NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001100180043-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREWORD ........................................... 1
CONCLUSIONS ........................................ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... 6
DISCUSSION .......................................... 8
I. PROBABLE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WAR ............. 8
Basic Assumption of Nuclear War .............. 8
Likelihood of Surprise Attack .................. 9
Priority Targets of Soviet Attacks .............. 9
Unlikelihood of Initial Secondary Attacks ....... 9
Likelihood of Two Phases ........ . .... ... ..... 10
Calculated Disruption of U.S. Command
Channels ................................. 11
Attitude of "Neutrals" .................. . ..... 11
II. LIMITATIONS ON CIA ROLE IN A NUCLEAR WAR .... 12
Problems of Redeployment ...............
....... 12
Vulnerability of CIA Resources ................. 13
Impact on Agent Personnel ..................... 13
Impact of Nuclear War on Communications ....... 14
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III.
CIA OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WAR ............ 15
A.
Distinction Between Military Theaters and
Other Areas ...........................
15
.
Intelligence Requirements .................
16
C.
CIA Role in Military Theaters During the
Initial Phase ..........................
18
Operational Intelligence , .......
20
Positive Intelligence
20
PW ...................................
21
E and E ...............................
21
D.
Subsequent Phase Operations in Military
Theaters ..............................
22
E.
Communications in Military Theaters .......
24
F.
Operations in Neutral Areas and
Strategic Islands ....................
24
IV.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NUCLEAR WAR . 27
Possible Restrictions on Use of Nuclear
Weapons in Soviet Satellites and
Soviet Minority Areas ..................... 27
Timing and Nature of Surrender or Cease Fire ...
Post Hostilities Role of CIA .................. 30
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In this report the Special Reserve Panel has sought to analyze the
likely impact of global nuclear warfare on CIA's wartime role. Principal
emphasis has been placed on the period through 1960, during which U. S.
military planning is based on a concept of unlimited nuclear warfare,
implying the use of nuclear weapons in both strategic and tactical roles
in all areas of the world in which suitable targets are located.
The Panel is cognizant of and has given much attention to the alter-
natives to all-out nuclear war. However, because the official U.S.
concept of the character of a general war resulting from a Soviet attack
through 1960 is based upon massive retaliation utilizing nuclear weapons
and because realistic war planning must in any case be based upon the
most adverse circumstances in which CIA initial wartime activities would
be carried out, the Panel has considered only CIA's role in a war involving
all-out use of nuclear weapons by both sides.
The Panel has placed primary emphasis on an analysis of CIA's
overseas role. The impact of an attack on Washington is likely to be
such that the field may have to operate with little Headquarters direc-
tion and support for an indefinite period of time.
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In preparing this report, the Panel has taken into consideration:
(1) U. S. Policies, insofar as available, governing the conduct of a
future general war; (2) CIA war plans; and (3) NIEs and other intel-
ligence on the wartime capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union,
the Soviet Satellite nations,, and neutral countries and our Allies.
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1 January 1958
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Major war up to 1960 would be an all-out nuclear war.
2. At least the first phase would be one of all-out and possibly
very brief unrestricted exchange of nuclear attacks.
3. There may be a subsequent phase or phases of what has been
termed "broken back" war.
4. The initial phase of all-out nuclear warfare would take place
in limited areas of highest strategic importance while large areas, either
neutral countries or "strategic islands," would be left relatively un-
touched, even by fall-out. Even small areas within the major combat
zones, i.e., "tactical islands" would be more or less free of nuclear
damage.
5. Since nuclear war would almost certainly begin with a sur-
prise attack, which Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and delivery
systems make increasingly feasible, early warning becomes ever more
vital but increasingly difficult to achieve.
6. CIA's ability to function during the first phase in areas of in-
tensive nuclear exchange would be severly limited. A large proportion
of existing CIA assets and facilities in areas of nuclear destruction
would be neutralized if not destroyed..
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(a) Great difficulties would arise in the redeployment and
reorganization of CIA field stations.
(b) Agent resources in particular would be highly vulnerable
to the effects of nuclear weapons.
(c) Extensive disruption of communications would occur.
Under these circumstances CIA would be capable of only the most
limited first phase operations in combat theaters. CIA's primary
task would be to cope with the problems of survival and redeploy-
ment for subsequent phases of operations and the establishment
of satisfactory relationships with the military commanders.
7. In contrast to the severe limitations on CIA's first phase role
in areas of extensive nuclear exchange, greatly expanded opportunities
for useful CIA operations would occur in the subsequent phase of "broken
back" warfare. In this phase extensive requirements for intelligence on
the chaotic post attack situation in key areas and numerous possibilities
for stimulating resistance activities and guerrilla warfare will exist.
8. Moreover, from the very outset of a war CIA could play a
major role in those areas which, bacause they remain neutral or are of
secondary military importance, would not come under intensive nuclear
attack. Indeed CIA operations in these areas could probably make a
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greater contribution to the over-all national effort than could the limited
activities which would be feasible in nuclear combat zones. In many
cases CIA staff personnel.and assets might be the only major U.S.
resources available to carry out U. S. policy.
9. The employment of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and its Allies
in satellite areas could decisively affect CIA operations in these areas,
but to date these problems have not been adequately explored.
10. The terms, timing and circumstances of surrender negotia-
tions which might occur after an extremely short period of nuclear ex-
change would critically affect. planning for CIA's wartime role as well
as for the key role CIA might have in the immediate post hostilities
period. Here, too, however, there does not appear to be any adequate
national planning.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Early warning operations must be given a clear-cut priority
over wartime requirements including those placed by the military upon
CIA.
2. CIA should accept only the most limited requirements in an-
ticipated areas of major nuclear exchange during the first phase of a
war.
3. Instead, CIA war planning for areas of likely nuclear exchange
should emphasize survival, reorganization and the establishment of
proper relationships with military commanders, in order to ensure
adequate CIA. support of the military in these areas in the subsequent
phase of the war.
4. CIA war planning for areas likely to remain neutral or i.:.e large
"strategic islands" likely to escape nuclear damage should be premi?:eca
on the concept that CIA can make a major and perhaps its most importa.-,t,
contribution to the national war effort in and from such areas.
5. An emergency communications system adaptable to the situr
ation of a nuclear war should be developed. It should include:
(a) Alternate facilities to those presently in use;
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(b) Facilities independent of existing military and civilian
systems;
(c) Equipment which can be operated by untrained CIA persen-
nel;
(d) Stored, protected and available equipment in both the
"tactical islands" within the combat areas and in the "strategic
islands" and neutral areas.
6. CIA should undertake a study to determine where strategic and
tactical islands would be likely to exist in a nuclear war and should under-
take war planning on the basis of this study; and
7. CIA should attempt to influence'U.S. national planners to con-
sider the pros and cons of employing nuclear weapons in Satellite areas.
8. CIA should examine the problem of the terms, timing, and
circumstances of possible surrender negotiation to determine the impact
these would have on CIA's wartime and post-hostilities roles.
9. Finally, we recommend that the above principles be adopted
as the guidelines for future CIA war planning.
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