TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000100150067-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: January 10, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

70-B-511 NRO History File
NRO - Organ"ar .eocPFor Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP85B00803fODtG0'i .O 7GOmpleted.
Memo to DCI from RMB 10 Jan 1962 S/Eyes only
"4. With respect to the National Reconnaissance Office, I have noted
the views you expressed to Messrs. Gilpatric and Charyk as summarized in
your memo for rec of 3 Jan. On this matter, again, I will simply
summarize certain views without supporting justification.
First, If there is to be a N R 0 with a single head, he must have the
responsibility and authority (subject, of course, to his superiors) for
major systems decisions in the development phase dnd for major opera-
tional decisions in the operational phase. Obviously he wld make such
decisions within the constraints imposed in the form of budgetary
limitations, intelligence requirements (which wld emanate from the USIB)
and natl policy.
Second. It will be difficult under the most favorable circs for an
individual placed in either the Agency or the Department of Defense to
exercise this authority over resources controlled by the other of the
two partner agencies.
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Third. Other than in the OX program, all the funds and the vast pre-
p.nderance of resources in the form of technical personnel, operational
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personnel, and facilities belong to the Department of Defense. The a-
bove difficulty would be maximized in a situation in which an officer of
the Agency was expected to exercise control over those resources.
Moreover, it would be virtually infeasible to transfer the resources
in question to the control of the Agency, as is being done with
funds and personnel in the OX program because the resources employed
in satellite programs are not separable from the total resources of the
Department of Defense.
Fourth. Accordingly, by far the easiest way to create a unified
N R 0 wld be to place its Director in the DOD and to limit the
Agency's role in recon programs to the performance of certain specified
functions. Notably procurement and assistance with problems of
security and cover, under his direction. This wld not, of course,
dilute the USIB's responsibility for rqmts and need involve no change
in the status of the P I C.
5. There are, I think, two other possi_blde arrfanigmer is t tnT6jj;g be
consistent with good management. One w be o an on
o f a N AppavediF r Wage 2b.O5/0'4l2:VPC# AL)PtSRO0 iRO 01O0tO00 c5 Agency
and responsibility for all satellite programs with the DOD.
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Each agency could then seek such support as it required from the other.
The other solution wld be to make the N R 0 into a truly joint project
organization headed by a director responsible to both the DCI and
the SecDef. Under this conception, all the resources required for
the conduct of N r programs shld be assigned by the two parent
agencies to the N R 0 and shld be directly controlldd by the N R 0.
Its T/O shld include personnel in Wash, in proj offices at contractor's
plants, and in the obrnl control center at Sunnyvale that are directly
engaged in the development and opn of recon systems. Its budget
shld cover the full costs of these programs. It shld be empowered to
execute contracts and carry out procurement under the authority of the
SecDef for all overt activities and under that of the DCI where security
so required.
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB6. In conclusion I might say that I regard this last solution as the e
-
best. F
I
It wid not ot course, represent a drastically cifferent arrange-
ment from that which wld result from simply placing the N R 0 within
the DOD. It wld require more surgery than the latter arrangement. On
the other h%3*gve-ctFQ--lFae1 2QQ?LD4 aCtJA P ~P aPeRMRPOW
0a0t01 gge50p0ro-vision of
joint control by the DCI and the SecDef wld serve as a protection against
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the absorption of these functions by the military services. Hopefully,
the opportunity for secure and technically venturesome development
could be maintained.
/s/ RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
DD(Plans)
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