NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240057-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: October 3, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

1964
Approve g ff) OLS/ I RffiA_RRF fR3R000100240057-1 A549
SUPERS: $7,500 EACH
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N.Y.
National Security and the Nuclear Test
Ban 6u- Z/ "d
EXTENSION OF REMARK
HON. JOSEPH S. CLARK
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Saturday, October 3, 1964
Mr. CLARK.* Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the Appendix of the RECORD, the newspa-
per account entitled "Arms Race Called
Road to Oblivion," which appeared in the
Washington Post of September 24 and
an article from the October 1964 edition
of Scientific American entitled "National
Security and the Nuclear Test Ban," by
Jerome B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York,
There being no objection, 'the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept.
24, 1964]
ARMS RACE CALLED ROAD TO OBLIVION-SCIENCE
EXPERTS SAY No FURTHER BUILDUP CAN
PRESERVE NATION
(By Howard Simons)
Two former key Government science ad-
visers say in a detailed study that a further
buildup in weaponry is virtually meaning-
less, as no conceivable military efforts can
-any longer safeguard a nation's security.
The two scientists are Jerome B. Wiesner
and Herbert F. York, who give their views in
a 9-page article to be published in the Oc-
tober issue of the Scientific American.
Wiesner was science adviser to the late
President Kennedy and is now dean of
science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. York was chief scientist at the
Pentagon during the Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy administrations and now is chancellor
of the University of California at San Diego.
The essence of their, thesis is that both
sides in an arms race are "confronted by
the dilemma of steadily increasing military
power and steadily decreasing national
security."
NO TECHNICAL SOLUTION
They further state that "this dilemma
has no technical solution" in their "con-
sidered professional judgment."
The two scientists, who point out that
tl ey have spent their professional lifetimes
advising the Government on military policy
and in the active development of weapons,
make this statement:
"If the great powers continue to look for
solutions in the area of science and tech-
nology only, the result will be to worsen
the situation. The clearly predictable course
of the arms race is a steady open spiral down-
ward into oblivion."
For these reasons, Wiesner and York argue
against continued underground nuclear
testing and in favor of further arms control
and thereafter "actual disarmament" as a
solution to the dilemma.
Whereas the article is cast In scientific
and technical terms, it clearly has political
implications because aspects of the theme
are now part of the political campaign.
JOHNSON ADVISERS
Senator BARRY M. GOLDWATER, particularly,
has decried what he contends is the admin-
istration's failure to develop new weapons
systems. Moreover, Wiesner Is a prime mover
and charter member of "Scientists and Engi-
neers for Johnson and HUMPHREY." Wiesner
is also a member of President Johnson's bi-
partisan Science Advisory Committee, as is
York.
Basing their arguments on nonsecret in-
forplation, Wiesner and York conclude that
blast shelters nor further refinements in
atomic and hydrogen weapons can protect
Americans or Russians against the ravages
of nuclear-tipped-missile warfare.
Arguing that "defense against thermo-
nuclear attack is impossible," Wiesner and
York dismiss the idea that fallout and blast
shelters can provide a significant solution
to the problem of national survival. They
maintain that calculations on the percentage
of population that would be saved in it shel-
tered society is unknowable because the form
of nuclear attack is unknowable.
Moreover, the big problem in their view
is not the physical theory of reducing radia-
tion but the "sociological problem of the sud-
den initiation of general chaos, which is not
subject to numerical analysis."
The two scientists question the effective-
ness of an anti-missile-missile...system as a
technical solution to the problem of preserv-
ing a nation from nuclear devastation. They
cite the case of the Nike-Zeus, which was in-
tended to be an American anti-missile-mis-
sile system capable of intercepting and de-
stroying nuclear warheads before they could
rain down upon the Nation.
At the time of the conception of the Nike-
Zeus system, the scientists say, its designers
were confronted with a comparatively simple
problem, "namely that of shooting down the
warheads one by one as they presented them-
selves to the detectors."
But what happened, according to Wiesner
and York, is that the offense outran the
defense. The designers of the offense began
to build penetration aids "mock weapons,
decoys, single rockets that eject multiple
warheads-devices and stratagems that
"overwhelmed the designed capability of the
Nike-Zeus system and compelled its recent
abandonment."
Wiesner and York suggest, too, that a
similar fate befell the Sage system designed
in the 1950's to protect the Nation against a
thermonuclear attack by bombers. Essen-
tially, they say, the offense against which
these systems were planned changes before
the defense system can be fully developed.
Nonetheless, the scientists do note interim
benefits from continuing efforts to develop
defense systems, even though "nothing on
the horizon suggests that there is a solution"
to the antimissile problem. One such bene-
fit, in their view, is that this kind of re-
search "promotes the continued development
of offensive weapons."
They explain that:
"The practical fact is that work on de-
fensive systems turns out to be the best way
to promote invention of the penetration aids
that nullify them."
In making their case for an end to all
nuclear weapons testing, Wiesner and York
tick off the reasons' advanced by others for
testing and dismiss each in turn.
Thus, they view the military usefulness of
superbombs, such as the 100-megaton weap-
on that Premier Khrushchev has boasted is
in the Soviet arsenal, as impractical. Such
a weapon, they say, would be expensive and
"under any imaginable circumstances it
would be of limited use and not many of its
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A5496 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
kind would be built." Moreover, they con-
tend that the United States has the know-
how to develop such a superbomb without
further testing.
As for the neutron bomb or pure fusion
bomb, publicized by some persons as capable
of killing people but leaving property intact,
Wiesner and York argue that even if its de-
velopment were simple the major powers
would want to slow its development. The
reason would be that such a theoretical
weapon could be made by the "smallest and
poorest powers in the world."
INFORMATION MARGINAL
In sum, Wiesner and York conclude that,
although further testing would contribute
some additional refinement to and knowledge
of nuclear weapons, such as the effect of
blast and radiation on material, "the infor-
mation would be, at best, marginal"
Moreover, the scientists feel other con-
siderations to be far greater uncertainties
than the knowledge of weapons effects.
Among these considerations they listed: How
good are the potential enemy's missiles; will
he strike cities or military bases or both;
what kind of attack will he launch?
Just such an uncertainty, they say,mani-
fested Itself In the famous missile gap con-
troversy of the 1960 presidential campaign.
Rather than continued nuclear testing,
which does little to resolve these uncertain-
ties in the view of Wiesner and York, they
suggest that the Nation could improve
its nuclear capability by improving the ac-
curacy and reliability of its missiles in order
to be more certain of delivering atomic war-
heads on their targets.
In want of a scientific and technical solu-
tion to the problem of defending the United
States against nuclear attack, the Nation has
evolved a strategy whose aim is to have a
capability to destroy or threaten to destroy
enemy targets even after absorbing the first
nuclear punch.
"Several approaches, in fact," says Wiesner
and York, "can be taken to assure the sur-
- vivai of a sufficient missile force after a first
attack on it. The most practical of these
are: 'hardening'; that is, direct protection
against physical damage; concealment, in-
cluding subterfuge and, as In the case of the
Polaris submarine missiles, mobility; and
numbers; that is, presenting more targets
than the attacker can possibly cope with."
Numbers, according to Weisner and York,
Is the most straightforward and certain of
these missile race tactics. They maintain
that by any measure the combination of
smaller warheads and greater numbers of
missiles provides the greatest assurance for
the Nation's deterrent force to survive and
wreak revenge and even win, whatever that
may mean.
Essentially, the two weapons specialists
argue that since both the United States and
the Soviet Union have had for some time and
do have the capability of destroying one an-
other and, since science and technology can-
not prevent such destruction, the only solu-
tion lies at the disarmament conference
table.
[From the Scientific American, October
1964]
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR TEST
BAN
(By Jerome B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York)
The partial nuclear test ban-the inter-
national treaty that prohibits nuclear explo-
sions in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and
inouter space-has been in effect for a little
more than a year. From July 1945, when the
first atomic bomb was set off in New Mexico,
until August 1963, when the United States
completed its last series of atmospheric bomb
tests In the Pacific, the accumulated tonnage
of nuclear explosions had been doubling
every 3 years. Contamination of the atmos-
phere by fission products and by the second-
ary products of Irradiation (notably the long-
lived carbon 14) was approaching a level
(nearly 10 percent of the natural background
radiation) that alarmed many biologists. A
chart plotting the accumulation of radio-
active products can also be read as a chart
of the acceleration in the arms race.
Now, for a year, the curve has flattened
out. From the objective record it can be
said that the improvement of both the physi-
cal and the political atmosphere of the world
has fulfilled at least the short-range expec-
tations of those who advocated and worked
for the test ban. In and of itself the treaty
does no more than moderate the continuing
arms race. It is nonetheless, as President
Kennedy said, "an important first step-a
step toward peace, a step toward reason, a
step away from war. 11
The passage of a year also makes it possible
to place in perspective and evaluate certain
misgivings that have been expressed about
the effect on U.S, national security of the
suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons
in the atmosphere. These misgivings princi-
pally involve the technology of nuclear arma-
ment. National security, of course, involves
moral questions and human values-politi-
cal, social, economic, and psychological ques-
tions as well as technological ones. Since no
one is an expert in all the disciplines of
knowledge concerned, it is necessary to con-
sider one class of such questions at a time,
always with the caution that such considera-
tion is incomplete. As scientists who have
been engaged for most of our professional
lifetimes in consultation on this country's
military policy and in the active develop-
ment of the weapons themselves, we shall de-
vote the present discussion primarily to the
technological questions.
The discussion will necessarily rest on un-
classified Information. It is unfortunate
that so many of the facts concerning this
most important problem are classified, but
that is the situation at this time. Since we
have access to classified information, how-
ever, we can assure the reader that we would
not have to modify any of the arguments
we present here if we were able to cite such
information. Nor do we know of any mili-
tary considerationsexcluded from open dis-
cussion by military secrecy that would
weaken any of our conclusions. We shall
discuss the matter from the point of view
of our country's national interest. We be-
lieve, however, that a Soviet military tech-
nologist, writing from the point of view of
the U.S.S.R., could write an almost identical
paper.
Today as never before national security
involves technical questions. The past two
decades have seen a historic revolution in
the technology of war. From the blockbuster
of World War II to the thermonuclear bomb
the violence of military explosives has been
scaled upward a million times. The time
required for the interhemispheric transport
of weapons of mass destruction has shrunk
from 20 hours for the 300-mile-per-hour
B-29 to the 30-minute flight time of the
ballistic missile. Moreover, the installation
of the computer in command and control
systems has increased their information-
processing capacity by as much as six orders
of magnitude compared with organizations
manned at corresponding points by human
nervous systems.
It has been suggested by some that tech-
nological surprise presents the primary dan-
ger to national security. Yet recognition of
the facts of the present state of military
technology must lead to the opposite con-
clusion. Intercontinental delivery time can-
not be reduced to secure any significant im-
provement in the effectiveness of the attack.
Improvement by another order of magnitude
in the information-processing capacity of
the defending system will not make nearly
October 22
as large a difference in its operational effec-
tiveness.
The point iswell illustrated by the 100-
megaton nuclear bomb. Whether or not it
is necessary, in the interests of national se-
curity, to test and deploy a bomb with a yield
in the range of 100 megatons was much dis-
cussed during the test ban debates. The
bomb was frequently referred to as the "big"
bomb, as if the bombs now in the U.S. arsenal
were somehow not big. The absurdity of
this notion is almost enough by itself to
settle the argument. A 1-megaton bomb,is
already about 50 times bigger than the bomb
that produced 100,000 casualties at Hiro-
shima, and 10 megatons is of the same order
of magnitude as the grand total of all high
explosives used in all wars to date. Other
technical considerations that surround this
question are nonetheless illuminating and
worth exploring.
There is, first of all, the tactics of the
missile race. The purpose of a missile sys-
tem is to be able to destroy or, perhaps more
accurately, able to threaten to destroy enemy
targets. No matter what the statesmen,
military men, and moralists on each side may
think of the national characteristics, capa-
bilities, and morality of the other side, no
matter what arguments may be made about
who is aggressive and who is not or who
is rational and who is not, the military
planners on each side must reckon with the
possibility that the other side will attack
first. This means that above all else the
planner must assure the survival of a suf-
ficient proportion of his own force, follow-
ing the heaviest surprise attack the other
side might mount, to launch a retaliatory at-
tack. Moreover, if the force is to be effective
as a deterrent to a. first strike, its capacity
to survive and wreak revenge and even win,
whatever that may mean, must be apparent
to the other side.
Several approaches, in fact, can be taken
to assure the survival of a sufficient missile
force after a first attack on it. The most
practical of these are: (1) "hardening," that
is, direct protection against physical dam-
age; (2) concealment, including subterfuge
and, as in the case of the Polaris submarine
missiles, mobility, and (3) numbers, that is,
presenting more targets than the attacker
can possibly cope with. - The most straight-
forward and certain of these is the last:
numbers. For the wealthier adversary It is
also the easiest, because he can attain abso-
lute superiority in numbers. A large num-
ber of weapons is also a good tactic for the
poorer adversary, because numbers even in
the absence of absolute superiority can hope-
lessly frustrate efforts to locate all targets.
There is an unavoidable trade-off, how-
ever, between the number and the size of
weapons. The cost of a missile depends on
many factors, one of the most important
being gross size or weight. Unless one
stretches "the state of the art" too far in the
direction of sophistication and miniaturiza-
tion, the cost of a missile turns out to be
roughly proportional to its weight, If other-
wise identical design criteria are used. The
protective structures needed for hardening
or the capacity of submarines needed to carry
the missile also have a cost roughly propor-
tional to the volume of the missile. Some of
the ancillary equipment has a cost propor-
tional to the size of the missile and some
does not; some operational expenditures vary
directly with size or weight and some do not.
The cost of the warhead generally does not,
although the more powerful warhead re-
quires the larger missile. It is not possible
to put all these factors together in precise
bookkeeping form, but it is correct to say
that the cost of a missile, complete and
ready for firing, increases somewhat more
slowly than linearly with its size.
On the other hand-considering hard
targets only-the effectiveness of a missile
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increases more slowly than cost as the size
of the, missile goes up. The reason is that
the radius of blast damage, which is the
primary effect employed against a hard
target, increases only as the cube root of
the yield and because yield has a more
or less direct relation to weight. Against
soft targets, meaning population centers and
conventional military .bases, even small
bombs are completely effective, and nothing
is gained by increasing yield. Given finite
resources, even in the wealthiest economy,
it would seem prudent to accept smaller
size in order to get larger numbers. On
any scale of Investment, in fact, the com-
bination of larger numbers and smaller size
results in greater effectiveness for the mis-
sile system as a whole, as contrasted to the
effectiveness of a single missile.
This line of reasoning has, for some years,
formed the basis of U.S. missile policy. The
administration of President Eisenhower,
when faced with the choice of bigger mis-
siles (the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan rock-
ets) as against smaller missiles (the solid-
fueled Minuteman and Polaris rockets),
decided to produce many more of the small-
er missiles, The administration of Presi-
dent Kennedy independently confirmed this
decision and increased the ratio of smaller
to larger missiles in the Nation's armament.
During the test ban hearings it was revealed
that the U.S. nuclear armament included
bombs of 23-megaton yield and higher, car-
ried by bombers. Recently Cyrus R. Vance,
Under Secretary of Defense, indicated' that
the Air Force has been retiring these large
bombs in favor of smaller ones. There are
presumably no targets that call for the use
of such enormous explosions.
The argument that says it is now critical
,for U.S. national security to build very big
bombs and missiles Tails completely when
It is examined in terms of,the strictly tech-
nical factors that determine the effective-
`ness of a missile attack. In addition to
explosive yield the principal factors are the
number of missiles, the overall reliability of
each missile, and the accuracy with which
it can be delivered tq its target. The ef-
fectiveness of the attack-the likelihood that
that a given target will be destroyed-can
be described by a number called the kill
probability (Pk). This number depends
on the number of missiles (N) launched
at the target, the reliability (r) of each
missile and the ratio of the radius of dam-
age (R5) effected by each missile to the ac-
curacy with which the missiles are delivered
to the target (CEP). The term "CEP,"
which stands for "circular error probable,"
Implies that the distribution of a large
number of hits around agiven target will
follow a standard error curve; actually, for
a variety of reasons (which include the
presence of systematic errors, coupling be-
tween certain causes of error and the spo-
radic nature of the larger error factors) the
distribution does not really follow a stand-
ard error curve. The term "CEP" is still
useful, however, and can be defined simply
as the circle within which half of a large
number of identical missiles would fall.
Now, in the case of a soft target, Rk is
very large for the present range of warhead
yields in the U.S. arsenal. The reason is
that soft targets are so highly vulnerable to
all the "prompt" effects (particularly the in-
cendiary effects) of thermonuclear weapons.
The range of these effects, modified by var-
ious attenuation factors, increases approxi-
mately as the square root or the cube root
of the yield at large distances. Under these
circumstances, given the accuracy of exist-
1ng fire-control systems, the ratio R./CEP
Is large and the likelihood that the target
will be destroyed becomes practically inde-
pendent of this ratio. Instead Py depends
primarily on r, the reliability of the missile.
If r is near unity, then a single missile (N=
1) will do the job; if r is not near unity,
then success in the attack calls for an offset-
ting increase in the number of missiles [Pk=
l-(1-r)N]. In either case changes in Rk
make little difference. That is to say, a big
bomb cannot destroy a soft target any more
surely than a small one can.
When it comes to hard targets, the ratio
R,,/CEP becomes much smaller even for
bombs of high yield. The blast effects-in-
eluding the ground rupture, deformation and
shock surrounding the crater of a surface
burst-have comparatively small radii at in-
tensities sufficient to overcome hardening.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the radii of
these effects increase only as the cube root
of the yield. This rule of thumb is modi-
fied somewhat in both directions by the
duration of the blast pulse, local variations
in geology and other factors, but it is sus-
tained by a voluminous record from weapons
tests. Since the radius of blast damage is of
the same order of size, as the circular error
probable, or smaller, the ratio Rk/CEP must
be reckoned withip an attack on a hard
target. Yet even in this situation the cube
root of,a given increase in yield would con-
tribute much less to success than a 'com-
parable investment in numbers, reliability or
accuracy.
Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere from
1945 to 1962, the last full year in which the
United States and the U.S.S.R. set off such
.,explosions, are presented on the basis of
accumulated megatons. The overall increase
in megatons has doubled every 3 years. The
data for this chart are from Federal Radia-
tion Council Report No. 4:
Accumulated megatons exploded in the
atmosphere
Megatons
1945-51-----------------------------
0.76
1952-54-----------------------------
61
1955-58-----------------------------
89
1957-58-----------------------------
174
1959-60------------------------------
174
1961---------------------------------
294
1962--------------------------I------
511
Yield is of course a product of the yield-
to-weight ratio of the nuclear explosive em-
ployed in the warhead multiplied by the
weight of the warhead. In order to gain
significant increases in the first of these two
quantities further nuclear tests would be
necessary. Increase in the weight of the
warhead, on the other hand, calls for bigger
and more efficient missiles. In the present
state of the art, efforts to improve CEP and
reliability as well as weight-carrying capac-
ity hold out more promise than efforts to im-
prove the yield-to-weight ratio. The reason
is that missile design and control involve
less mature and less fully exploited tech-
nologies than the technology of nuclear war-
heads. Finally, an increase in the number
of missiles, although not necessarily cheap,
promises more straightforward and assured
results than a fractional increase in yield-
to-weight ratio. Of all the various possible
technical approaches to improving the mili-
tary effectiveness of an offensive missile
force, therefore, the only one that calls for
testing (whether underground or in the at-
mosphere) is the one that offers the smallest
prospect of return.
Suppose, however, a new analysis,, based
on Information not previously considered,
should show that it is in fact necessary to
incorporate the 100-megaton bomb in the
U.S. arsenal. Can this be done without fur-
ther weapons tests? The answer is "yes."
Because the U.S.S.R. has pushed development
in this yield range and the United States has
not, the U.S. 100-megaton bomb might
not be as elegant as the Soviet model.
It would perhaps weigh somewhat more or
at, the same weight would produce a some-
what lower yield. It could be made, how-
ever, and the basic techniques for making it
have been known since the late 1950's. The
warhead for such a bomb would require
a big missile, but not so big as some being
developed by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration -for the U.S. space-ex-
ploration program. Such a weapon would be
expensive, particularly on a per-unit basis;
under any imaginable circumstances it would
be of limited use and not many of its kind
would be built.
The extensive series of weapons tests car-
ried out by the United States-involving the
detonation of several hundred nuclear bombs
and devices-have yielded two important
bodies of information. They, have shown how
to bring the country's nuclear striking force
to its present state of high effectiveness.
And they have demonstrated the effects of
nuclear weapons over a wide range of yields.
Among the many questions that call for
soundly based knowledge of weapons effects
perhaps none is more important in a dis-
cussion of the technical aspects of national
security than: What would be the result
of a surprise attack by missiles on the coun-
try's own missile forces? Obviously, if the
huge U.S. investment in its nuclear arma-
ment is to succeed in deterring an attacker,
that armament must be capable of surviving
a first strike.
A reliable knowledge of weapons effects
is crucial to the making of rational decisions
about the number of missiles needed, the
hardening of missile emplacements, the de-
gree of dispersal, the proportion that should
be made mobile and so on. The military
planner must bear in mind, however, that
such decisions take time-years-to carry
out and require large investments of finite
physical and human resources. The inertia
of the systems is such that the design en-
gineer at work today must be concerned not
with the surprise attack that might be
launched today but rather with the kind
and size of forces that might be launched
against them years in the future. In addi-
tion to blast, shock, and other physical ef-
fects, therefore, the planner must contend
with a vast range of other considerations.
These include the yields of the various bombs
the attacker would use against each target;
the reliability and accuracy of his missiles;
the number and kind of weapons systems he
would have available for attack; the tactics
of the attacker, meaning the number of mis-
siles he would commit to a first strike, the
fractions he would allocate to military as
against civilian targets and the relative im-
portance he would assign to various kinds of
military targets, the effects of chaos on the
defender's capacity to respond, and so on. In
all cases the planner must project his think-
ing forward to some hypothetical future time,
making what he can of the available intelli-
gence about the prospective attacker's pres-
ent capabilities and intentions. Plainly all
these "other considerations" involve in-
herently greater uncertainties than the
knowledge of weapons effects.
The extensive classified and unclassified
literature accumulated in two decades of
weapons tests and available to U.S. military
planners contains at least some observations
on all important effects for weapons with a
large range of yields. These observations
are more or less well understood in terms of
physical theories; they can be expressed in
numerical or algebraic form, and they can be
extrapolated into areas not fully explored in
the weapons tests conducted by the United
States, for example into the 100-megaton
range. As one departs from the precise cir-
cumstances of past experiments, of course,
extrapolation becomes less and less reliable.
Nonetheless, some sort of estimate can be
made about what the prompt and direct ef-
fects will be under any conceivable set of
circumstances.
Consider, in contrast, the degree of un-
certainty implicit in predicting the number
and kind of weapons systems that might be
available to the prospective attacker. Such
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an uncertainty manifested itself In the
famous "missile gap" controversy. The re-
markable difference between the dire predic-
tions made in the late 195D's-based as they
were on the best available- intelligence-and
the actual situation that developed In the
early 1960's can be taken as indicating the
magnitude of the uncertainties that sur-
round the variables other than weapons ef-
fects with which the military planner must
contend. Moreover, these factors, as they
concern a future attack, are uncertain not
only to the defender; they are almost as un-
certain to the attacker.
Uncertainties of this order and kind defy
reduction to mathematical expression. A
human activity as complex as modern war
cannot be computed with the precision
possible in manipulation of the data that
concern weapons effects. What is more, the
uncertainties about this single aspect of the
total problem are not, as it sometimes as-
sumed, multiplicative in estimation of the
overall uncertainty. Most, but not all, of
the uncertainties are independent of one
another. The total uncertainty is therefore,
crudely speaking, the square root of the sum
of the squares of the individual uncertain-
ties.
In our view further refinement of the re-
maining uncertainties in the data concern-
ing prompt direct physical effects can con-
tribute virtually nothing more to manage-
ment of the real military and political prob-
lems, even though it would produce neater
graphs. Furthermore, if new effects should
be discovered either experimentally or theo-
retically in the future, or if, in certain pe-
culiar environments, some of the now known
effects should be excessively uncertain. It
will be almost certainly possible to "over-
design" the protection against them. Thus,
although renewed atmospheric testing would
contribute some refinement to the data on
weapons effects, the information would be,
at best, of marginal value.
Such refinements continue to be sought
In the underground tests that are counte-
nanced under the partial test ban. From
this work may also come some reductions in
the cost of weapons, modest Improvements
In yield-to-weight ratios, devices to fill in
the spectrum of tactical nuclear weapons,
and so on. There is little else to justify the
effort and expenditure. The program is said
by some to be necessary, for example, to the
development of a pure fusion bomb, some-
times referred to as the neutron bomb. It
is fortunate that this theoretically possible
(stars are pure fusion systems) device has
turned out to be so highly difficult to create;
If it were relatively simple, its development
might open the way to thermonuclear arma-
ment for the smallest.and poorest powers in
the world. The United States, with its heavy
Investment in fission-to-fusion technology,
would be the last nation to welcome this
development and ought to be the last to en-
courage It. Underground testing is also jus-
tified for its contribution to the potential
peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Prom-
ising as these may be, the world could forgo
them for a time in exchange for cessation of
the arms race. Perhaps the best rationale
for the underground-test program is that it
helps to keep the scientific laboratories of
the Military Establishment intact and in
readiness; in readiness, however, for a full-
scale resumption of the arms race.
Paradoxically one of the potential destabi-
lizing elements in the present nuclear stand-
off is the possibility that one of the rival
powers might develop a successful antimis-
tile defense. Such a system, truly airtight
and in the exclusive possession of one of the
powers, would effectively nullify the deter-
rent force of the other, exposing the latter
to a first attack against which it could not
retaliate. The possibilities in this quarter
have often been cited in rationalization of
the need for resuming nuclear tests In the
atmosphere. Here two questions must be
examined. One must first ask if it is possible
to develop a successful antimissile defense
system. It then becomes appropriate to con-
sider whether or not nuclear weapons tests
can make a significant contribution to such
a development.
Any nation that commits Itself to large-
scale defense of its civilian population in the
thermonuclear age must necessarily reckon
with passive modes of defense (shelters) as
well as active ones (antimissile missiles).
It is in the active mode, however, that the
hazard of technological surprise most often
lurks. The hazard invites consideration if
only for the deeper insight It provides Into
the contemporary revolution in the tech-
nology of war.
The primary strategic result of that revo-
lution has been to overbalance the scales in
favor of the attacker rather than the de-
fender. During World War If interception
of no more than 10 percent of the attacking
force gave victory to the defending force in
the Battle of Britain. Attrition of this mag-
nitude was enough to halt the German at-
tack because it meant that a given weapons-
delivery system (bomber and crew) could de-
liver on the average only 10 payloads of high
explosive; such a delivery rate was not suf-
ficient to produce backbreaking damage. In
warfare by thermonuclear missiles the situa-
tion is quantitatively and qualitatively dif-
ferent. It is easily possible for the offense
to have In its possession and ready to launch
a number of missiles that exceeds the num-
ber of important industrial targets to be
attacked by, let us say, a factor of 10. Yet
the successful delivery of only one warhead
against each such target would result in what
most people would consider an effective at-
tack. Thus where an attrition rate of only
10 percent formerly crowned the defense
with success, a penetration rate of only 10
percent (corresponding to an attrition rate
of 90 percent) would give complete success
to the offense. The ratio of these two ratios
is 100 to 1; In this sense the task of defense
can be said to have become two orders of
magnitude more difficult.
Beyond this summary statement of the
situation there are many general reasons for
believing that defense against thermonuclear
attack is impossible. On the eve of attack
the offense can take time to get ready and
to "point up" its forces; the defense, mean-
while, must stay on the alert over periods of
years, perpetually ready and able to fire with-
in the very few minutes available after the
first early warning. The attacker can pick its
targets and can choose to concentrate its
forces on some and ignore others; the defense
must be prepared to defend all possible im-
portant targets. The offense may attack the
defense itself; then, as soon as one weapon
gets through, the rest have a free ride.
The hopelessness of the task of defense
is apparent even now in the stalemate of the
arms race. A considerable Inertia drags
against the movement of modern, large-scale,
unitary weapons systems from the stage of
research and development to operational de-
ployment. The duration and magnitude of
these enterprises, whether defensive or of-
fensive, , practically assure that no system
can reach full deployment under the mantle
of secrecy. The designer of the defensive sys-
tem, however, cannot begin until he has
learned something about the properties and
capabilities of the offensive system. Inevi-
tably the defense must start the race a lap
behind. In recent years, it seems, the of-
fense has even gained somev;kat In the speed
with which it can put into operation strata-
gems and devices that nullify-the most ex-
traordinary achievements in the technology
of defense. These general observations are
expensively illustrated In the development
and obsolescence of two major U.S. defense
systems.
Early in the 1950's the United States set
October 22
out to erect an impenetrable defense against
a thermonuclear attack by bombers. The
North American Continent was to be ringed
with a system of detectors that would flash
information back through the communica-
tions network to a number of computers.
The computers were to figure out from this
data what was going on and what ought to be
done about it and then flash a series of com-
mands to the various interceptor systems.
In addition to piloted aircraft, these includ-
ed the Bomarc (a guided airborne missile)
and the Nike-Hercules (a ballistic rocket).
By the early 1960's this Sage system was to
be ready to detect, intercept and destroy the
heaviest attack that could be launched
against it.
The early 1960's have come and yet nothing
like the capability planned In the 1950's has
been attained. Why not? Time scales
stretched out, subsystems failed to attain
their planned capabilities and costs in-
creased. Most important, the offense against
which the system was designed is not the
offense that actually exists in the early 1960's.
Today the offensive system on both sides is
a mixture of missiles and bombers. The Sage
system has a relatively small number of soft
but vital organs completely vulnerable to
missiles-a successful missile attack on them
would give a free ride to the bombers. As
early as 1958 the Department of Defense came
to realize that this would be the situation,
and the original grand plan was steadily cut
back. In other words, the Sage system that
could have been available, say, in 1963 and
that should have remained useful at least
through the 1960's would in principle have
worked quite well against the offense that ex-
isted in the 1950's. -
To answer the intercontinental ballistic
missile, the Department of Defense launched
the development of the Nike-Zeus system.
Nike-Zeus was intended to provide not a de-
fense of the continent at its perimeter but a
point defense of specific targets. To be sure,
the points were fairly large-the regions of
population concentration around 50 to 70
of the country's biggest cities. The system
was to detect incoming warheads, feeding the
radar returns directly into its computers,
and launch and guide an interceptor missile
carrying a nuclear warhead into intersection
with the trajectory of each of the Incoming
warheads.
Nike-Zeus was not designed to defend the
1,000 or so smaller centers outside the metro-
politan areas simply because there are too
many of these to be covered by the resources
available for a system so huge and compli-
cated. Nor was the system designed to de-
fend the retaliatory missiles, the security of
these forces being entrusted to the more re-
liable protection of dispersal, concealment,
mobility and number. In principle, the de-
fense of a hardened missile silo would have
presented by far the simplest case for proof
of the effectiveness of Nike-Zeus as advanced
by those who contend that such a system
can be made to work. There would be no
ambiguity about the location of the target of
the incoming warhead. By the same token
Nike-Zeus might have been considered for
the defense of a few special defense posts,
such as the headquarters of the Air Defense
Command of the Strategic Air Command.
These special cases are so few in number,
however, that it had to be concluded that the
attacker would either blast his way through
to them by a concentration of firepower or
ignore them altogether.
At the time of the conception of the Nike-
Zeus system its designers were confronted
with a comparatively simple problem, namely
that of shooting down the warheads one by
one as they presented themselves to the de-
tectors. Even this simple problem had to
be regarded as essentially unsolvable, in view
of the fact that a 90-percent success in inter-
ception constitutes failure In the inverted
terms of thermonuclear warfare. At first,
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therefore, the designers of the offensive sys- unprotected areas adjacent to cities, relying
tem did not take the prospect of an anti- on massive fallout to imperil the population
missile system seriously. Then the ,possibil- centers. This example serves also to sug-
ity that the problem of missile interception gest how heavily the effectiveness of any
might be solved in principle gave them program for sheltering the civilian popula-
pause. Thereupon the designers of the of- tion depends on the tactics of the attacker.
fense began to invent a family of penetra- Fallout shelters by themselves are of no avail
tion aids, that is, decoys and confusion tech- if the attacker chooses to assault the popula-
niqu.es. The details of these and the plans tion centers directly.
for their use are classified, but the under- In any speculation about the kind of
lying principles are obvious. They include attack to which this country might be ex-
light decoys that can be provided in large posed it is useful to note where the military
numbers but that soon betray their char- targets are located. Most of the missile bases
acter as "atmospheric sorting" separates them are, in fact, far from the largest cities. Other
from the heavier, decoys (and actual war- key military installations, however, are not
heads) that can be provided in smaller num- so located. Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
bers to confuse the defending detectors down Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles (Long
to the last minute. Single rockets can also Beach), and San Diego all have important
eject multiple warheads. Both the decoys naval bases. Essential command and con-
and the warheads, can be made to present trol centers are located in and near Denver,
ambiguous cross` sections to the radar sys- Omaha, and Washington, D.C. The rolicall
tems, These devices and stratagems over- 'could be extended to include other major
whelmed the designed capability of the Nike- cities containing military installations that
Zeus system and compelled its recent aban- would almost certainly have to be attacked
donment. in any major assault on this country. The
If the installation of-the system had pro- list does not stop with these; it is only pru-
ceeded according to plan, the first Nike-Zeus dent to suppose still other cities would come
units would have been operational within under attack, because there is no way to
the next year or two. This could have been know in advance what the strategy may be.
celebrated as a technical milestone. As a The only kind of shelter that is being
means of defense of a substantial percentage seriously considered these days, for other
of the population, however, the system would than certain key military installations, is
not have reached full operational deploy- the fallout shelter. By definition fallout
ment until the end of the decade. In view shelters offer protection against nothing but
of its huge cost the system should then fallout and provide virtually no protection
have looked forward to a decade of useful against blast, fire storms and other direct
life until, say, the late 1970's. Thus, in in- effects. Some people have tried to calculate
exorable accordance with the phase-lag of the percentage of the population that would
the defense, the U.S. population was to be be saved by fallout shelters in the event of
defended a decade too late by a system that massive attack. Such calculations always
might have been effective in principle (al- involve predictions about the form of the
though most probably not in practice) attack, but since the form is unknowable the
against the missiles of the early 1960's. calculations are nonsensical. Even for the
The race of the tortoise and the hare has people protected by fallout shelters the big
now entered the next lap with the develop- problem is not a problem in the physical
ment of the Nike-X system as succesor to theory of gamma-ray attenuation, which can
Nike-Zeus. The Advanced Research Proj- be neatly computed, but rather the socio-
ects Agency of the Department of Defense logical problem of the sudden initiation of
has been spending something on the order general chaos, which is not subject to nu-
of $200 million a year on its so-called de- merical analysis.
fender program, exploring on the broadest Suppose, in spite of all this, the country
front the principles and techniques that were to take fallout shelters seriously and
might prove useful in the attempt to solve build them in every city and town. The peo-
the antimissile problem. Although nothing ple living in metropolitan areas that qualify
on the horizon suggests that there is a solu- as targets because they contain essential
tion, this kind of work must go forward. It military installations and the people living
not only serves the forlorn hope of developing in metropolitan areas that might be targeted
an active antimissile defense but also pro- as a matter of deliberate policy would soon
motes the continued development of offen- recognize that fallout shelters are inadequate.
sive weapons. The practical fact is that That conclusion would be reinforced by the
work on defense systems turns out to be the inevitable reaction from the other side,
best way to promote invention of the pene- whose military planners would be compelled
tration aids that nullify them. to consider a massive civilian-shelter pro-
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, gram as portending a first strike against
the problems of antimissile development are them. Certainly the military planners of the
problems in radar, computer technology, mis- United States would be remiss if they did
sile propulsion, guidance and control. The not take similar note of a civilian-shelter
nuclear warheads for the antimissile missile program in the U.S.S.R. As a step in the
have been ready for a long time for delivery escalation of the arms race toward the ultf-
to the right place at the right time. Al- mate outbreak of war, the fallout shelter
though it is argued that certain refinements would lead inevitably to the blast shelter.
in the existing data about weapons effects Even with large numbers of blast shelters
are needed, the other uncertainties all loom built and evenly distributed throughout the
much larger than the marginal uncertainties metropolitan community, people would soon
in these physical effects. The antimissile
defense problem, then, is one in which nu-
clear testing can play no really significant
part.
The pursuit of an active defense system
de-
i
h
e pass
ve
demands parallel effort on t
fense, or shelter, front because the nature seal the population into shelters. Accord- conclusion or a comprehensive test ban such
of the defense system strongly conditions the ingly, the logical next step is the live-in and as that on which the great powers came close
tactics of the offense that is likely to be work-in blast shelter leading to still further to agreement more than once during 10 long
mounted against it. To take a perhaps far- disruption and distoration of civilization. years of negotiation at Geneva. The policing
fetched example, a Nike-Zeus system that There is no logical termination of the line of and inspection procedures so nearly agreed
provided protection for the major population reasoning that starts with belief in the use- on in those parleys would set significant
centers might invite the attackers to con- fulness of fallout shelters; the logic of this precedents and lay the foundations of mutual
centrate the weight of his assault in ground attempt to solve the problem of national confidence for proceeding thereafter to ac-
-_ _ _ _--_
.. ,
of even +?a1 disarmament
di
s
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more grotesque measures. This is to say, in
so many words, that if the arms race con-
tinues and resumes its former accelerating
tempo, 1984 is more than just a date on the
calendar 20 years hence.
Ever since shortly after World War II the
military power of the United States has been
steadily increasing. Throughout this same
period the national security of the United
States has been rapidly and inexorably
diminishing. In the early 1950's the-U.S.S.R.,
on, the basis of its own unilateral decision
and determination to accept the inevitable
retaliation, could have launched an attack
against the United States with bombers
carrying fission bombs. Some of these bomb-
ers would have penetrated our defenses and
the American casualties would have num-
bered in the millions. In the later 1950's,
again on its own sole decision and determina-
tion to accept the inevitable massive retalia-
tion, the U.S.S.R. could have launched an
attack against the United States using more
and better bombers, this time carrying
thermonuclear bombs. Some of these bomb-
ers would have penetrated our defenses and
the American casualties could have numbered
in the tens of millions.
Today the U.S.S.R., again on the basis of
its own decision and determination to ac-
cept the inevitable retaliation, could launch
an attack on the United States using inter-
continental missiles and bombers carrying
thermonuclear weapons. This time the num-
ber of American casualties could very well
be on the order of 100 million.
The steady decrease in national security
did not result from any inaction on the
part of responsible U.S. military and civilian
authorities. It resulted from the systematic
exploitation of the products of modern
science and technology by the U.S.S.R. The
air defenses deployed by the United States
during the 1950's would have reduced the
number of casualties the country might have
otherwise sustained, but their existence did
not substantively modify this picture. Nor
could it have been altered by any other de-
fense measures that might have been taken
but that _for one reason or another were not
taken.
From the Soviet point of view the picture
is similar but much worse. The military
power of the U.S.S.R. has been steadily in-
creasing since it became an atomic power in
1949. Soviet national security, however, has
been steadily decreasing. Hypothetically the
United States could unilaterally decide to
destroy the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. would
be absolutely powerless to prevent it. That
country could only, at best, seek to wreak
revenge through whatever retaliatory capa-
bility it might then have left.
Both sides in the arms race are thus con-
fronted by the dilemma of steadily increas-
ing military power and steadily decreasing
national security. It. is our considered pro-
fessional judgment that this dilemma has
no technical solution. If the great powers
continue to look for solutions in the area of
science and technology only, the result will
be to worsen the situation. The clearly pre-
dictable course of the arms race is a steady
open spiral downward into oblivion.
realize that shelters alone are not enough. We are optimistic, on the other hand, that
Accidental alarms, even in tautly disciplined there is a solution to this dilemma. The
military installations, have shown that peo- partial nuclear-test ban, we hope and believe,
ple do not always take early warnings sera- is truly an important first step toward find-
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5500 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
Summary of Record and Accomplish-
ments of the Committee on Ways and
Means During the 88th Congress
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILBUR D. MILLS
OF ARKANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESEITTATIVE8
Saturday, October 3, 1964
Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means has again
completed one of the busiest and one
of the most productive periods in its en-
tire history. The jurisdiction of this
Committee, as is well known, is exceed-
ingly broad and complex, including leg-
islation which affects the -day-to-day
economics and activities of all of our
Citizens. During the second session of
the 88th Congress just concluded, the
committee considered and reported leg-
islation In every major area of its juris-
diction.
To afford some indication of the ac-
complishments of the committee in each
Of"these major areas during, the past 2
years, four major measures stand out as
prime examples.
In the field of internal revenue taxa-
tion, the Revenue Act of 1964 represents
the largest single tax cut in thehistory
of the United States. In addition to
this very significant reduction in the
burdens carried by the American citizens,
the Revenue Act of 1964 made many
beneficial changes in the Internal Rev-
enue Code. A second major example in
the area of internal revenue taxation
is the Interest Equalization Act of 1964,
a measure which became necessary to
help correct a balance-of-payments defi-
cit and which was put into effect in 1964.
In the field of social security legisla-
tion, the committee reported the "Social
Security Amendments of 1964," H.R..
11865, which unfortunately slue to the
controversy over certain amendments
added by the other body was not enacted
into law. A second major example In
the social security field was. H.R. 9393,
a bill which made it possible for the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare to award disability insurance bene-
fits to many thousands of Individuals
who otherwise would have been ineligible
due to the technical requirements of the
existing legislation.
In the field of tariff and custom law,
the committee reported H.R. 11253, the
"Tariff Classification Act of 1.964."
Again unfortunately, this measure was
not finally enacted into law :because of
the controversy which arose over amend-
ments added in the other body, during the
closing days of the second session.
In addition to the above examples, it
was necessary for the committee to con-
sider and report legislation in the area
of the public debt, specifically bills ex-
tending the debt ceiling, and legislation
to extend for an additional temporary
period of time the excise taxes which
normally would expire or be reduced on
each June 30.
The foregoing measures indicate the
Intensive and productive activity of the
Committee on Ways and Means, but that
should not obscure the fact that the com-
mittee also reported and there was en-
acted into law many additional bills of
less major import.
As I have pointed out In the past, and
can again state without reservations, the
members of the Committee on Ways and
Means have devoted themselves dili-
gently and conscientiously to the heavy
work of the committee. The members
of the committee have been assiduous in
pursuing their responsibilities and in the
attendance of the meetings of the com-
mittee almost daily throughout two ses-
sions. Because of the nature of the work
of the committee it was again necessary
to conduct many executive sessions for
the consideration of the complex meas-
ures which the committee had before it.
While we as individual members of the
committee have of course not always
agreed on all of the measures considered
by the committee, certainly every mem-
ber can be justly proud of the work which
he has done and the record which he has
established.
October 22
As I have pointed out on numerous
past occasions, It is abundantly clear
that the nature of legislation falling
within the jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means is quite complex and
Is of vital importance to each and every
American citizen and to our Nation as a
whole. It is therefore necessary that our
committee must always proceed with
great caution, prudence, care and states-
manship in carrying out the legislative
responsibilities which we have.
During the course of this Congress the
Committee on Ways and Means held pub-
lic or executive hearings on a total of 59
days, exclusive of executive sessions, and
has directly received testimony from
more than 645 individuals during those
hearings. In addition, comments, rec-
ommendations, and statements of views
were received for the printed record from
many hundreds of other interested per-
sons and organizations. The hearings
are printed in 25 volumes covering ap-
proximately 9,000 pages of testimony.
Table 1, which follows, shows the subject
and the details of these hearings:
TABLE 1.-Ilearings held by Committee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong.
1sT SESS.
President's 1963 tax message_____________________________
Continuation of present debt ceiling_____________________
Tax features of Land and Water Conservation Fund
Act of 1963--------------------------------------------
Public debt ceiling------------------------------------
Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963___________________
Temporary increase in debt ceiling___
Tax treatment of beer concentrate-,: ____________________
Medical care for the aged I_______ ____________________
Medical care for the aged '______________________________
Temporary increase in debt ceiling and extension of
certain excise tax rates (executive hearing)_____________
Federal excise tax structure_____________________________
Total, 88th Cong_________________________--y--
Number of
pages
4,036
73
2, 502
58
1,421
' Hearings were then suspended until Jan. 20, 1964. See "Medical care for the aged" under 2d sess.
1 Resumed from Nov. 22, 1963. There was a total of 10 days of hearings.
In addition to the public hearings,
during the course of the 88th Congress
the full Committee on Ways and Means
met in executive session 166 times.
Of the 15,296 public and private bills
and resolutions introduced in the House
during the course of this Congress, there
was referred, to the Committee on Ways
and Means a total of 2,163 bills and
resolutions in addition to the 51 executive
communications. In addition, 17 mes-
sages of the President of the United
States were on subjects within the juris-
diction of the committee. Of the total
of 2,164 such bills and resolutions, there
were 916 tax bills, 680 tariff bills, and
453 social security bills, in addition to
some 115 bills of a miscellaneous char-
acter falling within the committe's juris-
diction. This represents more than one-
sixth of all the public bills and resolu-
tions introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives in this Congress. Table 2,
which follows, sets forth the breakdown
of the measures' referred to the commit-
tee:
Number of
volumes
TABLE 2. Bills and resolutions referred to the
Committee on Ways and Means, 88th
Cong., by category
Tax----------------------------------
916
Social security-----------------------
453
Tariff--------------------------------
880
Miscellaneous-------------------------
115
Total-------------------------
2,164
During this Congress, the committee
favorably reported to the House of Rep-
resentatives a total of 77 bills, which
breaks down as follows: 25 tax bills, 34
tariff bills, 11 social security bills, and 7
miscellaneous type bills. It should be
noted in this connection that it is the
practice of the committee to report from
time to time omnibus legislation which,
statistically, appears as one bill but
which in fact may combine the provisions
or subjects covered in a large number of
individual bills which were pending be-
fore the committee. For the further in-
formation of the Members, I shall insert
at this point table 3 which sets forth the
statistics on the status of the bills re-
ported by the committee during this
Congress:
Number of Number of
days witnesses
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