CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CLASS, CHANGED i 0: (,C,1
NEXT REVIEW DATE;
NO CHANGE IN CLASS, ^
0 DECLASSIFIED
COPY NO. 20
OCI NO. 6662/55
18 August 1955
DOCUMENT NO.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA review(s) completed.
State Department review completed
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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18 August 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
AMERICAN-CHINESE TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Geneva talks continue in an effort to find a formula
for the release of Americans detained in Communist China and
the return to the ms.inland of any Chinese in the United States
who may wish to go. The, Chinese Communists' immediate aims
with reference to item one of the agenda apparently are to
maintain the prerogatives of Chinese justice and to hold back
some of the Americans until assured that any arrangement on
the Chinese in the United States is working satisfactorily.
Wang Ping-nan's conduct in the negotiations suggests that he
wishes to avoid any abrupt tion of the talks.
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SOVIET TROOP REDUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR's announcement that it plane to-reduce its
armed forces by 640,000--about 16 percent of estimated present
strength--is the latest Soviet effort to establish proof of
peaceful intentions through "deeds" and give substance to the
peaceful coexistence line. The reduction will constitute an
adjustment of the Soviet armed forces to the changing require-
ments of nuclear warfare and probably will not diminish Soviet
combat capability. It will also help to relieve the Soviet
labor shortage. F__ I
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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Satellites Take Up Soviet Conciliatory Line. Toward US: The
Soviet conciliatory attitude toward e United tates
has now been cautiously echoed by the European Satellites.
Satellite propaganda, however, has been characterized more
by the sharp reduction of anti-American material than by
professed admiration for chievements. 25X1
. . . . . . . Page ]
Status of Soviet Troops in Hungary and Rumania: Rumanian
premier eorg u?e s announcement that Soviet troops
would be taken out of his country if foreign troops
were withdrawn from western Europe indicates that the
USSR does not intend to remove its armed forces from
southeastern Europe at this time. Page 2 25X1
=FJDENT~,IAL
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18 August 1955
USSR Improves Mobility of Forces in East Germany: The import
into East Germany of approximately 12,000 new Soviet
transport vehicles, which will greatly improve the
mobility of Soviet forces there, probably reflects
Soviet estimates of requirements for highly mobile opera-
tions in the event of nuclear warfare. Page 3 25X1
Kim Il-sung's Proposals of 15 August: North Korean premier
lm ti-sung,- at ,ceremon es on 15 August commemorating
the 10th anniversary of Korea's liberation from the
Japanese, called for a Far Eastern conference on the
peaceful unification of Korea, a withdrawal of foreign
troops, and a joint North-South conference. The
Communist objectives appear to be the withdrawal of
American forces from Korea and the reduction of tension,
without any attempt at present to settle the basic
question of unification. Page 3 25X1
Vietnam: Diem's communique rejecting Viet Minh demands for
election consultations has been field up by the French
and not officially forwarded to the Viet Minh authori-
ties. Relations between the International Control
Commission and the South Vietnam government appear to
have improved somewhat. Terrorist activity in Saigon
has abated during the past week.
Page 5 25X1
Laos: Pathet Lao-royal government negotiations are deadlocked
and neither side is likely to modify its position signifi-
cantly, despite the conciliatory efforts of the Indian
delegation of the International Control Commission. Mean-
while, the Pathets have increased military pressure in the
northern provinces. F77 I Page 5 25X1
Indonesia: The new Indonesian government under Premier
ara ap is more conservative than its predecessor. It
has already taken steps to achieve its main objectives--
the holding of elections and the settlement of army
grievances. Opposition from the National Party and
the Communists as well as friction with President
Sukarno can be expected to increase as the election
date approaches. Page
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New Pakistani Cabinet: The weakness of the new Pakistani
government is evident in the fact that only three major
political leaders have been given portfolios in an 11-man
cabinet. An offer to H. S. Suhrawardy, popular and able
opposition leader, to join the vernment remains open,
but he is unlikely to accept. o Page 8 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
Afghan-Pakistani Situation: Negotiations between Afghan
foreign minister Na m and Pakistani ambassador A. S. B.
Shah have reduced differences in the dispute between
the two countries to a single point--whether or not
Afghanistan will refrain from propaganda in favor of
Pushtoonistan.
Page 8
French North Africa: The French cabinet has instructed
Resident General Grandval to pursue a policy in Morocco
which is contrary to the wishes of the Moroccans but
is designed to conciliate the right wing of the French
cabinet. Rebel ambushes continue in Algeria; a
threatened general strike in Tunisia was postponed.
Page 9
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Rumors of Military Coup Continue in Brazil: Rumors and
en a s that a coup dietat is imminent in Brazil continue
as an aftermath of the 5 August speech by armed forces
chief of staff Gen. Canrobert Pereira da Costa calling
for military unity and alertness as the presidential
election of 3 October draws closer. Nearly all civilian
leaders, however, remain opposed to a coup. Page 10 25X1
New Tension in Argentina: The Argentine government's announce-
ment on 10 August of discovery of a plot to assassinate
Peron and top army officials underscores the continuing
failure of official "pacification"' overtures and may
presage a sterner policy. Opposition groups may respond
with new acts of resistance. Page 11 25X1
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BONN WEAKENING IN HIGHWAY TOLLS DISPUTE WITH EAST GERMANY . Page 1
The West German government has recently modified the
selective embargo on exports to East Germany which it imposed
last spring as a means of compelling the East German regime
to discontinue its harassment of West Berlin. Interference
with access to West Berlin is continuing, evidently for the
purpose of making continued access so costly that West Germany
will have to extend de facto recognition to the East German
regime by negotiating with it. 25X1
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18 August 1955
SEPARATISM THREATENS STABILITY OF PAKISTAN . . . . . . Page 3
The problem of separatism is again becoming acute in
Pakistan. In East Pakistan resentment against the centrali-
zation policy of Karachi appears to be building up. In West
Pakistan the proposal to merge all provinces into one unit
is strongly op osed especially in the Northwest Frontier
Province.
NEW POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS DEVELOPING IN GREECE . . . . . . Page 6
As the Greek Rally of Prime Minister Papagos gradually
weakens, intensified maneuvers of its leaders for alliances
to ensure their political survival are developing new align-
ments. A new political combination under Constantine
Karamanlis might provide a reasonably stable, nationalist
government after the Rally breaks up. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
The Geneva talks are stilt
concerned with finding a formu-
la for the release of Americans
detained in Communist China and
the return to the mainland of
any Chinese in the United States
who may wish to go.
Chinese Communist repre-
sentative Wang Ping-nan on 11
August proposed that Washing-
ton and Peiping declare that
Americans in China and Chinese
in the United States who de-
sire to return may do.so, eXtept
for those "involved in unfin-
ished civil or criminal cases."
Under Wang's plan, a third
country would act to facilitate
the return of Americans and
Chinese at the request of the
individual "or his government."
Wang's proposal would .
leave unchanged, however, the sta-
tus of the 40 or more Americans
detained in China, as all are
involved in "unfinished" cases.
Moreover, by providing for in-
vestigation of any individual's
case at the request of "his
government," the plan would
open the way for Peiping,through
the Indians, to put pressure
on Chinese who do not wish to
return.
Wang has strongly implied
that some of the detained Amer-
icans would be released, under
the pretext that reviews of
their cases had been completed,
SOVIET TROOP REDUCTION
The USSR's announcement
that it plans to reduce its
armed forces by 640,000--about
16 percent of estimated present
as soon as agreement is reached
on the scope of third-country
representation. At the same
time, his remarks suggested
that Peiping will not make a
mass release of the Americans.
'Peiping apparently wishes
both to maintain the preroga-
tives of Chinese justice and
to hold back some Americans un-
til assured that arrangements
for the return of Chinese from
the United States are working
satisfactorily.
Peiping has still not in-
dicated what questions it in-
tends to.put forward under the
second agenda item of "other
practical matters at issue."
Chou En-lai had implied in a
30 July speech that the Chinese
might want to talk about eco--
naaic restrictions and American
and Chinese Nationalist mili-
tary and intelligence operations
in the China area. In early
August Peiping seemed to be
preparing a position on the
principle of renunciation of
force--tied to a demand for the
withdrawal of American forces.
Nang Ping-nan's behavior
in the.talks so far has sug-
gested that the Chinese will
try to avoid any abrupt termi-
nation of the negotiations.
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strength--is the latest Soviet
effort to establish proof of
peaceful intentions through
"deeds" and give substance
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
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1954
TOTAL
3.9 MILLION
INTERIM
TOTAL
2.7MILLION
ARMED FORCES;
REDUCTION
FINAL GOAL
1.5 MILLION
SOVIET FORCE REDUCTION PROPOSAL
(10 MAY 1955) USING 1954 STRENGTH AS STARTING-POINT,
INTERIM TOTAL TO BE ATTAINED IN ONE YEAR.
ARMY
9,000,000
ARMY
2,500,000
the forthcoming UN
Disarmament Subcom-
mittee discussion by
putting pressure on
the West to make a
comparable concession
toward arms reduction.
The reduction goes
about half way toward
meeting the USSR's
proposal of 10 May
that armed forces be
reduced within one
year by 50 percent of
the difference between
their 1954 level and
an ultimate level of
1,500,000 for the
United States, Soviet
Union and Communist
China.
The USSR prob-
ably calculates that
as a result of the
relaxation in inter-
national tension fol-
lowing the summit con-
ference, it can count
on public sentiment,
particularly in West-
ern Europe, to pre-
1945 1954 DECEMBER 1955
SOVIET ARMED FORCES: 1945 -1955
to the peaceful coexistence
line. The reduction will con-
stitute an adjustment of the
Soviet armed forces to the
changing requirements of nu-
clear warfare and probably
will not diminish Soviet com-
bat capability. It will also
help relieve the Soviet labor
shortage.
The announcement of a
reduction at this time may be
an effort to recapture public
imagination with a concrete
disarmament move and to divert
attention from President Eisen-
hower's proposal at Geneva for
aerial inspection and an ex-
change of military blueprints..
It will strengthen Mos-
cow's negotiating position at
vent any further extension of
Western alliances and bases.
The-troop reduction is probably
intended as a further demonstra-
tion that the Soviet military
threat has faded.
The Soviet leaders may
also believe that such a demon-
stration of sincerity as a
unilateral reduction of forces
may result in splits in the
Western negotiating position
at the foreign ministers' con-
ference in October. In partic-
ular, they may hope to play off
the French proposal for budget-
ary controls as a means of en-
forcing disarmament and Eden's
advocacy of a collective secu-
rity system for Europe and de-
militarized zones in Germany
against the American emphasis
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.18 August 1955
on effective inspection and the
unification of Germany under
NATO control.
If the USSR reduces its
armed forces by 840,000 men
this year, it will increase
by approximately half the num-
ber of additional workers be-
coming available for the non-
agricultural labor force in
1955. During recent years,
rapid increases in nonagricul-
tural production, in the ab-
sence of the necessary gains
in output per worker, have been
achieved largely through greater
additions to'the labor force
than planned. These increments
have been decreasing in size
each year.
.Soviet planners may now be
trying to divert unproductive
manpower from the armed forces
to productive employment in the
economy.
The development of nuclear
weapons and means of delivering
them probably will continue to
be the most decisive factor
determining the relative mili-
tary strength of the Communist:
bloc and the West. Because of
the trend toward more powerful
weapons, Soviet leaders prob-
ably have come to believe that
military' manpower can be
reduced without a corresponding
impairment of military capabili-
ties. The reduction in the
armed forces'demands for man-
power probably will not involve
any reduction in their require-
ments for equipment and materiel.
The size of the military forces
is probably merely being ad--
justed in line with revised
military requirements and in
order to;:maximize the growth
of the total economy.
Part of the announced re-
duction may have been made
previously under the Malenkov
regime. There were indications
during 1953 that, contrary to
previous practice, demobili-
zation schedules in the USSR
were being strictly followed.
Release of personnel previously
held in service beyond the term
specified by law probably
has affected a shrinkage of to"
tai ,3tre4gth, although' Soviet
leaders have never publicly
said so.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY,
18 August 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Satellites Take Up Soviet
Conciliatory ne owar US
The conciliatory attitude
toward the United States first
displayed by Soviet internal
propaganda in early June was
adopted--although cautiously--
by the Eastern European Satel-
lites soon after the conclu-
sion of the summit conference
in Geneva. Satellite propa-
ganda, however, has been
characterized more by the
sharp reduction of anti-American
material than by professed
admiration for American achieve-
ments.
Satellite propaganda con-
cerning the summit conference
itself consisted of little
more than reprints of the
Soviet version. Coupled with
this, however, was a pronounced
drop in anti-American material.
Although references to "circles"
which agitate against peace are
still made, such villains are
now largely anonymous. Tradi-
tional opportunities for vili-
fication of the United States
are used only rarely, and al-
most entirely in connection
with a specific issue, such
as the redefection campaign.
A few of the Satellites
have begun to make occasional
favorable references tO the
American attitude at the sum-
mit conference, the American
people and domestic US affairs,
in sharp contrast to their
claims before the conference
that the United States was
interfering with Satellite
affairs through diplomacy and
espionage.
On 29 July, the Hungarian
press announced that "more sen-
sible circles are now gaining
the upper hand in America."
The Rumanian radio has reported
objectively on the Chinese-
American talks in Geneva and
declared that they will result
in friendly relations, as "de-
sired by the Chinese and Ameri-
can people."
Satellite broadcasts have
made few favorable references to
American economic and scientific
accomplishments of the type fre-
quently included in Soviet propa-
ganda in recent months. This is
probably because of the continued
necessity of paying tribute first,
foremost and almost exclusively
to the USSR.
Nevertheless, the Polish.
Home Service,in two August com-
mentaries on the visit of the
USSR's agricultural delegation
to the United States, admitted
that agriculture had been highly
developed in Iowa and that the
visit may promote "the growth of
mutual knowledge." This was at-
tended, however, by the statement
that only the large Iowa farms
were making money. This addition
was obviously in deference. to
Communist efforts to foster large
collective farms.
Both Poland and East Geri
many have acknowledged that'the
United States as well as the
USSR is a leader in atomic sci-
ence,, but both emphasized that
the USSR is ahead.
An East German commentary
illustrates`a standard pattern
of condescension and irony likely
to be employed whenever American
accomplishments are admitted.
It said the United States' con-
cern with the "profitable" as-
pects, of atomic energy is "a
little medieval," revealing that
?'a country with a modern technol-
ogy but an obsolete social order
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18 August 1955
simply cannot keep up with a
world that has dethroned the
golden calf."
Because the. Soviet propa-
ganda campaign apparently is de-
signed for lohgrterm%:'use~;:;the
Satellites can..be expected to
Status of Soviet Troops
n Hungary and Rumania
Rumanian prime minister
Gheorghiu-Dej's press announce-
ment on 11 August that Soviet
troops would no longer be needed
in Rumania and would be with-
drawn if "foreign troops were
withdrawn from,, .West Europe"
indicates that evacuation of
Soviet troops from Austria will
not necessarily mean removal
of the troops which have been
protecting Soviet communications
lines.
Ratification of the Aus-
trian state treaty removed the
legal basis for keeping Soviet
troops in Hungary and Rumania,
and the withdrawal of the So-
viet troops in Austria makes it
probable that some new legal
justification--probably the
Warsaw treaty--will
be put forward for
the continued occu-
pation of southeast-
ern Europe.
It does not ap--
pear that Soviet
forces now withdraw-
.ing from Austria will
be stationed in these
countries. Marshal
Zhukov's order of 31
July directing that
all Soviet troops
stationed in Austria
return "to the terri=
tory of the Soviet
Union before 1 Octo-
ber 1955" makes it
PART II
take on more of the character-
istics of the Soviet pattern.
Time lags are, however, almost
inevitable, and varying condi-
tions and local problems will
also probably result in differ-
ences of treatment.
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unlikely that any of these forces
will be reassigned to the Satel-
lites. Also, the route of the
departing Soviet troop trains in-
dicates a move back to the USSR.
The reported plan to trans-
fer the headquarters of the
Central Group of Forces from
Baden Austria, to Veszprem,
Hungary, remains unconfirmed.
It ii:i reasonable, however, that
this headquarters, which has
controlled Soviet troops assigned
to Austria and Hungary, might be
moved to Hungary for as long as
Soviet troops continue to be
stationed there.
The USSR evidently does not
intend to withdraw its armed
forces from southeastern Europe
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SOVIET GROUND FORCES
AUSTRIA- HUNGARY - RUMANIA
? Unit disposition
0 100 200 300
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
at this time. Continued Soviet
occupation of the area gives
substance to the Warsaw treaty
and maintains a Soviet bargain-
ing point to be used in pressing
for eventual removal of NATO
bases in Western Europe.
USSR Improves Mobility of
Forces In East Germany
Large-scale imports of new
Soviet transport vehicles into
East Germany between August
1954 and March 1955 have greatly
increased the mobility of Soviet
forces in East Germany. This
development apparently is part
of the modernization and equip-
ment program noted in the Soviet
army in Germany since early 1954
and probably reflects Soviet
estimates of requirements for
highly mobile operations in the
event of nuclear warfare.
During this period approxi-
mately 12,000 vehicles were im-
ported, bringing the possible
total vehicle strength of Soviet
units in Germany to about 65,OOQ
Although delivery of consider-
able quantities of the new So-
Kim I1-sung's Proposals of
15"1-gust
At a rally on 15 August
celebrating the tenth anniver-
sary of the liberation of Korea
from Japan, North Korean pre-
mier Kim I1--sung renewed the
Communist demand for a Far East-
ern conference "of all the
countries concerned, with the
broad participation of Asian
countries," to work out a pro-
gram for the peaceful unifica-
tion of Korea. Kim also called
for the withdrawal of foreign
troops, and proposed that North
and South Korea disavow the use
of force in settling the unifi-
cation problem, reduce their
armies to a minimum, provide
for greater contact, and hold
Satellites.
may loosen its hold on the
Soviet leaders may also
feel that withdrawal at this
time would increase popular un-
rest by encouraging the present
speculation among the Satellite
populations that the USSR is
yielding to Western pressure and
vielt vehicles to the East German
army/ and the return of worn-out
equipment to the USSR may reduce
this total, it is clear that
there has been a substantial
net increase for Soviet units.
Furthermore, the number of ve-
hicles reported in new or better-
than-average condition increased
from 25 percent of all vehicles
in July 1954 to 42 percent in
April 1955.
Major Soviet units in East
Germany have probably almost
reached authorized vehicle
strength. This increase reme-
dies any deficiencies that may
have existed in the capability
of Soviet motor transport to
sustain offensive military
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operations in Europe.
a joint North-South conference
to discuss the question.
All these proposals are
standard Communist propaganda.
They have been put forth peri-
odically since the end of hos-
tilities, and, in some instances,
even prior to the war. The call
for a renunciation of force by
North and South Korea, while
implicit in previous propaganda,
is more specific this time.
Kim's proposals on foreign troop
withdrawals, reduction of indig-
enous, forces to 100,000 and cul-
tural and economic intercourse
between the North and South
were set forth at the Geneva
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
conference in July 1954, and
have been repeated by the North
Korean regime during the past
year.
Emphasis on the unifica-
tion theme at this time, when
Rhee is adopting a bellicose
attitude toward the Communists,
is a further attempt to demon-
strate the North Korean re-
gime's desire for peaceful
unification.
Peiping has officially
supported Kim's proposals; Mos-
cow reported the speech without
official comment, emphasizing
those parts dealing with foreign
troop withdrawal and "peaceful"
unification.
Communist China has been
suggesting for several months
that it would be interested in
an international conference to
take up outstanding Far Eastern
questions, particularly those
relating to Formosa, Korea and
Indochina. Peiping expressed
the hope before and during the
summit talks that the Big Four
leaders would agree to such a
conference. The USSR was
expected at Geneva to propose
a conference of five,six, ten
or more powers--including Peiping
and some Asian neutrals--to
take up Asian questions, but,
apparently in the interest of
amity at Geneva, failed to
introduce Far Eastern questions
formally.
Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist comment since Geneva
has strongly suggested that a
proposal for a new multilateral
conference on Far Eastern issues
is being held in reserve. Chou
En-lai on 30 July stated ex-
plicitly that "we support" the
proposal of "many Asian countries"
for such a conference, and a
Pravda commentator on 3 August
wrote of the "urgent necessity"
of settling "pressing issues"
in the Far East, specifically
citing those related to China,
Indochina and Korea.
With respect specifically
to Korea, Chou En-lai in his
foreign affairs report of 11
August said, "The countries con-
cerned should convene a Far
Eastern conference with the
broad participation of Asian
countries to seek a peaceful
settlement of the Korean ques-
tion.'" There is no clear in-
dication whether the Communists
would prefer to discuss Korean
questions at a conference con-
cerned with Korea alone or as
one item on the agenda of a
conference on many Far Eastern
questions.
A continuation of the po-
litical status quo in Korea is
not to the Communists' immedi-
ate disadvantage. There is
little likelihood that they are
prepared to alter their previous
unification proposals, which
preclude free elections. The
population of North Korea is
approximately 7,900,000 while
that of the south is 21,000,000.
Thus the Communists would be un-
willing in practice to permit
either free elections under UN
supervision or an effective
joint legislature based on pro-
portional representation as de-
manded by the West.
The Communist objectives ap-
pear to be the withdrawal of
American forces from Korea and
the reduction of tension, with-
out any attempt at present to
25X1
settle the basic question of
unification.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
Premier Diem's communique
of 9 August rejecting Viet Minh
demands for election consulta-
tions has not yet been official-
ly forwarded to the Communist
authorities. The French have
refused to deliver Diem's mes-
sage to the Viet Minh on the
grounds that it was not properly
addressed. The South Vietnam
government purposely omitted
an address in order to avoid
any suggestion of recognition
of the Viet Minh regime.
The Viet Minh's reaction
to Diem's communique was at
first relatively mild, but
has since sharpened. Peiping
radio was warned of "dangerous
consequences" if the 1954
Geneva powers do not put an
end to South Vietnam's "viola-
tions" of the Geneva accords.
Relations between the
International Control Commis-
sion and the Diem government
appear to have improved some-
what following direct talks
between Diem and Indian chairman
Desai on the location of com-
mission headquarters in the
south. Desai is reported to
have stated recently that both
the North and the South Vietnan
governments are co-operating
with the control commission.
However, the Diem government
is still trying to arrange
for the bulk of the commission's
personnel to be quartered at
Dalat, while offering villas
in Saigon for the three com-
mission ambassadors.
25X1
_Jthe area im- 25X1
mediately sout of the 17th
parallel reports that this
zone is a "sieve" through which
political and possibly military
infiltration from the north is
steadily proceeding. Neither
the French nor the Vietnamese
have sufficient forces in the
area to block the flow.
Terrorist activity in
Saigon has generally abated in
the past week and military
action against rebel forces has
slackened.. A much-publicized
"massive" offensive by the
Vietnam National Army against
the Hoa Hao forces of Ba Cut
appears to be essentially a
routine clearing and patrol
operation. The possibility of
a Cao Dai uprising against the
government has again been ad-
vanced in certain quarters, but
it is generally felt that
hostilities are not imminent.
Meanwhile, the new French
ambassador and high commissioner
to Vietnam, Henri Hoppenot,
who arrived in Saigon on 11
August, has presented his
credentials to Premier Diem.
The negotiations between
the Laotian government and the
Pathet Lao continue deadlocked.
Government negotiators have
assured the Pathet Lao that it
could participate in free elec-
tions without discrimination
under the Laotian constitution,
but Pathet demands for revision
of the electoral law have been
almost completely rejected.
25X1
25X1
The government has again
called for the immediate re-estab-
lishment of royal administration
in the two northern provinces,
with the Pathets participating
but not in control. The Pathets
will probably reject the govern-
ment's proposals despite a visit
by the Indian chairman of the
International Control Commission
to the Pathet chief, Prince
Souphannouvong, in Sam Neua.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
Although this
visit resulted in no
tangible concessions,
the Indian official
returned professing
to have been im-
pressed by Souphan-
nouvong's "sincerity"
and desire for a
peaceful settlement.
He also felt that
Viet Minh influence
on the Pathets had
been exaggerated and
reported having seen
no Viet Minh person-
nel. Souphannouvong
assured him that,
while there are
strong fraternal
feelings, the Pathets
receive and need
little aid from the
Viet Minh.
PATHET LAO AREA- NORTHERN LAOS
? ?\
G PHONG SALYI
PHONG
SALY J
~?'~ PR OV I NC
~- 1 1 1 6 1
,--~ SAM NEUA
The Indian of-
IS AUGUST 1955
ficial will probably
persist in his search
for common ground on which to
negotiate a political settle-
ment. He has just reproached
the government for not trying
seriously. The government,
however, believing the nego-
tiations will make no progress,
is already preparing a strong
appeal to Nehru to be pre-
sented when Crown Prince
Savang and Prime Minister Katay
visit India in late August or
early September.
Meanwhile, the Pathets
have stepped up military pres-
sure on government forces in
northern Laos with small-scale
attacks during the past two
weeks.
Indonesia
The one-week-old Harahap
government in Indonesia has al-
ready taken steps to achieve its
main objectives--the holding of
the country's first national
elections and the settlement of
army grievances. Opposition
PART II
T
f
NONG
??~'^,~'
E Opp
r~ o~ P0~9D
51 a[ute Miles
A battalion of the Laotian
army was recently routed by a
Pathet Lao unit in the vicinity
of Muong Peun in Sam Neua Prov-
ince and the American army
attache in Vientiane has de-
scribed the situation in the area
as "critical. In addition, Com-
munist military activities in
Phong Saly Province are follow-
ing the pattern which was estab-
lished just before the Pathet
attacks on Muong Peun last month.
Only in the event of a col-
lapse of negotiations, however,
would intensified Communist mili-
tary action aimed at removing
government forces from the two
provinces become likely.
from the National Party and
the Communists, as well as
friction with President Sukarno,
can be expected to increase
as the elections, still sched-
uled for 29 September, ap-
proach.
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GONG PEUN
PROVINCE
Al
25X1
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
Although the cabinet as
a whole is not particularly
distinguished, none of its
members are known to be corrupt.
It will, moreover, be strongly
susceptible to the influence of
Vice President Hatta, who is
widely respected for his sense
of moderation and his national-
ism.
The new foreign minister
has indicated that an effort
will be made to "restore warmth"
in United States-Indonesian
relations. There is also reason
to believe that the new regime
will be considerably less eager
than its predecessor to promote
friendly relations with Commu-
nist China, and it may be less
vociferous in pressing the
Indonesian claim to Dutch New
Guinea.
Premier Harahap publicly
stated that an investigation of
election preparations would get
under way "immediately" in order
to determine whether they are
sufficiently advanced to permit
the elections to be held on
29 September.
With regard to the army,
one of the government's first
acts was to accept the resigna-
tion of General Utoyo as chief
of staff. Utoyo's appointment
precipitated the crisis leading
to the downfall of the Ali
regime.' The government has also
announced that it will respect
the army's integrity and keep
politics out of military affairs.
The army, meanwhile, is
25X1 pressing
or.a voice in the naming of the
permanent defense minister, for
establishment of a board to
suppress corruption in the gov-
ermmment, and for three seats
in both the new parliament and
the subsequent constituent
assembly. These requests will
undoubtedly be given serious
consideration by the government.
Army-government co-operation
is. :illustrated by the arrest of
the former minister of justice
on charges of. corruption, which
should not be hard to prove.
The army made the arrest with
the knowledge and approval of
the new minister, and it is
believed the outgoing finance
minister is also to be arrested
on charges of malfeasance in
office.
Opposition of the National
Party and the Communists to the
new government has not yet
crystallized. An official state-
meiiL of the National Party con-
ceded that the cabinet ought to
hold office for five months--
long enough to restore govern-
mental authority and carry out
the elections.
The Communists, who strongly
supported the All government to
the end, apparently have not yet
clearly charted a course of action
regarding the new government.
There have been reports of dis-
content within the party over
the united front policy, and
demands are increasing for. more
positive action, such as strikes
and demonstrations. The Commu-
nists, however, are undoubtedly
anxious to make a good showing
at the polls and may well re-
frain from "'direct action"
until after the elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
New Pakistani Cabinet
The weakness of the new
Pakistani government is evi-
dent in the fact that only
three major political leaders
have been given portfolios in
an 11-man cabinet. An offer to
H. S. Suhrawardy, popular and
able opposition leader, to join
the government remains open,
but he is unlikely to accept.
The only figures of note
in the cabinet sworn in on 12
August by Acting Governor Gen-
eral Iskander Mirza are Communi-
cations Minister Dr. Khan Sahib,
Interior Minister A. K. Fazlul
Huq, and Prime Minister Chaudri
Mohammad All.
Khan Sahib, who also holds
the portfolio for states and
frontier regions, is an elderly,
respected Pathan from the North-
west Frontier Province whose
more dynamic brother, Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, is leading the
opposition to creation of a
single province for all of West
Pakistan.
Fazlul Huq is head of the
United Front Party, whose agree-
ment to a coalition with the
Moslem League made the present
government possible.
Prime Minister Chaudri
Mohammad All at least temporarily
Afghan-Pakistani Situation
Negotiations between Af-
ghan foreign minister Naim and
Pakistani ambassador A. S. B.
Shah have reduced differences
in the dispute between the
two countries'to a single point
--whether or not Afghanistan
will refrain from propaganda
in favor of Pushtoonistan,
also holds the portfolios of
defense, foreign affairs,
economic affairs, and finance.
He is a competent and respected
administrator who commands the
devoted loyalty of the civil
service. Known as a devout
but liberal Moslem, he is the
personal choice of Mirza, and
has co-operated closely with
the West in foreign policy.
For several years his physical
condition has been uncertain
and his health is expected to
deteriorate under the pressure
of his new responsibilities.
The cabinet seems to have
been chosen mainly to approve
the actions of Mirza and,the
prime minister. Aside from Huq,
none of its members has any
political following.
Suhrawardy, head of the
Awami League, was offered the
post; of deputy prime minister
but has apparently decided to
lead the opposition. He and
the prime minister have ex-
changed public compliments and
the offer to Suhrawardy will
reportedly remain open for
another few days.
The loose Moslem League-
United Front coalition should
be able to muster a majority in
the Constituent Assembly. The
uncertainty as to where Huq
stands and as to whether he can
control the Front, as well as
the prospect of Suhrawardy's
skillful opposition, makes un-
certain the viabilit of the
present cabinet.
A Turkish offer to mediate
if the Pushtoonistan issue is
given up entirely has in effect
been rejected by Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's latest proposal
for mutual abandonment of propa-
ganda leading to "vilification
and hatred" without any refer-
ence to Pushtoonistan may lead
to eventual settlement,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 17EEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
An official of the Afghan
Ministry of Finance informed
the American embassy in Kabul
on 11 August that the USSR is
holding up shipments of badly
needed gasoline, kerosene, and
diesel fuel on the grounds that
settlement of the quarrel with
Pakistan, which made the Soviet
supplies essential, is imminent.
A known scarcity of POL
supplies in Kabul lends some
support to the report that the
USSR is holding back shipments.
Accordingly, fears that Prime
Minister Daud's problems would
be solved if he turned to the
USSR appear to have been re-
mature.
25X1
The French cabinet has in-
structed Resident General Grand-
val to pursue a policy in Moroc-
co which is contrary to the wishes
of the Moroccans but is designed
to conciliate the right wing of
the French cabinet. Rebel am-
bushes continue in Algeria and
a threatened general strike in
Tunisia has been postponed.
Morocco: On 12 August the
French ca inet in effect reject-
ed Grandval's recommendation,
as well as the petitions of a
growing number of French and
Moroccan organizations, that
Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa be re-
moved before the 20 August an-
niversary of the dethronement
of former sultan Mohamed ben
Youssef. The cabinet instructed
that Ben Arafa form a "repre-
sentative Moroccan government"
which would negotiate with Paris
for a reform program for Morocco.
Should this effort fail,
the cabinet might then consider
the formation of a regency,coun-
cil to carry on negotiations
while Ben Arafa remained on the
throne. Premier Faure estab-
lished a timetable, allowing
three days for Ben Arafa to in-
stall his new government and set-
ting 12 September as the absolute
deadline for establishment of a
negotiating body. The sultan,
however, has requested more
time in which to form a govern-
ment, which he indicated would
consist only of his supporters.
A residency spokesman in
Rabat has confirmed the belief
of American observers that the
request that Ben Arafa form a
government is a move by Faure
to convince rightist supporters
of Ben Arafa within the French
cabinet of the necessity for
eliminating the sultan. Faure
is certain that these ministers,
particularly Foreign Minister
Pinay, could be convinced by a
"demonstration" that the scheme
is unworkable.
Grandval is reported to have
resigned on 13 August but to
have later reconsidered and to
be willing to go through with the
maneuver.
American officials point
out that Moroccan nationalists
will'. be strengthened by Paris'
delaying tactic, and that the
maneuver may also result in a
serious loss of prestige for
Grandval, making the eventual
implementation of a reform pro-
gram more difficult.
Algeria: Rebel units con-
tinue tie-fir hit-and-run tactics
against military-scouts and con-
voys. Despite nearly a year's
experience in this type of war-
fare, the government's forces
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
remain highly susceptible to am-
bush.
A rebel cache containing
clothing of Egyptian origin,
revolvers, ammunition, and medi-
cal kits sufficient to equip
three platoons was recently dis-
covered in the Aures Mountains
in eastern Algeria. This dis-
covery may spur operations
against smuggling as well as
form the basis for new protests
to the Egyptian government.
Tunisia: A nationwide
strike sc a uled for 10 August
was called off by the pronation-
alist Tunisian General Labor
Union when its leaders recognized
that the economic distress of
the, country and widespread un-
employment were likely to be
aggravated rather than relieved
by hasty action.
The reaction of both French
officials and Tunisians to Secre-
tary Dulles' statement regarding
the French-Tunisian conventions
was favorable. A residency
spokesman remarked, however,
that the statement was likely to
be interpreted in Paris as evi-
dence that the United States
might shift its position in the
United Nations on the Moroccan
problem.
25X1
Rumors of Military Coup
continue in Brazil
Rumors and denials that a
coup d'etat is imminent in Brazil
continue as an aftermath of the
5 August speech by armed forces
chief of staff Gen. Canrobert
Pereira da Costa calling for mili-
tary unity and alertness as the
25X1 presidential election of 3 Octo-
ber draws closer.
President Cafe Filho and
most leading political figures
of all parties are on record
as opposed to any unconstitu-
tional solution of the presi-
dential succession, but news-
paper editor and congressman
Carlos Lacerda is publicly urg-
ing the military to call off
the elections.
The American embassy in
Rio de Janeiro reported on 10
August that the general public
was still apathetic toward the
election and the candidates,
and that sentiment in favor of a
military move seemed to be in-
creasing.in middle-class cir-
cles in Rio.
The Brazilian military
customarily regard themselves
as the guardians of constitu-
tional order and prefer to
leave politics to the politi-
cians. Their intervention in
the presidential campaign would
indicate a real fear that a
Kubitschek-Goulart victory is
likely.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 19555
If General Juarez Tavora,
the only moderate-conservative
candidate in the presidential
New Tension In Argentina
The Argentine government's
announcement on 15 August of
discovery of a plot to assas
sinate Peron and top army offi-
cials underscores the continuing
failure of official "pacifica-
tion" overtures and may presage
a sterner policy. Opposition
groups may respond with new
acts of resistance.
The announcement was made
in an atmosphere of continuing
antigovernment demonstrations,
hit-and-run attacks on the
police, and a new pamphlet cam-
paign urging peaceful resist-
ance by measures such as boy-
cotting commercial establish-
ments. On 14 August a church
declaration had urged Catholics
not to attend school or work
on the following day, the Feast
of the Assumption, which Peron
removed last March from the
list of legal holidays.
PART I I
forced.
race, can overtake Kubitschek's
lead, and win the election, the
military's hand will not be
25X1
25X1
In the government's commu-
nique announcing discovery of a
plot, retired military men were
implicated along with "Catholic
clergy, members of the Democratic
Party, nationalists,-and Com-
munists." The alleged leaders
were Mario Amadeo, a Catholic
leader who was also reported
involved in the 16 June revolt,
and Michel Torino, a Radical 25X1
leader and journalist, who sub-
sequently denied the charge.
The Peronista Party and
press are citing the alleged
plot as an example of the oppo-
sition's refusal to observe a
truce, Juan Cooke, a Peronista
leader in Buenos Aires, stated
on 15 August that Peronism must
be powerful and will again "go
on the street and hold public
functions." He said the party
would stage a "mobilization cam-
paign," and he appealed to those
who had left the party to return.
These new developments
point to the possible revival
of several measures which the
armed forces previously opposed,
including severe restrictions on
opposition parties and a strong
role for the Peronistas. More-
over,, new criticism of the ^hurch
is implied in the communique.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
The top military leaders, who
may also feel their lives
threatened by opposition plot-
ting, may now have to reassess
the impact such new measures
would have on the provincial
commanders and their other
supporters.
Army Minister Lucero re-
turned from a tour of army
posts in the provinces last
week. Because of "unsatis-
factory political conditions"
at some army posts, especially
in Mendoza, San Luis, Corrientes,
and Entre Rios, Lucero plans to
send other officers to visit the
provinces this month
25X1
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 19515
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BONN WEAKENING IN HIGHWAY TOLLS DISPUTE WITH.EAST GERMANY
The West 'German govern-
ment has recently modified the
selective embargo on exports to
East Germany which it imposed.
last spring as a means of com-
pelling the East German regime
to discontinue its harassment.
of West Berlin, Although this
harassment is continuing, the
West Germans appear reluctant
to press the toll issue at this
time, . evidently hoping. that
some solution to this problem
will be found during Chancellor
Adenauer's visit to Moscow in
September.
The West German cabinet,
possibly.under the pressure of
West German businessmen,. but
without prior consultation with
the Allied powers in-Bonn, de-
cided last month to permit de-
livery of certain embargoed
items in return for increased
East German exports of key com-
modities,, particularly brown
coal briquettes, Shipments of
hard coal and coke valued at
approximately $1,750,000 were
licensed in mid-July., and fur-
ther shipments are planned as
East German deliveries of brown
coal briquettes are received.
This Is a radical depar,
ture from Bonn's previous poligr
of ma.ifitaining cumulative pres-
sure on the East Germans un-
til they repeal the- excessive
increases in tolls on trucking
to West Berlin which were an-
nounced on 30 March 1955. Bonn
is, however, Still _ maintaining
its restrictions on the export
of'iron and steel products.
The toll increase was
evidently.... part of a Soviet East
German, strategy to make con-
tinued Western access to Berlin
so costly that -'West Germany
would have to pay the political
price of extending cue facto
recognition to the East German
regime by negotiating with it,
or else acquiesce in-this ad-
ditional step toward. the slow
economic strangulation of West
Berlin.
The West German cabinet,
somewhat reluctantly, responded
to the challenge by putting
into effect a selective embargo
on the export to East Germany
of.Ruhr iron, steel, and coke,
and concurrently broke off trade
negotiations.
West German and West Ber-
lin authorities also undertook
to compensate truckers for the
increase, in tolls. West German
officials even showed some signs
of willingness to pay the new
tolls indefinitely; they were
in general. agreement in princi-
ple that they should make some
.contribution to the upkeep of
those roads crossing East Ger-
many to Berlin that are used
for interzonal trade.
East German trade officials
rejected West German requests to
discuss the tolls in interzonal
trade negotiations, demanding
talks on the ministerial
level. Since Bonn,.has strongly
opposed granting this degree of
imp3licit recognition to the
East German government, West
German officials appealed to
the Western Allies to take up
the matter with the USSR.
At a four-power ambassa-
dors' conference.on 20 May,
Soviet ambassador Pushkin flatly
rejected the Allied argument
that the road tolls constituted
interference with access to
West Berlin and declared that
East. Germany as a "sovereign"
state was "master of its roads"
and had full authority to levy
taxes for their use. He urged
that representatives of East
and Nest Germany settle th* mat-
ter by direct negotiation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
18 August 1955
Solidly backed by the USSR,
East German officials sought to
force West Germany into nego-
tiations at the ministerial
level. They intensified har-
assing measures directed at
West Berlin by inaugurating.a
policy of seizing shipments of
metal scrap carried by trucks,
barges, or rail. At the same
time they announced "vigilance",
measures designed to curtail
access to West Berlin, claim-
ing these were necessary for
defense against espionage ac-
tivities directed against East
Germany from the "West Berlin
spy center."
Faced with these pressures
and Western reluctance to take
extreme retaliatory measures,
Bonn on 27 May partly capitulated
to East German demands for nego-
tiations and proposed that talks
be held between experts of the
two Transport Ministries. Al-
though Bonn acceded to demands
that the talks be held in East
Berlin, it insisted that this
did not imply any recognition of
the East German, regime..
Possibly in return for the
West German concession, East
Germany announced on 2 June that
the highway tolls would be some-
what reduced. The reduction for
freight trucks,.-however, was
negligible.
Negotiations between trans-
port experts to date have yielded
few results, although West Ger-
man officials are prepared to
offer an annual lump-sum pay-
ment of approximately $3,900,000
toward maintenance costs of high-
ways to Berlin, and if necessary
to raise the offer to $4,500,000.
They have also expressed a will-
ingness to consider concessions
to alleviate East German needs
for Western-manufactured rail-
road and truck spare parts.
There has been continuing
evidence that East Germany is
feeling the pinch of the em-
bargo on iron and steel products.
The first secretary of the
SECRET
Socialist Unity (Communist)
Party reported to the party
central committee on 2 June
.that shortages of iron and
steel would curtail expansion
of'the machine-building in-
dustry. Instead of carrying
out earlier threats to cut
deliveries of brown coal
briquettes, East German author-
ities have offered additional
quantities of briquettes in
exchange for larger amounts of
iron, steel, coke, and hard
coal.
American authorities in
Berlin feel that the East Ger-
man press campaign inaugurated
on 11 August for the resump-
tion of full-scale iron and
steel deliveries indicates con-
-tinued adverse effects of re-
duced shipments.
The East Germans are con-
tinuing their efforts to pres-
sure Bonn into further direct
contacts.in order to obtain a
measure of West German recog-
nition. When shipments of
live cattle to West Berlin
from Denmark via Warnemuende
were stopped by East Germany
last month, East German offi-
cials declared that the whole
matter could be settled easily
by official negotiations.
The East Germans are also
insisting that the West German
transport minister address a
letter to his East German
counterpart-authorizing his
technical experts to negotiate
the truck toll question. Bonn
has; been,reluctant to provide
such a letter, fearing that
the East Germans would exploit
it as an implication of West
German recognition of the
Pankow regime.
The interference with
access to West Berlin is con-
tinuing. In the second week
of July, East German seizures
of scrap shipments in transit
by barge, rail and truck be-
tween-West Berlin and West
Germany were resumed after a
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18 August 1955
week's lull, and have continued
into August. As of 25 July,
the value of scrap confiscated
and fines imposed since April
totaled over $202,000. The
West German scrap trade asso-
ciation is seeking guarantees
from the Bonn government to
compensate for fines paid, as
well as for the cost of con-
fiscated scrap, which is
covered only in part at pres-
ent.
East German authorities
have also extended measures to
bar East Germans from access to
West Berlin. A ban on travel
to West Berlin has been imposed
by forcing East Berliners to
sign pledges not to go to West
Berlin and threatening various
punishments for violation of
these pledges. The pledge cam-
paignTis now being extended to
ogler parts of East Germany.
At present, not only East
German government officials and
members of the Socialist Unity
Party and armed forces but also
employees of the East Berlin
municipality and state-owned
enterprises are barred from
West Berlin. West Berlin's
Mayor Suhr estimated on 4 Au-
gust that half of East Berlin's
labor force is now denied ac-
cess to West Berlin.
25X1
SEPARATISM THREATENS STABILITY OF PAKISTAN
The problem of separatism
is again becoming acute in
Pakistan. In East Pakistan,
resentment against the central-
ization policy of Karachi ap-
pears to be building up. In
West Pakistan, the proposal to
merge all provinces into one
unit is strongly opposed, es-
pecially in the Northwest Fron-
tier Province.
A major clash on these is-
sues will probably occur in the
Constituent Assembly. The
shaky new political arrange-
ment set up by Acting Governor
General Iskander Mirza and
Prime Minister Chaudri Mohammad
Ali is not likely to be able
to take any constructive ac-
tion on these problems.
Densely populated East
Pakistan has 55 percent of the
country's total population and
is separated from West Pakistan
by 1,000 miles of Indian
territory. Its language,
Bengali, is unrelated to West
Pakistan's Urdu and its cul-
tural and racial background
is quite different, although
both regions share the religion
of Islam. East Pakistan's
economy depends on jute rather
than cotton; the food of the
people is rice and fish rather
than wheat and meat. West
Pakistan's close orientation
toward the Middle East in
political and cultural affairs
is not shared by the eastern
wing of the country.
The recently restored
East Pakistani provincial gov-
ernment of Chief Minister Abu
Hussain Sarkar is controlled
by A. K. Faziul Huq, whose
separatist tendencies and mal-
administration last year forced
Karachi to take over direct
rule of the province. Huq is
a member of the new central
cabinet of Prime Minister
Chaudri Mohammad All, but he
was unable to bring with him
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25X1
the support of important ele-
ments of his united Front Party.
This, as well as the fact that
contrary to tradition neither
Pakistan's new governor general
nor its new prime minister is
a Bengali, will probably add to
the local suspicion that East
Pakistan is being run by and
exploited for the benefit of
West Pakistan.
Within East Pakistan, a
conflict is already apparent
SUBSISTENCE EXPORT
46 Rice Q Jute'..
4( Fish
EAST PAKISTAN
TOTAL POPULATION: 42,062,610
between the popularly elected
East Pakistani government and
West Pakistani administrative
officials appointed by Karachi.
East Pakistan has been the
center of Communist activity
in Pakistan since 1947. The
Communist Party of East Bengal,
unlike its West Pakistan coun-
terpart, is in close contact
with the well-organized Commu-
nist Party of India, The East
Pakistan party has identified
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18 August 1955
itself closely with Bengali
cultural and political aspira-
tions. One known Communist
was elected to the Central
Constituent Assembly on 21 June,
though he ran as an independent:
Chief Minister Sarkar has al-
ready released 450 political
prisoners, most of them pro-
fessional leftist agitators
who were jailed last year when
Karachi imposed direct rule.
Most political figures in
East Pakistan, including Fazlul
Huq, are either dubious about,
or openly opposed to, Pakistan's
close ties with the West. Mau-
lana Bashani, reactionary re-
ligious leader who heads the
important Awami League in East
Pakistan, is outspokenly anti-
American and has had frequent
Communist contacts. Some lo-
cal politicians favor a rap-
prochement. with India and
adherence to a policy of neu-
tralism in foreign affairs.
East Pakistan feels its
majority population should be
reflected in majority repre-.
sentation in the central gov-
ernment. It supports a parlia-
mentary form of government _
rather than one which gives in-
dependent power to an executive
governor general or president.
This old issue will be fought
out again in the new Constitu-
ent Assembly.
Some Bengalis may attempt
to defeat the government's plan
for a two-unit state, i.e.,
East and West Pakistan, by
alignment with opposition groups
in West Pakistan. The price of
Fazlul Huq's support of Mirza.
and Chaudri Mohammad Ali's gov-
ernment is likely to-include
increased influence and autonomy
for East Pakistan.
The present three provinces
and eight lesser units of West
Pakistan are based on natural
ethno-political divisions--some
have existed in their present
form for more than a century.
They conform closely to the
four major and several minor
dialects and languages of a
population of several distinct,
but closely related, cultures.
The common language, Urdu, is
widely known and accepted but
is not a common mother tongue.
The essential similarity of
all the groups within West
Pakistan, however, is in strik-
ing contrast to the dissimilar-
ity of the whole to East Paki-
stan.
The "one-unit" plan is the
brain child of the group of civil
and military administrators now
in control of the government.
It'has always been unpopular in
the states and smaller provinces
of West Pakistan which fear
that it will subordinate their
interests to those of the domi-
nant Punjab. Significantly,
the governments of all three
provinces have been overturned
by Karachi for reasons directly
or,indirectly connected with
opposition to the "one-unit"
concept, since former governor
.general Ghulam Mohammad took
over direction of the govern-
ment last October.
The "one-unit" bill was
introduced in the Constituent
Assembly on 8 August. The
depth of antagonism to the plan
had become apparent a thonth
earlier when Frontier Province
chief minister Abdur Rashid,
until then a devoted follower
of 'the central ruling group,
announced his opposition to
liquidation of the Northwest
Frontier Province. As a re-
sult of Rashid's provocative
statements in the Constituent
Assembly, he was dismissed.
At the same time, Iskander
Mirza, then interior minister ,
unadvisedly lifted the ban which
had kept Abdul-Ghaffar Khan,
leader of the once powerful
"Red Shirt" movement for pro-
vincial autonomy, from enter-
ing the Frontier Province since
1948. Ghaffar Khan trium-
phantly returned and was greeted
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18 August 1955
by a crowd of 100,000 at Pesha-
war. He immediately began
organizing opposition to mer-
ger of the province.
The virile character of
the Pathan population of the
Frontier Province makes the
situation explosive. Most Pa-
thans carry arms and civil dis-
turbances are a real possibil-
ity. Ghaffar Khan, known in
pre-partition India as "the
Frontier Gandhi," is an expert
demagogue pleading a popular
cause. The central government
has for a year and a half tried
unsuccessfully to win him over,
even nominating his brother,
Dr. Khan Sahib, as chief minis-
t e r. of the proposed single-
unit province of West Pakistan.
Under present conditions, an
attempt to arrest Ghaffar Khan
on his home ground might touch
off violent resistance.
Formal establishment of a
single province in West Paki-
stan will mean the end of.the
traditional special status
accorded to the tribes of the
border hills in their own terri-
tory. Pakistan will then have
to face the problem of how to
control 2,500,000 people who
have never before accepted for-
mal law. Development within
Pakistan of a Pathan autonomy
movement will also inevitably
handicap Pakistani opposition
to Afghanistan's long-standing
demand for establishment of an
independent state of Pushtoon-
Istan.
Thus, the government in
Karachi faces twin tasks: (1)
establishment of a harmonious
working relationship between
East and West Pakistan; and (2)
enactment and implementation of
the one-unit plan or tactful
abandonment of it in favor of
some other scheme. Until prog-
ress is made on these problems,
Pakistan is unlikely to be able
to achieve political stability,
regardless of changes in top
25X1
positions and the good intentions
of its leaders.
NEW POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS DEVELOPING IN:GREECE
As the conservative Greek
Rally of Prime Mini ster,Papagos
gradually weakens, intensified
maneuvers of its leaders for
alliances to ensure their polit-
Ic al survival are developing
new alignments.
The effectiveness of the
Rally, which has given Greece
more than two years of the sta-
blist government it has enjoyed
since the beginning of World War
II, appears to be almost ended.
Papagos, the only one capable
of holding the Rally together,
is in declining health and un-
able to perform his duties.
The government gained
considerable momentum in 1953
and early 1954 when it restored
confidence in the currency by
revaluation and trade liberali-
zation, secured substantial
foreign credits for internal
economic development and in-
creased its external security
through defense arrangements
with the United States, Turkey
and Yugoslavia. Starting with
the resignation in April 1953
of the Rally's chief economic
planner and spark plug, former
co-ordination minister Marke-
zinis, that momentum has been
dissipated and the government's
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18 August 1955
actions have aroused increasing
dissatisfaction.
The American embassy in
Athens reports considerable
sentiment in favor of a new
alliance which would cut across
traditional lines and break
away from the antiquated foun-
dations of the present par-
ties. Supporters of the new
party concept, both in the Rally
and the opposition, believe that
the leaders of the present par-
ties are largely discredited.
They think the country needs new
political faces and a program
responsive to current problems,
particularly in the economic
sphere, where the Rally's poli-
cies have not matured to the
benefit of the people as -a
whole. Such a new party would
probably be nationalist in tone
and less receptive to American
influence than the Rally, al-
though it would retain firm
Greek ties with the West.
Constantine Karamanlis,
capable minister of communica-
tions and public works, is a
strong proponent of a new party
and its probable leader if it
materializes. Karamanlis has
a real popular following,,aris-
ing primarily from his connection
with road-building and communicar
tions expansion programs which
have been of immediate.benefit
to large parts of the popula-
tion.,
The president of parlia-
ment, Constantine Rodo.poulos,
who reportedly considers him-
self the key to holding the
Rally together after'Papagos is
gone, favors the new-party idea,
as does Panagiotis Pipinell.is,
King Paul's unofficial political
adviser, who has been opposed
to the Rally. The palace also
is reported to be sympathetic
to a possible political com-
bination headed by Karamanlis,
whom it considers the. best
qualified candidate to succeed
Papagos.
Liberal Party leaders, ex-
cept party chief George Papand-
dreou, would probably join in
forming a new party led by
Karamanlis and his associates,
especially since their party
has become divided and in-
effective. A large segment of
the Rally would likewise be
receptive, leaving the small
followings of Foreign Minister
Ste,phanopoulos, Defense Minister
Kanellopoulos and others to make
whatever alliances they could.
Karamanlis is reported to
have stated that he would ac-
cept a call by the king to form
a provisional government in the
eventfof Papagos' death or re-
tirement. His government would
consist of both Rally members
and right-wing Liberals. He
would want to keep this govern-
ment in office for about four
or.five months, long enough to
prove the new concept and to
gain popular confidence, prob-
ably by taking vigorous steps
to reverse the inflationary
trend and speed up economic
development. Then he would be
ready to seek a mandate from
the people. For, the elections,
Karamanlis would introduce new
personalities from all over the
country as future leaders in
his government.
Behind the trend toward
a new political combination is
a growing feeling among moder-
ates that something must soon
be done to sto.p,the drift of
popular support toward the new-
ly formed Liberal Democratic
union of former Liberal leader
Sophocles Venizelos. His party
is composed of defectors from
the Liberal Party and the de-
clining National Progressive
Union of the Center (EPEK).
In an election, however, it
would probably also be sup-
ported by the remnants of EPEK,
the small Democratic Party,
and very likely the Communist-
dominated United Democratic
Left--approximating the popular
front which was successful in
the municipal elections of 1954.
Venizelos' recent public
statements are increasingly
neutralist and sympathetic to
domestic Communist "pacification"
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