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AUTH: H1170-
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET /
2002/11/19: CIA-RDP79TiQ
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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CONTENTS
() , 4. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT FEARS EAST INDONESIAN
COUP IS STEP TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
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5. SUEZ CANAL TOLLS ISSUE CONSIDERED CRUCIAL TO
AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN BRITAIN
KABUL
' 9? CAMBODIA SHOWS GROWING AWARENESS OF COMMUNIST
A j 10. ATTEMPT MAY BE MADE TO OVERTHROW HAITrS LATEST
X1 A PRESIDENT
I
AUSTRIA RESTRICTS UN COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
ANNEX- -Conclusions of the Watch Re ort of the Intelligence
Advisor Committee
8 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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4. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT FEARS EAST INDONESIAN
COUP IS STEP TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
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The Indonesian government and army
chief of staff Nasution are more con-
cerned over the East Indonesian coup
of 2 March than they have been over the
Sumatran disaffection,
I-rney tear
that the East Indonesian move for greater autonomy is only
the first step toward an eventual declaration of independence,
and Nasution believes that a stiff stand by Djakarta would
hasten such a development.
Lt. Col. Samual, territorial commander
in East Indonesia, has the support of traditional local rulers
who have consistently been opposed to the central government.
Most veterans of the former Netherlands Indonesian army are
in East Indonesia, and Nasution considers them to be suffi-
ciently well trained to form an army which would undoubtedly
support a move for independence. East Indonesia is also be-
lieved to be in a better position economically to maintain it-
self than Sumatra. The central government also regards as a
disquieting feature the proximity of Netherlands-controlled
West New Guinea, which would facilitate Dutch aid.
Comment The Djakarta government sent army nego-
tiators to Makassar, East Indonesian army
headquarters, on 6 March. If negotiations fail, it may attempt
a countercoup using Colonel Sudirman, a Javanese officer sta-
tioned in East Indonesia who has not committed himself to
Samual's action. Sudirman holds a special operational com-
mand composed of nine battalions, most of them Javanese, in
South Celebes and is under central rather than local army
authority. These forces make up approximately one fourth of
the army forces in East Indonesia.
8 Mar 57 25X1 A Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
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5.. SUEZ CANAL TOLLS ISSUE CONSIDERED CRUCIAL TO
AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN BRITAIN
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If Britain is required to pay tolls directly
to Egypt after the Suez Canal opens, the
result would be. disastrousto. the United
States' standing in Britain, Ambassador
Whitney reports following a conversation
on 6 March with Lord Salisbury, influential Leader of -the
House of Lords.
Whitney and Salisbury discussed the "dis-
tressing lack of improvement in Anglo-American feeling."
Salisbury analyzed anti-American feeling as a "simmering
pot nearly ready to boil." The United States would be given
the whole blame if tolls were to be paid directly to Egypt,
Salisbury suggested, even if the United States opposed it.
Comment Lord Salisbury's statements underline the
widespread British view that the United
States is not putting sufficient pressure on Nasr, and that the
Suez crisis may therefore result in a total defeat for Britain.
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,8. TRAINING PROGRAM IN SOVIET ARMS ESTABLISHED
IN KABUL
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Five training courses on the use of Soviet
arms are being conducted in Kabul for
Afghan officers, according to an Afghan
army officer. He said there are 80 offi-
ers in the antiaircraft course, 55 in the field artillery course,
100 in the mortars course, 150 in the infantry course, and an
unknown number in the antitank course. Some of the courses,
which are to last for six months, are conducted by Russian of-
ficers,
The American army attache has noted sev-
eral hundred Afghan officers entering school buildings near the
Ministry of Defense every day.
Comment Substantial quantities of ground forces
equipment are believed to have reached
Afghanistan under the Soviet-Afghan arms agreement. The
USSR reportedly is also developing a training program for the
air force. Afghan officers are also being trained by Turkey and
the United States.
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9. CAMBODIA SHOWS GROWING AWARENESS OF
COMMUNIST SUBVERSION THREAT
Concern over Communist influence in
Cambodia as well as a desire to take
corrective measures appears to be
growing in the Cambodian government.
The strongly anti-Communist minister
n y, Dap Chhuon, is taking an increasingly
old stand against a policy of accommodation with the Sino-
oviet bloc.
Prince Sihanouk, who has been the chief
proponent of closer relations with the bloc, seems to be
moving toward a policy of repression of Communist politi-
cal activity in Cambodia. The open subversion of the local
Overseas Chinese community by Communist agents operat-
ing in defiance of repeated Cambodian government warnings
seems to have made a particularly profound impression on
the prince. Suggestive of this change in Sihanouk's outlook
is his reported endorsement of closer Cambodian-South Viet-
namese relations, including joint security operations against
dissident Vietnamese and Viet Minh bands in the border area.
8 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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10.. ATTEMPT MAY BE MADE TO OVERTHROW HAITrS
LATEST PRESIDENT
supporters of Daniel Fignole, radical presidential candidate;
who was detained briefly on-5 March for an attempt to violate
the ban on political broadcasts.
According to some observers, army chief
of staff Cantave and presidential aspirant Jumelle have been
looking for an incident which would permit the army to inter-
vene and maintain public order, ousting Sylvain in the process.
Jumelle, who is supported by Cantave, has been reported co-
operating with. Fignole.
An attempt to oust Sylvain might lead to
serious civil disturbances between the supporters of the sev-
eral presidential candidates and possibly between various fac-
tions in the army.
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A leading Haitian businessman informed
the American embassy on 4 March that
an incident aimed at overthrowing Pro-
visional President Franck Sylvain would
develop this week. The embassy adds that
this incident may be set off by a strike of
8 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
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777--11, AUSTRIA RESTRICTS UN COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING HUNGARY
P03000140001-2
The Austrian Foreign Ministry has told
the UN committee on Hungary that it may
not interrogate refugees in Austria, al-
though it is welcome to conduct investiga-
tions. According to a Foreign Ministry official, Austria's
"precarious relationship with the Soviet bloc" is the real rea-
son for the government's stand, although it has explained the
decision on the ground that it fears disturbances in the refugee
camps.
Comment There have been other indications recently
that the strong Soviet criticism of Austria's
"unneutrality" is getting on Vienna's nerves. The government
initially instructed its UN delegation to abstain on the Soviet
resolution charging the US with instigating the Hungarian re-
volt and was persuaded to be absent instead only after strong
representations from the US that abstention would be widely
misunderstood.
Foreign Minister Figl, moreover, is said
to have accepted as authentic a recent report of Hungarian pres-
sure for Soviet reoccupation of Austria--a report which Ambas-
sador Thompson believes was a deliberate plant in the "war of
nerves."
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`T
ANNEX
Watch Report 344, 7 March
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the continental US or its possessions in:the? imme-
diate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral
to the Orbit in the immediate future.
C.
A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is
improbable in the immediate future. Unsettled issues and
continuing tensions in the area constitute possibilities for
violence.
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