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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
6 September 1966
State Department review
completed
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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6 September 1966
HIGHLIGHTS
Buddhist Institute leaders, in a move appar-
ently confirming their opposition to the upcoming
elections, have announced that they will lead a
hunger strike on the three days prior to the 11
September election.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Light contact has been reported between allied and
Communist forces in Operation SEWARD in Phu Yen
Province and Operation NAPA/LIEN KET 56 in Quang
Tin Province (Paras. 1-2). South Vietnamese Op-
eration DAN CHI 261 ended yesterday after nearly
four days of successful fighting in which 376 Viet
Cong were killed (Para. 3). The US search-and-de-
stroy Operation EL PASO III ended after insignifi-
-
cant results in Binh Long Province (Para. 4).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Buddhist Institute leaders reiterated their opposi-
tion to the Ky government and to the election to-
day, and announced that they would lead a 72-hour
hunger strike in protest of the election (Paras.
1-2). The hunger strike will also be a form of
ra er for the life of Tri Quang,
espi e two ntlelection -
ens by e vie Cong in Saigon today, some gov-
ernment officials feel that Communist terrorism
during the election period will not be too serious
(Para. 5).
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
ea infiltration
efforts in the area of the Demilitarized Zone
(Paras. 1-2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is'nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Polish
officials have discussed the Vietnam situation and
Poland's role in it in an unusually frank and
friendly conversation with the US ambassador
(Paras. 1-3). Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's
remarks to a Japanese delegation as reported by
Western press services are discussed (Paras. 4-6).
6 September 196-6
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Light contact between Communist troops and
US forces participating in the four-battalion
search-and-destroy Operation SEWARD in coastal Phu
Yen. Province was reported today. Six Americans
were wounded, and a total of 13 enemy troops were
killed and one captured in the five-hour engage-
ment.
2. The joint US - South Vietnamese Operation
EL PASO/LIEN KET 56, which began on 4 September in
the eastern portion of Quang Tin Province, has been
renamed Operation NAPA/LIEN KET 56. Light contact
has been reported in this operation with US Marine
forces suffering two killed and six wounded. Enemy
losses included eight killed and seven captured.
3. The South Vietnamese Army Operation DAN
CHI 261, conducted in the delta province of Chuong
Thien, ended yesterday after three and one half
days of fighting. Friendly losses were 21 killed
and 73 wounded. Viet Cong losses included 376 killed,
37 captured, and 190 weapons and 12 tons of ammuni-
tion and supplies captured.
4. Search-and-destroy Operation EL PASO III,
conducted in Binh Long Province north of Saigon by
one battalion of the US 1st Infantry Division, has
ended after having made insignificant contact with
Viet Cong forces. One American soldier was wounded
in the operation which began on 5 August. No enemy
casualties were reported.
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6 September 1966
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. At a press conference today in Saigon,
Buddhist Institute leaders announced that they would
lead a 72-hour hunger strike beginning 8 September
in protest of the government's constitutional as-
sembly election of 11 September. A communique,
signed by acting Institute chairman Thich Thien
Hoa, also demanded an interim government, called
for "noncooperation" in the election, and de-
nounced the assembly to be elected. Other docu-
ments, including telegrams of protests previously
sent to President Johnson and UN Secretary General
Thant, were released to newsmen at the conference.
IThien Hoa also
ma a some strong anti-American remarks, blaming
the US among other things for escalating the con-
flict in Vietnam.
2. Today's press conference appears to settle
once and for all the position of the Buddhist In-
stitute on the elections. There have been recent
indications that Institute council members were re-
considering their earlier call for an election boy-
cott, and that there were some differences between
acting chairman Thien Hoa and vice chairman Thich
Phap Tri. Today, however, Phap Tri read the communi-
que signed by Thien Hoa to the press gathering in
a public display of unity.
3. The 72-hour hunger strike will also be ob-
served as a form of prayer for Tri Quang, whose
condition the communique described as "critical."
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6 September 1966
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Viet Cong Terrorism in the Saigon Area
4. According to the press, Viet Cong terror-
ists blew up a polling place in a hamlet on the
northern outskirts of Saigon this afternoon (Saigon
time). There were no injuries reported. One by-
stander was injured in the Cholon district, how-
ever, when a Viet Cong agent tossed a grenade at
a loudspeaker truck during a political rally today.
5. Despite such incidents, a Vietnamese se-
curity-official in the capital area feels that the
over-all level of Viet Cong terrorism will not be
unmanageable. Moreover, Chief of State Thieu told
Ambassador Lodge today that Viet Cong activities
apparently are not going to be too serious." Thieu
said that the terrorism in Saigon thus far was not
out of proportion to that which had occurred on
special occasions in the past.
6 September 1966
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
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substantial waterborne logistics effort
was under way by enemy forces both slightly to the
north and south of the Demilitarized Zone. Activity
in the restricted zone south of the DMZ in South
Vietnamese waters was heaviest during the week of
21-27 August.
2. Hanoi's use of small coastal craft and
sampans in this area underscores the large logistic
effort probably intended to reinforce the 324th NVA
Division and other as yet unidentified North Viet-
namese forces operating near or in the DMZ. There
have also been numerous reports of DRV logistic ef-
forts across the DMZ over trails, recently improved
roads, and across the Ben Hai River. Recently cap-
tured documents indicate that most of the supplies
for the 324th Division have come from North Vietnam.
This has also been corroborated by recent prisoner
reports. Daily US air strikes in this area are
producing numerous secondary explosions and fires
and are destroying or damaging a large number of
trucks.
6 September 1966
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1. There is nothing of significance to report.
6 September 1966
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. In an unusually frank and friendly conver-
sation with US Ambassador Gronouski on 1 September,
Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz. again stressed
Warsaw's willingness to "do all it can" to end the
Vietnam conflict, but reiterated that Hanoi is suspi-
cious of the Poles for the role they played in last
January's US peace initiative. Winiewicz stated
flatly that he is convinced that the war would end
in 1967 since otherwise he would have to conclude that
"every leader in the world was. out of his mind." Re-
sponding to Gronouski's query concerning Hanoi's in-
flexibility on point three of its four points, Winie-
wicz noted that the Poles were "working hard" on a
reformulation acceptable to both Hanoi and the US.
2. Noting that the Eastern European countries
"would rejoice" if the USSR made a move for peace in
Vietnam, Winiewicz stated that Soviet caution stems.
from the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in Asia.
Stressing that this struggle is essentially between
those who believe in "-peaceful coexistence" and those
who do not, Winiewicz implied that this conflict is
mirrored in the domestic .politics of Poland and prob-
ably other Communist regimes.
3. Despite Winiewicz' optimism on the prospects
for a Vietnamese settlement and his pledge of Polish
cooperation with US efforts to this end, there is
no evidence as yet that the Poles have any new in-
formation leading them to believe that Moscow, Hanoi,
or the National Liberation Front may now be more re-
ceptive to peace moves than they have been in the
past.. Warsaw's optimism, however, does follow what
is believed to have been a review of the Vietnamese
situation by the Poles in recent weeks, and may pre-
sage a renewed Polish willingness actively to seek
a solution. Neither Winiewicz nor Foreign Minister
Rapacki--both of whom will attend the UN General As-
sembly session--reportedly expect Vietnam to be for-
mally discussed, but Winiewicz specifically stated
that useful discussions might be conducted in the
halls of the UN.. Winiewicz also said that Rapacki
would be Very interested in seeing Secretary Rusk
while in New York.
6 September 1966
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Chen Yi Remarks on Vietnam
4. Western news services have quoted Chinese
Foreign Minister Chen Yi as telling a group of
visiting Japanese Diet members that China is "not
entirely averse" to settling the Vietnam war by ne-
gotiation. He made clear, however, that such a set-
tlement would be on Communist terms. Chen Yi claimed
that negotiations are impossible "as long as the US
is resorting to force in Vietnam" and claimed that
there can be no "solution" until all American troops
are pulled out of Vietnam. Chen stated that he did
not believe that the US would attack China and that
the tension between the US and China would not last
forever.
5. These remarks sound strange coming from
Chen Yi--the Chinese rarely mention the possibility
of Vietnam negotiations--and may be a misquote or
a misunderstanding resulting from wishful Japanese
thinking. However, if the Japanese are reporting
Chen accurately, his remarks are another Chinese
effort to appear "reasonable" and to throw the onus
for the war on the US. Chen still asserted that a
solution is possible only if the US withdraws--a
long-standing key point in Peking's terms.
6. If Chen Yi was accurately quoted by the
press, his remarks would be close to the general
North Vietnamese position on talks. Discussions
can take place, according to Hanoi, prior to a
withdrawal of US troops, but such a pull-out must
precede any final "solution" or settlement.
6 September 1966
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