CHANGING SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF WORLD POLITICS AND THE USSR'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Changing Soviet Perco~tions Of 1+,'orld
Politics and the U~SR~s International Role
October 1975
A new note of Soviet self-confidence in international affairs,
seen in Moscow as validating the concept of a progressive historical
march, is emerging in the 1970s. Other major powers are not viewed
as having changed their basically hostile attitudes toward the USSR,
but the Soviets feel greater assurance about ?rheir capacity to deal
with them and less exaggerated concern for their effects on Soviet
security. Since insecurity has been a major factor motivating
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. 0. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED IN DECEMBER 1981
PR 75-113M
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Soviet polices in the past, it is nit surprising that new directions
in Soviet foreign policy have accompanied ?the new psycholog(cal mood.
Moscow perceives a new need today for normalized relations with maJor
states, especially the US, and has learned from exper(ence that work-
ing within the existing international system is more likely to serve
Soviet interests than frontal challenges to other great powers or to
the system itself. Largely for this reason the Soviet leaders have
developed an increased stake in international stability and have come
to accept the prospect of an indefinite period of coexistence with
the West.
Moscow still expects and seeks international change. But the
USSR cannot, in a period of detente, be the direct agent for much c,f
the change Its leaders still hope will occur. And while a residual
belief in the eventual attainment of ultimate Soviet aims in the basic
world struggle still exists in the USSR, the Soviets have increasingly
adfusted their sights, conceptually and operationally, to short-run
and intermediate-range goals. AchievAment of even these, they Soviets
realize, depends on success in working with forces that often act
independently of Soviet sway and in overcoming simultaneous counter-
veiling trends.
Sourc?s of Soviet Perceptions
Soviet ideology supplies the basic conceptual framework used by
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Soviet observers I n ana I yz i ng i nter?net i ona I of f~ i ~ s . The 1 ntsr-
pretation of world events this ideology i~rovides is dynamic: it
posits a fundamental struggle on a global scale, p resuppases constant
change, and gives impetus to an activist foreign policy. Yet while
Mar xism-Leninism attunas Soviet observers to the key role that events
within states play in affecting international behavior, it explains
little beyond the general ana abstract about relations among states.
And although the Soviet outlook could be called utopian in terms of its
stated goals, most Soviet leaders from 1917 'onwards have consciously
stressed realism and caution in practical policy matters and warned
of the dangers of adventurism in the long-term international competi-
tion between the emerging new order and the declining old. In this
regard, Brezhnev follows the examples of Lenin end Stalin rather than
Khrushchev.
The wider Soviet involvement in recent years in world affairs
and a belief that internal progress, especially toward economic goals,
is increasingly dependent on international relationships have led
Soviet leaders to seek a more accurate picture of the world. They
have tried to enhance the capabil(ties of their channels of informa-
tin about foreign events and, of particular notQ, to obtain more and
better analysis of that information. A larger role has been assigned
to the academic institutes in Moscow, especially the Institute of US
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and Canadia~i Studies and the Institute of thg World Economy and
International Relations, which are involved in provfdir,y ~olicy-
makers with es?himative Judgments about international affairs.
How deeply rooted the newer Soviet perceptions have become
cannot be told with certainty. The current leaders lived through
the Stalin era, with its articulate and heavily propagandized set
of ideas strASSing the hostility of the international environmen~~;
Soviet insecurity, and the necds.sity of avoldi~g foreign contact.
This era has left deep and widesproad Soviet doubts about the wisd~am
and orthodoxy of enmeshing the USSR in dealings with tnd capitalist
powers and making compromises with the Wbst. Yet despite the
persisting influence of ingrained views, perceptions du not remain
static . Doctr i na I l y pure positions are poss i b l e on l y when ever+~'~:s
are v i awed at a d i stance. I nvo I vsmer.?% with events requires th~~t.?t
dogma make room for pragmatism, le:;t unraalism drive the Sovi~t~i~
state into an isolationist position. The post-Stalin genera~i~f?,n
of Soviet leaders has already changed its outlook fn significfint
wavy b6~~~use of international experience, the influence or p~arsonal
a,-,r~ institutional rotes and interests, and newly perceived needs.
A new generation of past-Brezhnev leaders could also develop new
perceptions cf international problems and new ideas of what Soviet
national interests require in terms of international behavior.
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The New International Situation
The measuring standard and key determinant of the USSR's
progress i n the wor I dw i de po l i t i ca I strugg I s ;:~:,stu I ated by the
Soviets Is the international "correlation ~f forces." !n weighing
the strengths of the two sides, the Soviets attach great importance
to the power of the principal states, especially their o^onomic and
military capabilities and potential. But less tangible sc~;ial and
political factors are also considered to be ir~oortant, hence thg
continual Soviet assessing of U5 domestic cohesion and willpower.
In the Soviet view the world since 1911 has boon in gradual
transition from a purely capitalist system to a socialist one,
the most drZmatic single advance beir~g the Sovietization of East
Europe afar World War I;. But the 1970s, the Soviets argue, have
brought a further significant, even radical favorable change in the
international balance. Some Soviet commentary seems t~ imply a
tipping of the balance past a notional midway point, as though
"socialism" now possessed more than half of a world power pie. Ttie
factor mainly responsible for the new correlation of forces, in
Masc~w's view, is Soviet strategic nuclear strAngth, built up over
the last ten years 'ho a level roughly equivalent to that of the US.
Also ::ontri'outing to Soviet optimism is the combination of economic,
social, and political problems currently plaguing 1?hd West, which
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Moscow views as unprecedented. In Soviet eyp; these problems have
made the present phase of capitalism's "general crisis" unusually
deep and persistent and have thrown the West into its most serious
disarray since World War II.
The Soviets are unsure shout what developments will flow from
this "crisis," f~owever, and realize that any relative advantages
they now enjoy rest on an uncertain foundz~tion. More pronounced
leftward trends in West European politics (especially Communist
participation in coalition governments in France and Italy> seem
likely to them, but they also see in the present-day Western condition
the seedy of possible civil wars and the specter of revived fascism.
The Soviets apparently believe that capitalism cannot escape suffering
permanent d(sabilitres as a consequence of its problems and that it is
already fn a qualitatively new stage of its decline. But at the same
time they have respect for the capocity of the cai~italist system to
devise effective methods for coping with even such serio~.as problems
as the oil issue and to bounce back because of the overall size and
resiliency of the Western economic system.
The Soviets have also had dffficul-hies in determining the meaning
of th9 Western disarray for their own foreign policy. Some Party
elements reportedly feel that not enough is being don9 to take
advantage of the nevi International situation, and West European
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Communist parties are receiving conflicting signals from Moscow
on Just how best to improve their individual political positions.
So far, however, in line with the Soviet propensity in the 1970s
increas(ngly to dissociate the world revolutionary struggle from
the ordinary conduct of inters?~ate relations and place emphasis
on the latter, the most authoritative Soviet expositions of the
Western "crisis" have been more in the nature of efforts to steer
the detente policy over the shoals of this unanticipated situation
than of Justifications for revising course.
In no case hzs this been more c:early true than for Soviet
relations with the US, which remain the key fac+or affecting the
overall Soviet international role. In the 1970s the US moved to-
ward detente with the USSR and accommodated itself To the growth of
Soviet strategic forces and a Soviet role in resolving maJor world
problems. Whether :`his "realistic" US attitude will be sustained
is the chief question for Soviet policy-makers. The Soviets believe
that the US altered its foreign c~tlook in the early 1970s largely
for pragmatic reasons: the old policy was simply becoming less
effective and too expensive. But the new US policy, the Soviets
believe, rests or, an unconsolidated domestic base, the consensus
supporting earlier US policies has broken down, but no agreement
has yet been reached on what should take its plac;a. The Soviet
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reeding of the situation In the US throughout the 197 "pause" in
detente has been ?I'hat thf: pro-c+etente forces are st i I I more pow,erfu I
than their enemies, but that the la?`ter remain strong, still tapping
a reservoir of anti-Soviet feelings not yet completely dissipated
from the Co 1 d Way .
The newfound Soviet confidence is not free from counterbalancing
rectors, and Moscow does nc~t see the shifts in the intsrnationai
"correlation of forces" wholly on9-sidedly. For one thing, the
favorable changes that have occurred in the 1970s are not irrevocable.
In this critical regard th~ry differ from postwar Sevier gains in East
Europe, which are ,judged fie be "irreversible." Even the lengthy and
expensive Soviet nuclear missile buildup does not guarantee future
strategic stabiil?y or even parity.
Moscow is also clearly a~rare of the storm clouds on its inter-
national horizon. Chief among them is Chfna, whose "loss" greatly
damaged the USSR's image as the nucleus of an ever-increasing inter-
national political movement and whos9 deep-seated hostility threatens
to outlive Mao. But Europe too, the recent collective security
agreement notwithstanding, contains 3 self-assured West Germany and
has shown little susceptibility to increases in Soviet influence
despite spells of political turmoil and lessened fears of the Soviet
military threat. The emergence of several secc~dary power centers in
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CONFIDENTIAL
the world is welcomed by Moscow as representing a docline in US
authority among its chief partners, but the Soviets are uneasy
about what direction these newly independent political forces will
take. While the Soviet perception of the world as enemy is changing,
it has not been replaced by one of the world as oys~f?er, ripe with
opportunities to be exploited. '.
The Soviet International Role .
Soviet policy today is informed by a sense of "having arrived"
internationally. By successfully weathering critical trials over the
years, 'tile Soviets believe that the USSR has demonstrated a capacity
to sustain itself and grow in a dangerous and unpredictable inter-
national environment. There is also considerable national pride
connected with the :soviet international role that is important to a
people whose sense of inferiority vis a-vis other great powers and
cultures has baen great and to a regime in need of evidence of its
own competence and legitimacy. The Soviets feel that their inter-
' national prestige is more solidly based today than was the case
under Khrushchev, whose incautious political moves aroused rather
than impressed adversaries and bought little influence in other
countries. A stronger and more secure USSR does not guarantee
success in all foreign undertakings, tut it does mean a more active
and influential Soviet international presence.
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Current Soviet percept(ons of world atfairs, however, imply
a degree of ins'habi!ity for Sovlet policy. Although poli*ical
changes such as those in southarn Europe from Turkey to Portugal,
tempt Moscow to see ar-,d act ~n opportunities for Soviet advantage,
the Soviet leaders are aware that graater militancy would damage
their relations with the West without assuring any expansion of
Soviet influence. While the Soviets are prepared t~~ lni?ervene
abroad in areas and ~r, occasions when they think the political and
military risks are Justified -- as seems to be the case in Angola --
they must continuously reassess the costs involved. In the rest of
tho 1970s and beyand the USSR may Tiiiu 3t~p!f Aven more subJect to
the strains inherent in its contradictory international roles:
how effectively can it continue to represent itself as revolutionary,
progressive, and the patron of the have-nets of this world while
seeking expanded friendship with the U~, recognition as a rich and
advanced country, and stabil,ty in certain regimes and regions?
There will prof,~bly continue to be a strong Soviet attitude in favor
of keeping relations with the US and other ~?aJor powers on a reasonably
even keel, despite inevitable ups and downs. But mutuality of interest
and viewpoint beyween East and West has long been anathema in the
USSR, and reaching genuine compromises with the West will never be an
easy or a natural process for Soviet leaders.
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