CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

~Zzl/d
OZ,
Approved EZRelease 11 009U A005000040001-1
J
25X1
25X1
4 March 1960
Copy No. C f i
TEL 16E I
I ~/ ,- CE
PON
DOCUMENT NO. 41
NO CHARGE IN CLASS.
p DECLASSIFIED
GLASS, I.Vi,'NCLC rot
NEXT 7_ S
/ ~,at____ ?~~"~ AUTl JKUN 70.2 m 25X1
DATEt __ REYIEW8E1
25X1
Approved For Released /1 S. gltkVMO0975AO05000040001
~~/rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr~rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr~rrr~~~~~
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
 25a4l d 1 2002/07/12 CIA RDP79T 5A005000040001 1
prove W e ease - -
0
I
25X1
25X1
Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Nehru is reported to expect
Chou n- ai to come to New Delhi in April with a fairly strong
negotiating position. He believes that Chou, having reached a
border agreement with Burma and possibly with Nepal by that
time, will suggest that India be equally reasonable. He also
thinks that China, to indicate its own reasonableness, may of-
f er to withdraw Chinese troops from Longju outpost in Assam.
Inasmuch as Nehru feels that negotiations probably will be con-
centrated on the northeastern portion of the Kashmiri province
of Ladakh, he is faced with the problem of how to reconcile his
public statement that he will "give nothing away" with the prob-
ability that the Chinese will insist on holding the territory they
now occupy there. Nehru reportedly has said he would accept
a solution calling for neutralization of the disputed territory in
Ladakh. The Qhinese. however, have already rejected a sim-
ilar proposal.1
Philippines: President Garcia's recent speech to a conven-
tion of Philippine businessmen, in which he promised full im-
plementation of his "Filipino First" economic policies, is a
further indication of his determination to make political capital
out of growing Philippine nationalism. The programs aimed at
4 Mar 60 DAILY BRIEF
(1}
25X1
11
j Approved For ReIe - 5A0050000400~1 j
 achieving "economic independence," has led to increasing
restrictions on foreign business activity, including that of
American firms. The "Filipino First"' slogan appears to
be extending into the foreign policy field, with Philippine
officials beginning to voice the need for greater "national
25X1 self -assertion:'
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's 3 AUrch statement at
Constantine that the Algerian problem cannot be settled for
a long time and only after the victory of French arms prob-
ably has the double purpose of reassuring the French Army
and putting pressure on FLN leaders to speed cease-fire
talks. By confining his Algerian tour to military field in-
stallations, De Gaulle is further emphasizing his interest
in army operations and in officer opinion.
(Page 6)
25X1
0
M ?r,
4 I&r 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 m CIA-RQE!Z9jOO9 5AO05000040001;-I-
M V//W/l 00/0111/01/11011/1//
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
 25X1
Approved '"Fo~r Rel
Philippine President Emphasizes. "Filipino First" Policy
President Garcia's. determination to capitalize on grow-
ing Philippine nationalist sentiment has been emphasized in
his recent speech to the Philippine Chamber of Commerce
promising full implementation of his "Filipino First" policy
in order to wrest control of the economy from "alien dom-
ination." Garcia's remarks are likely to encourage the con-
gressional clamor for legislative restrictions on foreign
nationals and firms in the Philippines. In addition to an ex-
isting law, aimed, primarily at the Overseas Chinese, for the
gradual exclusion of aliens from the country's retail trade,
there has been a growing tendency to apply discriminatory ad-
ministrative measures to all foreign businessmen, including
Americans,
25X1
Despite the relatively weak appeal of the administration's
"Filipino First" slogan in last November's senatorial and local
elections, Garcia may hope that continued exploitation of na-
tionalist sentiment will divert attention from the opposition's
effective attack on government inefficiency and corruption. He
may increasingly seek to place the blame for his domestic fail-
ures on close ties with the United States. A developing Philippine
tendency to make unilateral reinterpretations of existing agree-
ments with the United States. may indicate that the "Filipino First"
theme is being extended from commercial to foreign policy clues-
tions. F_ I
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
4 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
 25X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T05A005000040001-1
III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Says Algerian Settlement Possible Only After
Military Victory
President de Gaulle's statement on 3 March that the Alge-
rian problem would not' be settled for a long time, and only
after the victory of French arms, is his toughest public state-
ment yet on the Algerian problem and probably reflects his
mounting irritation with FLN slowness in moving toward a
cease-fire. The statement is almost certainly an attempt to
bring additional pressure on FLN leaders. The French Pres-
ident has indicated that he hoped to achieve a settlement in
Algeria prior to Khrushchev's visit in mid-March, De Gaulle
has not yet mentioned the 29 February statement of rebel
leader Ferhat Abbas, but French officials in Tunis have in-
dicated that it was regarded by Paris as "constructive in tone."
The statements, made to French Army officers at Con-
stantine, the first stop on a tour of military installations in
Algeria, are probably also intended to reassure the army in
the wake of the repression of the January "revolt" and the re-
sulting command shifts. De Gaulle stated clearly that "France
must stay in Algeria," although he said the conditions would de-
pend on the wishes of the inhabitants, De Gaulle is probably also
attempting to. sound out army opinion and gauge army sentiment
on moving ahead with self -determination,
De Gaulle's omission of the city of Algiers from his tour
may have been partly on security grounds but was probably also
a way of implying to the army that he is satisfied with the prog-
ress in shifting local administration from army to civilian con-
trol. On the eve of De Gaulle's arrival in Constantine, a direc-
tive of the Delegate General explained that the shift was made to
permit the army to concentrate on "operational action.'.'
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
4 Max 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000040001-1
 7,00
TOP SFCRFT
j /
~'DFT9T Approved For Release 7/12. 00975AO05000040001-1
20U2/
Approved For Release/b/1 j fo"IeV00975A005000040001-1