CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001100070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

WCUM ? NO.
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OCI NO. 0056/57
31 January 1957
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CO N FI ENTIAL
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794; THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
THE ALGERIAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The widely heralded Moslem general strike in Algeria,
which began on 28 January, appears to be subsiding but
may be resumed in full force when the UN General Assembly
begins its debate on Algeria next week. In France, the
victory of moderate rightist elements in a recent by-
election is likely to increase pressure on Premier Mollet
to make his Algerian program more palatable to the
conservatives in the National Assembly.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Egypt and Israel are resisting diplomatic pressure
for modification of their stands on the Gaza and Gulf of
Agaba.issues. The UN debate not having produced a
solution thus far, attempts are being made to proceed
by bilateral negotiations, such as those India is re-
ported undertaking in Cairo.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
VISIT OF IRAQI CROWN PRINCE ABD AL-ILAH . . . . . . . . Page 1
Iraqi crown prince Abd al-Ilah, whose visit to the
United States coincides with that of King Saud, exerts
much behind-the-scenes influence on his country's
political affairs. Since the Suez Canal intervention,
Iraq has been playing down its relationship with Britain
and has been turning toward the United States. Abd al-Ilah
will probably seek larger American military assistance',
especially for the Iraqi air force, and will attempt to
persuade the United States to join the Baghdad pact.
KASHMIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The UN Security Council resolution of 24 January re-
newing the earlier call for a plebiscite in Kashmir was
met with satisfaction in Pakistan and with deep hostility
in India. However, India is unlikely to resort to armed
action.
CON I '---I
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31 January 1957
CYPRUS: THE TURKISH POSITION AT THE UN . . . . . . . . Page 3
Turkey will enter the forthcoming UN General Assembly
debate on Cyprus determined to prevent an extension of
Greek sovereignty to the island, from which Turkey's
southern coastline and defense bases could be dominated.
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
President Sukarno, in a speech on 27 January, appealed
directly to the public for support of his assumption of
a more powerful role in the Indonesian government, and
indicated he would continue to emphasize a unitary rather
than a federal state. Military and political relations
between Djakarta and Sumatra remain at an impasse, and
political parties are resuming agitation for a major
cabinet shake-up.
NENNI SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Nenni Socialist Party congress scheduled for
6-10 February is expected to concern itself largely with
the question of whether the party should maintain ties
with the Communists or unite with the Saragat Socialists,
who are at present part of Italy's coalition government.
Any Socialist reunification would have a decisive effect
on the position of other parties and probably would lead
to readjustments in the composition of the Italian
cabinet.
FORTHCOMING SUPREME SOVIET MEETING . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The meeting of the Supreme Soviet scheduled to open
in Moscow on 5 February will consider the government's
1957 state budget and perhaps the 1957 economic plan. One
or more of the top leaders may spew on economic policy
and political matters, such as the ferment among Soviet
students and intellectuals, and Soviet policy toward the
Middle East.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
SOVIET LEADERS TOUR THE PROVINCES . . . . .. . . . . . . Page 7
In the past two weeks, top Soviet leaders have made
quick trips to outlying districts of the USSR to present
Order of Lenin awards to 14 republics, oblasts and krais
for their outstanding achievements in agriculture during
1956. The extensive publicity accorded the visits and
the wide range of subjects covered in the speeches suggest
that the members of the collective leadership desire to
make a show of their personal concern for the welfare of
the people and to arouse enthusiasm for the regime's
policies-on current economic and international problems.
CHOU-RESUMES ASIAN TOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Back in Asia after visits to Moscow and the troubled
Satellites, Chou En-lai has resumed his efforts to per-
suade the neutral nations that Peiping is the champion
of Asian-African freedom and solidarity, devoted to the
ca
use of peace and deserving of international acceptance.
F__ 1
ZHUKOV VISIT TO INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Soviet defense minister Zhukov's principal task on
his visit to India probably is to repair the damage to
Soviet-Indian relations caused by Indian "misunder-
standings" of Soviet actions in Hungary. Soviet sympathy
and support for India's claims to Kashmir may help over-
come this coolness, although Zhukov's bitter attacks on
American policy appear to have embarrassed his hosts.
CHINESE COMMUNIST YOUTH DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS . . . . . . Page 10
Peiping newspapers and radio broadcasts have recently
taken issue with what they describe as a trend toward
irresponsible behavior among Chinese middle school stu-
dents and young factory workers. These comments may re-
flect official concern lest student unrest become a
p
roblem in China as it recently has in the USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
INTELLECTUAL DISSATISFACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA . , . ,
Intellectual dissatisfaction reminiscent of the early
stirrings of discontent in Hungary and Poland has recently
flared into the open in Czechoslovakia. The authors'
union weekly has criticized the destructive effects of the
Socialist system on both the individual and society, and
its editor has pleaded for understanding for "progressive"
writers. The regime may have to resort to repressive
measures in an attempt to ensure conformity.
THE EAST GERMAN REFUGEE PROBLEM .
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During 1956, a steady flow of refugees to the West
continued to deplete East Germany's manpower resources.
The 1956 total of 279,488 is the second highest for any
year since 1949, when accurate records were first kept.
More than 3,000,000 persons, about 17 percent of the
population, have left East Germany since the end of World
War II. The loss particularly of skilled technicians
seriously interferes with the regime's plans to increase
industrial and agricultural production. F__ I 25X1
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MEETINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page '13
In an attempt to enforce unity and discipline in the
Communist camp, Moscow apparently has been promoting a
series of meetings of Sino-Soviet bloc government and
party leaders. The latest issue of the Soviet theoretical
journal, Kommunist, opposes "a return to all forms of
centralized organ nation" such as the Cominform or Comin-
tern, but supports "international meetings of represent-
atives of the various Communist parties" strengthen
international Communist unity. 25X1
CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Prince Sihanouk is finding it increasingly difficult
to maintain undisputed leadership in Cambodia. Dissatis-
faction with his rule has apparently spread through his
own political organization, the Sangkum. There is deep-
ening concern among Cambodian leaders over Sihanouk's
encouragement of close contacts with the Communist bloc.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
STATUS OF THE TOP SOVIET LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Relationships within the top Soviet hierarchy have
increasingly become the subject of speculation. in Moscow.
According to some reports, important changes are to be
made at the Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for 5 Feb-
ruary. Throughout the crises which arose in the past year,
in connection with the de-Stalinization campaign and the
events in Hungary and Poland, Khrushchev has shown flexi-
bility in adapting himself to new circumstances--includ-
ing reversals in some of his policies.
THE NILE WATER CONFLICT BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, . , Page 6
In the conflict between Egypt and the Sudan over
the disposition of the Nile waters, Cairo claims rights
to a greater portion of water than Khartoum is willing
to acknowledge and wants a larger share of any surplus
resulting from the construction of new works on the
river. The Sudan is not immediately in need of more water;-,
but, in order to forestall Egypt's de facto acquisition of
additional water rights,desires a final determination of
the shares each nation is to receive before any new con-
WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Under revised rearmament plans, the West German
government plans to have 135,000 men in uniform by the
end of 1957 and seven divisions ready for combat by mid-
1958. The new figures are a downward revision from an
earlier NATO-approved goal of 270,000 by the end of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
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31 January 1957
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE ALGERIAN SITUATION
The widely heralded Moslem
general strike in Algeria,
which began on 28 January,
appears to be subsiding but may
be resumed in full force when
the UN General Assembly begins
its debate on Algeria next
month. In France, the victory
of moderate rightist elements
in a recent by-election is
believed likely to increase
pressure on Premier Mollet to
make his Algerian program more
palatable to the conservatives
in the National Assembly.
The strike, launched by
the National Liberation Front
(FLN) in anticipation that the
United Nations would take up
the Algerian item this week,
was most effective in the
capital and in eastern cities,
where up to 100 percent of the
Moslem population reportedly
co-operated from the outset.
Elsewhere the strike was less
widely observed. .
In France, where there are
nearly 500,000 Algerian labor-
ers, 60 to 70 percent responded
in the Paris area and about 25
percent in the provinces.
The strike did not have
severe paralyzing effects any-
where, however, as essential
services in Algeria were main-
tained by Europeans with the
aid of military personnel and
convicts. Elaborate security
precautions were taken by the
French administration. As the
week progressed, a back-to-work
movement began, but as of 30
January, the bulk of Moslem
workers in the Algiers area
was still on strike;
Although there was a spate
of bombings and assassinations
as well as two large frontier
engagements in Algeria last
week end, neither the increased
urban terrorism nor the large-
scale military offensive which
the rebels reportedly planned
to co-ordinate with the strike
materialized. Such attacks may
be timed to coincide with the
UN debate, now scheduled to
begin on 4 February, when the
strike presumably will be
intensified. The American
consul general in Algiers be-
lieves that the nationalist
leaders are prepared to sacrifice
thousands of lives in an effort 25X1
to ensure UN intervention.
The temper of the local
Europeans is such that any
marked increase of terrorism
is likely to provoke them into
all-out reprisals against the
Moslems. If this situation
can be averted however, and
the UN debate is terminated
speedily on terms not favorable
to France, some French officials
now feel that the FLN will soon
agree to negotiate a cease-fire
on the basis of Premier Mollet's
9 January "declaration of in-
tention."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
Algiers' Mayor Chevallier,
who has been persuaded that
Algerian independence is inev-
itable, recently told the Amer-
ican consul general that the
FLN realizes the Mollet pro-
posals contain "the guarantees
of power and independence," but
that extremists want France to
lose face in the UN before ac-
cepting them.
The 27 January by-election
in Paris indicated that the
electorate supports the govern-
ment's policy for Algeria. Al-
though the defeat suffered
by the French extremists reduces
the immediate fears of an at-
tack on French parliamentary
institutions, such fears would
revive following an unfavorable
resolution in the UN or large-
scale uprisings inAlgeria.
Mallet still faces dif-
ficulty, however, since the
moderate right considers itself
the principal victor in the
election. The American embassy
anticipates pressure on Mollet
to make changes in his Algerian
policy, particularly to quality
the offer of voting equality
for Europeans and Moslems.
Mollet probably hopes to offset
such pressure by taking a
strong position, in the UN de-
fending France's role in Algeria
and rejecting UN interference.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt and Israel are re-
sisting diplomatic-pressure for
modification of. their stands on..,
the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba is-
sues. Egyptian foreign minister
Fawzi objects to proposals to
station UN troops in Gaza and
at the entrance to the gulf on
the ground that this would re-
ward Israeli aggression.
Pressure on Egypt does not
seem likely to get very far in
the immediate future. A member
of the Indian UN delegation re-
ports that his government has
been pressing hard-to-get Egypt
to adopt a "reasonable atti-
tude." However, the Indians
have found Cairo willing to go
no further than a three-point
scheme calling for withdrawal
of forces, reaffirmation of the
armistice agreement which Israel
claims has lapsed, and deploy-
ment of the UNEF along both
sides of the Egyptian-Israeli
armistice line. This does not
appear to be any advance over
the earlier Egyptian position.
The last point, included in
Hammarskjold's report, was also
raised earlier by Nasr.
Egypt's firmness is sup-
ported by other members of the
Asian-African bloc in the UN,
but there seems to be signifi-
cant "go slow" sentiment mixed
with this support. The Egyp-
tians, themselves do not appear
anxious for immediate drastic
UN action against Israel; they
have no specific suggestions as
to how to get the Israelis to
withdraw, although the Cairo
press, in its usual bellicose
tones, threatens that Egypt
might have to take the matter
into its own hands.
Israeli intransigence is
illustrated by Tel Aviv's state-
ment that it is unable to under-
stand the UN secretary general's
report on the withdrawal problem.
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31 January 1957
The Israelis are strengthened
by the backing of France--the
only nation to vote with them
against the UN resolution
calling for full evacuation.
A French Foreign Ministry offi-
cial last week said Israel was
requesting additional arms,
especially artillery, from
France. He predicted that
Israel would obtain French fi-
nancing for` its projected pipe-
line from the Gulf of Aqaba to
the Mediterranean.
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The Israelis apparently
do not expect that their stand
will result in any military
operations against them in the
near future. Their army's.,
active strength is now es-
timated at 65,000, including
paramilitary units--a figure
which marks a new low level for
Israel's forces. The army re-
mains capable, however, of mobi-
lizing its full strength of
200,000 men in 24 to 48 hours.
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 31 January 1957
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
VISIT OF IRAQI CROWN PRINCE ABD AL-ILAH
Prince Abd al-Ilah, both
ex-regent of Iraq and heir pre-
sumptive, whose visit to the
United States coincides with
that of King Saud, exerts con-
siderable influence over Iraq's
political affairs.
The objectives of Abd
al-Ilah's trip are manifold.
He principally wished to de-
termine the relationship of
the Baghdad pact to the
American proposals for the
Middle East and hopes to per-
suade the United States to join
the pact.
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Iraq is in a unique posi-
tion among the Arab states. As
the only Arab member of the pact,
it is isolated from its Arab
neighbors and-has become the
target of a propaganda campaign
carried on by Egypt and Syria,
Iraq's economy and vast develop-
ment plans depend on its oil
royalties, which have been cut
drastically as a result of
Syria's demolition of the pipe-
line. Syria, along with Egypt,
is exploiting the cutting off
of oil to force Iraq to sever
its ties with the pact.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
Since the Suez Canal in-
tervention4 Iraq has been turn-
ing toward the United States
and has been playing down its
relationship with Britain.
Abd al-Ilah will probably seek
larger American military assist-
ance, especially for the Iraqi
air force. 25X1
kASHMIR
The UN Security Council
resolution of 24 January re-
newing its earlier call for a
plebiscite in Kashmir was met
with satisfaction in Pakistan
but with strong opposition in
India..
India's belligerent atti-
tude is also reflected in
Krishna Menon's statement to
Ambassador Lodge on 24 January
that there is danger of Paki-
stani "fedayeen" attacks in
Kashmir and that if they occur
he favors taking over all of
Pakistan. Concurrently, the
Indian prbss has lashed out at
"the interested and mischievous
role" played by Britain and the
United States throughout
bitterness and isolation pre-
vailing in New Delhi.
The Indian attitude is
likely to become more extreme
in an attempt to discourage fur-
ther UN action on Kashmir. New
Delhi is adamant in opposing
any form of a plebiscite--
which it would probably lose
because of the 77-percent Moslem
majority in Kashmir. Addition-
ally, a few extremists who have
never accepted partition of the
subcontinent would probably
welcome an incident in Kashmir
as an excuse to launch an all-
out attack to reincorporate
Pakistan.
However, India, which al-
ready controls most of Kashmir,
is unlikely at present to ini-
tiate hostilities--especially
in view of Nehru's preoccupation
with the Indian national elec-
tions which begin late in Febru-
ary. Pakistan is equally un-
likely to take violent action
as long as it continues to re-
ceive UN support, although the
possibility remains that irre-
sponsible Kashmiri or tribal
elements on either side may
provoke disturbances in order
to force Karachi and New Delhi
to act.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
CYPRUS: THE TURKISH POSITION
Turkey will enter the
forthcoming UN General Assembly
debate on Cyprus determined
that under no circumstances
must the way be opened for an
extension of Greek sovereignty
to the island, from which Tur-
key's southern coastline and
defense bases could be domi-
nated. Ankara claims that
Greek opposition to partition
of Cyprus proves that Greece
invented the self-determination
scheme for Cyprus "to camouflage
its struggle to annex the is-
land." The Turks insist that
if there is to be any change in
the status of Cyprus, they must
have troops on the island to
safeguard the security of the
Turkish mainland.
Turkey will accept any of
three possible alternatives:
(1) Britain to retain absolute
sovereignty; (2) self-govern-
ment for Cyprus accompanied by
the continuation of British
base rights, with enosis pre-
cluded after the pattern of the
proh.ib+i.tion of a German-Austrian
An,schluss; or (3) self-govern-
ment for Cyprus, after all ter-
rorism ceases, with eventual
partition of the island and with
military bases either retained
by Britain or placed under.NATO
control.. Turkey views'the idea
of partition as the best of a
number of unsatisfactory solu-
tions.
Turkey sees the necessity
of demonstrating a willingness
to compromise on the Cyprus
issue and has therefore aban-
doned its demand for retention
of the status quo in favor of
self-government and eventual
partition of the island, pos-
sibly to be accompanied by
demands for a simultaneous
readjustment of the Greek-
Turkish border on the European
mainland.
During the forthcoming
General Assembly debate, Turkey
will undoubtedly align itself
with Britain, unless it believes
London is willing to accept a
compromise that would violate
Turkish interests. The Turkish
delegation may be expected to
be reserved until Greek strategy
becomes apparent.
Turkey opposes the idea
of a UN fact-finding committee
for Cyprus for fear of Soviet
participation. It would prefer
a more general UN resolution
merely calling for continued
negotiations or an agreement
by the disputants to submit
the controversy to the North
Atlantic Council, where the
issue woula ae removed from
possible Soviet machinations
and where Turkey would have a
veto over recommendations.
D
Indonesia's President Su-
karno has taken another step
to promote his plan to estab-
lish a powerful "advisory coun-
cil" which, under his personal
leadership, would control all
Indonesian affairs. In a speech
to a Communist-organized mass
meeting in Bandung on 27 Janu-
ary, he appealed directly to
the public to support his as-
sumption of a more powerful
role in the government.
Although he withheld spe-
cific proposals "until later,"
Sukarno strongly criticized
Indonesia's provisional
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31 January 1957
constitution and basic laws as
unsuitable for Indonesia's
national development. He said
he had in mind a transitional
administration which would
bridge the gap between the pres-
ent. "unsatisfactory" situation
and the completion of the new
permanent constitution some two
years or more hence. He indi-
cated that his own concept would
continue to emphasize a unitary
rather than a federal state.
Sukarno's appeal to the
public over the heads of the
political parties--who dislike
certain aspects of his propos-
al--appears to be the beginning
of an all-out campaign to build
mass support for his scheme.
The successful implementation
of his plans depends, however,
on the restoration of a sem-
blance of army headquarters'
control in Sumatra, since uni-
fied army support is essential.
Military and political re-
lations between Djakarta and
Sumatra continue deadlocked.
The army chief of staff, General
Nasution, has traveled to
Sumatra to seek a satisfactory
settlement. He reportedly has
talked individually with all
principal officers, including
Colonel Simbolon, rebel com-
mander in North Sumatra. They
then held a formal military
conference, which opened in
Palembang on 29 January. No
immediate solution may be ex-
pected to result from these
conversations.
In view of the slow devel-
opment of Sukarno's plans,
various political part....es have
been encouraged to resume
agitation for a major cabinet
shake-up. The Christian Party
has decided again to suggest
the cabinet's resignation, and
the Nahdlatul Ulama--the key to
cabinet survival--reportedly
has decided to call for a re-
shuffle. Parliamentary debate
on the cabinet's handling of
Sumatra began on 28 January
and will continue for two weeks,
probably ending in a vote of
confidence.
The Nenni Socialist Party
congress scheduled for 6-10 Feb-
ruary is expected to concern
itself largely with the con-
troversial question of main-
taining ties with the Communists
or reuniting with the .4aragat
Socialists, who are at present
part of Italy's coalition
government. Because Socialist
reunification, if achieved, is
widely expected to have exten-
sive effects on the position of
other parties, particularly the
Communist, the Nenni party
meeting is for the time being
the dominating event on the
Italian political scene, with
a possible cabinet showdown
being postponed till the outcome
of the congress is known.
Terms set by Saragat's
Democratic Socialists last
September call for a clean
break with the Communists as
a precondition, and the pro-
Communist wing of Nenni's party
consequently opposes reunifica-
tion. It is not yet clear how
much congress support can be
marshaled against this group
by Nenni's supporters who favor
reunification, because by 27
January only about one quarter
of the provincial federations
had chosen delegates to the
congress.
The federation in :Rome,
however, elected a proreunifi-
cation delegation, an
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31 January 1957
Nenni believes he now has the
support of 35 percent of the
party. He sees another 15,
percent as close to his posi-
tion, while 30 percent favor
the pro-Communists, and the
remainder of the party is
undecided. Pierre Commin, the
acting secretary general of
the French Socialist Party,
who sponsored the negotiations
between Nenni and Saragat last
fall and is attending the Feb-
ruary congress, believes Nenni
will get a majority of 60 to
70 percent of the delegates.
If the congress drafts a
statement on reunification
which meets Saragat's terms
for a merger, the Democratic
Socialists are expected to
speed up their own congress
and subsequently to leave the
cabinet. Even if the Nenni
congress drafts only an equiv-
ocal. resolution, the Segni
government may be jeopardized
by the withdrawal of the
Democratic Socialists. They
now find themselves at odds
with their Christian Democratic
and Liberal Party colleagues
in the coalition over the pro-
visions of the bill regulating
agrarian contracts, and over
the selection of the new min-
ister for state participation
in enterprises.
The Communists have already
indicated their concern over
the possibilities of a Social-
ist merger. On 2U January,
party chief Togliatti attacked
the moves toward Socialist
unification as "harmful and
dangerous" to the working class,
and declared that if it hap-
pened, his party would "ener-
getically work" on the side of
those against reunification in
Nenni's party.
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31 January 1957
25X6
FORTHCOMING SUPREME SOVIET MEETING
The meeting of the Supreme
Soviet scheduled to open in
Moscow on 5 February will con-
sider the government's 1957
state budget, and perhaps the
1957 economic plan. One or more
of the top leaders may speak on
economic policy and political
matters such as the ferment
among Soviet students and
intellectuals or Soviet policy
toward the Middle East.
Present evidence tends to
discount rumors recently cir-
culating in Moscow that another
meeting of the party central
committee will be held before
the Supreme Soviet convenes, or
that important changes within
the leadership are in the off-
ing. (See PART III, p. 1. )
Marshal Zhukov, who as a candi-
date member of the party presid-
ium would probably be required
to attend a plenum, arrived in
New Delhi on 24 January for a
visit of two weeks or more in
connection with India's inde-
pendence anniversary celebra-
tions. Another presidium
candidate, N. A. Mukhitdinov,
left Moscow on 19 January for
a 10-day visit to Iran.
Much of the speculation
concerning personnel changes
has centered around the possi-
bility that Voroshilov, one of
the remaining "Old Bolsheviks,"
will be retired as titular head
of state (chairman of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet)
and that Premier Bulganin will
be given the essentially honor-
ary post. It was announced on
22 January, however, that Voro-
shilov will make a state visit
to Peiping in April, which tends
to discount the rumor.
Statements of Soviet
leaders and the Moscow press
since the December meeting of
the central committee have al-
ready given some guidelines of
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31 January 1957,
the new budget 'and annual eco-
nomic plan--the.compilation of
which has probably involved at
least tentative decisions on
adjustments in the Sixth Five-
Year .Plan (1956-1960). The
continued primacy of heavy
industry has been frequently
restated. Additional commit-
ments to increase hbusing con-,
struction and improve consumer
welfare in general have been
promised, however, and high
priority for agriculture,
including the relatively un-
successful'corn program, is to
continue. .Lastly, much emphasis
has been placed on the inten-
tion to maintain all major
goals of the Sixth Five-Year.
Plan through better planning
and management, and by increas-
ing labor productivity.
In the housing field,
Party Life, an authoritative
journal of the central commit-
tee, has editorialized that
housing presently requires the
same kind of "national attention
previously given the new lands
program," according to"the
American embassy. Mme. Furtseva,
candidate presidium member, is
reported to have said that the
Moscow area housing allocation
will increase about 22 percent
in 1957.
A redirection of industrial
investment will probably be
ordered by the plan for 1957,
with an accompanying reduction
of new starts in industrial con-
struction in order, to concen-
trate resources on completing
important projects. In addi-
tion, a reduction in the total
volume of investment this year
is possible as part of a re-
scheduling of the five-year
25X1
investment plan.
(Prepared jointly with ORR
SOVIET LEADERS TOUR THE PROVINCES
In the past two weeks top
Soviet leaders have made fly-
ing trips to outlying districts
of the USSR to present Order
of Lenin awards to 14 republics,
oblasts and'krais for their
outstanding achievements in
agriculture during 1956. The
extensive publicity accorded
the visits and the wide range
of subjects covered in the
speeches suggest that'the mem-
bers of the collective leader-
ship took this opportunity to
demonstrate personally their
concern for the welfare of the
people and to arouse enthusiasm
for Soviet policies on current
economic and international
problems.
The speeches had several
themes in common: they played
up the agricultural achieve-
ments of the areas visited as
glowing examples for the rest.
of the USSR.; lauded recent
government concessions to the
citizenry, such as increased
pensions and shorter working'
hours; stressed the need for
greater vigilance and unity in
the face of a "resurgence of
reactionary imperialism" in
the West; condemned "Western
aggression" in the, Middle East,
particularly the recent American
proposals; and re-emphasized
the growing solidarity of the
"socialist" camp.
Officials participating
included all full members of
the presidium with the excep-
tion of Pervukhin, Saburov and
Ririchenko, several members of
the party secretariat, and
former politburo member Andrei
Andreyev. Pervukhin and Saburov
are presumably working full
time on the 1957 budget and
economic plan.to.be presented
to the forthcoming Supreme
Soviet session,. and Kirichenko,
as first secretary of the
Ukraine, is occupied with re-
public party meetings.
The five central Asian
.-republics were visited by the
most prominent Soviet leaders.
An attempt seems to have been
made to send a leader to those
oblasts and krais with which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January'1957
Travels of Soviet Leaders
Voronezh Oblast
Saratov Oblast
Chkalov Oblast
?3 ((''.,J~Chelyabinsk Oblast
A `'x? Omsk Oblast
SSR
he had in some way been asso-
ciated. Moscow received the
award from Khrushchev, oblast
party boss for a number of
years. Malenkov was sent to
his home town of Chkalov, and
Suslov to Saratov, which he
represents in the USSR Supreme
Soviet. Secretaries Belyayev
and Aristov went to Altai Krai
and Chelyabinsk Oblasts respec-
tively, where both had been first
secretaries prior to their all-
Union appointments. Andreyev,
not a member of the top ruling
circle, may have been picked to
visit Novosibirsk because he
Republics, Krais, and Oblasts
recently awarded the Order of Lenin
for agricultural production.
Soviet Leaders and the cities to which they
traveled to present the Order of Lenin awards:
1. Khrushchev Moscow
2. Molotov Voronezh
3. Suslov Saratov
4. Malenkov Chkalov
5. Aristov Chelyabinsk
6. Brezhnev Omsk
7. Andreyev Novosibirsk
8. Belyayev Barnaul
9. Kaganovich Krasnoyarsk
10. Mikoyan Ashkabad
11. Khrushchev and Tashkent
Voroshilov
12. Bulganin Stalinabad
13. Khrushchev Frunze
14. Voroshilov Alma Ata
has long represented one of
its electoral districts in the
RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
Khrushchev was the only
presidium member who handed
out awards to more than one
oblast or republic, and he was
the recipient of laudatory per-
sonallpraise-from Ar'istoy,who
in his speech in Chelyabinsk
Oblast said he felt it "neces-
sary to mention the great energy
and persistence, the bold initia-
tive and determination demon-
strated by N. S. Khrushchev in
the reclamation of virgin and
waste lands."
CHOU RESUMES ASIAN TOUR
Back in Asia once again
after a hurried visit to Mos-
cow and the troubled Satel-
lites, Chou En-lai has resumed
his efforts to persuade his
hosts that Peiping is the
champion of Asian-African free-
dom and solidarity, devoted to
Kazakh SSR
the cause of peace and deserving
of international acceptance.
Chou pushed this theme most
actively in Afghanistan, where
he arrived on 19 January for a
stay of five days. The joint
communique issued in Kabul on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
22 January was essentually non-
committal, but Chou favorably
impressed Afghan leaders and
Asian-African diplomats'in
Kabul.
While in Afghanistan,
Chou steered clear of contro-
versy and made no open attacks
on either the American Middle
East proposals or on "colonial-
ism"--unlike Marshal Zhukov,
who is now visiting India.
(See Part II, p. 12.), During
the round of official social
functions arranged by his hosts,
he paid special attention to
the ambassadors from Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Japan--while
neglecting the Soviet diplo-
mats. Afghan officials, like
many others who have'dealt
with Chou since 1945, were
apparently convinced he was
"sincere" and "reasonable."
During a conversation on
23 January, the Afghan deputy
foreign minister told American
embassy officials his govern-
ment considered continued
American opposition to Commu-
nist China a "gross error"which
deprived the Chinese of a
desired alternative to Moscow.
After leaving Afghanistan,
Chou stopped briefly in New
Delhi on 24 January, where he
conferred for a third time with
Prime Minister Nehru,
In Nepal, on 26 January,
Chou came out against the
recent UN resolution on Kashmir,
which he called "not satisfac-
tory," At a Republic Day
reception in the Indian embassy
at Katmandu, Chou told reporters
he thought raising the problem
in the UN--in line with the
demands of Pakistan--had not
produced "good results." Ear-
lier, during his visits to
both New Delhi and Karachi,
Chou had evaded questions on
the Kashmir problem by saying
that he was "studying" the
issue.
He promised that Communist
China would continue to support
Nepalese development efforts
and would do everything possible
to promote "traditional trade"
with Nepal through Tibet.
Chou's visit to Nepal ended
with a generally noncontrover-
sial joint communique on 29
January.
Chou was then planning to
go to Ceylon, reportedly on an
invitation requested by Peiping,
where he was scheduled to stay
until 5 February. He is expect-
ed to return home at the end
of his visit in Colombo and may
go by way of Rangoon in order
to sign a final agreement on
the border settlement with
ZHUKOV VISIT ^:'0 INDIA
Soviet defense minister
Zhukov and a party of high-
ranking officers arrived in
New Delhi on 24 January for a
good-will tour of India,
ostensibly to return Air Marshal
Mukerjee's visit to Moscow late
in 1955 and to represent the
USSR at the Indian Republic
Day celebration on 26 January.
Following the precedent
set by Bulganin and Khrushchev
in their tour of South and
Southeast'Asia in 1955, Zhukov
bitterly' attacked American
policy at a banquet the evening
he arrived, to the evident
embarrassment of his hosts.
Zhukov reiterated the Soviet
peace line and charged that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
the United States by means
of pretexts and subterfuges
"is attempting to seize the
positions lost by Britain and
France in the Near and Middle
East ...and to seize the key
strategic positions and the
natural resources" of the area
for its own use.
Zhukov's principal task as
"good-will ambassador" probably
is to repair the damage to
Soviet-Indian relations caused
by Indian "misunderstandings"
of Soviet actions in Hungary.
Although India is cool to the
new American proposals on the
Middle East, such heavy-handed
approaches are not likely to
endear Zhukov to Nehru and
official Indian circles. How-
ever, now that the Kashmir
issue has re-emerged in critical
form, Soviet sympathy and
support may help overcome the
effects of the intervention in
Hungary.
To date, the official
Indian reception of Zhukov and
his party has been relatively
cool, and the Indian press has
given the visit only moderate
coverage. 25X1
CHINESE COMMUNIST YOUTH DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS
Peiping newspapers and
radio broadcasts have recently
taken issue with what they
describe as a trend toward ir-
responsible behavior among
Chinese middle school students
and young factory workers.
These comments may reflect
official concern lest student
unrest become?a problem in
China as it recently has in
the USSR.
Criticism last spring of
low academic standards in mid-
dle schools was followed by a
reduction in supervised extra-
curricular activities, includ-
ing ideological and political
training, at the beginning of
the school year in September.
According to the Communist
press, this relaxation of con-
trol over student activities
has led to instances of imper-
tinence toward teachers and
frequent absences from classes.
In some cases students have re-
fused to attend physical exer-
cise sessions or engage in
school-sponsored welfare work.
Some students have resolved
neither to subscribe to nor
read newspapers. Student
ignorance of events in Hungary
and Egypt and of the work of
the Chinese Communist eighth
party congress has been decried.
Teachers are also coming
in for sharp criticism. Charged
with a laissez-faire attitude,
they are warned that their
failure to take an interest
in student political and
group activities will lead to
the development of "bureau-
cratic individualism and radi-
cal democracy" among students.
Commenting on the inclina-
tion of young people to defy
Communist moral standards,
Peiping has claimed that fond-
ness for extravagant dance
parties, where Western popular
music is played and "women
rascals" abound, has exposed
youths to corrosive capitalist
concepts and has had an ad-
verse effect on their factory
production and ideological
studies. Greater ideological
leadership over factory workers
has been called for, and
school authorities have been
told to instill Communist con-
cepts of morality.
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CURRENT IN'T'ELLIGENCE WEEKLY STJMIGARY
31 January 1957
Chinese youths apparently
h
The Chinese Communists are
ave not seriously questioned
placing their main reliance
regime policy, but have diverged
from acce
ted
tti
on strengthened political-
p
a
tudes, judg-
ideological training
and closer
ing by Peiping's references to
"do
bt
"
d "
"
supervision of youth
activities
u
s
an
wrong thoughts
to correct these aberrations
aroused by world problems.
.
25X1
INTELLECTUAL DISSATISFACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Intellectual dissatisfac-
tion reminiscent of the early
stirrings of discontent in
Hungary and Poland has recent-
ly flared into the open in
Czechoslovakia. Ending eight
months of silence on contro-
versial issues, Czech literary
figures in late December began
to speak up in critical tones
and responded to a regime
counteroffensive with a defense
of the author's right to "the
wings of art and one's own
voice."
An article in a December
issue of the Czech authors'
union weekly, Literarni Nooviny,
boldly criticized the estruc-
tive effects of the Socialist
system on both the individual
and society. The author, R.
J. Benes, attacked the per-
sistence of Stalinism among
those with "sclerotic spiritual
arteries" and claimed that the
people, "dragged along by the
merciless mechanism of every-
day planned work," are living
in a type of "undesired isola-
tion," Events in Hungary,
the article said, caused "deep
moral shock, the remedy for
which is to aim a critical
surgeon's knife at our own
ranks;"
The article was denounced
quickly by the new literary
periodical Tvorba, which may
have been launched to counter-
act Literarni Novi,ny's tendency
toward fort right reporting,
and by Rude Pravo, the party
daily.
Literarni Noviny's editor,
Jan P .ar-- therto a regime
spokesman--cautiously came
to the defense of the magazine
and the article in question,
stating that it was an error
for the Czech press to attribute
evil intent to Czech authors
expressing their personal views.
Although criticizing some of
Benes' views, he admitted there
is a struggle for individual
expression in Czechoslovakia
but said it was not an attempt
to "disturb the unity of the
party and the people."
He commented that for the
literary group in Czechoslovakia
"this year was not an easy one;
visible results were outnumbered
by scars," an indication that
not only the last few months
but the course of events since
the Soviet party congress had
caused considerable ferment
and confusion within Czech in-
tellectual circles.
Before the Benes article
appeared, the regime may have
seen in Literarni Noviny a
safety valve for intellectual
expression. But because of
the similarity of the present
controversy to the ferment in
Czechoslovakia last spring,
which was resolutely condemned
by the party conference in mid-
June, the regime can be expected
to try to ensure conformity by
the adoption of repressive
measures, if necessary.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
During 1956, a steady flow
of refugees to the West con-
tinued to deplete East Germany's
manpower resources. The 1956
total of 279,488 is the second
highest for any year since
1949, when accurate records
were first kept; 331,390 fled
increased sharply. Of about
64,000 in this group in 1956--
22 percent of the total refugee
flow--about 46,000 were males,
or, translated into military
terms, the equivalent of four
Soviet-type divisions.
in 1953.
The loss of skilled
The reasons given by re-
technicians particularly
cent defectors for their actions
seriously
interferes with
the
include no hope of reunifica-
regime's
plans to increase
in-
tion, continuation of the low
dustrial
and agricultural
pro-
standard of living, constant
duction and thereby improve
pressures and surveillance,
the East
German standard of
ideological indoctrination of
living.
children, recurring drives for
increased agricultural and in-
Because of the refugee
flow, the population in East
Germany is actually
decreasing. Barring
German reunification,
the downward trend
will probably con-
tinue because a
large proportion of
refugees are in or
dustrial production, and high-
pressure methods of recruiting
for the armed forces.
FLOW OF EAST GERMAN REFUGEES
TO WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN
ir
th
b
t t
t
o en
er
a
ou
e
prime reproductive
years.
1956
279,488
Approximately
1955
252
880
3,015,000 persons,
,
about 17 percent of
the present popula-
1954
184,198
tion
have left East
,
Germany since the
1953
331
390
f th
Of
d
,
e war.
en
o
the 1956 total, 151,-
853 or 57.9 percent
1952
182,393
fled to West Berlin;
the remaining 127,635
1951
165
648
d i
t
W
t
,
crosse
n
o
es
Germany. These
figures include only
1950
199,498
those registering
with Western authori-
TOTAL 1,595,495
ite
i
i
s qu
ties;
t
probable that several
'4510'49
YEARLY
284,000 AV ERAGE
thousand more have
fled.
TOTAL 1,420, 495
In the past two
years the number of
refugees in the 17-
24 age bracket has
TOTAL 3,015,495
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
East German authorities
have stepped up their efforts
to induce refugees to redefect,
and apparently have had some
success with those disillusioned
because the "Golden West" did
not measure up to their expec-
tations of high living and easy
money. An estimated 200,000
refugees have returned to East
Germany since the end of 1949.
The regime is also con-
ducting an extensive propaganda
campaign to dissuade people from
fleeing. Admitting that diffi-
culties and shortages exist,
the Communists are promising
better things for the future
and exhorting people to take
pride in doing without luxuries
for the honor of participating
in building a better world for
those who follow them.
Without a sharp improve-
ment in economic conditions and
substantial political liberali-
zation, neither of which at the
moment appears likely, rede-
fections will remain relatively
few. Unless security measures
are drastically tightened, the
refugee flow will probably con-
tinue unabated. 25X1
(Concurred in by ORR)
(The organizational pat-
tern Moscow is following in
enforcing unity and discipline
in the Communist camp is indi-
cated by the recent series of
meetings of Sino-Soviet bloc
governmental and party leaders
The latest issue of the Soviet
theoretical journal Kommunist
opposes "a return to al orms
of centralized organization".
such as the Cominform or Comin-
tern, but supports "international
meetings of representatives of
the various Communist parties"
to strengthen international
Communist unity.
During the last two
months, French Communist leaders
reportedly visited Moscow,
Prague and Warsaw, and Italian
Communist leaders visited Mos-
cow and Prague; Chou En-lai led
a Chinese governmental delega-
tion to Moscow, Warsaw and Buda-
pest; Czech, Polish, East Ger-
man and Rumanian governmental
and/or party delegations made
visits to Moscow; and Bulgarian-
Albanian, Polish-East German
and Czech-East German bilateral
talks were held.. From 1-4 Janu-
ary, party and government lead-
ers of the USSR, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria
raet in Budapest, a gathering
given particular attention by
Communist propaganda
The events in Hungary and
Poland, the growing differences
with Yugoslavia and, to a lesser
extent, the unrest in some
Western European parties have
impressed the Soviet leaders
with the need to reassert their
authority within the Communist
movement. Some Communists
have advocated setting up
another organization like the
Comin orm, dissolved last -
April, but the latest Kommunist
article appears to have ruled
this out.
There are several advan-
tages to an informal series of
meetings. The Poles possibly
would refuse to join a formal
organization, thus seriously
undermining it. In a joint
communique with the Yugoslavs
in December, Poland endorsed
bilateral party relations as
"the most correct form."
The existence of a new
formal organization would draw
attention to Yugoslavia's
equivocal position and revive
memories of the Cominform's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
expulsion of Tito. Last year
Soviet leaders tried to per-
suade the Yugoslavs to join a
new international organization.
Now they are trying to isolate
Yugoslavia but might fear that
exclusion from such a group
would drive Tito further into
the arms of the West.
Italian leader Togliatti
has expressed his preference
for bilateral contacts. Togli-
atti would have a lot to lose
from participation in any new
organization--certain to em-
phasize his party's sub-
servience to Moscow--at a time
when the party is wracked by
dissension and is facing the
difficult problem of keeping
the Nenni Socialists from
breaking away from the Commu-
nists to join the Social Demo-
crats. The Italian Communist
paper has described the recent
visit of Italian leaders to
Moscow as an example of the
new form of co-operation in
the post-Cominf orm period.
Moscow may try to give
more authoritative ideological
and political guidance by
publishing an international
Communist journal, presumably
modeled after the Cominform
j ournal.
Prince Sihanouk continues
to dominate Cambodian politics,
but there are indications he
is finding it increasingly
difficult to maintain undis-
puted leadership. Resentment
over Sihanouk's policies and
dissatisfaction with his one-
man form of government appear
to have spread to the National
Assembly, which is composed
entirely of members of the
Sangkum, the prince's own
political organization. In
two separate actions, the
assembly recently acted inde-
pendently of the prince's
desires in passing a press
censorship law and forcing
the removal of two objection-
able cabinet members. Although
the assembly later backed
down under pressure from
Sihanouk, unresolved antago-
nisms are likely to precipi-
tate future government crises.
As a hedge against further
independent action by the
legislature, Sihanouk has con-
trived to superimpose the semi-
annual Sangkum National Congress
--a public policy forum which
he completely dominates--on the
assembly. The congress is to
play an advisory role to the
assembly, and irreconcilable
differences are to be resolved
by public referendum, where
Sihanouk is confident of over-
whelming support.
The growing concern of
some-influential Cambodian
leaders thatSihanouk's neu-
tralist foreign policy is
exposing the nation to Commu-
nist subversion is also work-
ing against him. The rapid
spread of Communist propaganda
and influence among the Over-
seas Chinese and Vietnamese
minority groups in Cambodia
has been all too evident to
these Cambodians.
Colonel Dap Chhuon, the
powerful minister of national
security and a critic of Cam-
bodia's close relations with
the Sino-Soviet bloc, has
frequently complained that
Sihanouk and the government
do not appreciate the gravity
of the Communist penetration.
As the situation continues to
drift, Chhuon and others who
share his apprehension may
attempt to bring direct pres-
sure on Sihanouk, possibly
through the palace, to reap-
praise his policies.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
STATUS OF THE TOP SOVIET LEADERS
The effects of the de-
Stalinization campaign and
events in Hungary and Poland
have posed serious problems for
the Soviet leaders and stimu-
lated speculation concerning
the status of the leadership.
According to some reports, im-
portant changes are to be made
at the Supreme Soviet meeting
scheduled for 5 February.
Collective Leadership
Within the collective
leadership that developed soon
after Stalin's death as a sys-
tem of rule designed to pre-
vent the rise of another Stalin,
one faction came increasingly
to dominate the party presidium.
This faction was led by Khru-
shchev, and, though its exact
membership may have varied from
time to time, it appears general-
ly to have included Mikoyan,
Bulganin, and Pervukhin.
Khrushchev, like Stalin
before him, used the principle
of "divide and rule." He made
common cause with the conserva-
tive "Stalinists"--Kaganovich
and Molotov--to defeat Malenkov,
and then, abruptly turning his
back on them, he championed a
vigorously "liberal" program
designed to erase the stulti-
fying effects of terror and
extreme centralization from the
domestic scene and to secure
allies and a dominant place in
world affairs abroad.
Despite Khrushchev's in-
creasing dominance and control
of the party machinery--its
central apparatus, the central
committee, and key positions in
the party hierarchy--a form
of "collective leadership" has
continued. Khrushchev has as-
pired to sit at the head of the
table but he has shown no desire
to dine alone.
The highpoint in the for-
tunes of Khrushchev's "inner
circle" was reached just before
the 20th patty congress in Feb-
ruary 1956. Since then, the
Soviet leaders have had to deal
with such problems as those
arising from de-Stalinization,
the Poznan riots, failure to
reach a satisfactory ideologi-
cal accommodation with Tito,
and the developments in Poland
and Hungary. Throughout these
crises Khrushchev showed con-
siderable flexibility in adapt-
ing himself to new circumstances
--including reversals in some
of his policies.
Khrushchev
Nikita S. Khrushchev ap-
parently is still the dominant
personality in the leadership
and speaks authorita-
tively for the regime.
Apart from some rumors
in mid-November and
again in December that
he would be replaced,
and the early Yugoslav
line that Tito went to
the Crimea to bolster
Khrushchev' s shaky posi-
tion, there is no evi-
dence that his status
has been reduced or that KHRUSHCHEV
his influence has been weakened.
He has been more active
than any of the other leaders,
particularly in functions with
a public relations value. He
has made numerous speeches and
otherwise acted to maintain
his prominence. In Pravda of
1 January 1957, for examp e, he
answered questions put by the
editor of the Czech newspaper,
Rude Pravo. It is an estab-
lished custom for questions put
by some foreign journalist to
be answered at the end of the
year, but since Stalin's death
this has been the prerogative of
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31 January 1957
the premier, not the party first
secretary, Bulganin answered
questions put by the chief
editor of the Polish radio in
Pravda of 2 January, but it was
dear that Khrushchev's were
the more important statements.
Khrushchev's once-liberal
orientation in Soviet policy
formation seems to have been
modified in recent months.
Apparently recognizing that the
Soviet tide is at an ebb stage,
he now appears more occupied
with maintaining the status quo
than trying new or unorthodox
solutions to Soviet problems.
As long as this orientation
continues, he will be disposed
toward "tried and true" methods
and hence view tougher tech-
niques more favorably than
heretofore.
He appears to have modi-
fied his outlook spontaneously
as the adverse effects of his
"liberal" policies began to be
felt. By the time the Poznan
riots took place, he had ap-
parently concluded he had made
an error in the way he had
handled the de-Stalinization
campaign, and by August he prob-
ably had qualms about the
rapprochement with Tito.
The process of reorienting
his views may have been aided
by the advice of the military
and the influence of some of
the more conservative (Stalin-
ist) members of the party
presidium. His quick and easy
adoption of the harder line
appears to have cut the ground
from under any attempts by his
critics to make political capi-
tal of the difficulties in which
the Soviet Union found itself.
Khrushchev is an ebullient,
self-confident and optimistic
individual who may not be con-
tent for long to be on the
defensive in the fight against
"capitalist imperialism." He
is, however, more than any of
the other Soviet leaders, some-
thing of, a politician in the
Western sense of the word and
may be expected to ensure that
his political position is
adequately protected before
embarking on a serious counter-
attack in the world arena.
Bulganin
Nikolai A. Bulganin's
exact position in the Soviet
top leadership is difficult to
assess. As head of the
government, he ranks
second to Khrushchev,
and the West German
delegation in Septem-
ber 1955 even felt
that he was the more
important of the two.
Others, after recent
negotiations with the
two, have suggested that
his role is more that
of an urbane and cul
BULGANIN
tured front than of an independ-
ent.voice in policy formula-
tion. Perhaps Bulganin is,
as suggested by one of the
Japanese who took pact in the
recent negotiations with the
Soviet leaders, "a very thought-
ful and cautious individual."
If so, he may find it difficult
to hold his own with the more
volatile and impulsive Khru-
shchev.
Bulganin's prestige may
have been damaged, as Ambassador
Bohlen suggests, by the results
of the December central committee
plenum. The plenum's decree
on his report called for "im-
provement" in the leadership of
the national economy, and as
head of government Bulganin is
the highest official responsible
for that leadership. "Improve-
ment of Leadership, of the USSR
National Economy," however, was
the subject of Bulganin's re-
port to the plenum and he,
presumably, was the one de-
manding the improvement.
Bulganin apparently remains
a responsible and trusted member
of Khrushchev's "inner circle,"
but probably does not have an
independent power position in
the party presidium.
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31 January 1957
Mikoyan
Anastas I. Mikoyan is also
a member of the Khrushchev
"inner circle" but does appear
to have an independent
power position. He
impressed a member of
the Japanese delegation
in the negotiations
this fall as one of the
most powerful of the
Soviet leaders and one
who appeared to have
the loyalty of a number
of the younger bureau-
crats. He is probably
the third if not the
second most powerful and influ-
ential member of the top lead-
ership. Although long identi-
fied as an exponent of the
'-'liberal" line, he has shown a
facility for adapting his views
to changing conditions and it
may be presumed that he agrees
with the somewhat tougher line
now in effect.
Mikoyan has been particu-
larly susceptible to blame for
the Hungarian crisis because
he, along with Suslov, was en-
trusted with Hungarian matters
this past summer and fall. He
presided over Gero's replace-
ment of Rakosi in July and ap-
peared again in Budapest with
Suslov on 25 October. After
observing conditions in the
Hungarian capital he, in the
words of one report, "berated
Gero for having stampeded Mos-
cow through an exaggerated and
distorted picture of the nature
of the Budapest revolt." He
and Suslov then picked Kadar to
succeed Gero as party boss. On
10 January, when Kadar was in
Moscow for talks with Chou
En-lai and the Soviet leaders,
Mikoyan participated. This in-
dicates his continuing concern
with Hungarian affairs.
Pervukhin
Mikhail G. Pervukhin may
now be the fourth ranking mem-
ber in the top leadership. His
recent appointment as head of
the State Economic Commission
for Short-term Planning, the
granting of executive functions
to the commission, and the
assignment of five former dep-
uty premiers as his
deputies confirm earlier
indications of his in-
creasing authority. . His
position in the top
leadership stems almost
exclusively from his
administrative and tech-
nical abilities--he ap-
pears to have even less
of an independent power
position in the party
presidium than Bulganin.
His views on general policy are
probably more narrowly economic
than the others of the "inner
circle."
Pervukhin has for some
time ranked high as an executive
in the government, possibly
second only to Bulganin in
general administrative matters.
He has on occasion served as
acting premier and may have
been chairman of the Council of
Ministers' Commission for Cur-
rent Questions. This commission
waa formed by the presidium .of:'
the Council of Ministers "to
examine and decide all current
problems except those decided
by the first deputies and the
deputies of the chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers."
This commission appears to bear
some resemblance to the old
"buro" of the Council of Minis-
ters.. Chairmanship of it, is
likely to convey considerable
power to the holder.
The executive powers granted
the planning commission in Decem-
ber may have been taken from
the Commission for Current Ques-
tions, although there is every
likelihood that some of the
powers were taken from other
sources as well, including in-
dividual members of the Council
of Ministers.
Kirichenko
Aleksei I. Kirichenko un-
doubtedly owes his position as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
party boss in the Ukraine and
also on the all-Union party
presidium to his old mentor,
Khrushchev. As long as
Khrushchev continues to
maintain close associ~-
ations with the Ukraine,-
Kirichenko will probably
.not be able to build up
an independent power
base there, but the job
has good potentialities
and his influence in the
republic may'some day
serve to further his
KIRICHENKO career. For the moment
he appears content to concen-
trate on Ukrainian problems and
follow Khrushchev's lead in
national affairs.
Mikhail A. Suslov seems to
be a secondary figure in the
top.leadership and may have
been put on,the._presidi-
um primarily to',. provide,
in..addltion. to Khru-
sh.chgv,:.a br.idge.between
it and the secretariat.
He appeared to one ob-
server who talked with
him as quite unimpres-
sive and not the "power-
ful young man" reported
by the press. There is
no evidence to support
SUSLOV the recent press claims
that he is a "hard-line advo-
cate" but there have been re-
ports that he tends to be
rather doctrinaire on occasion.
His speech on 7 November was
relatively mild, as was also
the speech Mme.Furtseva deliver-
-ed. for him to the Italian Com-
munist Party. in December.
Suslov, like Mikoyan, has
been susceptible to blame for
the Hungarian situation since
he, too, was entrusted with
Hungarian matters. There have,
however, been no indications of
any changes in his status.
Malenkov
Georgy M. Malenkov's partic-
ipation in the five-nation
talks in Budapest is the first.
confirmed instance since his
demotion from the premiership
in February 1955 in
which he has been en-
trusted to represent
the Soviet government
in broad policy matters.
It. lends credibility to the
rumors that he and Sus-
lov were in Budapest
during the latter half
of November, presumably
guiding the Kadar re-
gime in its attempts to
regain control over the
Hungarian people.
These events suggest that
Malenkov's status is improving,
but the improvement, at this
point, doesnot appear sufficient-
ly great to make him a threat
to Khrushchev's leadership. He
remains a deputy premier, the
lowest ranking job held by any
party presidium member, and
the significance of his presence
at the Budapest meeting is par-
tially vitiated by the fact
that he did not particpate in
the. talks Kadarhad with Chou
En-lai and the Soviet leaders
in Moscow on 10 January.
It may be, however, that
his period of punishment for
having "failed" as premier is
at an end and that he may soon
be made a first deputy premier
like Mikoyan, Molotov, Kagan-
ovich, Pervukhin and Saburov,
or, alternatively, he may be
returned to work in the party
secretariat where,. as Khru- -
shchev's subordinaise,,,he...might
be able to exercise the talents
that Stalin found so useful.
Voroshilov
Kliment Ye. Voroshilov is
an old man (76) who, as presi-
dent of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, is chief
official greeter for the Soviet
state:. He4s virtually devoid
of,.-any . real ,.power or-- influence.
Rumors of ehis imminent ^retire-
ment) persist and..-it is entirely
possible he might be transferred
to an even lesser position.
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31 January 1957
There are few
strains connected with
his job, however, and
his health continues to
be adequate to handle
the few requirements it
poses for him. On 15
April, he is scheduled
to make a state visit
to China to "strengthen
Sino-Soviet friendship."
State Control appears
to mark the lowest
point in his career
since he first became
a member of the polit-
buro, in 1926. This is
true despite the re-
gime's avowed intention
to broaden the powers
and improve the activi-
ties of the ministry,
for he is now removed
MOLOTOV from the vital area of
foreign policy and saddled
with responsibility for minis-
try, which has little potenti-
ality for becoming a base of
political power.
Kaganovich
Lazar M. Kaganovich,
like Molotov, has lost
political power and in-
fluence during the past
two years and seems now
to be largely reduced
to the role of trouble-
shooter in narrow areas
of the economy. The ebb
in Kaganovich's fortunes
began well before the
autumn of 1955 since by
KAGANOVICH that time Pervukhin, who
of all the presidium members
most closely approximated him
in industrial knowledge, ex-
perience and administrative
ability, had forged ahead of
him to become acting premier
in Bulganin's absence. In
December 1956,when Saburov's
planning commission was under
fire at the party plenum, it
was Pervukhin who was selected
to iron out difficulties in
the broad field of economic
planning.
Saburov
Maxim Z. Saburov's
claim to a position in
the top leadership
stems more from his
long experience and
undoubted technical
qualifications in ad-
ministration of the
economy than from a
personal political fol-
lowing. Once a mem- SABUROV
ber of Stalin's personal secre,:
tariat, he has undoubtedly lost
prestige as a result of his
removal in December from the
State Economic Commission for
Short-term Planning. He re-
tained the position of first
deputy premier, however, which
suggests that he is to be as~+
signed *,.dther administrative.
responsibilities in the Soviet
government.
Zhukov
Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov,
though only a candidate mem-
ber of the party presidium,
not only commands the
armed forces, but has
great personal popu-
larity among Soviet
citizens generally,
which gives him the
potentiality for exert-
ing an even greater
influence on Soviet
policy than some pres-
ent.. full members of
the presidium. In ad-
dition,. the fact that
the Soviet leaders used the
Soviet army in Hungary and
threatened to use it in Po-
land has undoubtedly increased
his influence on policy. He
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Vyacheslav M.,Molotov's
assignment as USSR Minister of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
has, however, shown no inclina-
tion to act in an independent
way. He has reportedly been
fiercely zealous in safeguard-
ing the military interests of
the Soviet Union as well as
the interests of the military,
but seemingly is willing to
leave general political ques-
tions to the other leaders.
THE NILE WATER CONFLICT BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN
In the conflict between
Egypt and the Sudan over the
disposition of the waters of
the Nile, Cairo claims rights
to a greater portion of water
than Khartoum is willing to ac-
knowledge and wants a larger
share of any surplus resulting
from the construction of new
works on the river.
The Sudan is not im-
mediately in need of
more water, but de-
-a
-P4
l
Harvested acreage--allowing for
multiple harvests on the same
land--is now about 6,200,000
.acres, approximately equal to
the amount of harvested acreage
in Mississippi. Egypt's popula-
tion, however, is about 24,000,-
000 compared to Mississippi's
2,500,000.
EGYPT: POPULATION PRESSURE ON LAND
na
deter- POPULATION
.i1- _ ~_ MILLIONS
-4 --+4 __
of
each nation is to re-
ceive before any new
construction begins
in order to forestall
Egypt's de facto ac-
quisition of addition-
al water rights.
Pressures on Egypt
Because of Egypt's
extremely small rain-
fall, agriculture de-
pends entirely on wa-
ter from the Nile.
1897 1910
31 JANUARY 1957
PER CAPITA
HARVESTED
ACREAGE
WITHOUT NILE DEVELOPMENT
WITH NILE
II
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31 January 1957
THE NILE RIVER
Even the most ambitious
development program is unlikely
to increase Egypt's agricul-
tural area to over 7,785,000
acres. The Aswan High Dam,
after an expenditure of some-
$1.2 billion would bring undLr
continuous irrigation only
1,349,000 acres of new land
and convert 695,460 acres of
partially irrigated land into
fully irrigated areas.
Egypt's growing population
will probably exceed by 1980
that of France today--some
43,000,000. Cairo has made
some efforts to alleviate the
pressure for land by reclama-
tion and settlement, especially
in the much publicized Libera-
tion Province on the western
edge of the Nile delta. Proj-
ects there, involving collec-
tive and communal farming, are
still in a very early stage,
however, and are unlikely ever
to yield substantial benefits.
Egypt's Position
Cairo disagrees with
Khartoum on the average flow
of water past Aswan, rights to
existing water supplies, and
the relative shares of each
country in any surplus brought
about by new works.
Egypt insists that the
average flow at Aswan is only
0
AVERAGE NILE DISCHARGE AT ASWAN
Figures based on selected periods
(BILLIONS OF CUBIC METERS)
103
Includes
maximun
flooa years
Excludes
maximum
flood years
Includes
maximum and
mimimum
flood years
1913-
1914
LOWEST
YEAR
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
~AHundrip
Suez
Canal
BELGIAN
CONGO
Lake,
Kluu
RUANDA-URUNDI
SAUDI
ARABIA
80 billion cubic meters rather
than 84 billion cubic meters
as claimed by the Sudan. A
conservative estimate of the
average flow is 83 billion
cubic meters.
Egypt also claims 51 bil-
lion cubic meters in existing
water rights, 3 billion cubic
meters more than Khartoum ac-
cepts. Based on the amount of
irrigated land, at 8,000 cubic
meters per year per acre, the
figure would be 48.21 billion.
Neither country disagrees with
the Sudan's existing rights of
some 4 billion cubic meters.
Egypt's claim to an even-
tual total of 62 billion cubic
meters would be more than
adequate for all irrigation
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31 January 1957
purposes. If the maximum
amount, 7,785,000 acres, of
land in Egypt were irrigated,
approximately 58.25 billion
cubic meters of water would be
required. The Sudan is will-
ing to allow 49 billion cubic
meters as Egypt's ultimate
share.
The Sudan's Position
Sudanese engineers say
that 5,500,000 acres of land
are suitable for immediate
NILE WATER SUPPLY & ALLOCATION
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(BILLIONS OF CUBIC METERS) *
SUDANESE CLAIMS EGYPTIAN CLAIMS
EGYPT
48
UDAN
4
AMOUNT OF TOTAL
WATER EXISTING
AVAILABLE WATER RIGHTS
EVAPORATION
AT HIGH
DAM
UNALLOCATED
SURPLUS
In defense of its position,
Khartoum cites a study made by
an American engineer, H. L.
Cory, which was published by
the Egyptian government in 1920.
Cory would have given Egypt a
total of 61 billion cubic me-
ters? the Sudan 23 billion cubic
meters. Now, however, the Sudan
argues that because of its rap-
id development, this figure
is too low and it needs 31
AFTER AFTER
DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION
OF NILE OF ASWAN
BASIN DAM
SUDAN'S
SHARE OF
SURPLUS
EGYPT'S
SHARE OF
SURPLUS
development--3,000,000 with a
gravity irrigation system in
the Gezira between the White
and Blue Nile south of Khar-
toum, 1,500,000 acres with
pump irrigation systems on the
Niles; 500,000 to be watered
from the Atbara River; and
500,000 to be watered from the
proposed Jonglei Canal. The
Sudan claims the right to
irrigate this area at the same
rate as Egypt--8,000 cubic
meters of water an acre per
year. The total figure the
Sudan wants would thus be 44
billion cubic meters, the equiv-
alent, 6ecause of evaporation
loss, of 35 billion cubic
meters at Aswan.
billion cubic meters
more than it now re-
ceives. Khartoum,
admitting that it
would be a number of
years before it could
use the full amount
it is asking, insists
that water rights be determined
before any diversion project
such as the Aswan High Dam--
is built and Egypt acquires
more water rights.
Existing Works
Egypt has six barrages but
only one dam--the Aswan Dam
built in 1902 with a present
reservoir capacity of 5.3
billion cubic meters. Barrages
are designed not to store flood
waters, as is the Aswan Dam,
but to regulate the water level
;during flood time and divert
it into irrigation canals.
The Sudan has no barrages
but has two dams, the Senna on
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1920
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31 January 1957
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF NILE BASIN
PROPOSED WORKS ~ EXISTING WORKS
FIGURES INDICATE GROSS STORAGE IN BILLIONS OF CUBIC METERS
EGYPT
SUDAN
ASSUIT BARRAGE
NAG HAMMADI BARRAGE
ISNA BARRAGE
(130)
Y
------IO------------------
SEMNA DAM
ifain Nile
yMEROWE DAM (4TH CATARACT DAM)
Atbara River
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 January 1957
the Blue Nile and the Gebel
Aulia on the White Nile. The
Senna dam--with a relatively
small storage capacity of 1 bil-
lion cubic meters--stores water
to irrigate the Sudan's cotton
crop in Gezira without using
Nile waters during the summer,
when the natural river flow is
used almost exclusively by
Egypt. The Gebel Aulia dam--
completed in 1937 with a reser-
voir capacity of 2.5 billion
cubic meters--was built solely
to irrigate Egyptian land.
Proposed Development Projects
All existing works in the
Nile system are designed prin-
cipally to regulate the annual'
flood,and none are concerned
with irrigation storage over a
period of years. The next step
in the Nile development is to
provide long-term storage fa-
cilities. If this is not done,
an extension of the irrigated
area could prove disastrous in
a year with water shortage.
Two general plans have thus far
been advanced, the Aswan High
Dam and a comprehensive storage
scheme. Egypt's high dam pro-
posal was first seriously put
forth in 1953. The storage
scheme, favored by the Sudan,
has long been under study.
The Aswan High Dam
The Aswan High Dam project
involves the construction of a
dam across the Nile about five
miles upstream from the exist-
ing Aswan Dam. The new dam
would create a reservoir with
a capacity of 130 billion cubic
meters. Its primary purpose
would be to store water for
irrigation. Secondarily it
would protect Egypt's downstream
areas from flood and provide
improved navigation conditions.
The dam itself would take
at least 10 years to build. The
reservoir would store 70 bil-
lion cubic meters of water for
irrigation, plus 30 billion
cubic meters for flood control.
The other 30 billion cubic
meters would be allowed for
deposition of silt.
The advantages of this
project to Egypt would depend
on the share of the water Cairo
would receive under its agree-
ment with the Sudan. If Egypt's
share were significantly less
than 61 billion cubic meters,
the project might not be worth
the large investment required,
It is on this point that dis-
cussions with the Sudan were
broken off in mid-1955, and
Khartoum refused to acknowledge
Egypt's right to this amount.
Comprehensive Storage Scheme
This plan calls for a se-
ries of dams and barrages to be
built largely in the Sudan. The
bulk of the long-term storage
of irrigation waters, however,
would be in Lake Albert and
Lake Victoria. By raising the
water level of Lake Albert one
meter, and Lake Victoria four
feet, the amount of stored water
would be equal to 105.3 billion
cubic meters, some 35 billion
cubic meters more than the
expected capacity for irriga-
tion storage of the high dam.
Because of the large swamps
through which the water from
these lakes now passes, however,
the water loss through absorb-
tion is substantial--on the
average about 50 percent. To
avoid this, a diversion canal--
the Jonglei Canal--would have
to be built. In addition,a
number of regulating barrages
would be required, as well as
a dam at Lake Tana in Ethiopia,.
The Aswan High Dam and the
comprehensive storage scheme
might be made complementary.
The high dame could be somewhat
smaller than now planned and
other works could be undertaken
in the Sudan.
Without the Aswan High Dam,
or a similar project, the growth
of the Egyptian economy is like-
ly to lag far behind the probable
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increase in population. This
would mean a steady decline in
the standard of living, with
serious implications for the
future social and political
evolution of Egypt. Even though
Aswan or similar works might
not make possible any signifi-
cant per capita rise in the
living standard, they would at
least prevent a disastrous dete-
ioration in this standard.
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WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT
The West German rearma-
ment effort, first planned in
1950 and formally initiated in
January 1956 on the basis of a
three- to four-year build-up of
12 divisions and 500,000 men,
has shifted its emphasis away
from the original goals to
what Defense Minister Strauss
calls a t'quality-before..quantity
approach. Instead of gradually
building up the larger force,
the Germans have recently in-
dicated that they wish to con-
centrate on more rapid creation
of seven combat-ready divisions
with the most modern equipment.
Strauss Takes Over
Chancellor Adenauer's
cabinet reshuffle on 16 Octo-
ber 1956 brought in as defense
minister the aggressive and
capable Franz Josef Strauss,
a clever politician who would
like to succeed Adenauer, and
who, as atomic minister, had
been one of the noisiest and
most effective critics of what
he and much of the public con-
sidered to be a Utopian armed
forces build-up program.
Although much of the Ger-
man planning for the new look
in the German army was ap-
parently under way when Strauss
supplanted his much-criticized
predecessor and political ad-
versary, Theodor Blank, the
publicity-conscious Strauss, in
his explanations to the public
and to Bonn's NATO allies, has
taken'.the.credit for the shift.
Adenauer's Christian Democratic
Union (CDU), which-'.-is already
worried about the unpopularity
of rearmament in many circles
and the effect on CDU pros-
pects in the September Bundes-
tag elections, hopes to be
able to benefit from the changes
A West German view of Defense Minister
Strauss and rearmament. From Der Spiegel.
in approach as well as in
personalities.
In a further bid for pub-
lic support, the CDU agreed
last October to a reduction
from 18 to 12 months in the
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31 January 1957
length of service for draftees,
and Strauss apparently intends
to draft relatively few men
before the September election.
Subsequent events in Hungary
and the Middle East have given
impetus to the government's
plans for rapidly building up a
few eombat-ready units, and
may also serve to weaken the
public distaste for the rearma-
ment effort.
D
WEST GERMAN
ARMED FORCES
(IN THOUSANDS)
ORIGINAL NATO GOAL
GERMAN FULFILLMENT
OR PRESENT PLAN
2 70
135
-96
75
one mountain division. Under
the original plan, these divisions
would have been split in two
and used as cadres for the
formation of new units. Now,
they will be left intact, and
are expected to be at from 60
to 80 percent of strength by
the end of 1957, and combat-
ready during 1958.
UNAN-
NOUNCED
been unwilling to
commit themselves
formally to their
NATO allies to any
plans beyond 1957, re-
liable sources report
that the cabinet has
approved a firm in-
terim forces ceiling
of only 343,000 men
for 31 March 1961.
At that time, the army
would have 200,000 men
in 12 divisions, all
at about 70 percent
of strength. The air
force would have 100,-
000 and the navy 20,-
000 men, with the re-
maining personnel in
administrative and
support units. The
total cost of this
build-up would be
$12.85 billion and
would require the Ger-
mans to increase their
defense budget during
1958-61 by about $1.3
billion a year above
Present Goals
Strauss has so far an-
nounced hips: goals only through
1957. Late in 1956, he scaled
down the NATO goal of 96,000
men in uniform for that year
to 75,000, a figure the Germans
met., In place of 270,000 for
the end of 1957, Bonn now will
aim for 135, 000, of which 85,500
will be in the army.
The Defense Ministry is
building up three motorized in-
fantry divisions, two armored
divisions, one air-borne., and
70122 2 the present annual
level of $2.1 billion.
Equipment
Strauss has always stressed
Germany's need for atomic weap-
ons,, and is likely to increase
his demands in this field. He
is already laying the ground-
work for combat under conditio;as
of nuclear warfare, by setting
14p infantry and armored divisions
of only V2-13,000 men each.
During the training stages
of the build-up, Bonn will "make
do" with the equipment it has
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received from its allies, Never-
theless, there are increasing
indications that in the future
the Germans will want more and
more to develop their own tanks
and aircraft. Industry is ap
parently.less reluctant to par-
ticipate in rearmament than
formerly.
Air and Navy
Strauss reportedly wishes
to proceed with the build-up of
effective ground forces, and
later to shift the emphasis to
air power. Until now, less
stress has been placed on the
air force, which is scheduled
to have.tw.o transport squadrons
and two or three fighter squad-
rons and 27,000 men by the end
of 1957. With 12,000 men now,
it is concentrating mainly on
training flying ' personnel.
The new navy was original-
ly to number only 17,000 men,
primarily with patrol functions:
By April it is scheduled to
have about 10,000 men, formed
in three motor-torpedo squadrons,
four minesweeper.:squadrgns,-and
one..landiag craft squadron. It.
is now concentrating on training
personnel, with its future plans,
mission and size much in ques-
tion, but with its top officers
pressing for a greater role for
the naval forces.
New Plans
Strauss has recently be-
gun to emphasize a broad de-
fense program based on three
"pillars":
1) the.mobile units of the three
armed services, under NATO,
2) national home defense units,
both land and air, which would
be-.-under German control and
work closely with NATO, and
3) civilian defense units,
under Interior Ministry control,
for catastrophe situations.
The whole concept of ad-
ditional home defense forces,
planned for some time, will
stress the formation of Swiss-
type militia reserve units,
calling largely on older per-
sonnel for engineer, communica-
tions,and guarding service near
their homes. While Strauss re-
cently said that such units
would at first involve only 30,-
000 men, the plan would permit
a rapid expansion of the German
forces as well as complete Ger-
man control over these units.
Leadership
Strauss apparently wants
to make important shifts in
leadership of the new forces.
It appears that he will replace
Lt'. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, who
holds the top post of chair-
man of the.Supreme Military
Councilbut whose war experience
was mainly of a staff nature,
with former Lt. Gen. Walter
Wenck, who-was commander of-the
German Twelfth Army at.the end
of the' war. This shift is
tentatively scheduled for March,
after a proposed reorganization
of the -ministry which would give
the top general new powers.
Strauss is reportedly: trying. to
find a suitable "prestige job"
for Heusinger,in NATO. Heusinger's
deputy, Lt-. Gen. Speidel, is al-
ready slated for. a NATO post
this spring.
Thus the present period
of the German forces build-up
,appears to be a transitional
one, an attempt to create the
basic defense and-security
forces structure as fast as
political expediency will al-
low. This phase seems likely
to last until after the Bundes-
tag., elections in September.
Then if present policies are
confirmed at the polls, Bonn
can proceed with the formation
4. of an effective fighting
? machine, the main ingredient
now lacking in West Germany's
emergence as a major power.
1 -1
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