DCI BRIEFING FOR SENATOR STENNIS DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000500180002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 11, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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1 June 1963
DCI MIMING FOR
RATOL ASR 19
DO*I ICA RZ1 HLID
Is the Dominican Republic, there is no prospect in
night for a political compromise, and a military
solution appears unlikely. The loyalist regime
mounted a successful military drive La. late May
to clean out rbbel pockets in the northern part
of the capital, but this initiative came to an *ad
when the troops reached the cortidor stretching ac
across the toga from the intornatioaal safety some.
Int er t has continued his attempt to nobi li.ue
mass support through rallies and demonstrations
but has largely been unsuccessful. Re has
gained the support of some conservative parties
politicians who give a right-wing cast to
his regime.
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. In a sudden nave to gain support, iabsrt an
etas first offered to let the OAS set the "to
for elections that would be open to all non.
extremist ca*didates, and supervised by the OAS.
The "bola "looted the iwrARr''. as "another
Inbert faros." Iabert later retreated from his
proposal, saying that the "Casaane problem"
must be solved before any solution can be found.
C. labert appears to be under acme pressure Bros
his military leaders to avoid concessions to
the rebels. They disppproved of his transfer
of the hat ional Palace to OAS control and nay
have been behind his refusal to allow the 0*1,
to control Radio last. Aowingo. lens of the
loyalist military commanders are probably toying
with the idea of taking direct action against
the rebels.
11. The rebels appear to be increasingly tense as the
stalemate continues. This is indicated by tightened
security measures in the rebel sector of Santo
t inge, and by possible dissension between Cassano*s
Comanist backers and his supporters in Juan poacb's
Dominican Revolutionary party (MM).
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A. Caamanv appears to remain intransigent towards
political solution. No is demanding a hive-
point program as the basis for a srttlowent.
These include: retention of the 1963 Hooch
Constitution; maintenance of the $oacb-dodinated
Congress; incorporation of rebel military lead-
re into the military forces; r govor rnt of
socrati.c personalities" (probably excluding
Inbert) ; and the immediate depstture of the in-
terventiontat forces. Iatbert and his supporters
find the first four of those points unaccept-
able.
Communist t*fluence along the rebels remains
strong. They are particularly active in rebel
military units and in propaganda activitiss.
to fact, one adviser to the Communists recommended
that they tone down their propaganda because its
Coaauniat origin was too obvious.
C. The rebels have been increasingly their propaganda
against the US, probably because they teal that
the US is preventing a settlesaent favorable to them.
The largo 01-10,,000) rebel rally last 5sturday
vociferously stressed an anti-US these.
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111. *xtled President Juan Sosca has continued, from his
en in Puerto Rico, to g*ide rebel leaders and to
boost the morals- of rebel forces through recorddd
peaches urging the people to maintain the strug-
gle. lloich is also working to maintain the unity
of his Dominican Revolutionary !arty. I. has or-
dered that the party's executive committee meet,
1 decisions must fist be discussed with
A. sch has advised the rebels to exploit the
changes of loyalist atrocities. This thecae
is certain to receive such play by the rebels.
N* has also instructed the rebel leaders not
rush into negotiations. Is says that the
stalemate is not their problem but that of
be 98 and CAS. Its addition, perhaps to give
heart to the rebels, Scech had predicted that
a*,solution** will be reached in June even it
there is no "agreement."
251.
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The Latin American contingents in the Inter--American
Pence Force are playing a more important role. They
now patrol such of the International Security Zone.
The Mrasilian troops in particular sees to be very
effective. There are now 1,200 Mraailians, 250
Sondurass, 160 Nicaraguans, 21 Costa Ricans and 3 21
Salvadorans under the dommand of Brazilian General
5"tugo Panasco Alvin.
A. There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence
in the Dominican interior. Those have included
attacks on police stations and army posts. There
have also been demonstrations that have resulted
in violence.
The outlook is for more violence. Monday, June
14, is the anniversary of the abortive 1950
Castro-backed invasion against Trujillo, from
which the gourteenth of dune Political Group, a
supporter of Cassano, takes its name. It
in likely that they will attempt to celebrate
with demonstrations throughout the country. This
any result in violence as the loyalist military
and police attempt to 'IiU Adsthem.
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11 June 1963
DCI I*11NG FOR
R ATOR 6TZ$WI6
In rlivia, the military junta had had some success
this week in attempts to establish authority over
the nationalized mines.
The attempt to bring the tin mines under control
caused violent clashes in the latter part of
May, but the government considers the issue so
imperative that it is willing to use armed force
it necessary.
1. The miners, undisciplined and led by extrem-
ists, have resisted effective government au-
thortty ever since the revolution of 1939.
2. The Bolivian government, however, now realizes
that it cannot begin to cope with its economic
problems before it establishes sound manage-
meat of the nationalized mines.
A program for reform and rehabilitation of
the mines has been decreed, but cannot be im-
plemented until the miners are brought under'
control and disarmed.
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It. The power struggle between the co-presidents of the
junta, garrientos and Ovando, remains the moot dis-
turbing element in the political picture.
A. It stems from the ambitious character of the two
The reform program has been accepted at some Mines
after a brief show of force, but a few wines, notably
at auanuni (WAS-ROO--pzI) and Golquiri, remain out-
side government control. Military occupation of
these mines is imminent.
genera is . Bach wants to be president, and both
have significant military support, but only liar-
rtentoe has popular political support.
Since President Victor Pas *tenssoro was ousted
last November, General Ovando has been conss+pir-
.ing secretly with extremists of both the right
and left in an effort to line up enough politi-
cal support of his own to topple General Bar--
rientos.
C. Relations between the two wen came dangerously
close to the breaking point on May 24.
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1. At that time Harrieatos, then sole M y.
head of the junta, had begun deporting the
principal extreme leftists and was moving the
army against the arced workers' militias and
striking workers.
2. Ovando, who was commander of the armed forces,
signed a cease-fire pact with the workers with-
out consulting the rest of the junta. The
agreement in effect gave the workers almost
everything they demanded, and wouldhkzee de-
nied the government the necessary means of
controling the mines.
garrientos moved Ovando up to the co-presidency
and took over joint command of the armed forces,
in order to keep an eye on him., to neutralize
his power, and, most importantly, to maintain
unity in the armed forces. A split in the sili..
tary would probably have plunged the country into
civil war, and still could. do far this maneuver
by garrientos has succeeded. Ovando is lying low,
and unity of the armed forces has been preserved,
but a final showdown between the two seems in-
evttabls.
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11 June 1965
MCI S*IS?ice Ire
$ I$
in the middle ARetNfU*ionalis* and rivalry in the
Arab camp have given rise to a now crop of coup
rumors, just at the time when Israel is taking a
harder line against border incursions and the Arab
plans to divert Jordan waters.
A. Syria has been demanding a more aggressis*
Arab reaction to the Israelis. The May 31
speech by Sgyptian president 5a.sir was a weak..-
but accurate--apology forttbe inability of the
Arab camp to challenge the Israelis militarily
uIDDLI EAST
this tis*.
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C. Iraq itself to in poor position to take part
against another government. The pro-
ypt ian and ant i-Zgypt is n factions in Baghdad
are at each other's throats again. President
Arif who holds the shaky regime together is
The costly
military campaign against the Kurds ib on again,
with little promise of success.
1. Communist and ^aathist elements in lraq
are talking about coup possibilities.
Moves toward unity with Egypt have aantag..
onined those who oppose Xasi.r; while at the
ease time they have been so minimal that
they have not satisfied those who demad
union.
11. Arab terrorist raiding parties are striking into
Xsruel from Lebanon and Jordan. the two governments
are probably not directly involved, but there been
unable to stop the raids and are afraid that they
will either provoke Israeli reprisals or raise ten-
sion to such a pitch that they cannot successfully
resist Syrian demands that stronger forces of the
United Arab C4-emnd be stationed in Leeauon and Jordan.
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yptian troops. He feels that if
;tart' stalemate with the royalists,
supported by Saudi Arabia.
head of the Yemeni republican
ster human, has' been urging
d 1ly ever since October, 1962. It now am.xzounts
bore 50 to 55,000 men,
Despite this heavy Egyptian comm
VAR presence were removed, he could find
enough common ground with the Yemeni tribes
1row this mess, It is not only costly
ydtian troop strength has been increased
Saudis to end the civil war.
woul(: certainly like to extricate him-
,showing no signs of success, but ties up
about one third of his ground forces at a
hen other Arabs are challengin
ac-or, defiant posture again-St
Yere", but would lose considerable prest
waver, unless he can leave a friendly
in the Arab world.
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would not only give up any influence
for such a solution, and without it, he
;gr cannot afford to pull out of Yemen,
ubi Can government in reasonably secure
control there. lie sees no early prospect
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INS
"CB-UP PAP" WW
DCI'b lIF1
*PM? S'KF1I*I3
R L1C Or VIR
AU AR MT FCltCt
1 Jaaneseotr' 1065
(kflAF)
Latest Available
Army
220,3160
`a v7
8,194
(breakdown not a va i lable )
Marine
7,209
A it
10A521
246,284
(audit 31 Map)
855,138
A.Bi 1 Forces
Bl
048
(do)
1
,
Popular Force 168,317
(do)
05,173
160
187
Coastal Force x,747
(eest iawa to 15 ma
)
,
4
01
National Police 31,396
y
(do)
,
0
37,
_
(do)
tti
"71 346
573, 3+118
comparison of strength figures subject to fiats audit
---
regu laars , Region l Force, Popular Force -` -sb dr
Iron 510,63o in January to 510,468 in Jun*, Decl Iare
due to drop to Popular Format strength.)
P,'8 "NY Or YIE`I"ll*M (PAVB) (Worth Vietnamese) in 4outb Vietnam:
400 (on* battalion)
1,200 (one regiment)
3,800 to 4,500 (three r.g'ts)
: MAC7 carries 2nd In, 101st Befit, 305th Div
confirmed
,
+AVI defector in #.on'tu Province earl' this hear reported
all 3 bus of 101st i8 Bata t tar, and YACY carries as "possible"
1965 infiltration. Two defectors, latest in June, report all
three regiments of 335th to booth Vietnam. )
eat estimated strength of Worth Vietnamese army was *28,000
239,000 at present. of these, we estimated that about
were in Laos on i January, and still cariry the saws figure
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I Jan 65
Current
flit C0t0 forces
Chat Regulars :
(*&C V
32,975 (19 Dec.
46,800
(*)
Non-Combat regulars :
(not carried) (update)
4,200
(?)
.
!
{P? - 8Ci , 001
91, 755
.
Total; 92,975 0112,975
155,955
(0)
political than military. They enter villages to
Jor infiltration.
conduct propaganda, collect taxes, etc.)
The increase in Viet Cong main farce strength from, Jaaaaary
to the present reflects largely the re-evaluation of MACY and
South Vietnamese Order-of-battle holdings, rather than any
inures do not include 400 PAW listed on previous page
117 completing MACV's "V ist Cong gain Force" hold iag
47.000 combat, 64,600 total.
This figure could include another estimated 30,000 arced
Viet Cong ,bo m we have usitted because their role is
ate Companies 135 lag
tons 47 64(incl Qatar PAVI)
tat Headquarters 5 9
Unit breakd+nwa of ccesbat regulars :
Operate platoons 99 114
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