW STEPS UP ATTACK ON NATIONAL COMMUNISM
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1. USSR SLOWS RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR 1957
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At the opening session of the Supreme
Soviet on 5 February the USSR revealed
a more realistic "new look" in its plan-
ning aimed at salvaging Sixth Five-Year
Plan goals. Planned growth of industrial
production in 1957 has been cut back from the 10. 7 percent
for 1956 to 7. 1 percent in order to concentrate resources in
lagging raw materials industries. The 1957 budget alloca-
tions to industry and agriculture are slightly higher than last
year.
Industry: Incomplete data from the speeches
by the new chief of planning, M. G. Pervukhin, and Finance
Minister A. G. Zverev give no indication that the USSR has
abandoned the Sixth Five-Year Plan goals, but prospects for
success are by far the worst that have faced the Soviet Union
since World War II. By radically rephasing the investment
program Soviet leaders may still hope to reach the 1960 goals
for iron, steel, coal, cement and electric power, the key in-
dustries in which construction of new capacity is far behind
schedule. The machine building industries will concentrate
on producing the capital equipment required by these basic
industries. State investment expenditures on machinery and
equipment will increase by 20 percent, from 55 to 60 billion
rubles. Production of agricultural machinery, however, still
has high priority. Growth rates in heavy and light industry
were cut back about equally.
Consumer Welfare: The budget provides
for a substantial reduction in the state loan and higher per-
sonal income tax exemptions, and more than half of the in-
crease in total budget expenditures is allocated to health and
welfare measures. Although investment in housing is increased
from 25 to 30 billion rubles and loans to private builders will
increase six times, no change in the original housing goals for
1960 is apparent. The planned 9. 5 percent increase in agricul-
tural production in 1957 assumes that the extremely favorable
weather conditions of 1956 will recur. Thus prospects for the
Soviet consumer in 1957 appear essentially unchanged.
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Military Allocations: The announced
military allocation decreased, from 102. 5 billion rubles
planned for 1956 to 97. 6 billion in 1957. Although informa-
tion is incomplete, this allocation is not inconsistent with
the announced Soviet demobilization of 1, 2 million men. If
this demobilization has in fact been completed, the 1957 allo-
cation could allow an increase in military procurement of
approximately 10 percent. On the other hand, if demobiliza-
tion was limited to the 400,000 soldiers who apparently joined
the labor force in 1956, 1957 procurement may be held at about
1956 levels.
Prospects: Soviet economic problems ap-
pear to be more serious than had previously been thought.
Pervukhin's more realistic approach may in the long run bring
industrial growth back to the rate of previous years. In the
short run, however, the planned rate of growth will be the
smallest for any peacetime year since 1928. The Soviet lead-
ership will have to accept at :least a temporary delay in the
race to "catch up with the West."
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4. SINO-CEYLONESE COMMUNIQUE
from Nehru and only noncommittal statements from the other
Asian leaders he has visited since his return from Moscow.
The statement reflects the Communist view on several key
issues and criticizes American policies.
The joint communique issued on 5 Feb-
ruary in Colombo by Premiers Bandara-
naike and Chou is a propaganda victory
for Chou, and will help to offset the fact
that he obtained no joint communique
On the question of Middle East develop-
ments the communique echoes Communist propaganda ridi-
culing the concept of a power vacuum and charging the US
with trying to take over the position formerly occupied by
Britain and France. The statement also attacks "antago-
nistic military blocs;' stressing the need for prohibition of
nuclear weapons and calling for an end to nuclear weapons
tests.
The communiques calls for stronger Asian-
African solidarity to combat the efforts of "imperialist and
colonial forces" and declares that another Asian-African
conference should be convened "at the earliest opportune mo-
ment" Peiping and Moscow both had earlier indicated ap-
proval of Indonesian suggestions for a second Bandung con-
ference.
Bandaranaike probably acquiesced in
Chou's wording on several points on which the Ceylonese
prime minister himself does not feel strongly and which he
does not intend to press. A number of views expressed in
the communi u6 are also held by other South Asian nations.
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5. U NU'S POLITICAL OPPONENTS FEAR HE WILL MAKE
PEACE WITH COMMUNIST INSURGENTS
As an incoming prime minister, Nu may
be planning to offer a program with a "new approach" to the
solution of Burma's most serious problems. Some kind of
negotiations with the insurgents and an effort to establish a
coalition with the NUF might well be part of such a plan, as
there is considerable sentiment in Burma for the nine years
of insurgency to end.
The Communist insurgents have made sev-
eral unsuccessful approaches to the government during the
past year for a negotiated settlement in order to operate as
a legal political party. The government, however, has con-
sistently refused to deal with the Communists as equals and
has insisted that the insurgents surrender with their arms be-
fore negotiations take place.
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6. MOSCOW STEPS UP ATTACK ON NATIONAL COMMUNISM
will encourage pro-Soviet elements in Poland to believe that
their cause is not yet lost.
Such attacks, if continued, may cause the Gomulka leadership
in Poland to take an even more definitive stand in defense of
national Communism and lead to a more overt Soviet campaign
against that leadership. At the same time, this type of attack
An article in the 3 February issue of
Soviet Russia, entitled "Concerning False
Slogans of National Communism.,' contains
specific attacks on members of the Yugo-
slav, Polish and United States parties.
The article cites US official and press state-
ments as depicting national Communism as a tactical weapon
which can be used to "divide and conquer" and equates national
Communism with "national opportunism:' It attacks Yugoslavia
for attempting to substitute coexistence for proletarian inter-
nationalism in relations between socialist states. It criticizes
statements "in Yugoslavia, and also in some organs of the Pol-
ish . press... in... which. national peculiarities are emphasized
one-sidedly and their 'particular roads' are advanced as the
first plan for the achievement of socialism:'
the latter returned to Belgrade.
Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow on 28 January shortly before
The continued attack on the Yugoslavs tends
to belie the rumors circulating in Belgrade that Khrushchev of-
fered Tito some form of "olive branch" when he talked with the
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