E I W 7 5 ~peYed yp*R~s
200010911$ :CIA-RDP86S0?608R000500140005-8
,.. Y
`1 ~ of
ntellgence Weekly
5 f~eb. 7~5 ~ :-~ ~ ~ ~. ?~ ~ E~ EIW. 75-5
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Secret
Nu I%urclNn 1)Lsxcrrr
Economic Intelligence Weekly
Secret
ER EIW 75-5
S February 1915
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
clo..ln.a hr otD~w
!~?mp~ Irom p?n?rol dalmsiNcallon Kh?dul?
of [.O. 116.:9, ?~?mpllon col.poryi
4 Dell (9), and ])
Au-omatlca~l d?cloulf~?d oni
Do~? Impo~rCbl? to D?t?rmin?
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Nn l~nrrlHn Ulerrrn
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
b Fobruory 1fl76
Dovolopod Countrlos: Tito Slump In Porspactivo 3
Dovoloplnp Countrlo.s: Impact of Incroasnd OII Prlcos 6
OPEC Intorost In Trlpa~tlto Invostmant Grows 7
..8
Itoly: Anothor Poymonts Squoozo In 1976 , g
Notos, Statistics
Industrial Output in the Major Developed Countries has been droppins at ari
accelerated pace in recent months. The decline during the three?month period ending
in November averaged 8-1/2% (annual rate), Output in Italy, France, and Japan
fell most sharply -- 20%, 18?~, and 14%, respectively. In November, production
in the seven major countries stood 6?.6 below the year-earlier level.
French and Italian Trade Balances Have Improved because the recession has
cut imports. The French trade deficit dropped to an average $90 million in the
last three months of 1974, compared with a $400 million average in the pc-eceding
half year, 8y the fourth quarter, Italy's mon*,hly deficit had dropped below $300
million from the $670 million average of the first half.
Note: Comments and qucrics re~rding the liconomic Intelligence YJeekly arc welcomed. They may be directed
25X1A to the Office of liconomic Research, Codc 143, Gxtc~sion 7892.
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Secret
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Sopnroto Handting for Agricultural Isauos in tho Multilotoral Trado
Nogotiations, domandod by thv French, has Bann ~~ceeptod by tho othor EC
mombars. Ths EC did not went to isolate tho Fron~h on this issuo, (oaring Paris
would block agroorrient on a unified community position for tho upcoming trodo
talks.
Tightnoss in tho Wur'd Wheat Morkot Easod last wank as China and tho USSR
cancolod import contracts for morn than I million tons of l1S whoat, and obsorvors
forocast o rocord 1976 US whoat crop. Pricos now aro 3096 below tho poak lovol
of a year ago.
Tho Dollar Strengthonod against most major curroncios last week as reports
surfacod of groater control bank intorvontion. An and to dollar sales that stommed
from the covoring of Swiss franc-dollar positions contributed to tho rocovery. Thb
EC plan to prevent currency movements of more then 196 a day should add stability
to money markots. Kuwsit ha, proposed that the recent gyrations of the dollar
be assessed at the next plenary session of OPEC. (Secret Igo Foreign Dissem)
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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: T~iE SLUMP IN PERSPECTIVE
The econumlc cimtraction in the moor developed countries, rrlrcady seven
quartcr~ long, is the sharpe:~t since: World Wnr I1.
Composite GNI' in the 13ig Six foreibrn economics fell ('rom a level 2-1~2
percentage points above the long-term trend in early 1973 to 5 percentage points
below trend by the end of 1 ~Y14. 'T'his change is two to three times the drop
in comparable periods of the two previous postwar contractions.
So far, the contraction has been most severe in Japan and mildest in Italy.
I%ra~r~^e: 1n a country noted for steady economic expansion, GNi' had
slipped 2 pcrccnt~~,_ points below the trend b;~ late 1974.
IraAy: The slump, under way for only three quarters, still is shallow
compared with the recession of 1969-72.
The severity of :hc slump results largely from two factors: (a) '.nc
simultaneous beginning of the contractich in several countries, which caused foreign
as well as donrestic demand to weaken, and (b) oil price hikes and supply squeezes
over the past 1 G months, which have depressed GNP both directly and indirectly.
Thy recession has several quarters to go, to ;udgc from the Iergth of the
two previous slumps ar~d from the special circumstances of the current slowdown.
s
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25X6
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Srcwt
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Oil pricey will rcntain hil;lr, lengthening llte period of weak demand ;urd placing
unpraceJentccl burdens on n;rlionul ;uul international I'in;rnciul institutions.
Govcrnnrenls h;rvu lx.en, and will continue to hc, slower Ihan usual to react to
the slump Ix~cause of preoccupation with inflation and bul;mcc-ol-payurents
problems. Exp;msion progrunts, even when adopted, will not be fully felt I'or a half
yesrr or so. (Unclassilied)~
Among the [,DCs, South Asian countries havr, been severely hurt by
skyrocketing oil prices, fast Asian and sulrSaharan African countries moderately
affected, and South Ameriaut countries least clamagcd. [3ecausc the LD~'s have
had to draw down skimpy financial reserves and to resort to further borrowing,
they will have still gre.':tcr difficulty in mcuting their 1975 oil hills. Economic
performance will depend even more closely on aid from developed countries, OPEC
countries, and international financial institutions.
13alancc of I'aymcnts
Oil imports by the. non-OPI~C dcvcloping countries totaled at (cast $13 billion
in 1974, as opposed to $4.7 billion in 1973. Iliglrcr prices were the cause, volume
rising at most 3`%. The ri,;c in world petroleum prices ah.o contributed to increased
prices for imported food, fertilizer, and industrial products. Since export prices
and export volume rose less than proportionately, the LDCs incurred a $31 billion
trade deficit, $12.8 billion with OPEC countries. Compared with 1973, the trade
balance deteriorated by SS ;.:Ilion with OECD countries and $10 billion with OPEC
countries.
As a partial offset, multilateral official capital inflows rose by more than
$3 billion; bilateral official flows from OPEC countries gew by some $1.4 billion.
While the picture on total capital flows is rti.~t yet clear, private capital flows have
been the principal source of financing the deficit for the more prosperous LDCs.
OPEC and multilateral sources appear to have been the prune rncans of financing
the 1974 balance for UN-designated Most Seriously Af;cctcd nations.
Domestic Development
Contrary to earlier pessimistic forecasts, nearly all dcvcloping countries
achieved some scrt of economic gowth in 1974, witli tl~c average real gowtlt
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rote reaching 3"0, :'opulallon incru;scs continued io mulch ur exceed the incrcayc
in output in many of these countries. I~ut?thermorc, hit;hcr imprt?! hriccs contriln;lcd
to rum;~unt domestic inilution in the LUCs, which ra-t ut an estimutccl average
ruts o1 305, in 1974.
I~ow 1.DCs h;rve succeeded in reducing o? ~:onsurnhtion or imports absolutely.
Most have had to be content with slowing dowi; the ruts of growth of rc?nsumplion,
mainly through higher tuxes on oil-rclutal activities. I)evcloping countries arc being
forced to reorder their priorities and to place particular emphasis on food and
fertilizer pr~duclion, oil exploration, .aid llte devcloprnent of non-oi! energy
sources.
iZcgionnl l3rcnkdown
Latin American countries as a group have held up best under the burden
of increased oil prices. Their advantages have included (a) domestic oil production
that partially satisfies their needs, (b) ready access to foreign lending, anu
(c) export prices that remained ~?clativcly firm for most of the past year. I3r;zil's
1Gr4 real GNP growth of 10`/~ was the highest of any m,Uor non-OI'L;C LDC.
South Asian countries -- Indio, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka -were
severely afflicted in 1974 by rising import bills and lagb*ing export. earnings. Oil
bills rose to one-third of export earnings in India and Bangladesh and to almost
one-fourth of carnins ii; Pakistan and Sri Lanka. L.argc expenditures for food and
difficulties in exporting to recession-hit customers compounded their troubles.
In 1974 tiic real growth rate in the Last Asian LDCs -several of which had
tx:cn growing at :0% - fell by one-half on the average. Growth in exports, especially
food and ligla manufactures, offset much of the damage from higher import costs.
The developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa suffered a doubling of their
combined trade deficit in i 974. Increased official foreign loans and grants were
tl~e principal means of financing their deficits.
These problems will worsen in 1975. Prices for oil, food, and fertilizer will
remain }sigh and prices of manufactured imports will increase, whereas prices of
many LDC exports are expected to fall. The financing of balance-of-payments
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dul'icils will ;rc more difl'icull hccnc~,e erl previous drawdowns of I'in;uncial reserves
raid c~clraustion of private lines of credit. 'I'hc perl'ornuurcc of LUCs in 1'175 will
lre increasingly dependent ern assistance from developed counlrics, UI'I:C countries,
and international financial institutions. (Ccrnl'idential)^
OPEC INTEREST IN TRIPARTITE INVESTMENT rROWS
Middle East oil producers arc showing increased interest in tripartite invcstmcnt
in developing counlrics. Suelt ventures -- bringing surplus petrodollars and Western
technology together in third counlrics -enable OI'I:C states to increase investment
in LuCs sal'cly, without using their own scarce manpower. The oil producers thus;
can both diversify their investments and blunt LUC criticism of higher oil prices.
Growth in tripartite invcshnent is likely to be conccnlruted in a handful of LUCs,
mainly Arab.
Among the Middle East producers, Kuwait offers the brightest prospects for
tripartite vcntures. At !cast half a dozen Kuwaiti financial insti%ution:: already arc
active in LDCs. The Kuwaitis have recently undertaken tripartite vcntures in Jordan
(a powcrplant) and Ycmcn (agicultural development), ntainlS? with US consultants
and contractors. Kuwait also is involved in joint projects in the LUCs with the
World Bank and its subsidiar.~, the International Devel~pmcnt Asso~~i~ Lion.
The Saudis plan to channel an increasing share of their invcstmcnt in LDCs
through the Arab Investment Company and the Saudi Arabian Development Fund.
The former has already undcrtakcn a t*irartitc venture to build a sugar processing
complex in Sudan with Japanes^ and US firnis. The Saudis arc considering projects
in Egypt in cooperation with US, British, and Italian firms.
Iran believes that sc;lcction of development projects and technology is tl~e
responsibility of aid recipients. It flies leas decided to rely primarily on direct loans
to help developing nations. Interest in tripartite vcntures nonctlrelcss should grow
in time.
Tripartite invcstmcnt will do little to offset the current account deficits of
most LDCs this year. The amount invested wily, remain small and often will simply
replace funds earmarked for direct gants or loans. Only Moslem countries can
expect to receive appreciable financial relief through these three-cornered vcntures.
(Confidential No Foreign Dissem)^
~ ~ ~ ~
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crat
Italy probably ?.~ill be able to finance another large current account deficit
in 1975 without resorting to harsh impart controls or to a debt moratorium. At
the same time, conditions attached to new foreign loans conceivably could bring
down the Moro government.
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Uullook t'or the C'urrenl Acrounl
After more lh;ut tripling to ~~ billion last year, the current account clcl'icit
shuulcl ~Irop to $G.G billion in 1975. The deepening recession will improve Ilse
lruclu balance. The government has little option but to continue lire ;uistet?ily
program itt spite of the cotil in economic; gt?owlh. 'I'o rcllatc substantially not Duly
woulel worsen the current account clel'icit but also would abrogate the terms of
several inlernulional louts, Jeaparclir,ing Italy's I'untl-raising ability.
If Itonte continues its austerity measures through most ol? 1975, the oil track
clcl'icit probably will rise only slightly this yrur, to $7.5 billion. The anticinatal
ITALY: Current Account 1
BlII1on US $
Oil Trade, f.o.b. Non-Oil Trado, f.o.b.
~.o ~--~
7.5
Net Services and Transfers Total Current Account
2 r
2.4 i
8
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1974
Currcntucatuntdeflcit: $B.Oblllian
Actual Financing
? $2.1 billiun ? 1?uromarket losrns
? $2.0 billlon - Wcst German loses
? $1.9 billlon ? L'C credit
? $0.7 billlon ? hawing on $1.2 bllllon IM1~
standby credit
Current account deficit: $G.2 bllllon (pro?
jCCtCd)
Awallablc Financing
~ $1.0 billlon - unusrd drawings on 1974
credits
? $0.3 billlon ? remainder of IMF stsurdby
credit
Possibly Avsrllublc Finsutcing
? $0.8 billion - IMF;tII facility
? $O.ti bllllon -net short?tenn conuacrclal
buck oorrowings
? $0.4 billlon ? drawing on IMF gold tranchc
0$1.0 billion to $2.0 billion - L'C recycling
fund
x$1.0 billion - prepayments from Iran for
goods on order
? Funding from various recycling schemes,
such as cxpuncrcd IMF oil facility and
OECD "safety net"
increase in the average price of imported crude from $ I I.00 to $ 12.00 per barrel
(c.i.f.) should be partly offset by a small drop in volumes Demand for irnportc.l
oil is expected to decline because of sagging industrial output and +hc availability
of large gasoline stocks.
The non-oil trade account probably will show a plump surplus this year, on
top of the recent sharp improvement. Export volume is likely to increase by 6`Y? or
so, while impart volume should decline a littler The non-oil balance also should
benefit from improved terms of trade, since prices of exports (mostly manufactures)
promise to climb faster titan prices of imports (mostly food, raw materials, and
manufacttrres).
Tltc 13.8?Io trade-weighted depreriafion of the lira in 1974 is helping Italy
tc retain its competitiveness in foreign markets, 4: spite an above-average inflation
rate of 25%. Expansion in export volume rtonctlteless will be restrained by weak
demand in developed countries and financing problems in the oil-poor LDCs. Sales
to OPEC states will rise substantially following an 80?I? jump to more than
$2 billion in 1974; such sales arc still only 8l0 of total experts.
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l)ndcr the present restrictive policies, intporl valuate prc-hubly will drop u
percentaf!c point or two. 'l'ight credit, high interest rates, and dccllning prol'fis
will cut into investment. Consumer dcnu~nd will remain soil, despitr a recent hike
in I'ringc hcncrits. 'I'stx htcreuses will trirtt disposable income, and job uncertaintlrs
will cncourngc workers to save,
'I'hc rcnutintlcr or the current account should show a considcrs;bly lurgrr clrficit
than lust 7~cur. A decline in import-related I'rcit!ht costs will be more Ihsut c~l'1'scl
by a pronounced rise in interest psrymc.nts on foreign loans, from Irss th;ut
$1 billion lust year to sot cstirnutcd $? billion in 1975. I~urthernu~rc, the I;urc~pcun
recessiort will cut int~t tourist curnints, and sluggish economic activity in Wcst
t'-crmany will inhibit the growth of emigrant remittances.
rinancing the Urticit
'I'hc capitol account at best will der little to case the tlefic't bottler( ;utcf rnigltt
even udtl to it. State entcryiriscs and comntcrciul b:utks have largely exhausted their
credit with private linuncial institutions. Repayments on past loans will be about
$ I billion, tloublc last year's figiuc. Rcrnoval of the import tlcposit snc~mc in
March, as scheduled, could Icad to increased capital outflows, orfsctting the inflow
of capital repatriated because of tight crctlit. Most important, a massive capital
(light is possible in the event of protracted political crisis.
Rome is counting on official borrowing to cover even more of its deficit this
year than in 1974. Only a gradual depreciation of the lira is likely, because of
the government's commitment to avoiding the inflationary effects of a sharp
devaluation. In order not to alienate its I:C partners and other creditors, Italy
will extend the import deposit scheme or introduce other import controls only
as a last resort. Rome will strongly resist reducing its uncommitted gold reserves,
worth $I1 billion at current market prices. It has only $3.2 billion in convertible
currency holdings, including $1.0 billion in unused borrowings from last year.
The possibility of a financing crunch is greatest in the first half of the year,
before the government nails down loans new under consideration. As a stopgap,
Rome may have to draw on the $4.5 billion available in short-term currency
swaps - a risky solution unless long-term financing is reasonably assttrcd.
The stickiest problems in financing the deficit stem from politically unpalatable
conditions that potential Ienclers might attach to tltcir loans. 25X6
25X6
ri
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In parlicula~wcrulcl Ilkc
Itonte to strc;unlinc the gctvernmrnt hurc;n;rracy, a -ncasurc Ihal wcrulcl rut clrcply
inlo the I'arly~s sysl~~m of pntrcrnagc. I~urthcrmurc, belt
lightening! in the form of reclucccl spending or I;tx hikes mil!ht alicnalr lahctr, which
so fns has heat shieldcc! I'rctm austerity throuNh waYc incre;rscs, improved 1'ring!r
Ix;nel'ils, ;utcl unemployment compensation. 'I'o r;rise I;rhor's ire iu this year of nt;~nr
wage ronlrart rcncg;uliatictns would pose a elang!crnus threat tu;m economy alrr;rcly
clop in recession.
Scvcr;rl Arch countries reportedly would like to attach political conclilions
to their loans. I3;rsically, they seek tv inhibit ttali;rn coupcralion within the
International I:ncrgy Agteney and with the Unileel States.
If its eredilors insist upon politically unarceptablc conditions, Maly prcrh;rhly
will turn to the United States for long-term bilateral assist:utce. (Secret No Foreign
bissem) ^
* ~ ~ ~
Notc;~
Cool Response to US-Sponsored Grnin Conclave
The meeting next week in London, initiated by the Unitccl States to develop
a world systcrn of grain rescrvcs, has gcneratal little enthusiasm. Several nations
aro participating only out of deference to the Unitccl States. China has clcclined
to participate, and the USSR has not responded. Scvcral ccnuttries, especially I:C
nations and Japan, have raised the following points: (a) grain rcscrvcs should be
discussed in the upcoming MTN and, in any case, will be brought up at the FAO
-nccting; on 24 February, and (b) the US proposal fails to emphasize the goal of
price stabilisation. (Secret)
is
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Sauces Arabia Kirk;a UCf 1 d75 A,id Prugrnm
Saudi Arabian 1975 bilateral uid ix ol'I' with a han~~, nmid much morr huhlicity
tium the S;:udia normally allow. King I~;cytial'y chcc:k-writint; durinN hip Midra~l
tour :In(I Idq payment of Itahat Summit hledgcs :uldcd up to more Ih;in $7On
million in January, more th;nt half tltc bilateral nid paid out in all of 1')~Q. Litypt,
Jordan, a:td Syri;i c:ontinuc to he the tt:;~or recipirntx. 13ilalcral ohlikation4 c;irrird
over front 1 x)74 and new krauts proh;ibly will produce n 1 x)75 aid fib-,urr in rxcesw
of ~ I.5 billion. (Sec:ret No I~oreil;n I)issrm)
is
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25X6
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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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METAL PRICES Monthly Avnrn11n Cneh 1'ricn
I ,i h.rnlln,
J Fnb
11 Jon
Uec /A
Jan 74
July 1;171 1973 1974 1975
inn
~9Jan
11 Jan
Oa ]4
Jm ]4
July 1971 1973 1914 1975 July 1971 1913
t Appmumates world muAel puce hequemly ustd by manor world producers and waders.
dthouph only small quanwwrs al Ihese melds are actudly Uaded on the lME
1 Producers' pnce. covers most pnmay metals sold m the United $Nle3
~(luoled on New'/or1 market a Composite pnce for Chuapo. Phdadelphra. and Pdlsburph
STEEL SCRAP
r,~i~
Jfeb rinn
11 Jon t yr i~
Oec 14 I~~u^:
Jan 71 I ~, ~I p
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AGRICULTURAL PRICES Mf11111-IyAvnrnunCnellPrirn
WNEAT
Kanaaa Cily Nn 7 IIuA Wllllal
July 197?. 1013 1(174 1915 July 1017 1:)73 1974 197Ci
'~OXBEANS
COTTON
Mamphn 1'/n
Jlab JOG
11 JRa A 02
Uac lA I,1J
Jan f1 01tl
J Fan 509
?1 Jan 5B0
Oat )1 1 JO
Jan ]1 011
J fan o IoSo
21 Jan O J905
Oac '11 O J050
Jan .1 0.1900
CORN
fhlf.RuR NR 7 Yellow
SUGAR
Wmid haw Naw Yoyw Nn 1 I
50 ~ I
July 1972 1973 1914 1975
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1lah JtlJ
7 J Jan J OJ
tla !1 J G1
Jan 1/ 2 00
Jhb JJ15
?1 Jan 3900
Dat l1 15 00
Jan 71 1590
J fan 5915
21 Jan 59,15
Oac 71 81.09
Jan 11 89.09
FOOD iND
15n ~~
175
July 1972 1973
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Ihly Avnrnpn Cnrh Prirn
J -ab JOG
21.1an 4 02
hat lA A 1J
Jan lA 5 NI
J Feb 5 BD
71 Jan 5 AO
Otc lA 1 J0
Jan )4 0.11
J Feb 0.1050
2r Jan DJ905
Dec 14 0395P
Jen 74 o,tseo
July 1972 1973 19'!4 1975
15 r-.
caRrW
Chlcapn Nn 1 Yrllnw
SUGAR
World ~iaw Naw YmA No I t
50i I
July 19'2 1973 1974 1975
COFFEE
Dtha Mdde
J Iah J rIJ
21 Jan J OJ
Dec lA J G2
Jan 7A 2 00
J leb JJ 25
?1 Jon J000
Drc 14 15 00
Jen 1A 15 JO
J Feb 58,75
21 Jen 50.75
Deg 14 el.oe
Jen 14 ee oe
:11
a5o FOOD INDEX
125
:125 -
JUO
275
2511
275 -
2Ub
115 -
150 -
1070 -100
ihif n o compiled mdn
by IM ESp~4m1U ler 10
loud commod~bu which
enter mlunalionel Ueda
Commoddiu en
werphhd by J year movrnp
weanpa of rmporu into
induttriehted counuiee
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