Published on CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom)


ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 19, 1999
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 5, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8.pdf [3]561.58 KB
Body: 
E I W 7 5 ~peYed yp*R~s 200010911$ :CIA-RDP86S0?608R000500140005-8 ,.. Y `1 ~ of ntellgence Weekly 5 f~eb. 7~5 ~ :-~ ~ ~ ~. ?~ ~ E~ EIW. 75-5 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Secret Nu I%urclNn 1)Lsxcrrr Economic Intelligence Weekly Secret ER EIW 75-5 S February 1915 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 ~pY N ~ 4 3 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions clo..ln.a hr otD~w !~?mp~ Irom p?n?rol dalmsiNcallon Kh?dul? of [.O. 116.:9, ?~?mpllon col.poryi 4 Dell (9), and ]) Au-omatlca~l d?cloulf~?d oni Do~? Impo~rCbl? to D?t?rmin? Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-R?i1:8(~3T00608R000500140005-8 Nn l~nrrlHn Ulerrrn ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY b Fobruory 1fl76 Dovolopod Countrlos: Tito Slump In Porspactivo 3 Dovoloplnp Countrlo.s: Impact of Incroasnd OII Prlcos 6 OPEC Intorost In Trlpa~tlto Invostmant Grows 7 ..8 Itoly: Anothor Poymonts Squoozo In 1976 , g Notos, Statistics Industrial Output in the Major Developed Countries has been droppins at ari accelerated pace in recent months. The decline during the three?month period ending in November averaged 8-1/2% (annual rate), Output in Italy, France, and Japan fell most sharply -- 20%, 18?~, and 14%, respectively. In November, production in the seven major countries stood 6?.6 below the year-earlier level. French and Italian Trade Balances Have Improved because the recession has cut imports. The French trade deficit dropped to an average $90 million in the last three months of 1974, compared with a $400 million average in the pc-eceding half year, 8y the fourth quarter, Italy's mon*,hly deficit had dropped below $300 million from the $670 million average of the first half. Note: Comments and qucrics re~rding the liconomic Intelligence YJeekly arc welcomed. They may be directed 25X1A to the Office of liconomic Research, Codc 143, Gxtc~sion 7892. Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Secret Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDF~l18'~00608R000500140005-8 Sopnroto Handting for Agricultural Isauos in tho Multilotoral Trado Nogotiations, domandod by thv French, has Bann ~~ceeptod by tho othor EC mombars. Ths EC did not went to isolate tho Fron~h on this issuo, (oaring Paris would block agroorrient on a unified community position for tho upcoming trodo talks. Tightnoss in tho Wur'd Wheat Morkot Easod last wank as China and tho USSR cancolod import contracts for morn than I million tons of l1S whoat, and obsorvors forocast o rocord 1976 US whoat crop. Pricos now aro 3096 below tho poak lovol of a year ago. Tho Dollar Strengthonod against most major curroncios last week as reports surfacod of groater control bank intorvontion. An and to dollar sales that stommed from the covoring of Swiss franc-dollar positions contributed to tho rocovery. Thb EC plan to prevent currency movements of more then 196 a day should add stability to money markots. Kuwsit ha, proposed that the recent gyrations of the dollar be assessed at the next plenary session of OPEC. (Secret Igo Foreign Dissem) Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RD~~T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RD~~T00608R000500140005-8 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: T~iE SLUMP IN PERSPECTIVE The econumlc cimtraction in the moor developed countries, rrlrcady seven quartcr~ long, is the sharpe:~t since: World Wnr I1. Composite GNI' in the 13ig Six foreibrn economics fell ('rom a level 2-1~2 percentage points above the long-term trend in early 1973 to 5 percentage points below trend by the end of 1 ~Y14. 'T'his change is two to three times the drop in comparable periods of the two previous postwar contractions. So far, the contraction has been most severe in Japan and mildest in Italy. I%ra~r~^e: 1n a country noted for steady economic expansion, GNi' had slipped 2 pcrccnt~~,_ points below the trend b;~ late 1974. IraAy: The slump, under way for only three quarters, still is shallow compared with the recession of 1969-72. The severity of :hc slump results largely from two factors: (a) '.nc simultaneous beginning of the contractich in several countries, which caused foreign as well as donrestic demand to weaken, and (b) oil price hikes and supply squeezes over the past 1 G months, which have depressed GNP both directly and indirectly. Thy recession has several quarters to go, to ;udgc from the Iergth of the two previous slumps ar~d from the special circumstances of the current slowdown. s Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-F~~~6T00608R000500140005-8 25X6 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Srcwt Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Oil pricey will rcntain hil;lr, lengthening llte period of weak demand ;urd placing unpraceJentccl burdens on n;rlionul ;uul international I'in;rnciul institutions. Govcrnnrenls h;rvu lx.en, and will continue to hc, slower Ihan usual to react to the slump Ix~cause of preoccupation with inflation and bul;mcc-ol-payurents problems. Exp;msion progrunts, even when adopted, will not be fully felt I'or a half yesrr or so. (Unclassilied)~ Among the [,DCs, South Asian countries havr, been severely hurt by skyrocketing oil prices, fast Asian and sulrSaharan African countries moderately affected, and South Ameriaut countries least clamagcd. [3ecausc the LD~'s have had to draw down skimpy financial reserves and to resort to further borrowing, they will have still gre.':tcr difficulty in mcuting their 1975 oil hills. Economic performance will depend even more closely on aid from developed countries, OPEC countries, and international financial institutions. 13alancc of I'aymcnts Oil imports by the. non-OPI~C dcvcloping countries totaled at (cast $13 billion in 1974, as opposed to $4.7 billion in 1973. Iliglrcr prices were the cause, volume rising at most 3`%. The ri,;c in world petroleum prices ah.o contributed to increased prices for imported food, fertilizer, and industrial products. Since export prices and export volume rose less than proportionately, the LDCs incurred a $31 billion trade deficit, $12.8 billion with OPEC countries. Compared with 1973, the trade balance deteriorated by SS ;.:Ilion with OECD countries and $10 billion with OPEC countries. As a partial offset, multilateral official capital inflows rose by more than $3 billion; bilateral official flows from OPEC countries gew by some $1.4 billion. While the picture on total capital flows is rti.~t yet clear, private capital flows have been the principal source of financing the deficit for the more prosperous LDCs. OPEC and multilateral sources appear to have been the prune rncans of financing the 1974 balance for UN-designated Most Seriously Af;cctcd nations. Domestic Development Contrary to earlier pessimistic forecasts, nearly all dcvcloping countries achieved some scrt of economic gowth in 1974, witli tl~c average real gowtlt Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDF~~.Tr00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDI~A'i~00608R000500140005-8 rote reaching 3"0, :'opulallon incru;scs continued io mulch ur exceed the incrcayc in output in many of these countries. I~ut?thermorc, hit;hcr imprt?! hriccs contriln;lcd to rum;~unt domestic inilution in the LUCs, which ra-t ut an estimutccl average ruts o1 305, in 1974. I~ow 1.DCs h;rve succeeded in reducing o? ~:onsurnhtion or imports absolutely. Most have had to be content with slowing dowi; the ruts of growth of rc?nsumplion, mainly through higher tuxes on oil-rclutal activities. I)evcloping countries arc being forced to reorder their priorities and to place particular emphasis on food and fertilizer pr~duclion, oil exploration, .aid llte devcloprnent of non-oi! energy sources. iZcgionnl l3rcnkdown Latin American countries as a group have held up best under the burden of increased oil prices. Their advantages have included (a) domestic oil production that partially satisfies their needs, (b) ready access to foreign lending, anu (c) export prices that remained ~?clativcly firm for most of the past year. I3r;zil's 1Gr4 real GNP growth of 10`/~ was the highest of any m,Uor non-OI'L;C LDC. South Asian countries -- Indio, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka -were severely afflicted in 1974 by rising import bills and lagb*ing export. earnings. Oil bills rose to one-third of export earnings in India and Bangladesh and to almost one-fourth of carnins ii; Pakistan and Sri Lanka. L.argc expenditures for food and difficulties in exporting to recession-hit customers compounded their troubles. In 1974 tiic real growth rate in the Last Asian LDCs -several of which had tx:cn growing at :0% - fell by one-half on the average. Growth in exports, especially food and ligla manufactures, offset much of the damage from higher import costs. The developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa suffered a doubling of their combined trade deficit in i 974. Increased official foreign loans and grants were tl~e principal means of financing their deficits. These problems will worsen in 1975. Prices for oil, food, and fertilizer will remain }sigh and prices of manufactured imports will increase, whereas prices of many LDC exports are expected to fall. The financing of balance-of-payments s Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDI00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP8~9Edb608R000500140005-8 dul'icils will ;rc more difl'icull hccnc~,e erl previous drawdowns of I'in;uncial reserves raid c~clraustion of private lines of credit. 'I'hc perl'ornuurcc of LUCs in 1'175 will lre increasingly dependent ern assistance from developed counlrics, UI'I:C countries, and international financial institutions. (Ccrnl'idential)^ OPEC INTEREST IN TRIPARTITE INVESTMENT rROWS Middle East oil producers arc showing increased interest in tripartite invcstmcnt in developing counlrics. Suelt ventures -- bringing surplus petrodollars and Western technology together in third counlrics -enable OI'I:C states to increase investment in LuCs sal'cly, without using their own scarce manpower. The oil producers thus; can both diversify their investments and blunt LUC criticism of higher oil prices. Growth in tripartite invcshnent is likely to be conccnlruted in a handful of LUCs, mainly Arab. Among the Middle East producers, Kuwait offers the brightest prospects for tripartite vcntures. At !cast half a dozen Kuwaiti financial insti%ution:: already arc active in LDCs. The Kuwaitis have recently undertaken tripartite vcntures in Jordan (a powcrplant) and Ycmcn (agicultural development), ntainlS? with US consultants and contractors. Kuwait also is involved in joint projects in the LUCs with the World Bank and its subsidiar.~, the International Devel~pmcnt Asso~~i~ Lion. The Saudis plan to channel an increasing share of their invcstmcnt in LDCs through the Arab Investment Company and the Saudi Arabian Development Fund. The former has already undcrtakcn a t*irartitc venture to build a sugar processing complex in Sudan with Japanes^ and US firnis. The Saudis arc considering projects in Egypt in cooperation with US, British, and Italian firms. Iran believes that sc;lcction of development projects and technology is tl~e responsibility of aid recipients. It flies leas decided to rely primarily on direct loans to help developing nations. Interest in tripartite vcntures nonctlrelcss should grow in time. Tripartite invcstmcnt will do little to offset the current account deficits of most LDCs this year. The amount invested wily, remain small and often will simply replace funds earmarked for direct gants or loans. Only Moslem countries can expect to receive appreciable financial relief through these three-cornered vcntures. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)^ ~ ~ ~ ~ Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP~TeW0608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RD~86T00608R000500140005-8 crat Italy probably ?.~ill be able to finance another large current account deficit in 1975 without resorting to harsh impart controls or to a debt moratorium. At the same time, conditions attached to new foreign loans conceivably could bring down the Moro government. Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-R[~~~T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP>~9rAb608R000500140005-8 Uullook t'or the C'urrenl Acrounl After more lh;ut tripling to ~~ billion last year, the current account clcl'icit shuulcl ~Irop to $G.G billion in 1975. The deepening recession will improve Ilse lruclu balance. The government has little option but to continue lire ;uistet?ily program itt spite of the cotil in economic; gt?owlh. 'I'o rcllatc substantially not Duly woulel worsen the current account clel'icit but also would abrogate the terms of several inlernulional louts, Jeaparclir,ing Italy's I'untl-raising ability. If Itonte continues its austerity measures through most ol? 1975, the oil track clcl'icit probably will rise only slightly this yrur, to $7.5 billion. The anticinatal ITALY: Current Account 1 BlII1on US $ Oil Trade, f.o.b. Non-Oil Trado, f.o.b. ~.o ~--~ 7.5 Net Services and Transfers Total Current Account 2 r 2.4 i 8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-R151R,$6T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDPt1s8~a0608R000500140005-8 1974 Currcntucatuntdeflcit: $B.Oblllian Actual Financing ? $2.1 billiun ? 1?uromarket losrns ? $2.0 billlon - Wcst German loses ? $1.9 billlon ? L'C credit ? $0.7 billlon ? hawing on $1.2 bllllon IM1~ standby credit Current account deficit: $G.2 bllllon (pro? jCCtCd) Awallablc Financing ~ $1.0 billlon - unusrd drawings on 1974 credits ? $0.3 billlon ? remainder of IMF stsurdby credit Possibly Avsrllublc Finsutcing ? $0.8 billion - IMF;tII facility ? $O.ti bllllon -net short?tenn conuacrclal buck oorrowings ? $0.4 billlon ? drawing on IMF gold tranchc 0$1.0 billion to $2.0 billion - L'C recycling fund x$1.0 billion - prepayments from Iran for goods on order ? Funding from various recycling schemes, such as cxpuncrcd IMF oil facility and OECD "safety net" increase in the average price of imported crude from $ I I.00 to $ 12.00 per barrel (c.i.f.) should be partly offset by a small drop in volumes Demand for irnportc.l oil is expected to decline because of sagging industrial output and +hc availability of large gasoline stocks. The non-oil trade account probably will show a plump surplus this year, on top of the recent sharp improvement. Export volume is likely to increase by 6`Y? or so, while impart volume should decline a littler The non-oil balance also should benefit from improved terms of trade, since prices of exports (mostly manufactures) promise to climb faster titan prices of imports (mostly food, raw materials, and manufacttrres). Tltc 13.8?Io trade-weighted depreriafion of the lira in 1974 is helping Italy tc retain its competitiveness in foreign markets, 4: spite an above-average inflation rate of 25%. Expansion in export volume rtonctlteless will be restrained by weak demand in developed countries and financing problems in the oil-poor LDCs. Sales to OPEC states will rise substantially following an 80?I? jump to more than $2 billion in 1974; such sales arc still only 8l0 of total experts. Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDFt~~.T~0608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-f~f3i~6T00608R000500140005-8 l)ndcr the present restrictive policies, intporl valuate prc-hubly will drop u percentaf!c point or two. 'l'ight credit, high interest rates, and dccllning prol'fis will cut into investment. Consumer dcnu~nd will remain soil, despitr a recent hike in I'ringc hcncrits. 'I'stx htcreuses will trirtt disposable income, and job uncertaintlrs will cncourngc workers to save, 'I'hc rcnutintlcr or the current account should show a considcrs;bly lurgrr clrficit than lust 7~cur. A decline in import-related I'rcit!ht costs will be more Ihsut c~l'1'scl by a pronounced rise in interest psrymc.nts on foreign loans, from Irss th;ut $1 billion lust year to sot cstirnutcd $? billion in 1975. I~urthernu~rc, the I;urc~pcun recessiort will cut int~t tourist curnints, and sluggish economic activity in Wcst t'-crmany will inhibit the growth of emigrant remittances. rinancing the Urticit 'I'hc capitol account at best will der little to case the tlefic't bottler( ;utcf rnigltt even udtl to it. State entcryiriscs and comntcrciul b:utks have largely exhausted their credit with private linuncial institutions. Repayments on past loans will be about $ I billion, tloublc last year's figiuc. Rcrnoval of the import tlcposit snc~mc in March, as scheduled, could Icad to increased capital outflows, orfsctting the inflow of capital repatriated because of tight crctlit. Most important, a massive capital (light is possible in the event of protracted political crisis. Rome is counting on official borrowing to cover even more of its deficit this year than in 1974. Only a gradual depreciation of the lira is likely, because of the government's commitment to avoiding the inflationary effects of a sharp devaluation. In order not to alienate its I:C partners and other creditors, Italy will extend the import deposit scheme or introduce other import controls only as a last resort. Rome will strongly resist reducing its uncommitted gold reserves, worth $I1 billion at current market prices. It has only $3.2 billion in convertible currency holdings, including $1.0 billion in unused borrowings from last year. The possibility of a financing crunch is greatest in the first half of the year, before the government nails down loans new under consideration. As a stopgap, Rome may have to draw on the $4.5 billion available in short-term currency swaps - a risky solution unless long-term financing is reasonably assttrcd. The stickiest problems in financing the deficit stem from politically unpalatable conditions that potential Ienclers might attach to tltcir loans. 25X6 25X6 ri Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIA~~~86T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-R~r$~T00608R000500140005-8 In parlicula~wcrulcl Ilkc Itonte to strc;unlinc the gctvernmrnt hurc;n;rracy, a -ncasurc Ihal wcrulcl rut clrcply inlo the I'arly~s sysl~~m of pntrcrnagc. I~urthcrmurc, belt lightening! in the form of reclucccl spending or I;tx hikes mil!ht alicnalr lahctr, which so fns has heat shieldcc! I'rctm austerity throuNh waYc incre;rscs, improved 1'ring!r Ix;nel'ils, ;utcl unemployment compensation. 'I'o r;rise I;rhor's ire iu this year of nt;~nr wage ronlrart rcncg;uliatictns would pose a elang!crnus threat tu;m economy alrr;rcly clop in recession. Scvcr;rl Arch countries reportedly would like to attach political conclilions to their loans. I3;rsically, they seek tv inhibit ttali;rn coupcralion within the International I:ncrgy Agteney and with the Unileel States. If its eredilors insist upon politically unarceptablc conditions, Maly prcrh;rhly will turn to the United States for long-term bilateral assist:utce. (Secret No Foreign bissem) ^ * ~ ~ ~ Notc;~ Cool Response to US-Sponsored Grnin Conclave The meeting next week in London, initiated by the Unitccl States to develop a world systcrn of grain rescrvcs, has gcneratal little enthusiasm. Several nations aro participating only out of deference to the Unitccl States. China has clcclined to participate, and the USSR has not responded. Scvcral ccnuttries, especially I:C nations and Japan, have raised the following points: (a) grain rcscrvcs should be discussed in the upcoming MTN and, in any case, will be brought up at the FAO -nccting; on 24 February, and (b) the US proposal fails to emphasize the goal of price stabilisation. (Secret) is Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-~Dro86T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RD~+89tf00608R000500140005-8 Sauces Arabia Kirk;a UCf 1 d75 A,id Prugrnm Saudi Arabian 1975 bilateral uid ix ol'I' with a han~~, nmid much morr huhlicity tium the S;:udia normally allow. King I~;cytial'y chcc:k-writint; durinN hip Midra~l tour :In(I Idq payment of Itahat Summit hledgcs :uldcd up to more Ih;in $7On million in January, more th;nt half tltc bilateral nid paid out in all of 1')~Q. Litypt, Jordan, a:td Syri;i c:ontinuc to he the tt:;~or recipirntx. 13ilalcral ohlikation4 c;irrird over front 1 x)74 and new krauts proh;ibly will produce n 1 x)75 aid fib-,urr in rxcesw of ~ I.5 billion. (Sec:ret No I~oreil;n I)issrm) is Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIA~}et86T00608R000500140005-8 25X6 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 METAL PRICES Monthly Avnrn11n Cneh 1'ricn I ,i h.rnlln, J Fnb 11 Jon Uec /A Jan 74 July 1;171 1973 1974 1975 inn ~9Jan 11 Jan Oa ]4 Jm ]4 July 1971 1973 1914 1975 July 1971 1913 t Appmumates world muAel puce hequemly ustd by manor world producers and waders. dthouph only small quanwwrs al Ihese melds are actudly Uaded on the lME 1 Producers' pnce. covers most pnmay metals sold m the United $Nle3 ~(luoled on New'/or1 market a Composite pnce for Chuapo. Phdadelphra. and Pdlsburph STEEL SCRAP r,~i~ Jfeb rinn 11 Jon t yr i~ Oec 14 I~~u^: Jan 71 I ~, ~I p Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP~?T00608R000500140005-8 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 AGRICULTURAL PRICES Mf11111-IyAvnrnunCnellPrirn WNEAT Kanaaa Cily Nn 7 IIuA Wllllal July 197?. 1013 1(174 1915 July 1017 1:)73 1974 197Ci '~OXBEANS COTTON Mamphn 1'/n Jlab JOG 11 JRa A 02 Uac lA I,1J Jan f1 01tl J Fan 509 ?1 Jan 5B0 Oat )1 1 JO Jan ]1 011 J fan o IoSo 21 Jan O J905 Oac '11 O J050 Jan .1 0.1900 CORN fhlf.RuR NR 7 Yellow SUGAR Wmid haw Naw Yoyw Nn 1 I 50 ~ I July 1972 1973 1914 1975 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : C~-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 1lah JtlJ 7 J Jan J OJ tla !1 J G1 Jan 1/ 2 00 Jhb JJ15 ?1 Jan 3900 Dat l1 15 00 Jan 71 1590 J fan 5915 21 Jan 59,15 Oac 71 81.09 Jan 11 89.09 FOOD iND 15n ~~ 175 July 1972 1973 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8 Ihly Avnrnpn Cnrh Prirn J -ab JOG 21.1an 4 02 hat lA A 1J Jan lA 5 NI J Feb 5 BD 71 Jan 5 AO Otc lA 1 J0 Jan )4 0.11 J Feb 0.1050 2r Jan DJ905 Dec 14 0395P Jen 74 o,tseo July 1972 1973 19'!4 1975 15 r-. caRrW Chlcapn Nn 1 Yrllnw SUGAR World ~iaw Naw YmA No I t 50i I July 19'2 1973 1974 1975 COFFEE Dtha Mdde J Iah J rIJ 21 Jan J OJ Dec lA J G2 Jan 7A 2 00 J leb JJ 25 ?1 Jon J000 Drc 14 15 00 Jen 1A 15 JO J Feb 58,75 21 Jen 50.75 Deg 14 el.oe Jen 14 ee oe :11 a5o FOOD INDEX 125 :125 - JUO 275 2511 275 - 2Ub 115 - 150 - 1070 -100 ihif n o compiled mdn by IM ESp~4m1U ler 10 loud commod~bu which enter mlunalionel Ueda Commoddiu en werphhd by J year movrnp weanpa of rmporu into induttriehted counuiee p4~proved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140005-8

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