Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82M00591R000400080008-3
Body:
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OGC 77-0645
28 January 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR A.D/DCI/IC
SUBJECT Possible Restrictions on Unofficial Travel
1. This is with reference to the presented DCID which would restrict
or discourage private travel in hazardous areas by Intelligence Community
personnel who have or have had access to sensitive compartmented information.
This responds also to your request of several months ago for an agreed
position by the pertinent IC legal staffs as to the restrictions which legally
could be applied to discourage or prevent such travel.
2. I have worked up the attached memorandum to reflect the views
expressed by the several legal staffs in the meetings and other communica-
tions we have had. The memorandum represents at least a minimum position
acceptable to all, although there was some support for more restrictive
measures and it has been suggested that the practical considerations as
to available administrative actions should be stressed. The agreeement
reflected in the memorandum therefore would suggest no legal objections
to the DCID proposed for action by SEACOM at its meeting of 9 February.
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cc: Ralph Goldenberg, ER]DA
Joseph Davis, FBI
DIA
Russell Munk, Treasury
NSA
Jeffrey Smith, State
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28 January 1977
Associate General Counsel.
SUBJECT Possible Restrictions on Unofficial Travel
1. What restrictions can be legally placed on unofficial travel of
employees having access to certain categories of sensitive compartmented
information? In particular? may restrictions be placed on the unofficial
travel of such persons to countries or areas where there is danger of
compromise of the information?
2. By way of general background to the questions, it may be noted
that the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of the Government to
restrict travel on national security grounds. It is clear, again from
Supreme Court decisions, that United States citizens have a constitutional
right to travel abroad--freedom to travel is an element of the liberty of
which citizens cannot be denied without due process of law. But the due
process requirements do not mean that no restrictions may be imposed on
foreign travel. For example, and relevant to these questions, the court
has upheld the authority of the Secretary of State to refuse to validate
passports for travel to certain areas when he has concluded that such
travel "might involve the Nation in dangerous international incidents. "
3. It would appear legally permissible therefore for agencies to
adopt regulations restricting travel to hazardous areas by employees
who possess sensitive compartmented information or other national security
information. That is, it would not be beyond the authority of agencies
to adopt such regulations. Clearly there is a direct relationship between
the functions and missions of the agencies and any such regulations--the
need to protect the information.
4. The enforceability of any such regulation would vary in different
situations, and among the agencies, but there would be no need to refrain
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from adopting regulations merely because the means and authority for
enforcement might not be uniform. In some instances, agencies could
request compliance; in some cases, employees could be reassigned to
other duties where access to sensitive compartmented information is no
longer needed. A department's regulations could provide for administrative
sanctions, such as suspension or dismissal. In some cases, suspension or
dismissal might be in order even without express provision to that effect
in the departmental travel regulations. As a practical matter, therefore,
it would be necessary for the department to determine the available and
desirable means of enforcement. And it should be recognized that
means of enforcement as to former employees and retired personnel probably
are non-existent.
5. Ultimate enforceability in the courts of course cannot be certain..
But with a strong factual situation--for example, current practices of a
country of detaining, harassing or provoking such persons for the purpose
of extracting information from them or to exploit them for probable espionage
purposes--it would seem quite possible that the courts would uphold the
regulations and the sanctions enforcing them.
6. In sum, it is believed that agencies may restrict the unofficial
travel of employees who possess national security information, that
administrative sanctions may be imposed and that there is basis to
believe such sanctions would be upheld by the courts.
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