MEMORANDA FOR SECRETARY SIMON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001600110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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Orrice of the Director
of Central lntell Bence
NIO #2230/74
4 October 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT Memoranda for
Secretary Simon
Here are copies of five short
memoranda requested of CIA by Treasury
in support of Secretary Simon's forth-
coming trip to the USSR. They were
prepared by the Offices of Economic
Research and Current Intelligence.
Also requested and included
are biographical sketches of six key
Soviets with whom Secretary Simon
is likely to confer. These were
prepared by the Office,, of Central
National Intelligence Officer
for USS.R,,EE
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
The Honorable William E. Simon
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.
Dear Bill,
I am transmitting a number of papers on Soviet
matters which your people asked us to prepare in
support of your forthcoming trip to Moscow. Let me
take the occasion to raise a concern with you.
In our formal relations with the USSR, the
intelligence community has a particular interestlinf
the exchange of information. We need a good
Soviet economic data which are presently una ailatle,
oximately
and must be laboriously and only appr f
mated, if we are to provide the necessary
support to you and other policymakers in a time of
increasingly close engagement with the USSR. And
beyond these particular needs, there is a broad US
interest in persuading the Soviets to relax their
habitual secretiveness if we are to deal with them
in a truly normal fashion within a peaceful world.
With this in mind, I hope you will find occasions
to impress on the Soviet leaders the seriousness with
which we approach the bilateral agreements to exchange
ty co-mmitments
information. The Soviets have made formal
on this in the agreements on agriculture,
and other areas. They have been less than forthcoming
thus far in providing information under the Agricul-
ture, Agreement. We would hope that the agreement to
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A. October 1974
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exchange basic economic, industrial, and commerical
information and forecasts under the recently concluded
Long Term Cooperation Agreement will move forward and
provide the insights we need into the Soviet economy.
The Soviets ought not to be allowed to backslide, as
they surely will do if we do not issue repeated firm
reminders.
Sincerely,
(with memo)
Distribution:
3 - Addressee
1 -- DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/DCI/NIO
1 EcEn/NIO
2 -- USSR/NIO
11 - NIO/Reg.
1 - NIO~
1 - Mr.
1 - Mr. John MacCracken/Treas.
1 - Mr. Bill Morrell/Treas.
1 - Mr. Foster,'Collins/Treas.
1 ADDI (Walsh).
f`
Colby
Rector
(without memo.)
Distribution: .
1 - Bob Gates/NSC Staff
1 - OER
1 - OCI e man
l.- CRS/Mr. Eisenbeiss
5 - OER/U.
2 - OCI/USSR
2 CRS IS R R
1 - C/SB
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I. Soviet Foreign Economic Policy Toward West
II. Soviet Energy Strategy
III. Grain Prospects in USSR and Eastern Europe
IV. Soviet Hard Currency Payments
V. Recent Internal Developments
VI. Key Biographies
Brezhnev
Kosygin
V. N. Novikov
Patolichev
Baybakov
Garbuzov
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Soviet Foreign Economic Policy Toward the West
The chief Soviet goal in trade with the West is to obtain
equipment and technology to raise the level of Soviet indus-
trial technology and to achieve production goals more rapidly
than Communist resources permit.
Lately Soviet leaders have increasingly emphasized the
value of Western technology. Their concern is to boost lag-
ging productivity and to narrow the large and widening techno-
logical gap vis-a-vis the West.
-- Soviet imports from the West have doubled
since 1971 -- from almost $3 billion to an
estimated $6 billion in 1974.
-- New Soviet contracts for Western equipment
increased from less than $1 billion in 1971
to $2.6 billion in 1973, and probably will
be higher in 1974 (see Table).
-- Cooperative ventures, mainly in resource de-
velopment, have become a major vehicle for
attracting Western capital investment as well
as technology. Large projects are under way
in the chemical, forestry, and energy fields.
-- Long-term cooperation agreements with Western
governments have encouraged similar agreements
between the USSR and individual Western firms.
The US. has become a major target in efforts to secure
advanced technology, equipment, and other commodities.
-- Soviet imports from the United States rose
from $150 million in 1971 to $1.2 billion in
1973. Grain inflated the totals, but imports
of equipment increased from $60 million to
$200 million in the same period.
-- Soviet contracts for US equipment have in-
creased, and will keep imports from the US
in 1974 at high levels despite a decline in
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UNCLASSIFIED
a/
Soviet Equipment Orders from Developed West
Total
US
W. Germany
Million US $
1972 1973 1974
1971
2,600 1,845
850 1,695
Rounded to nearest $5 million-
a/
January-August.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
imports of grain. Imports of US equipment may
reach $400 million.
-- The USSR is seeking US capital, technology, and
know-how to help develop Soviet resources and
industry. Big gas and oil deals are currently
in abeyance, but large plant and equipment
deals are being negotiated.
-- US-Soviet S&T agreements have led to about 30
Soviet technology agreements with US firms.
- 2 -
UNCLASSIFIED
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SOVIET ENERGY STRATEGY
Development and Growth
Since 1960, a remarkable expansion in energy production
has supported Soviet economic development. (Table 1) Soviet
economic plans depend on a continued rapid growth of energy
supplies. But additions to capacity are becoming increasingly
expensive.
About 80% of Soviet primary energy resources are located
in Siberia, far from the industrial centers where three-fourths
of the energy is used. Finding and developing these Siberian
resources poses major problems:
~- Harsh climate, difficult terrain and permafrost
interfere.
---Soviet geophysical and exploration equipment is
often obsolete or unsuited for complex geological
structures or permafrost.
A lack of computerized analytical facilities
limits capability to locate new deposits.
-- Western equipment and expertise are needed to
exploit potential offshore oil deposits in
northern and eastern seas.
-- Shortages of good-quality drill pipe and casing,
poor quality bits, underpowered mud pumps, and
inadequate blowout preventers all hamper Soviet
oilfield operations.
-- The Soviets have recently acknowledged that,
contrary to earlier expectations, production
growth in the oil fields of West Siberia will
slacken in five to six years. This slowdown
will further increase the need to locate
additional large reserves of oil and gas in
East Siberia where conditions of terrain and
climate are extremely difficult.
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USSR: Production of Fuels and Power, 1960-1975 Plan
1975
Unit of Production
1960
1965
1970
1971 1972
1973
Plan
Crude Oil
Million metric tons
147.2
241.7
348.8
371.8 393.8
421
496
Natural Gas
Billion cubic meters
45.3
127.7
197.9
212.4 221.4
236.3
320
Coal*
Million metric tons
490.1
54.5.1
577.5
591.5 603.6
615
639
Electric Power:
Billion kilowatt-hours
292.3
506.7
740.9
800.4 857.4
915
1,065
Thermal
241.4
425.3
616.5
674.3 734.5
790
900
Hydro
50.9
81.4
124.4
126.1 122.9
125 -
165
Nuclear Power
Billion kilowatt-hours
0
1.4
3.5
'3.5 7.7
11.7
25
Oil Shale
Million metric tons
14.1
21.3
24.3
26.1 29.3
N.A.
32.7
Peat
Million metric tons
53.6
45.7
57.5
44.9 57.0
N.A.
78.3
Fuelwood
Million cubic meters
74.4
86.9
69
69 66.7
N.A.
55.5
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Three-fourths of Soviet coal reserves are also
in Siberia, but most of these are suitable only
for producing steam for heat or electric power
generation. Exploitation even for power purposes
must await further Soviet development of high-
voltage, interconnected transmission networks
to move large amounts of power westward to
consuming centers.
Under existing Soviet plans, the oil and gas share of
total energy consumption (see Table .2:,) will continue to grow.
These fuels, however, will be reserved for priority domestic
uses and for export. Nuclear power will not be a significant
energy source until after the mid-1980s.
Export
The USSR will strive to develop its energy resources for
export as well as for domestic needs. For several years ex-
ports of oil have been the USSR's largest single source of
foreign exchange. In 1973 exports to the West amounted to
about 700,000 bpd and earned $1.25 billion in hard currency.
Moscow also delivered 1.1 million bpd of oil to Eastern
Europe in 1973, about two-thirds of East European oil supplies.
By the early 1960s the USSR probably will be able to continue
meeting its own needs and those of Eastern Europe only if ex-
ports to the West are held to about the present level.
The USSR now is a small net importer of natural gas,
but deliveries to Europe are scheduled to grow considerably
as a result of contracts with Austria, West Germany, Italy,
France, Finland and East European countries. By 1975, Eastern
Europe will rely on the USSR for 20% of its total gas supply,
twice the share obtained from the USSR in 1973.
~E IA - VIAL
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USSR: Production and Consumption of Energy, 1973
Production
Consumption
Million tons* Percent Million tons* Percent
Oil
613
41.8
463
35.4
Natural gas
281
19.1
288
22.0
Coal
468
31.9
454
34.8
Hydroelectric and
nuclear power
48
3.3
44
3.4
Other**
57
3.9
57
4.4
TOTAL
1,467
100.0
1,306
100.0
* Million tons of hard coal equivalent (7,000,000 Kilocalories
per metric tons.) fuelwood.
** Oil shale, peat, and
CONFIDENTIAL
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Foreign Investment in Soviet Energy Development
The USSR is pushing cooperative ventures with US and
Japanese firms to get Western assistance in developing
Siberian cis deposits and to earn foreign exchange from
sales of liquefied natural gas.
- US participation has become questionable be-
cause of pricing and financing problems.
Even without US assistance, gas from West
Siberian deposits could be sold to Western
Europe when the Soviet pipeline network is
completed.
-- Japanese participation in developing East
Siberian gas deposits without the US is
uncertain.
-- Foreign markets for East Siberian gas other
than the US or Japan are unlikely to develop
for some time.
The Japanese have agreed to provide $450 million to help
finance development of coal reserves in East Siberi~,. 'ear
Yakutsk. In return, the USSR is to export 104 million tons
of coking coal to Japan during 1979-98. A Soviet-Japanese
cooperative arrangement exists to locate and develop oil de-
posits in the offshore area around Sakhalin, with Gulf Oil
Company as technical advisor. If oil is discovered, Japan
will be able to procure half the oil produced.
US or Soviet Energy Leverage?
In the energy field, neither the USSR nor the US has
much bargaining power in relation to the other. Although the
United States needs oil and the USSR needs modern equipment
and technology, each can get along without the other. Soviet
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petroleum operations would be less efficient and growth in
production might be smaller than with US equipment and
technology. Nonetheless, the USSR could remain self-sufficient
in oil and gas while earning substantial amounts of foreign
exchange from exports. The United States could use Soviet
oil and gas, but the amounts obtained probably would continue
to be small relative to total US requirements.
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1974 Grain Prospects in the USSR and Eastern Europe
The USSR and Eastern Europe are expected to have good
but not record grain crops this year. The harvest in both
areas should largely cover domestic needs; major imports from
the West will not be necessary.
Grain Production
We believe that the 1974 Soviet grain crop will be about
198 million tons -- short of the official goal of 206 million
tons but still the second largest grain crop in Soviet history.
Rainfall, the most important determinant of grain yields,
was abundant throughout most of the USSR during May and June.
At the end of June, it appeared likely that the output goal
would be achieved.
In July, the weather took a turn for the worse. As the
grain reached the harvesting stage in the West, heavy rains
lodged the plants and hindered the harvest. Because much of
the cut grain was left in the fields too long, grain losses
were high and the milling quality of the wheat was reduced.
In the East, the weather was hot and dry while the grain
was in the critical heading stage. We estimate that the
drought destroyed 8 million tons of grain -- primarily wheat.
Prospects for Soviet Imports
The USSR. will need 200 to 210 million tons of grain to
cover domestic requirements and normal export commitments in
FY 1975. Since carry-over stocks from last year's record
harvest are 20 to 30 million tons, a crop of 198 million
tons should be sufficient to make large-scale grain imports
unnecessary in FY 1975. The sharp drop in grain purchases
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and a return to the usual level of grain exports will re-
establish the Soviets as net exporters of grain in FY 1975.
The Soviets indeed have bought only small quantities of
grain so far this year. Most of the one million tons of corn
and wheat scheduled for delivery in FY 1975 are leftovers from
1972 and 1973 contracts with the US. In addition, a small
amount of corn was recently purchased from Argentina.
The Soviets can use the imported grain to offset short-
falls in certain kinds of grain. The corn will help feed the
growing livestock herds; the wheat may be used to make bread
since the milling quality of this year's wheat crop and the
carry-over stocks:' is doubtful.
Eastern Europe
Grain Production
We estimate the 1974 East European grain crop at 71 mil-
lion metric tons -- 2.5 million tons below the X973 record.
-- Record crops were harvested in East Germany,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
-- Poland's crop -- usually about 30 percent of
the East Europeans total -- flirted with disaster
throughout the growing season, but ended in a
harvest only 6 percent below the previous year's
record.
-- Bulgaria failed to improve over the past two
harvests.
-- Romania had its second poor harvest in a row.
Prospects for East European Imports
East European grain imports in FY 1975 are projected at
9 million tons, compared with 8 million tons in FY 1974. The
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USSR probably will supply 4.5 million tons, mostly wheat.
Based on past trading patterns, the East Europeans will look
to the United States for 2.0 to 2.5 million tons of grain,
mostly corn, while seeking the balance from other Western
sources.
The northern countries are expected to account for al-
most all of the imports: East Germany about 3.5 million tons,
Poland 3 million tons plus, and Czechoslovakia about 1.5 mil-
lion tons. All three countries have the option of reducing
grain imports by purchasing other feeds, such as oilcake and
meal, or by cutting livestock goals.
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Soviet Hard Currency Payments
Until this year's turnaround, the USSR has been unable
to generate sufficient exports to finance growing imports
from hard currency countries. (Table 1)
-- Since 1965, deficits have been financed chiefly
by credits. The Soviets rebuilt their depleted
gold reserve, selling almost none before 1972.
-- In 1972 and 1973 Soviet hard currency deficit
rose dramatically -- averaging $1.5 billion a
year -- because of record imports of grain and
equipment.
-- Soviet gold was used to finance about 40 percent
of the 1972-1973 deficit. Credits took care of
the rest.
-- Soviet debt is expected to exceed $4 billion
in 1974. (Table 2)
-- To ease its debt burden and to generate ex-
ports, the Soviets have concluded a number of
so-called cooperative ventures with Western
firms which call for repayment of credits
in the products developed by the venture.
The US has provided the Soviets with substantial credits
since the May 1972 Summit.
-- About $500 million in long-term Exirlbank
credits.
-- About $500 million in matching private
credits.
-- About $500 million in 3-year CCC credits
for grain.
-- About $200 million in medium- and long-term
credits from banks and other financial sources.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Table 1
USSR Hard Currency Trade Deficit`s/
Year
Exports
Imports
t .l .nco
1965
1,374
1,560
-186
1966
1,516
1,755
-238
1967
1,711
1,616
+95
1966
1,909
2,018
-109
1969
2,125
2,436
-311
1970
2,197
2,711
-514
1971
2,652
2,955
-303
1972
2,815
4,171
-1,357
1973
4,817
6,566
_1,749
1974b" 7,500 6,000 +1,500
a. Based on official Soviet data.
b. Estimated.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
Soviet Credit Drawings and Repayments from the Developed West
Million US $
Year
Credit
D
i
Interest
Repayment of
Net
End of Year
_
raw
ngs
Payments
Principal
Credits
_
Debt
1965
190
17
149
24
380
1966
275
20
150
105
505
1.967
305
29
152
124
653
1968
510
38
217
255
951
1969
630
57
265
309
1316
1970
715
79
310
326
1722
1971
682
103
374
204
2029
1972
1030
122
451
457
2608
1973
1690
157
657
876
3641
1974-/
1410
220
858
332
4194
z/ Preliminary
UNCLASSIFIED
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But there has been a turnaround in the Soviet hard cur-
rency picture.
-- High oil and other raw material prices will
increase Soviet exports substantially, and
grain imports will drop in 1974. An export
surplus of $1.5 billion is expected in 1974
and possibly a larger surplus in 1975.
-- High gold prices provide an additional cushion.
At $150 an ounce, sales out of current produc-
tion would earn the Soviets over $1 billion
in 1974 and even more in subsequent years.
The strong Soviet hard currency position will improve
the USSR's economic bargaining power for the next few years.
-- Moscow can now afford to pay cash. It re-
cently agreed to buy roughly $800 million
worth of equipment for the Kursk steel com-
plex in this fashion and has hinted that it
might make similar offers to US companies.
-- The USSR can resist high interest rates and
is likely to bargain hard on other commercial
terms.
-- The Soviets can also consider postponing ex-
ports of some commodities, such as diamonds,
which probably will bring higher prices in
the future.
In the longer term, payments prospects are less favorable,
however.
-- Declining oil exports by the end of the decade
will curb the increase in export earnings.
-- Debt will grow if Moscow chooses to maintain
the growth of imports.
-- Total debt could rise tows much as $13 bil-
lion by 1980.
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RECENT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
After a month of watchful stock-taking, during which Soviet
officials eagerly sought reassurances from US officials of policy
continuity under President Ford, Brezhnev forcefully reaffirmed
Soviet interest in improved US-Soviet relations in a late Sep-
tember speech. It is significant that these remarks came on
the heels of the first post-vacation full-dress Politburo meet-
ing. A foreign policy review in the light of various summer
developments affecting detente was probably one agenda item at
this session.
We have received reports this summer of growinq divisions
within the leadership over detente-related questions, such as
SALT, MBFR and CSCE. In some reports Brezhnev is portrayed.
as under increasing pressure from critics of detente. At least
some of these reports seem designed to convey the message that
the US should accommodate Brezhnev's views or it will be stuck
with some one tougher.
There may well be some truth in the reports. It would be
surprising if recent changes in Western governments had not re-
vived misgivings in some Soviet quarters about the pace and
specific contents of detente. Brezhnev, having exploited for
his own ends the technique of personal diplomacy, must be
particularly unhappy with recent events in the Wort. '_"_T c has,
however, shown an ability to trim when necessary. While
Brezhnev is the single most influential voice within the ruling
circle and the leading spokesman on all Soviet policy, he con-
tinues to operate within a system of shared power in which the
views of his colleagues carry great weight.
one issue now on the Soviet leaders' minds is long-term
planning. This fall they are drawing up both a five-year and
a fifteen-year plan for the period beginning in 1976. This
process forces a consideration of long-term ends, such as the
emphasis to give to consumer welfare, and also of basic means,
such as the degree to which Western economic assistance is
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desirable and available. A Tass article recently revealed a
brief outline of the long-term plan which indicates that
priority attention will be given to developing Siberia, ex-
panding agriculture in the non-black--soil zone, exploiting
energy reserves, and improving consumer welfare--the "prime
target."
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Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
C CT 1974
The Honorable William E. Simon
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220
Dear Bill,
I am transmitting a number of papers on Soviet
matters which your people asked us to prepare in
support of your forthcoming trip to Moscow. Let me
take the occasion to raise a concern with you.
In our formal relations with the USSR, the
intelligence community has a particular interest in
the exchange of information. We need a good deal of
Soviet economic data which are presently unavailable,
and must be laboriously and only approximately esti-
mated, if we are to provide the necessary first-rate
support to you and other policymakers in a time of
increasingly close engagement with the USSR. And
beyond these particular needs, there is a broad US
interest in persuading the Soviets to relax their
habitual secretiveness if we are to deal with them
in a truly normal fashion within a peaceful world.
With this in mind, I hope you will find occasions
to impress on the Soviet leaders the seriousness with
which we approach the bilateral agr.e?ements to exchange
information. The Soviets have made formal commitments
on this in the agreements on agriculture, transportation,
and other areas. They have been less than forthcoming
thus far in providing information under the Agricul-
,turr Agreement. We would hope that the agreement to
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exchange basic economic, industrials and commerical
information and forecasts under the recently concluded
Long Term Cooperation Agreement will move forward and
provide the insights we need into the Soviet economy.
The Soviets ought not to be allowed to backslide, as
they surely will do if we do not issue repeated firm
reminders.
Sincerely,
's/ Bill
W. E. Colby
Director
NID/USSR:
Distribution:
Original
1
1
1
1
1
1
- Addressee
-- DC I
- ER
- DDCI
- NIO/RI
- NIO/USSR
- GAC
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of Central intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Gates
NSC Staff
SUBJECT CIA Papers in Support
of Secretary Simon's
Trip to the USSR
Treasury requested from CIA five
short up-date memoranda and biographic
sketches of several key Soviets in
support of Secretary Simon's forth-
coming trip. Here are copies for your
information and use.n
Attachment
Intelligence Officer'
for USSR/EE
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001600110001-8
 LEGIB
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001600110001-8
Treasury has requested the following pa
Secretary Simon's October visit to Moscow.
1. Internal and Political Developments in USSR
2. Soviet Foreign Economic Toward West
3. Soviet Hard Currency Payments
4. Grain Prospects in USSR and Eastern Europe
5. Soviet Energy Strategy
6. Biographies of
a. Brezhnev
b. Kosygin
c. V. N. Novikov
d. Patolichev
e. Baibakov
f. Garbuzov
These, says Treasury, are all updates of papers
which we did for them in May 1974 (one done at the time
on Soviet foreign policy does not require updating;
Treasury will instead summarize memo of last week on the
"Soviet Image of the US.") None of the papers should
be over 2 pages, and the first one should not be over 1 page.
Simon is not leaving until 11 October but wants these
papers for reading on the previous weekend. This requires
delivery on Friday, 3 October. Deadline to me, therefore,
will be COB 1 October.
My office will do the final typing.
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001600110001-8