CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001300010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 23, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 September 1952
OCI No., 9384
Copy NO.
297
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
DIA review(s) completed.
Army, OSD and State Dept review(s)
completed.
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RETURN TO ARCH VES& BRAS DIM
IIMMMEOIATELY AFTER USE `
JOB - RQ&....13 -...-
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. British want representative at ANZUS Military Committee
meeting: British Foreign Secretary en on September re-
quest that arrangements be made for a British representative
to attend the forthcoming meeting of the ANZUS Military
Committee. He re-emphasized that Britain's special Common-
wealth relations with both Australia and New Zealand involve
an automatic mutual defense obligation and the closest mili-
tary and strategic collaboration. Eden indicated that he
expects parliamentary criticism over Britain's exclusion from
the ANZUS Council.
The Department of State has replied that all participants
in ANZUS desire to maintain close liaison with Britain until
such time as an expansion of the organization can be under-
25X1 taken. F77
Comment: The British press gave generally favorable
treatment to the Honolulu meeting of the ANZUS Council, but
suggested that Britain has a legitimate claim to future
participation.
Because of the Bevan-Attlee conflict in the British Labor
Party, however, the Churchill government cannot be certain
of immunity from parliamentary criticism on this matter,
despite the fact that its position is essentially the same as
that taken by the Labor government when the Pacific Pact
scheme was initiated.
observer status on ANZUS: The
-
ench Charge
American massy in Canberra reports that the PF
has approached both the Australian Department of External
Affairs and the American Embassy regarding the prospects for
a French observer at future ANZUS Council meetings. The
Embassy as well as a high Australian official is inclined to
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doubt the charge's t that he acted without instruc-
tions from Paris.
3. Mexican copper shipped to possibly unreliable firm in
Italy: 71 shipment of Tons of copper wire bars and tons
of electrolytic copper cathodes left Vera Cruz on 8 September
consigned to the Italian firm SITAMET by Cobre de Mexico.
Cobre de Mexico has informed the US Embassy that this
shipment represents an order approved by the US Consul
General in Milan in August, and that it wishes to ship other
orders totalling 3,300 tons to the same firm in the near
25X1 future. F77 I
Comment: Cobre de Mexico, Mexico's only producer of
electroly copper, customarily seeks US Embassy approval of
its foreign orders. In August, the US Consul General in
Milan withdrew his objections to a SITAMET order for 500 tons
after confirming that the copper had been committed to re-
liable buyers. The objections had been based on the knowledge
that SITAMET had previously sold a strategic commodity to a
notorious transshipper.
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4. Georgian Party attacks independence
The First ecre ary of e organ Communist arty, in his
report to the 15th Georgian Party Congress on 16 September,
claimed that some of the provincial leaders were attempting
to promote "chieftainship" and were giving preference to
local over state interests. He reminded the congress of the
antistate activities of certain tribes in the 1920's and
1930's and warned that any similar attempt now to partition
Georgia into separate principalities would not be tolerated.
Comment: Georgia, until the recent purge, held a
favoreposTtion in the USSR, receiving more material aid and
less` interference in its political and cultural life than
the other 15 republics. The resulting degree of autonomy
for local officials apparently permitted a serious amount of
corruption and nepotism.
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5. MVD responsibility for Volga-Don Canal confirmed. The
Soviet press on 20 ep em er announce a e u ers of
the Volga-Don Canal were awarded the order of Lenin. The
list of recipients includes Minister of Internal Affairs
S. N. Kruglov and five of his Deputy Ministers, N. K. Bogdanov,
S. S. Mamulov, B. P. Obruchnikov, V. S. Ryasnui and I. A.
Seroa .
The Embassy in Moscow believes that the absence of
awards to top officials of other agencies of the Soviet Govern-
ment leaves little doubt that the MVD was the responsible
agency. The sensitivity of Soviet officials concerning the
'
MVD
s role in this project is demonstrated by the fact that
the list omitted the titles of these six officials.
I
Comment: The reluctance of the Russians to indicate the
responsible agency may be attributed to the fact that they do
not desire to connect the name of the infamous MVD, with
its millions of forced laborers, to a project supposedly
constructed by free socialist labor.
6. Initiation of fall troop rotation in Soviet Zone of
Austria. orces in us r a es ma e a oviet
troops arrived in Austria via Hungary during the period from
15 to 17 September. Approximately 500 of these were sent on
to garrisons in western Hungary; the remainder arrived at
Kaisersteinbruch Reception Center southwest of Vienna.
These troops, which appear to be recruits,-probably
represent the first increment of the anticipated fall rota-
tion, but there is no evidence of the imminent departure of
age classes eligible bilization.
Comment: Approximately 2,900 Soviet troops arrived in
Austria e ween 21 and 26 July, after which the reception
center was reportedly closed down. Recent information has
indicated that these troops were recruits from the class of
1933. The latest; :arrivals are probably,also:_of,..-the 1933 class.
Soviet troop rotation in Austria appears to be following
the two-phase cycle which occurred last year. Over 10,000
troops of the 1931 class entered Austria in June 1951 and
approximately 4,350 of the 1932 class arrived during November.
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7. French-USSR delegation departs in irate mood: According
to the renc Ambassador n Moscow, a delegation from the
USSR-French Society visiting the Soviet Union recently de-
parted in an irate mood because of the close rein applied
by Soviet authorities on the delegates' activities in Moscow
and, particularly, because they were unable to obtain an
interview with Ilya Ehrenburg, prominent Soviet author and
propagandist.
Officials in the American Embassy comment that the
treatment given the French delegation is indicative of the
unwillingness of Soviet authorities to permit contacts be-
tween Soviet citizens and foreigners in the USSR. Moscow
feels this separation is necessary even though the visitors
are sympathetic to Communism and despite the fact that Commu-
nists abroad are promoting national fronts and world peace
campaigns.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Continuing release of Bulgarian political prisoners
report: According to information o a ne roug e
Eastern European Bureau of the Netherlands Foreign Office,
the number of new internees in Bulgarian concentration camps
during the past two years has been less than the number set
free. There are at present no more than 7,000 political
prisoners in the country, all of whom are quartered on Bellene
Island in the Danube River. Although a large number of camps
were crowded with political unreliables immediately following
World War II, inmates of these camps were transferred to
Bellene beginning in July 1949, and the former camps are
now occupie only b common criminals and paramilitary labor
personnel.
Comment:" Other recent estimates have placed the number
of Bulgarian political prisoners at 60,000 or more.
Although the Bellene camp is believed to be Bulgaria's
largest center for political offenders and unreliables, it
is doubtful whether it is the only prison of its type in
the country. Many such camps have been reported to be
located in the Dobrudja. Since even the slightest opposition
to the regime is considered a crime, it is difficult if not
impossible to differentiate between "political prisoners"
and "common criminals" in Bulgaria.
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9. Polish troops believed returning to barracks from field
train ng areas: a ary Attache n arsaw, w o re-
turned on`geptember from a three-day field trip into
northwest Poland, reported that all Polish and Soviet barracks
were still empty except for housekeeping details. Since
16 September, however, "more and more trucks are coming into
the First Division area in Warsaw with paraphernalia and
supplies." In addition, there was evidence that Polish and
Soviet troops in the Grossborn training area were getting
ready to move out, and Warsaw newspapers reported a demonstra-
tion in Katowice welcoming Polish troops back from summer
training.
The attache expects most or all of the troops
to be back
in barracks by 27 September.
Comment. Last year all Polish troops had returned from
field ra n ng to their home garrisons by late September.
These movements took place by train, however, and western
observers were not aware of them. There has been no indi-
cation yet on what scale the summer field maneuvers were held.
25X1
10. Martyka trial involves Polish gentry, US official and
former I employees: of s press account-9 o the a-r y a
trial, which en e In Warsaw on 20 September, have played
up the "refinement" of some of the female gentry involved
with the accused. Testimony has charged that the USIS was
engaged in espionage, has implicated two former USIS employees
in Warsaw as go-betweens with the band which allegedly
murdered Martyka, and has involved an American Foreign Service
officer who has recently been transferred from Warsaw.
American Embassy officials emphasize that there is no
indication that the Poles intend the trial to produce serious
diplomatic consequences. The testimon apparently does not
involve any Americans now in land. 25X1
I 'I
Comment: Several of the accused are former landowners
and mem" hers of the aristocracy, and the trial is apparently
intended to condemn the remaining elements of these classes
in the eyes of other Poles and show that they are connected
with the United States.
Repeated mention of the intelligentsia suggests that
trial propaganda is designed to warn hostile segments of this
class, while seeking to retain the allegiance of the pro-
government portion. This also may be further evidence of the
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appeal of Western broadcasts to the intelligentsia.
Reference to the US inspiration of the accused and the
"American gangster"methods used in the murder show that the
trial is part of the current hate-America and anti-VOA
campaign. The implication of former employees of the USIS,
which was closed a year ago in Warsaw, is undoubtedly a
further attempt to prevent Polish citizens from having any
contact with the American Embassy.
11. Polish physicists confer with Soviet scientists: The
American Embassy In Warsaw has reported the conclusion of a
physicists1conference at Spala, Poland, on 15 September.
The two weeks' conference, was attended by 150 Polish scientists
and three Soviet professors, and included discussions of
nuclear physics. Professor Infeld acclaimed its importance
and called it a "turning point in the history of Polish
physics." Embassy officials commented that the conference
may be the beginning of the'use of Polish brains in Soviet
economic development.
Comment: For some time there has been some discontent
among dish scientists because of the refusal of the
Russians to allow them either to contact Western scientists
on nuclear subjects or to participate in Soviet atomic de-
velopment. This conference may indicate that the Russians
will now permit the Polish scientists to perform some un-
classified tasks for them. On the other hand it may be a
conciliatory political move by the Russians.
Leopold Infeld, the Polish-Canadian atomic scientist,
collaborated with Enstein at Princeton in the late thirties
and held the chair of applied mathematics at Toronto Univer-
sity from 1939 until 1950, when he returned to Poland to
take a leading part in Polish political-scientific activity.
12. Joint Rumanian-East German chemical company created:
The BucHare radio has announce t a on . ep em er a
protocol was signed in Berlin which expanded the volume of
trade between Rumania and East Germany. In addition, the
protocol called for "the creation on a parity basis of a
mixed Rumanian-German company for the development of the
chemical industry in the Rumanian Peoples' Republic by
utilizing raw materials available" in Rumania.
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The importance of the agreement is indicated by the
negotiators for both countries. Chivu Stoica, Vice Chairman
of the Council of Ministers, and Miron Constantinescu,
Chairman of the State Planning Commission, represented 25X1
Rumania; while Heinrich Rau, Deputy Minister-President, and
Bruno Leuschner, Chairman of the State Planning Commission,
signed for the German Democratic Republica
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Comment: In June Rumania and Hungary concluded a
similar agreement whereby a joint company was to be set up
with Hungarian equipment to exploit Rumanian natural gas and
chemical resources. Another agreement for economic coopera-
tion was recently concluded between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
A build-up of Rumania's chemical industry, in addition
to its petroleum industry, will greatly increase its stra-
tegic and industrial potential within the Soviet Orbit.
13. Rumanian collectivization drive continues: The American
Legation n uc ares repor s a the "triumph of Socialism
in the villages" is being widely hailed in the Rumanian press,
while there are frequent notices of convictions of kulaks for
sabotaging sowing and withholding crops from the state. Em-
phasis appears to be on formation of agricultural tilling
associations rather than kolkhozes, but the press has reported
for the first time that 47 of these associations have been
changed into kolkhozes.
pressure
for collectivization has been sharply increasea "un-
socialized" Transylvania, chiefly through confiscation of
land and imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes.
Comment: Increased prominence given to formation of
agricultural associations coincides with the first anniver-
sary of the drive, which began in September 1951, for formation
"on the voluntary principle" of permanent agricultural
associations. At that time it was announced that these
associations would accustom peasants to "collective methods of
managing their agricultural exploitation as a preliminary step
toward establishment of collective farms."
Some 1,112 agricultural associations have been formed in
the last year, 265 of them in the, past month; and over 400
collective farms have been set up in 1952.
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Japanese confident that World Buddhist Conference will not
be subverted: Japanese delegates a eve that their large
majority at World Conference of Buddhists will prevent the
conference from being subverted by radical elements from South-
east Asia, according to Ambassador Murphy.
Murphy notes, however, that although the conference appears
to be primarily religious in nature, there is some danger of a
Communist attempt to tie in the conference objectives with those
of the Peiping Peace Conference. He reports that "Peace through
Buddhism," as contrasted with the building of armaments, is ex-
pected to be on the agenda for discussion.
Comment: Japanese Buddhists, who traditionally avoid
politics, will oppose any attempts by radical elements to swing
the conference toward political matters. On the other hand,
left-wing Buddhist groups will probably exploit the peace
issue, and may also follow the precedent set in Burma and
Thailand where strenuous efforts are being made to establish
the compatibility of Communism and Buddhism.
tacked Communist derlegates to the Peiping Peace Conference on
18 September in the Japanese Foreign Office was part of the
"National Martyr's Youth Corps." The corps is an ultra-
nationalist;, paramilitary, youth organization formed last
June to crush Communist activity in Japan.
Ambassador Murphy comments that although this is a minor
incident, it is the first publicized display of violence by
an ultranationalist group since World War II. He thinks
that the group may well grow and become more active as a
result of the widespread publicity given the incident.
Office: Ambassador urp y reports that the group w e at-
Foreign
Ultranationalist Japanese create incident in
Comment: The peace treaty, rearmament and the anti-
Communns -aTmosphere in Japan have given impetus to the growth
of rightist; societies. While their common theme is anti;-;
Communism, a number of them have adopted policies of anti-
foreignism and neutrality.
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16. Nationalization of China's private banks expected in 1953:
e communists
in China have begun the a eov auks under the
guise of "amalgamation." By mid-1953 or earlier, it is ex-
pected that all banks dealing in foreign exchange will be
branches of the state-operated Bank of China, and all banks
dealing in domestic finance will be branches of the official
people's Bank.
Comment: The amalgamation of private banks in China to
facil ae government control has been under way for more than
two years. As with other sectors of the economy, the trend
in banking is toward full nationalization.
Continuing reports are received of the government take-
over of private firms, such as the nationalization on 1
September of China's largest private shipping company.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
18, Viet Minh considered more vulnerable to political than
military action: Commenting on recent reports of the Viet
n s material weakness and lowering morale, the American
Consul in Hanoi concludes that they must be viewed with re-
serve. He believes that any weaknesses of the Viet Minh are
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probably compensated for by their more skillful administration
and propaganda as compared with the Bao Dai Government. The
Consul adds that if the Vietnam Government were able to make
real progress politically, it would deal the Viet Minh a
graver blow than any of which the French-Vietnamese military
forces are capable.
25X1
19. Karens in Burma reported seeking alliance with former
Japanese puppe : Karen insurgents have commence negotiating
an alliance wi Dr. Ba Maw, head of the Burmese Government
during the Japanese occupation, 25X1
Ba Maw is said to have encouragea
to form an a ance with the Chinese Nationalists in north-
east Burma and to cooperate temporarily with the Burmese
Communists. In return for assuming overt political action
in behalf of the Karens, Ba Maw asked to be given access
the ores and timbers now in Karen-controlled areas.
Comment: Ba Maw, who is one of Burma's shrewdest politi-
ciansery has been a leading spokesman Of pro-Communist
elements which have been calling for government action to
expel the Chinese Nationalists.
The fact that the Karens were singled out for especially
severe treatment by Ba Maw's puppet government would appear
to preclude their turning to him now.
20. Insurgents reported uniting in Burma: Representatives
of Burma's two Communist par es an We -insurgent, pro-
Communist PVO have been meeting in west central Burma and have
agreed to form an alliance, according to press reports reach-
ing Rangoon. While the command functions of each group have
not yet been resolved, all groups have promised to contribute
1500 troops toward the establishment of a common striking
force.
The American Embassy in Rangoon comments that the Burma
War Office has denied these reports, but adds that other un-
confirmed information indicates that the insurgents had met
and that they desire to coordinate their efforts.
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Comment: Problems of leadership and spheres of influence
have eeu a leading causes of friction among Burman insur-
gents. As they have been increasingly on the defensive, how-
ever, there has been a greater inducement for composing their
differences.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
21.
Iranian Chief of Staff restricts travel of foreign attaches: Iranian Chlef of Staff Baharmast has denied
every request of the American and British Military Attaches
during the past two weeks for permission to travel outside
Tehran. Although the restrictions ostensibly apply to all
military attaches, the American Army Attache notes that
other foreign attaches seldom leave the capital.
contacting tribes along the Iranian frontiers.
directed primarily against the British to prevent them from
Ambassador Henderson believes that the restrictions are
Comment: Baharmast recently ordered the General Staff
not t- scuss army reorganization plans with the US Army
Mission, and the new restrictions apparently represent
another step in Baharmast's anti-foreign policy.
22. Egypt may consider British-drafted constitution on
Sudan: Egypt may accept e r s - ra a cons i u on on
'tie Sudan as a basis for discussion, but may first suggest
amendments, such as postponement of the elections scheduled
for November, according to Lieutenant Colonel Sabri, Egyptian
senior staff officer in the Sudan. Sabri stated that Egypt's
chief objection to the Sudan constitution is that it gives
the Governor General too much power.
Sabri's position suggests that Egypt's military regime
has adopted a more reasonable view on the Sudan issue than
previous Cairo governments. Sabri's advice may carry some
weight in Egyptian official circles, sipne he is a brother of
one gf General Nagib's close advisers.
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Comment: If Sabri's advice is followed, it would
represent a-major change in Egyptian policy on the Sudan
question. There is no clear indication, however, that
General Nagib is prepared to face the repercussions within
Egypt that such a settlement might cause.
23. Turkish reaction to British proposal on MEDO: The Turk-
ish Foreign n s ry states that agrees in pr nciple with
the British proposal on the Middle East Defense Organization,
but believes that the Arab States should be invited to sit in
on any discussions preceding its organization. Arab partici-
pation need not imply a commitment on membership, and such an
invitation should refute possible claims of the Arabs that the
sponsoring powers were proceeding without consulting them.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry observes that the present
Egyptian Government appears more favorably inclined toward
MEDO than its predecessors. Ankara proposes more military
aid to Turkey and evqntual establishment of MEDO headquarters
in southern Turkey. 25X1
Comment: The Turks do not favor proceeding with defense
plann nI g? efore the obligations of each member of MEDO are
clarified. Egypt's position is still unclear, but General
Nagib's desire for Western arms may make him consider a more
moderate course than his predecessors. Ankara's desire to
have MEDO headquarters in Turkey is presumably motivated by
considerations of prestige.
24. Special security measures imposed in Tangier: The insist-
ent rumors a a genera strike in . orocco wou d occur when the
French reply to the Sultan's demands for more autonomy was de-
livered have caused extraordinary security measures to be taken
in Tangier.
Nationalists in Tangier have not yet been advised of the
contents of the reply, but declare that they will maintain
their traditional passivity and hope that oun nationalist
"hot bloods" can be kept under control. L_ I 25X1
Comment: French officials in Morocco, as well as in the
Interns ,onal Zone of Tangier, have expressed their fears that
France's reply to the Sultan's memorandum of last March would
incite disorders. The note was finally delivered on 17
September, but its contents have not yet been made public.
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Tangier officials are particularly apprehensive because
of the riots which broke out on 30 March.
25. Arab League finances UN trip of Tunisian and. Moroccan
the
to the Iraq Foreign Minister
n
,
g
national s s ccor
Arab League will finance sending a Tunisian delegation to
the UN General Assembly meeting. Such a delegation would
include the former Tunisian Minister of Justice, Salah ben
Youssef, and probably Habib Bourghiba, head of the nationalist
Neo-Destour Party, and the former Minister of Social Affairs,
Mohamed Badrao
In addition to requests for American visas for the Tu-
nisian nationalists, the Arab League has requested one for
nationalist Mohamed Hassan al-Wazzani.
Comment: The French Government has already strongly
protested e issuance of American visas to nationalists,
particularly Ben Youssef and Badra. It is highly unlikely
at present that Bourghiba could reach New York because he
has been in forced residence since last January.
Because of Wazzani's uncertain loyalties, the French
presumably would have fewer objections to his appearing at
UN headquarters.
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Paris Embassy com1nents'l on French Communist Party crisis:
The American massy in Paris states that the current cr s s
in the French Communist Party, the most serious since 1939, is
the compelling reason for Thorez's imminent retgrn from the
Soviet Union.
The Communists are facing a "delicate situation" which
could develop into a national deviationist movement along
Titoist lines, If Ai'idre Marty and Charles Tillon, the purged
leaders who represent the militant elements and paramilitary
cadres, further delay a "full public confession," grave reper-
cussions may be expected.
28. Italy promises to increase defense expenditures after
elections: a an Treasury minister MILK has assure e
American Ambassador that a third extraordinary $400,000,000
defense appropriation will be sought from parliament immediately
after the elections next spring. Although this money ostensi-
bly would be expended in fiscal years 1955 and 1956, it will
be available for defense orders in 1953 following parliamentary
approval. Pella intimated that he might even overlook defense
contracting against these funds prior to parliamentary approval.
Pella is also trying to persuade the Defense Ministry to
increase from $64,000;000 to $128,000,000 the expenditures pro-
grammed for major military items out of the second $400,000,000
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extraordinary appropriation passed in June.
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Comment: American officials in Rome have previously
reported f`at although Italy's defense expenditures for
1952 will meet NATO goals, targets for fiscal years 1953 and
1954 are unlikely to be met. Although this new appropriation
might improve the level of expenditures in fiscal year 1954,
it may come too late to make much difference in fiscal year
1953.
29, Argentina tries to call meeting to form Latin American
labor organza ono The caraguan Foreign n s ry has been
informed by its massy in Buenos Aires that the purpose of
the current tour of Latin America by Argentine labor repre-
sentatives is to organize a congress of the Committee for
Syndical Unity to meet in Mexico City to form an Argentine-
backed Latin American labor organization. When the meeting
would be held is not known.
Comment: The Latin American Committee for Syndical Unity
was formet an Argentine-subsidized conference in Asuncion,
Paraguay, last February. At that time Argentina tried to
organize a strictly Latin American labor confederation, but
could gain only enough support for the committee.
In view of the vigorous propaganda activities of its
Labor Attaches throughout Latin America, Argentina may be-
lieve that now there is sufficient support for a confederation
including some, though not the'most important, unions from each
Latin American country,
30.
Bolivian Minister of Mines opposes "confiscation" of tin
mines: Minister o nes and Petroleum uan ecin s a e on
l September that he rejects immediate confiscation of Bolivia's
tin mines and railways, as proposed by the Bolivian Labor
Central (COB), because this "would place Bolivia at the service
of Russia" Since Lechin heads the COB, his statement has been
interpreted as his separation from the Communist or extremist
leaders of the labor organization.
23 Sept 52
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Lechin said that the majority of COB members belong to
the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and support a policy
of nationalization without class struggle. He also said that
they favor reorganization rather than suppression of the army.
Comment: These statements are similar to those of President
Paz anTmay indicate that for the present Lechin finds it more
advantageous to cooperate with Paz. In the past Lechin has
encouraged the COB's extremist demands and has threatened to
call out labor to oust the President if nationalization were
delayed.
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25X1
23 September 1952
CIA No., 49817
Copy No. 38
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
25X1
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved ForRelease 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP79T0114' 001300010001-7
TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
TOP SECRET
23 Sept 52
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TOP SECRET
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
n ul-
2. Iranian official 'believes
nl~oeradossadeq soo dlciaerrep y
timatum~o rlt s rime
o e John ng o-American approach for a solution of the oil
dispute will neither threaten severance of diplomaticshelations
with Great Britain nor set a time limit
according to the vice president of the Iranian Senate.
Ambassador Henderson also reports that Iranians
Mossadeq are hoping that his reply will persuade
25X1 d the United States to chan a their policies toward Iran.
Comment: Awareness of nationalist
ultimatum? sentiment
Judging fromrhismpast
induce~liossadeq to deliver an out his threats. There is
actions, however, he may not carry
no evidence that he is ready to give up attempts at an agreement.
3. Mossadeq retains position despite Kashani challenges Mossa-
deq is s e s rongest po It ca ea er in. ran, according
to Ambassador Henderson. Kashani, however, has a more effec-
tive political organization and Mossadeq's recognitionmof his
growing prestige is indicated by the Kashani after the latter
thatMMossadeThhasmcalledoon.
irstrtimefrom
first
states that this is the
25X1 anyone except the Shah in the last year.
Comment: Kashani's political strength has increased ma-
teria y slnce mid-July, when Mossadeq returned to power. There
is no evidence, however, that he is strong enough to displace
the Prime Minister.
WESTERN EUROPE
rove rapid build-up of
illing to app
Italy believed unw 4. a Amer can Embassy in Rome states that
NATO ml 1 ary ases:
the a lan overn.ment will certainly be unwilling to approve
a rapid acceleration of
The government fears t such approval. The
tional elections would be jeopardized by
r the
Embassy believes that such
ofnalienatingithewPeoPleSrofeWestern
Soviet cold-war objective
TOP SECRET
23 Sept 52
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Europe from the United States.
Comment: The Italians have previously indicated that a
programme such scope would require parliamentary ratification.
LATIN AMERICA
wi ref
alu
en
co
ianFore gnMiniser
5. Brazilian ForeignuMurasion?
Braz
to attend anez s na g 1-+ that
G!
-sV
tion
is?n
eves a on ourstoattend thelbanezinaugura fuse a Chilean invitation together with the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, and certain
Uruguay or Para-
Latin American countries, not including
guay.
guay.
and the high-ranking mili-
tr
i
y
s
ign Min
The Brazilian Foretary show some nervousness concerning Ibanez's plans. Thely
increasing to any
Foreign Minister stated that Brazil is becoming a
nti isolated because nd does
anot ll ties between Brazil land the Uni i
US combination, a
s should be strengthened.
n
Comment: Brazil's attitude toward then Childannin nation
will be~ movated by the desire not only
the United States but also to take that action most likely to
weaken Ibanez's Argentine connections.
TOP SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded or declassi-
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document. .
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?"t' 26 uec PREVlous eoITIONS. TOP SECRET (40)