EVIDENCE OF VC/NVA BASE AREAS IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70S00385R000200190034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: July 19, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
Approved For Re a 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70S00385R 00190034-3
1 9 JUL 1967
EVIDENCE OF VC/NVA BASE AREAS IN CAMBODIA
in a very
convincing way that the VC/NVA forces have been using base areas
in Cambodia and that they plan to continue to do so. The bases are
used to take refuge for extended periods of time, to support the
infiltration route, to direct and support operations in South Viet-
nam, and to conduct cross border operations. The bases vary in
size and configuration, depending on their use and on the section
of the border in which they are located. Some bases consist of
regimental size, permanent-type complexes with command, logistics,
medical, and defensive facilities. These bases are usually estab-
lished and operated covertly, although local Cambodian authorities
sometimes give. their active support and approval.
Captured documents, obtained in the Tay Ninh area during the
past two years, discuss mainly VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory
adjacent to Tay Ninh Province.
in Cambodian territory adjacent to those provinces. Sufficient in-
dications are available from other areas, however, to indicate that
2SrX1
Communist bases have not been limited to the areas mentioned. above.
 25X1
Approved For Re.e 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70S00385R 00190034-3
.04 W_
Listed below in chronological order is information from cap-
tured documents that reveals in the clearest terms how the Communists
have been using Cambodian territory.
--Minutes of a VC meeting held on 8 April 1966 to discuss
taking refuge on Cambodian soil relate that, after re-
viewing the situation, it was unanimously agreed that
a) when the VC need help, local Cambodian chiefs readily
provided assistance and show cooperation in setting up
living and messing facilities on a long term basis;
b) VC security while on Cambodian soil was inadequate
25X1
~) the Cambodians feared that secrecy had
not been preserved and that the Allies would attack them.
The Cambodians were also responsible for their acts to
higher echelons; d). taking refuge on Cambodian soil was
necessary because the percentage of sick and wounded in
base areas in South Vietnam was very high. J#
--Letter dated July 1966 to the chief of Chi Fu Circum-
scription Office, Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia, from the
01934-3
25X1
 25X1 I.
Approved For Rase 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70SO0385F 0200190034-3
Commander in Chief, Border Defense corps, NFLSVN Libera-
tion Army, requested that he come to Ba Thu, Svay Rieng
Province, to discuss with representatives of the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) and the
Liberation Army problems concerning frontier security. To
maintain security and to prevent Allied terrorist attempts,
it was preferable for him to be escorted.
--Report on the Activities of C. 66 Party Committee during
July and August 1966, related that a) after VC units took
refuge in Cambodia in April 1966, some units (i.e., the
entire agency with letter box number 1646B, the rear ser-
vices element headed by Ba Te, and the element with letter
box number 1852B) did not return to Vietnamese territory;
b) one supply element of the political department, which
previously was stationed at Lo Go, was bivouacked in Cam-
bodian territory; c) the number of people who intended to
move to Cambodia or who,were'preparing for their evacuation
to Cambodian territory was increasing; d) in Cambodia VC
agencies illegally cleared many trails and roads leading
to riversides and forests. J
--Minutes of a Frontier Inter-Province Meeting held on 26
November 1966 at Duc Hue District (Hau Nghia Province,
South Vietnam) stated that Cambodian authorities and post
commanders had not had any problems with South Vietnamese
refugees. The former told the civilian population to build
Approved For Relea a 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70S00385R0002001 0034-3
25X1
 25X1
Approved For a se - 0034-3
air raid shelters. Some Vietnamese had settled down tem-
porarily at the border and were not willing to return.
--Undated document captured in Tay Ninh Province about March
1967 entitled "Regulations Concerning the Border" stated
two regulations on quartering,. messing, and construction
of bases as follows:
"l. It is absolutely forbidden to all agencies,
military units, branches, and schools perform-
ing operations in the border area to build their
base on Cambodian territory, with the exception
of the convalescence camps which accommodate a
large number of wounded and sick patients.
the latter case, construction of such camps will
be subject to approval by the Border Action Sec-
tion."
"2. Those units or agencies which have been
permitted by the Border Action Section to build
their bases across the border should comply with
the regulations, i.e. They should select a well
concealed location as the site for the camp, and
they should not cut the trees."
Also included in the document were measures to avoid enemy
sweeps operations, one of which reads as follows:
"Upon being ordered to go back to our side of
-4-
Approved For;Rel
25X1
 25X1
Approved For ReI 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70SO0385RO 0190034-3
the border, we should., prior to our departure,
erase all traces, such as places to hang up the
hammocks, plastic sheets for our tents, bottles,
milk cans, etc.,. We should pay particular
attention to destroying the smallest piece of
paper bearing Vietnamese letters. We should
also carefully conceal the shelters and water
wells which might be of use to us in the subse-
quent escapes to safety." V*
--Report No. 61/BC of supply Group 80A, dated 1966?(day and
month not specified) captured in Tay Ninh Province 30 March
1967 stated that Group 80A requested that it be issued from
20,000 to 31,000 Cambodian Riels for use in case of evacua-
tion during Allied Sweep Operations.
--Notebooks captured in northern Tay Ninh Province in March
1967 described in detail the VC construction of a 40-kilo-
meter road, 11 kilometers of which were on Cambodian terri-
tory, to connect the Cambodian road network in Mondulkiri
Province, Cambodia, with Route 14 and the waterways in Phuoc
Long Province, South Vietnam, The road was built by NVA
Engineer Battalion 611, beginning in February 1966. The
whole road was built to support truck traffic, with the
objective of transporting rice and medical supplies from
This.document also'states, due to poor security and discipline
by some VC units near Lo Go, the Cambodian authorities made them leave.
90,934-3
25X1
 Approved For Rele se 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70S00385R0002001
Cambodia. to Phuoc Long for the Central Committee for South
Vietnam (COSVN) Rear Service Group 86. j .
--A notebook captured on 21 December 1966 revealed that a.
Political-military school for VC Military Region II was lo-
cated in Cambodia in the vicinity of Ba Thu, Svay Rieng
Province. The school taught instructors, of combat training
for the provincial main force and local units. The
,trainees were instructed to treat the Cambodian. people,
officers, and soldiers with equality in order to gain
their support for the VC.
--Document captured 31 March 1967 in Tay Ninh Province re-
veals that rice was being shipped from South Vietnam to
Cambodian territor
b
y
y one of the COSVN rear service uni
in order to prevent its capture by Allied operations. ,/
25X1
on VC NVA facilities and defensive
positi6ns in the South Vietnamese
border area of Ratanakiri Province.
further
id
t
en
ified this area as the headquarters of the B-3 front which
directs the Communist campaign in the western highlands of South
Vietnam.
r25XT~'
25Xi,
25
Approved For Re
11
2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3
Analysis of aerial photography of the Cambodian border area
adjacent to South Vietnam confirms in some cases and provides addi-
tional information on the base areas identified in the previous sec-'
tion of this report. In addiition, photography reveals possible or
probable insurgency activity in many additional areas along the
border.
23
X1
25X1 4
Approved
 25X1
Approved For R~
In two major areas, how-
ever - western Ratanakiri Province and southwestern Mondulkiri
Province -- it is possible to detect in photography and support from
intelligence derived from other sources that major portions of the
activities result from VC/NVA use.
Western Ratanakiri
Western Ratanakiri Province from the area of the Tonle San (Se
San in South Vietnam) south across Route 19 to the Prek Drang Valley
(Ia Drang in South Vietnam) appears to be the' most extensive area
in Cambodia being used as a VC/NVA base. This base is centered in
South Vietnam but.extends into a strip of Cambodia territory about
5 to 10 miles in width and 25 miles in length. This portion of the
base in Cambodia forms part of the logistical system for acquisition
and storage of supplies. It also provides facilities in Cambodia
for sanctuary, hospitalization, rest, and training.
Development of this area into a major VC base is revealed by
aerial photography. In November 1965 during the Chu Pong mountain
battle that raged throughout the Ia Drang Valley in South Vietnam,
photographic analysis of adjoining areas in Cambodia, particularly,?
the Prek Drang Valley, revealed photographic evidence
well used trails crisscrossing. the border areas generally from one
i remote heavily wooded area to another 'equally remote area. Defen-
sive positions including heavy anti-aircraft machine guns and
25X1
Approved For R
9.9,0034-3
 Approved For Rilease 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3 25X1
foxholes were identified on aerial photography in the vicinity of
and well inside Cambodia to a maximum of about 5 miles.
A detailed search of photography of Ratanakiri Province as far
west as the administrative capital of Lomphat revealed only scant
evidence of partially concealed, thatched buildings
By late 1966, however, comparative photography left little
25X1 doubt that Communist forces were utilizing the sanctuary of Cam-
bodia on a more permanent basis. Numerous thatched buildings with
.associated trails, defense positions, and row crop agriculture had
appeared in widely dispersed areas throughout the area adjacent to
the border. At least 50 areas of probable Communist activity near
,the border have been identified by the National Photographic
Intelligence Center,~(NPIC)'to date. The Cambodian road network has
25X1
Approved Foe Release 9004119115 ? rein-RnRZOS00385Rh002001x0934-3
 25X1
Approved For Rase 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70S00385F200190034-3
been extended to the banks of the Tonle San and water transshipment
areas have been built. Also, within this area are at least two
Cambodian border defense posts. The extent of complicity by local
Cambodian officials in this area cannot be documented, however.
25X1
consisted'of 6 large thatched
huts, each 10 meters by 10 meters, surrounded by 30
smaller huts each 5 meters by 8 meters.
25X1
Approved For Release 20p4/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3
were 1,000 NVA soldiers and 500 Montagnard VC in the
camp. 2,41
a VC/NVA training post
PA base'camp was located on Chi Chan
The post served as a training site for
an unidentified VC/NVA force of 600 men who had re-
cently arrived at the site.
25X1
25X1
 App
?1 For Release 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70S003851Q00190034-
25X1
Southeastern Mondulkiri
Another major base is situated in Cambodia at Mt. Nam Lyr 80
miles south of the Prek Drang Valley. The base area extends from
the South Vietnamese border some 15 miles west in the vicnity of
feeder roads extending from the southern portion of-Route 141.
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong support activity, reported since
early 1966, has become particularly pronounced since the beginning
of 1967. Photography has revealed a high concentration of insur-
gent facilities adjacent to and at the terminus of motorable access
activity in the Laotian Panhandle.
The major supporting vehicular artery in the area is a circular
unnumbered road about 35 miles in length connecting Route 14 and
Route 141. At least thirty of the identified probable insurgent
facilities in the area are located adjacent to two access roads
which extend from the unnumbered road toward the South Vietnam border.
Both the unnumbered road and the access roads exhibit evidence of
frequent vehicular activity. Four encampments have been identified
immediately south of the Nam Lyr mountain area.
?-0n February 4, 1967, a convoy of 15 Cambodian G"C trucks
25X1
Approved Foy' Release 2004/12/15: CIA-RDP70S00485R000200 90034-3
 -14-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Rel
It was supplied from Camp Le Rolland
carried 200 sacks of rice (100 kg. each, total of 22 tons),
60 sacks of dried fish, and 20 tins of fish sauce from
Camp Le Rolland to'Buon Muor At that point
the supplies were loaded on elephants and carried to a
VC supply base at
--A source who defected in March 1967 reported that-a large
VC staging area was located at Mt. Nam Lyr near
about 3 km west of the Vietnamese border. As many as
6,000 VC and NVA troops were bivouacked in the area in
early 1967.
.--According to a July 14, 1966 report, a VC. camp consisting
of 10 thatched huts, each measuring 6 x 45 meters, was
situated at
Ithence through I land Buon Y.Miar Klang
(unlocated). Supplies were carried on elephants to the
camp. 17
--According to a February 1967 report, two VC platoons were
located at Buon Bo Dra
--A Communist headquarters is located in a cave about 3 km.
southwest of Kav Khle
,Units were operating
in this area for -two years. 1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP70SO0385R000200190034-3