CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002500120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL,
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 56
OCI NO. 0022/60
7 January 1960
Document -------1---------------
No Change to Class. ^
^ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S (~
. ------- 9_~2
lNext Review Date: --- HR 70-3
~L-A K~ C
Date:
Document No. ----------------------
No Change In Class. ^
^ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S V
xt Review Date: -- HR D#e
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 99eR9-T---
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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I hi
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL SUMMARY
7 January 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
1
Khrushchev used a number of year-end messages and
statements to stress disarmament as the key issue in
international relations in an effort to emphasize the
USSR's peaceful posture in the period leading up to the
summit meeting on 16 May. The Soviet premier's reitera-
tion of the Soviet proposal for universal disarmament,
his suggestion of a possible unilateral reduction in So-
viet forces, and his renewed pledge that the USSR would
not be the first to resume nuclear tests were intended to
underline Moscow's desire to maintain the "noticeable
thawing in international relations" which he claims was
characteristic of 1959. At the Supreme Soviet session
beginning on 14 January, Khrushchev will probably sum-
marize the USSR's position on the issues to be discussed
at the summit conference and may also elaborate on his
hints of Soviet troop cuts.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
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Iraqi political parties have begun to apply for
licensing under Qasim's new party law, thus opening a new
phase in the contest between pro- and anti-Communist ele-
ments for predominant influence over the government. The
Shatt al Arab issue continues to disturb Iraqi-Iranian
relations, although both sides still seem to desire a
peaceful settlement. In the UAR, President Nasir has suc-
cessfully weathered the resignation of the Baathist min-
isters in the Syrian region, but his troubles with Syria
are by no means over. A new Saudi Arabian budget for 1960
indicates that Crown Prince Faysal's 1959
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NEW GOVERNMENT IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
A new coalition cabinet has been formed under the
premiership of KhouAbhay, the elderly former president
of the King's Council. The new government includes rep-
resentatives of the reformist Committee for Defense of
National Interests (CDNI) and former Premier Phoui's
old-guard Rally of the Lao People, in addition to polit-
ical independents such as Premier Khou. The cabinet's
major function will probably be preparing the country for
national elections some time this year. CDNI members may
also push for a harder line toward the Communists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Communist China's latest note to India contributes
nothing to break the deadlock on the border issue. The
note, delivered on 26 December and broadcast by Peiping
on 2 January, was moderate in tone but repeated the "his-
torical facts" Peiping uses to back up its territorial
claims while denying those of New Delhi. It called again
for talks between Nehru and Chou En-lai and urged the
Indians to accept the Chinese view that the entire border
has never been delimited. Initial Indian reaction to the
note has been negative. In the hope of enlisting Soviet
influence to make some change in the Chinese position,
Nehru may wait until after Khrushchev's visit to New
Delhi--expected in February or early March--to make a for-
mal reply.
KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Khrushchev's projected visit to Indonesia, scheduled
for 18 February to 2 March, will enable him to repay a
long-overdue protocol debt and to exercise his personal
diplomacy. He is expected to use both this visit and a
stopover in India and Burma to attempt to smooth relations
between those countries and Communist China and to seek
official support for the positions he plans to press at
the summit meeting.
AFGHAN PROBLEMS FOLLOWING KANDAHAR RIOTS . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The recent riots in the city of Kandahar--occasioned
by the Afghan Government's policy of encouraging women to
appear in public without the veil--has caused Prime Min-
ister Daud to postpone indefinitely his trip to Vienna for
medical treatment. Daud will probably remain in Afghani-
stan until satisfied that the unrest will not spread to
the Pushtoon tribes. While looking for ways to strengthen
his position with the tribes, Daud apparently is deter-
mined to press ahead with his reforms, feeling it would be
more dangerous to give in to his opposition than to sup-
press it.
EAST GERMAN FARMERS RESORT TO SABOTAGE AGAINST REGIME . . Page 4
East German leaders have recently been outspoken in
their expression of concern over increasing peasant resist-
ance manifested by acts of arson, sabotage, and physical
violence. Regime determination to press more farmers into
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
PART II (continued)
collectives appears to have raised rural discontent to its
highest level in recent years, and runs the risk of further
difficulties with the food supply, already sharply cur-
tailed by last summer's drought.
SOVIET BLOC RESUMES PRESSURE ON GREECE . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Soviet Union and the Balkan satellites have re-
newed pressure on the Karamanlis government through a
mixture of threats and blandishments. Satellite leaders
have issued new calls for improved relations, and the USSR
has proposed-that the Big Three attempt to settle out-
standing differences between Greece and Bulgaria. Athens
shows no weakening in its determination to resist these
pressures, but fears that the Greek people may be impressed
by conciliator gestures from the Communist bloc.
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID TO NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES . . . . . Page 7
During 1959 the Sino-Soviet bloc extended to nonbloc
countries slightly more than $1 billion in new credits--
virtually all for economic development in the underdevel-
oped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The
USSR accounted for about 90 percent of the 1959 aid, in-
cluding a new credit to Finland. Since the beginning
of the bloc's economic offensive in 1954, the Soviet Union
has extended about $2.5 billion, and East European nations
and Communist China about $1 billion in credits. Military
material accounts for most of the aid delivered to date,
about one third of the total extended, but more economic
credits will be used during 1960. There are indications
that the program will be expanded, with new emphasis on
African and Latin American countries.
WESTERN EUROPE'S ECONOMIC GROUPINGS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
European finance and economics ministers will meet
informally in Paris on 12 and 13 January to seek a basis
for reconciling fundamental differences between the French-
led European Economic Community and the British-inspired
European Free Trade Association. Only limited progress
is expected. The meeting will explore in addition the
question of a joint Western program for aid to underdevel-
oped countries, but agreement on means for accomplishing
this is also unlikely.
TERRORISM IN CAMEROUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Terrorist activity appears to be turning into virtual
civil war in parts of southwestern Cameroun, the former
UN trust territory which became independent on 1 January.
French Army units--heretofore officially confined to bor-
der control operations--are expected soon to be reinforced
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
PART II (continued)
and to respond to Prime Minister Ahidjo's request for di-
rect assistance. While more overt and energetic French
military involvement may contain the violence, which is
limited to one major tribe and is basically social and
economic in origin, it is also likely to be exploited by
domestic and foreign elements who consider Ahidjo a French
MACMILLAN'S AFRICAN TRIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
London is engaged in a restudy of its approach to
the reconciliation of the clashing interests of the Afri-
cans and white settlers in Rhodesia-Nyasaland and Kenya.
Prime Minister Macmillan on 5 January began a month-long
tour of Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which will help formulate gov-
ernment decisions on several African questions which-have
become major domestic political controversies. The new
colonial secretary, Iain Macleod, visited East Africa
TENSIONS BETWEEN ETHIOPIANS AND SOMALIS . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Friction in eastern Africa between Ethiopia and its
Somali neighbors will probably increase as Somali nation-
alism gains strength. The Italian trust territory of
Somalia will become independent in July 1960, the protec-
torate of Somaliland is being prepared for early independ-
ence by Britain, and the pan-Somali movement is becoming
more active in its efforts to achieve union of all ethnic
Somalis--including those in southeastern Ethiopia.
I
ALGERIAN REBELS CONFER IN TRIPOLI . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The meeting of the Algerian rebel Revolutionary Coun-
cil, now in its third week, is expected to result in a
reorganization of the provisional government which will
increase the influence of military leaders. Such a move
would place in positions of power the "men who fight" to
whom De Gaulle's cease-fire proposals were addressed; at
the same.'time, it'~ would dramatize the rebels' willing-
ness to continue the war if a satisfactory peace cannot be
arranged. Other topics under discussion probably include
the supply difficulties of rebel forces in Algeria and a
possible relocation of rebel ministries based in Tunis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
PART II (continued)
FRENCH LABOR UNREST GROWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
French labor unions, frustrated by the Debrd govern-
ment's refusal to grant more than token wage increases,
have recently stepped up the number and scope of short
protest strikes in public services and the nationalized
industries, such as Air France and the railroads. While
the government has shown no inclination to compromise in
response to such strike action, it must expect increas-
ingly effective union pressures as a result of the new
willingness of non-Communist unions to cooperate with Com-
munist-led organizations, especially at the local level.
THREATS TO ITALIAN PREMIER SEGNI'S GOVERNMENT . .
. Page 15
Italian Premier Segni's Christian Democratic minority
government is threatened by intraparty dissension over
pending major legislation and by the possible loss of
parliamentary support from the right-wing parties, which
fear a Christian Democratic deal with the Nenni Socialists
in Sicily. The last-minute postponement of Gronchi's trip
to the USSR is probably the result of domestic pressures
as well as reasons of health, and suggests that a olitical
crisis may be imminent.
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN FINNISH LABOR . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Tactical moves by the dissident Social Democratic
faction of the Finnish Confederation of Labor (SAK) are
weakening the position of the moderate SAK leadership and
are greatly increasing the danger of eventual Communist
domination of the organization. The danger is probably
greater now than at any time during the past decade. The
dissidents appear prepared to enter into a tactical alli-
ance with the Communists, who with their sympathizers al-
ready constitute an estimated 40 percent of SAK's 240,000
members.
PANAMANIAN POLITICAL OUTLOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Continued anti-US agitation and demands for further
US concessions regarding the Panama Canal are expected to
characterize the campaigning now getting under way for
Panama's May 1960 presidential election. Leaders of nine
parties are jockeying for party endorsement and public
support. Opposition-inspired demonstrations against Presi-
dent de la Guardia's administration will be especially
likely during the campaign and may lead to new anti-Ameri-
can incidents.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
DE GAULLE AND COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
De Gaulle is apparently increasingly concerned that
Peiping is the major long-range threat to world peace and
has publicly characterized Communist China as a "yellow
peril" which is particularly threatening the "white,
European" USSR. The French are also impressed by diver-
gent Moscow and Peiping tactics, especially toward the
Algerian problem, and believe that in underdeveloped areas
there is a general Soviet-Chinese rivalry which can be ex-
ploited. De Gaulle's suggestion of "nonintervention" and
joint East-West aid to underdeveloped countries as summit
topics is connected with his concern over Peiping, since
he maintains that these topics offer the best chance for
genuine cooperation between Moscow and the West as a prel-
ude to what he calls a new world equilibrtum. Meanwhile,
however, the question of France's relation with Com9unist
China will depend largely on purely national considera-
tion, and De Gaulle's recognition of the Peiping regime
at a tactically advantageous time is a distinct possibil-
ity
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Since its inception in 1949, the Chinese Communist
Navy has had a steady growth and is now the largest navy
of any Asian country. Although still primarily a coast
defense force, it does have a small strategic capability
in its 15 native-built, W-class, long-range submarines.
Communist China has built .width ,$oviet aid; -,Riga class es-
cort vessels, T-43 minesweepers, torpedo boats, and gun-
boats.
. Page 7
The USSR, in concert with other bloc countries, has
moved rapidly to expand diplomatic, economic, and cultural
ties with Guinea and Ghana and to exploit Haile.;Selassie's
acceptance of economic aid during his mid-1959 visit to
the bloc. Moscow is attempting to establish relations
with Liberia, pave the way for diplomatic and economic
ties with Cameroun and four more territories slated for
independence in 1960, and woo nationalist leaders and move-
ments throughout non-Arab Africa, including colonial and
trust areas.
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7 January 1960
PART III (continued)
GREECE FACES SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Greece may be heading for a serious recession as a
result of unfavorable trends which have developed in the
economy in recent months. The economic decline is frus-
trating Athens' attempts to meet the country's NATO obli-
gations. Pro-Communist Greeks and Soviet representatives
are attempting to exploit the situation by emphasizing
the bloc-'s willingness to buy the country's agricultural
surpluses. There are fears in Greece that continuing
deterioration of the economy may undermine the Karamanlis
government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUugy
7 January 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Khrushchev has used a num-
ber of year-end messages and
statements to stress disarmament
as the key issue in internation-
al. relations in an effort to em-
phasize the USSR's peaceful pos-
ture. He reiterated the Soviet
proposal for universal disarma-
ment, hinted at a possible uni-
lateral reduction in Soviet
forces, and renewed the pledge
that the USSR would not be the
first to resume nuclear tests.
Such remarks were intended to
underline Moscow's desire to
maintain the "noticeable thawing
in international relations"
which the Soviet premier claims
was characteristic of 1959.
Troop Reduction
At a Kremlin New Year's
Eve reception, Khrushchev spec-
ulated on the possibility of a
further unilateral reduction in
Soviet forces. He may use the
Supreme Soviet session beginning
on 14 January as an occasion to
elaborate on his remarks.r-
On New Year's Eve, Khru-
shchev posed the question wheth-
er the Soviet Union should not
proceed unilaterally if the
"cold war forces" seek "to drag
us into the labyrinths of end-
less disputation." He con-
cluded that it might be "worth-
while" to reduce conventional
forces and rely on "rockets for
defense." Since August 1955,
the USSR has announced three
troops reductions totaling 2,-
140,000 men. A formal announce-
ment of further cuts would
strengthen the USSR's position
in pressing its proposal for
universal disarmament, which
Khrushchev apparently intends
to make the central theme of
the Soviet line prior to the
East-West summit meeting.
Any reduction of Soviet
forces would be beneficial from
the economic standpoint. The
Seven-Year Plan calls for a
rise in state employees of 12,-
000,000,of which only about
8,500,000 will come from the
natural increase of the popula-
tion. Measures are under way
to lessen this gap by employing
more women and youths, and the
balance will. have to be made up
by transfers r~s the collec-
tive farms or by releases from
the military. For the next few
years the outlook is for sub-
stantially smaller numbers of
males reaching working and con-
scription age, and manpower
needs may cause the Soviet lead-
ers to permit military force
levels to drop automatically by
continuing the present rates
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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of deferments from military
service and the present pattern
of call-ups and releases.
The general trend of So-
viet military thinking has been
toward greater reliance on mis-
siles and nuclear weapons in de-
fense planning. This was most
recently reflected in Khru-
shchev's remarks to Austrian
officials 'in October that he had
asked his military advisers for
an estimate of the cost of
shifting the Soviet military
system from conventional arma-
ments to missiles. He added
that their estimate of 30 bil-
lion rublesl$7.5 billion at the
official rate)would be cheaper
than the cost of a system based
on conventional weapons.
Khrushchev's remarks on
reliance on missiles may have
also been intended to under-
score the USSR's achievements
in modern weapons development.
His statements were preceded
by glowing references to ad-
vances in Soviet rocketry dur-
ing 1959.
In a letter to Japanese
public figures and newspapers
on 30 December, Khrushchev pre-
sented a favorable assessment
of the past year's developments
and expressed his expectation
that "joint steps" would be
taken at a summit conference
in order "to find ways to agree-
ment on disarmament and on oth-
er pressing international is-
sues." Cautioning against over-
estimating the achievements al-
ready attained in relaxing ten-
sion, Khrushchev stated that
only the first step had been
taken. He reviewed the details
of his proposal for universal
disarmament which he described
as serving to ensure the "lofty
and noble goal of peaceful co-
existence."
Apparently referring to the
US announcement reserving the
right to resume nuclear testing,
Khrushchev condemned as "par-
ticularly deplorable" actions
which were "likely to complicate
negotations and raise more ob-
stacles to establishing inter-
national understanding."
In replying on 30 December
to questions submitted by an
Argentine editor, Khrushchev
singled out universal disarma-
ment as the "most pressing and
the most burning problem of the
present time." He characterized
the disarmament problem as "far
outside" the framework of spe-
cial conferences of experts and
diplomats and recalled that the
Soviet Union had proposed that
"radical" steps be taken to
achieve a disarmament solution.
Predicting that a disarma-
ment settlement along the lines
proposed by the USSR would mark
1960 as the year beginning the
realization of "mankind's age-
long dream of a world without
wars," Khrushchev noted that
the ten-nation disarmament com-
mittee would be meeting in
March "under conditions in which
the clear prerequisites for a
serious improvement in the in-
ternational situation are at
hand." The Soviet premier
pointedly called attention to
the "great significance" of his
agreement with President Eisen-
hower that disarmament was the
most important question facing
the peoples of the world.
Nuclear Testing
In the first top-level re-
sponse to the US decision reserv-
ing the right to resume nuclear
tests, Khrushchev reaffirmed
Moscow's pledge not to resume
tests unless the West did so.
He claimed in his interview with
the Argentine journalist that
all the prerequisites for a ban
on nuclear testing already exist
and that the USSR is prepared
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7 January 1960
for an immediate agreement.
Clearly referring to the dispute
over the detection of under-
ground nuclear tests, the Soviet
leader expressed a hope that the
desire for cooperation between
states so recently evident would
help to remove "all the obstacles
that are being artificially
placed" in the way of improved
relations.
Soviet propagandaists have
strongly implied that the US is
seeking some pretext for resum-
ing tests, although they have
abandoned earlier press treat-
ment designed to leave the im-
pression that recent AEC experi-
ments with conventional explo-
sives were actually nuclear
tests.
On 2 January, two days after
Pravda had correctly identified
these experiments as nonnuclear,
Peiping picked up and repeated
in the press and propaganda
broadcasts the earlier Soviet
charge. People's Daily alleged
that "in k"'t_Re United States
had conducted a series of "un-
derground nuclear weapons experi-
ments, according to the US
Atomic Energy Commission."
Summit Meeting
Commenting publicly for
the first time since his agree-
ment to attend a summit meeting
in Paris on 16 May, Khrushchev,
in his letter to the Japanese,
specifically spelled out the
United States, Britain, France,
and the USSR as the participants.
As in his first reply to the
Western leaders, Khrushchev's
30 December letter also referred
to a four-power meeting.
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Iraq
Although celebrations for
Iraqi Army Day on 6 January os-
tensibly were organized by a
committee representing anti- and
pro-Communist elements, the
parade was dominated by such
Communist-front groups as the
Peace Partisans, Democratic
Youth, and Communist-dominated
unions and professional organ-
izations. The main theme was
"peace," with anti-Nasir and
anti-imperialism banners vying
with "peace doves" for second
place.
Army Day also was the oc-
casion for legalization of po-
litical parties under the new
"Associations Law," which gov-
erns the activities of such or-
ganizations as the Red Crescent,
as well as political parties.
Party activities will be under
the control of the minister of
interior, who has the authority
to dissolve parties which vio-
late the strict provisions of
the new law. Students, army
personnel, judges, and certain
other government personnel are
banned from party membership.
Any party may publish a newspaper;
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7 January 1960
subject to the usual press cen-
sorship. Although provisions
exist for appeal from the de-
cisions of the Interior Minis-
try, these are highly circum-
scribed and will be ineffectual
in practice.
The National Democratic
party (NDP) is the first party
to take advantage of the new
law, and Minister of Agriculture
Hudayb Haj Hammud has resigned
his position in order to lead
the party. Other prominent NDP
members in the cabinet, such as
Finance Minister Hadid and For-
eign Minister Jawad, are re-
maining, at least for the time
being. Hammud was replaced by
Brigadier Amin, an anti-Commu-
nist.
On 4 January American mili-
tary attaches were permitted to
attend, for the first time since
the 1958 revolution, an Iraqi
Army exercise. Held in what
was claimed to be a "normal"
way near the Iranian border, the
exercise was well planned and
executed. It included units
using artillery and tanks pro-
cured from the Soviet bloc, but
British rather than Soviet-type
aircraft.
Accompanying the resump-
tion of political activities is
the threat of inflation and dis-
illusionment with the regime's
ability to deliver on unreal-
istic promises. This is caus-
ing increasing concern among
Iraqi officials who are aware
of the economic pitfalls facing
Qasim and who report that he
has taken over almost single-
handedly the conduct of economic
affairs, ignoring his ministers
and staff. Wage increases,in
some cases reaching 80 percent,
and a 40-percent rise in the
note issue since the revolution,
coupled with a poor date crop
and disastrous grain harvest,
could lead to a rapid infla-
tionary spiral.
Iraq-Iran
Relations between Iraq and
Iran continue to be strained
by the Shatt al Arab controversy,
and the tone of recent propa-
ganda exchanges remains bellig-
erent. Although direct talks be-
tween the foreign ministers of
the two countries may be held
in the near future, little
willingness'to compromise is
apparent. If direct talks fail,
the issue may be referred to
the UN or the International
Court, a move that could pre-
sent a potentially serious
dilemma for Iran's Western al-
lies.
Nasir's acceptance last
week of the resignations of five
Baathist members of the Syrian
cabinet has probably been inter-
preted by conservative elements
as further evidence that the re-
gime will be compelled to rely
more and more on the old-line
politicians, merchants, and large
landowners. Nasir used such
elements to undermine the so-
cialist Baathist strength in
last July's elections and may
make further concessions to
them when he forms a new cabinet
and parliament next month. Vice
President Amir, since his ar-
rival in Syria on an expediting
mission last October, has spent
much of his time reassuring the
conservatives regarding Cairo's
intentions.
Any gain in conservative
support the regime may obtain
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7 January 1960
could be short-lived, however,
and Nasir still face formidable
long-range problems in Syria.
Reliance on the opportunistic
Abd al-Hamid Sarraj as the re-
gime's watchdog in Syria is a
weak point, and although the
suppression of political party
activity has thus far handi-
capped the formation of organ-
ized resistance to the regime,
dissidence exists on many levels
and in the military.
The regime's success in
Syria may ultimately be decided
by its handling of the worsening
economic situation. Syria is
now suffering from its third
consecutive year of drought--
popularly, if illogically,
blamed on the Egyptians--and
Cairo's measures to extend state
control over the free Syrian
economy have also caused resent-
ment. Amir's mission has been
generally well received, but
his efforts to improve Syrian
economic conditions will not
have immediate visible results.
Meanwhile, the regime will con-
tinue to be hard pressed to im-
prove its slipping prestige and
hold together the two-year-old
union.
Suez Canal Dispute
The Astypalea, a small
Greek freighter, is still de-
tained at Port Said with its
cargo of cement from Israel,
and UN Secretary General Hammar-
skjold is continuing his efforts
to obtain its release.
The secretary general has
a personal interest in this
latest incident in the :con-
troversy over Israeli shipping
via the Suez Canal, since he be-
lieves the UAR's action has
jeopardized his effectiveness
as a mediator. The Astypalea's
voyage was to have been the
first test of the UAR's private
agreement, negotiated by Hammar-
skjold, to permit through the
canal cargoes sent f.o.b. from
Israel and those sent c.i.f. to
Israel. Under these terms--
Cairo's "effective position"--
Israel would not legally own
the cargoes, and the UAR could
let them pass in accordance
with its public prohibitions
against Israeli-owned goods.
The arrangements, however,
foundered on a technicality.
Cairo claims the ship's papers
show that while there is a con-
tract for sale of the cement,
no money changed hands and the
cargo therefore is still Israeli
property subject to the usual
restriction. Nasir's govern-
ment is particularly sensitive
on this point, because it wants
to avoid providing grist for
critical propaganda from Iraq.
So far the Israelis, al-
though perturbed, seem content
to let Hammarskjold try to un-
tangle the problem, at the same
time charging that the vessel's
detention supports their con-
tention that Nasir cannot be
trusted. An eventual formal
complaint to the UN Security
Council remains a possibility
if the ship and its cargo are
not soon released.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia, which began
1959 in a very shaky financial
condition, ended the year in a
relatively sound position. For
the first time in history, the
budget was presented before the
beginning of the Saudi fiscal
year--31 December. Revenues
and expenditures are at about the
same level as last year, al-
though allocations for the royal
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7 January 1960
family are up somewhat. The
1960 budget reflects the suc-
cess of Crown Prince Faysal's
"austerity" program, which
halted the country's slide to-
ward economic chaos.
A high point in Faysal's
efforts to modernize the coun-
try's finances was the 28 De-
cember decree providing for a
gold-backed Saudi paper cur-
rency. This is a further step
away from Saudi Arabia's tradi-
tional but long discredited
bimetallic gold and silver
standard. Pilgrim receipts, a
form of paper currency which
has been circulating for sev-
eral years, will be gradually
replaced by the new paper
riyal.
The new government formed
in Laos under Khou Abhay, a re-
spected and moderate elder
statesman who was most recently
president of the King's Council,
comprises three representatives
of the reformist Committee for
Defense of National Interests
(CDNI), three from former Pre-
mier Phoui's old-guard Rally of
the Lao People (RLP), and four
independents considered close
to King Savang. This develop-
ment follows by one week Phoui's
forced resignation as the re-
sult of a dispute with the King
and the CDNI over constitution-
al matters.
The government in the mean-
time had been in the hands of
the Laotian Army's five generals,
three of whom are CDNI members.
Their most significant step was
to decree that the National As-
sembly's mandate had expired on
25 December, thus registering
the victory of the CDNI and the
King in their constitutional dis-
pute with Phoui.
The new cabinet, whose
main function will be to prepare
the country for elections some-
time this year for a new Nation-
al Assembly, is probably the
best that could be obtained un-
der present political conditions
in Laos. The CDNI will control
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the important ministries of for-
eign affairs, defense, and fi-
nance, while the interior port-
folio will be held by one of
the more able of the RLP's lead-
ers. Aside from Phoui's de-
parture, the net effect of the
recent crisis in terms of power
relationships within Laos' anti-
Communist ranks will be to give
the CDNI a possibly decisive
voice in determining the con-
servative slate in the forth-
coming electoral contest.
25X1
Despite the fact that the
militantly anti-Communist CDNI
disclaims any intention to make
radical changes in policy, a
harder line toward the Commu-
nists is possible. The mere
anticipation of a more repres-
sive government policy may stim-
ulate Communists both at home
and abroad to take countermeas-
ures, perhaps including intensi-
fied guerrilla activity. The
North Vietnamese radio has al-
ready called on the Laotian peo-
ple to unite and struggle
against the CDNI, which it
branded an "instrument of Amer-
ican imperialism." It has
charged the Laotian Army
with recent border violations
and warned that these will
have "disastrous consequences."
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7 January 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Communist China's latest
note to India, delivered on 26
December and broadcast on 2
January, contributes nothing
to break the deadlocked border
issue. New Delhi's initial
reaction has been negative.
the Chinese called on India to
accept are Peiping's view that
the entire border has "never
been delimited" and Chou's
previous proposal for a mutual
withdrawal of frontier troops.
The note--an answer to In-
dian communications of 26 Sep-
tember and 4 November--was es-
sentially a repetition of the
"historical facts" Peiping uses
to portray its own territorial
claims as traditionally valid
while denying those of India.
It was couched in relatively
moderate tones and contained
sufficient references to Sino-
Indian friendship to suggest
that the Chinese are anxious
to calm the dispute with a dis-
play of their best diplomatic
manners even though they have
no intention of acquiescing in
Indian demands. Broadcast of
the full text in English to
Europe and Asia further sug-
gests that Peiping hopes to
convince others of its "just
and reasonable" position.
The Chinese again')urged
that talks between Choq En-lai
and Nehru be held "sp edily,"
ignoring Nehru's deci ion
against meeting `viile the po-
sitions of.-the two sides are
. so .far, apart. Peiping, ap-
parently feeling that if such
a meeting were scheduled, its
bitter critics in India would
have to moderate their attacks
to avoid embarrassing the In-
dian prime minister at the con-
ference table, suggested that
a Chou-Nehru meeting could
"reach agreement on some prin-
ciples." Two such "key points"
Neither of these points
is likely to be acceptable to
the Indians, who have already
rejected Peiping's withdrawal
proposal and have consistently
maintained that most of the
border is delimited by custom
or treaties. Nehru will prob-
ably again turn down a meeting
with Chou on the grounds that
it is premature. He may sug-
gest, however, that lower-level
meetings be held.
Nehru may defer a formal
reply to the Chinese note un-
til after Khrushchev's expected
visit to New Delhi in February
or early March. He may.hope to
enlist Soviet influence to make
some change in Peiping's posi-
tion. Khrushchev, who has been
embarrassed by the dispute and
has remained publicly neutral,
probably will encourage Nehru
to enter negotiations with the
Chinese.
While diplomatic efforts
seem to have brought the coun-
tries no closer to negotiation,
both the Chinese and the In-
dians apparently hope to avoid
further armed clashes and have
restricted their border patrols.
Indian officials have denied
press reports that Chinese troops
shot down an Indian transport
plane which crashed on 3 January 25X1
while dropping supplies to Indian
outposts in the rugged mountain
country of northern Assam.
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January 1960
KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO INDONESIA
Khrushchev's projected vis-
it to Indonesia, now scheduled
for 18 February to 2 March, will
enable him to repay a long-over-
due protocol debt and to exercise
his personal diplomacy. Presi-
dent Sukarno, who visited Mos-
cow in 1956 and again in May?195
renewed 'his invitation :for :.Khru- .
shchev'to visit Djakarta through
party presidium member N. S....Mu-
khitdinov when the latter'headed
a Soviet parliamentary delegation
to Indonesia in October .,1993:; .:Khru
shchevwill probably offer the gov-
ernment support for its-claims
to West Irian, bolster its neu-
tralism, and expound on the So-
viet Union's desire-to bring
peace to, the world. Since In-
donesia has used only a fifth
of the 1100, 000, 000 credit granted
in 1955, no new aid offer is
likely.
The problem of Communist
China's deteriorating relations
with Indonesia because of the
dispute concerning, Overseas
Chinese may cause Khrushchev
some embarrassing moments. The
Indonesian press has already
begun to claim that the visit
indicates that he "is not par-
ticularly pleased with China's
discourteous attitude toward
Indonesia."
The Chinese, however, are
moving on their own to calm the
furor; Chinese Foreign Minister
Chen Yi's letter of 24 December
was mild in tone and called for
speedy action on an exchange of
the ratifications of the citi-
zenship agreement and an open-
ing of negotiations on the In-
donesian treatment of Overseas
Chinese. On 31 December, Chi-
nese Communist Ambassador Huang
Chen appealed to Foreign Minis-
ter Subandrio to let "bygones be
bygones" and said that China was
ready to accept the Indonesian
decision on "internal policy."
If negotiations have not started
by the time Khrushchev arrives -
in Djakarta, he can be expected
to maintain the Soviet Union's
positio'n of neutrality in the
dispute while minimizing the ad-
verse effects it has had and
calling for negotiations in,
"good faith.?
Khrushchev's visit is un-
likely to produce any noticeable
changes in Indonesia's neutralist
policy. It is likely to have
its principal effect on the
Indonesian Communist party, (PKI),
the largest such party in non-
Communist Asia and the largest
single party in Indonesia. Pres-
ently obstructed at the national
level by army policies, PKI re-
cruiting activity and prestige
among the masses will profit
from the appearance of the world's
foremost Communist leader with
President Sukarno, Indonesia's
most popular figure.
Khrushchev has been invited
to stop over in New Delhi during
his. trip to Indonesia. He will
probably concentrate on getting
public and official Indian sup-
port for a. general statement of
the positions he plans to press
at the summit meeting.
As in. Indonesia, Khru
:shchev will be faced with an
embarrassment caused by China.
The USSR's neutral public stand
on the border issue, however,
has kept it free of blame, and
Khrushchev's.many private com-
niunicatioihs have impressed Neh-
ru with Moscow's desire to make
certain the dispute does not
lead to a deterioration of So-
viet-Indian relations,
Khrushchev will also vis-
it 73urma during the trip and may
stop inother';southeast:Asian coun-
tries :such.as Cambodia, if invited.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
AFGHAN PROBLEMS FOLLOWING KANDAHAR RIOTS
The Afghan Government has
taken a serious view of the
antigovernment riots in the
city of Kandahar on 21 and 23
December. Prime Minister Daud,
who was to go to Vienna for
medical treatment, has post-
poned' his departure indefinite-
ly, probably until he is
satisfied that the unrest has
been completely suppressed
and will not spread to the
Pushtoon tribes. The gov-
ernor of Kandahar is appar-
ently under house arrest
in Kabul, and the military
commandant of the province
has been given full author-
ity.
The Afghan Government,
heartened by the success of
its policy of encouraging
women in Kabul to appear in
public without the veil, ap-
parently moved too fast in
more conservative Kandahar.
Rioting by religious ele-
ments opposing this reform
took the government by sur-
prise and was suppressed only
after troops had killed a
number of demonstrators. Or-
der appears to have been re-
stored, although tension per-
sists.
Kabul is probably con-
cerned lest antigovernment sen-
timent spread to tribes living
near the Pakistani border.
Localized incidents result-
ing from opposition by these
tribes to government modern-
ization measures have been
suppressed during the past
year. More widespread opposi-
tion involving several power-
ful tribes at one time would
present a serious threat to
the Daud regime.
Daud's problem has been
made more difficult by the
death in late December of his
uncle, Shah Mahmud, who had
more prestige among the tribes
than any other member of the
royal family. The family is
probably looking for ways to
strengthen its position with
the tribes, possibly through
new appointments to government
office.
The Afghan Government's
frustration over difficulties
in implementing the moderniza-
tion program may also create a
new strain in Afghan-Pakistani
relations. Some Afghan offi-
cials have privately accused
Pakistan of having a hand in
the Kandahar riots, an atti-
tude consistent with previous-
ly expressed Afghan feelings
that President Ayub's regime
would be harder to deal with
than its predecessors. Paki-
stani press exploitation of the
Kandahar situation may also an-
tagonize the Afghans.
Nevertheless, Daud ap-
parently is determined to
press ahead with his pro-
grams for reform and develop-
ment. Meetings to encourage
social progress have been
held in other parts of the
country since the Kandahar
riots and have received marked
emphasis in the Kabul press.
Daud apparently feels it would
be more dangerous to give in
to the opposition than to sup-
press it.
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ENMARK -
DENMARK-
7 January 1960
7
EAST GERMAN FARMERS RESORT TO SABOTAGE AGAINST REGIME
East German farmers are
resorting to arson, physical
violence, and organized com-
munity action to pre-
vent collectivization,
according to a speech
delivered by polit-
buro member Erich
Mueckenberger at the
seventh plenum of the
Socialist Unity (Com-
munist) party (SED)
central committee,
held from 10 to 14
December. Muecken-
berger, who has par-
ty responsibility for
agricultural matters,
declared that some
900 fires had been
set in the third quar-
ter of 1959 alone,
with property damage
of 5.5 million East
German marks ($2,500,-
000 at the legal rate).
Such serious disaffec-
tion among the peas-
antry will bring a-
bout further deteri-
oration of the food
supply already sharply
curtailed by last sum-
mer's drought.
As justification
for stronger measures
against the farmers,
Mueckenberger cited
Khrushchev's state-
ment at the Hungarian
party congress that
the "class struggle"
does not cease during
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giving lip service to the
idea of voluntary collectivi-
zation--specifically endorsed
FAST GERMANY
`N
N. .'Schwerin
Hamburg
SCHWERIN
FEDERAL
the "building of socialism,"
thus indicating that an inten-
sification of pressure on inde-
pendent farmers is in the offing.
Party boss Ulbricht--although
"persistent persuasion"--mass
intimidation--as the correct
method of dealing with in-
dependent peasants.
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7 January 1960
Some farmers have cited
production figures to prove
that small family farms are
far more productive than col-
lectives, and resistance to
collectivization has been led,
in some cases, by SED members
in the interest of greater out-
put. The regime has repeatedly
denounced such "third-road" doc-
trines as opportunistic, non-
Marxist, and "Social Democratic,"
and has resorted to arrests to
break resistance.
Minister of Agriculture
Reichelt announced at the ple-
num that 43.5 percent of the
arable land now is in collec-
tives. This compared with 40.9
percent in September and 37
percent in January 1959. The
total socialized area, includ-
ing state farms, now is 52 per-
cent.
Reichelt said that collet-
tivitation must be accelerated,
and he denounced any opposition
as opportunism or weakness. He
added that the planned increase
of cattle and milk production
under the Seven-Year Plan must
be reached in 1963, two years
ahead of schedule.
SED leaders are recruiting
party members to go to farm
areas as agitators and ""colon-
ists." Industrial workers
have been sent on special "rural
Sunday" trips to talk the farm-
ers into joining collectives.
The Schwerin party newspaper
reported on 7 December that 8,-
275 agitators had visited vil-
lages the previous day. As a
result, 122 independent farmers 25X1
had promised to join collec-
tives.
in by ORR
SOVIET BLOC RESUMES PRESSURES ON GREECE
The Soviet Union and the
Balkan satellites have resumed
their campaign of threats and
blandishments designed to make
Greece accept bloc proposals
for negotiating outstanding
intra-Balkan problems. Athens
shows no weakening in its de-
termination to resist these
pressures, but fears that the
Greek people may be impressed
by conciliatory gestures from
the bloc.
In late December the So-
viet charge in Athena suggested
to an American Embassy official
that Soviet, British, and Amer-
ican envoys in Sofia attempt to
break the impasse between Bul-
garia and Greece over war debts
and reparations, ostensibly the
major obstacle to better vela-
tions between the two countries.
The proposal, which antic-
ipates the early accreditation
of an American minister to Bul-
garia, has not been officially
broached by the USSR to the
Greek Government. It parallels,
however, a suggestion by former
Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis
in an early December issue of a
major proregime paper, ICathimerini.
While the Soviet Government may
have assumed that the Pipinelis
article had some. official back-
ing, a Greek Foreign Ministry
spokesman has privately stated
that his government is opposed
to such negotiations.
The absence of any pub-
licity to date suggests that
the overture was intended to
sow suspicion in Athens that
the United States and Britain
might be willing to negotiate
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7 January 1960
a settlement--under Article 36
of the Bulgarian peace treaty--
without Greek participation.
Refusal by the United States
and Britain to accede to :a for-
mal Soviet request of this na-
ture could also be used by bloc
countries to claim that the
treaty as a whole is no long-
er in force and thus "legalize"
missile installations in Bul-
garia.
In public, Moscow has
adopted a somewhat harder atti-
tude toward Greece. On 27 De-
cember, Izvestia attacked the
Karamanl s government for re-
fusing to participate in a Bal-
kan conference and for failing
to respond to Soviet overtures
to improve relations.
The meeting of Bulgarian
Premier Yugov and his Rumanian
counterpart, Chivu Stoica, in
Bucharest from 16 to 22 Decem-
ber appears to have involved
the coordination of new measures
toward Greece. Rumania's at-
titude toward Athens since the
meeting has been conciliatory,
and press articles have empha-
sized that the moment is op-
portune to settle Balkan prob-
lems. An amnesty for Greek
political prisoners in Rumania--
reportedly to be announced
soon--would dovetail with this
propaganda and serve as a good-
will gesture.
While Albania has Condemned
Greece for allegedly planning
to set up NATO missile bases,
it has tempered this by calling
for improved relations and for
Greek participation in a Balkan
conference. There is little
possibility, however, that Ti-
rana would be willing to settle
the problem of Greek claims to
northern Epirus--now a part of
Albania--which has been a seri-
ous deterrent to improved state
relations.
Bulgarian party First
Secretary Zhivkov, in an inter-
view with the far-left Greek
paper Avghi on 23 December,
also ca a for the establish-
ment of normal diplomatic and
trade relations, and proposed
that trade fairs be set up in
principal cities in each coun-
try. At the 21-25 December
meeting of the National Assem-
bly,Zhivkov renewed his call
for extensive bilateral Greek-
Bulgarian negotiations on out-
standing problems and suggested
an agreement to reduce the
armies of both states to the
size required for border pro-
tection. The creation of a
"Committee for Balkan Under-
standing and Cooperation" was
also announced at the assem-
bly.
Zhivkov also made the
point, however, that if Greece
or Turkey,"persists" in plans
for NATO missile bases on its
territory, Bulgaria will
have to petition the USSR for
similar installations. Athens
apparently understands this
to imply that the Bulgarian
threat to turn to the USSR
for missile bases would be
carried out if Athens and An-
kara reject the proposal for
a Balkan summit ccoference. By
playing up Zhivkov's remarks
in the worst possible light,
Karamanlis hopes to unite the
Greek people behind his gov-
ernment in the face of an "ex-
ternal threat of aggression."
Despite Athens' posture
toward the bloc, Foreign Min-
ister Averoff has privately
conceded that Greece's dete-
rioratin;g economic position
makes it susceptible to bloc
offers to absorb large agri-
cultural surpluses in exchange
for "normalizing" relations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'UIIARY
7 January 1960
SINO-SOVIET 3LOC AID TO NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
During 195) the wino-So-
viet bloc extended slightly more
than $1 billion in new credits
to nonbloc countries, with the
USSR accounting for about 90
percent of this aid. Of this
amount, $125,004 000 was made
available to Finland and the
balance to underdeveloped coun-
tries in Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East. In the absence of
any new major agreements for
military aid, 1959 became the
most significant year in terms
of purely economic assistance
since the bloc's foreign aid
campaign began in 1954. So-
viet economic and military aid
outside the bloc since then--
primarily to underdeveloped
countries--totals about $2.5
billion; East European nations
and Communist China have ex-
tended about $1 billion.
Some one third of the to-
tal called for in bloc aid agree-
ments has been delivered to date.
Nearly 60 percent of the aid de-
livered consists of military
items and services provided the
UAR, Afghanistan, Iraq, Indo-
nesia, and Yemen. The Soviet-
constructed Bhilai steel mill
in India and a variety of proj-
ects and other economic as-
sistance provided to Yugoslavia
and Afghanistan account for most
MAJOR BLOC AID ~D TO THE FREE WORLD IN 1959
(Million US Dollars)
USSR (Total aid extended=940.0) , Other Bloc countriesiTotal aid extended=100.01
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7 January 1960
of the economic aid delivered.
Advanced project planning and
surveys indicate that the rate
of use of economic aid will be
increased during 1960.
The first Soviet credits
to non-Arab states in Africa
were extended in 1959. Ethio-
pia received a standard. Soviet
$100,000,000 credit and a $10,-
000,000 Czech credit, and Guin-
ea was granted a $35,000,000
Soviet credit, as well as small
assistance from other bloc
countries. During the year
the bloc also committed itself
to aid India's Third Five-Year
Plan, which begins in 1961.
New Delhi is to receive $420,-
000,000 from Moscow and nearly
$50,000,000 from Prague as
initial aid for the plan.
Asian countries have been
the major recipients of bloc
credits, accounting for 60 per-
cent of those extended in 1959.
General offers of economic as-
sistance and a few specific
proposals made elsewhere show
that a further expansion of
Soviet foreign aid to under-
developed countries can be
expected, with new emphasis
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on African and Latin American
countries.
(Prepared y
An informal meeting of
European finance and economics
ministers in Paris on 12 and
13 January will try to find a
basis for reconciling fundamen-
tal differences between the
French-led European Economic
Community (EEC) and the Brit-
ish-inspired European Free
Trade Association (EFTA). The
meeting will also explore the
question of a joint Wesi.3rn
program for aid to underdevel-
oped countries, but is unlikely
to agree on means for accom-
plishing this.
The meeting results in
part from recent expressions
of concern by such leaders as
Adenauer, Macmillan, and Spaak
over the diverging paths of
the six-nation EEC'and the
seven-nation EFTA, and the
threat thus posed to European
unity and prosperity. The pos-
sibility of directly negotiat-
ing these differences within
the OEEC framework dwindled
steadily during the latter
half of 1959 because of France's
belief that Britain was using
the OEEC to undermine the Com-
mon Market.
The composition of the
ministerial meeting is largely
an attempt to meet these French
suspicions. Five countries
from the EEC and the EFTA will
participate; the permanence of
the EEC is acknowledged by in-
cluding representation from
its executive commission, and
the widespread European desire
for. US representation is alsomet.
The outlook for agreement,
however, is poor. France is
bent on the political and
strategic-advantages of the
Continental EEC grouping having
a common external tariff and
sees no evidence that London
is prepared to abandon its
longer term objective of a
free-trade association for all
of Western Europe but giving
Berlin external tariff autonomy.
The informal group can hardly
be expected to do more than
prepare an arrangement for fu-
ture negotiations on specific
issues, possibly within a
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7 January 1960
reorganized OEEC providing full
United States and Canadian mem-
bership.
Western European govern-
ments generally achnowledge the
desirability of increasing and
coordinating their assistance
to less-developed countries.
Fearful ofinflation, however, na-
tional finance ministers are
hesitant to allocate any sub-
stantial amount of foreign ex-
change to such purposes unless
it is covered by new taxes--
politically difficult to raise.
European Community (Coal Steel Community,
EURATOM, European Economic Community)
Applicants for association with the
European Economic Community
Organization for European Economic
Cooperation
European Economic Community: France, Belgium, Italy,
West Germany, and Netherlands.
European Free Trade Association: United Kingdom,
Portugal, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden.
Executive Commission of the European Economic
Community.
Greece - Candidate for European Economic Community
membership.
US and Canada - Associate members of the Organization
For this reason and because
of extensive national and re-
gional preoccupation with as-
sociated underdeveloped areas,
such as the EEC commitment to
Africa, there will be a tendency
in the meeting not to go beyond
endorsement in principle of
large-scale cooperative aid and
establishment of administrative
machinery to work toward this
end. West Germany and Italy,
however, may make substantial
specific offers contingent on
parallel participation by other
nations.
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TERRORISM IN CAMEROUN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
Terrorist activity by ele-
ments of the important Bamileke
tribe appears to be turning in-
to virtual civil war in parts
of southwestern Cameroun, the
former French-administered UN
trust territory which became
independent on 1 Jan-
uary. France's top
official in the coun-
try indicated on 29
December that full-
scale rebellion was
raging in three : fourths
of Bamileke Depart-
ment, where he said
the two most impor-
tant of many maraud-
ing bands control a
large area. Normal
activities have been
completely disrupted
in this region,from
which 7,000 refugees,
including some Euro-
peans, reportedly fled
to neighboring Brit-
ish Cameroons during
the first three weeks
of December.
At the same time,
isolated attacks by
Bamileke terrorists--
who appear to be well
supplied with funds.
and obsolete` hunting
weapons and to have
a limited number of
Czech-made automatic
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ever, the unrest is being agi-
tated and exploited by politi-
cal elements affiliated with the
extremist wing of the outlawed
nationalist movement, the Union
of the Cameroons Population
(UPC). These elements, which
Department boundary
Enugu
Bamil
pistols--continue to occur in
Yaounde, Cameroun's capital, and
in Douala, its seaport and larg-
est city. Some 50 persons were
reported killed and 75 wounded
following particularly bold in-
cidents staged in those cities
last week as foreign guests--
including several Soviet bloc
delegations--were congregating
for the independence ceremonies.
This increasing turbulence
among the Bamileke seems to stem
basically from population pres-
sure on the tribe's limited
arable land and from abuses of
authority by many of its auto-
cratic hereditary chiefs. How-
C MEROONSIJ 4
GABON
0
4
receive material and financial
support from, but are by no means
all controlled by, the opportun-
istic, exiled UPC leader Felix
Moumie, are determined to over-
throw moderate Prime Minister
Ahidjo, whom they consider a
French stooge.
This opinion of Ahidjo is
shared by many of his less ex-
treme domestic opponents, as
well as by the militant nation-
alist leaders.of Ghana, Guinea,
and the UAR. Representatives
from these countries, which have
assisted Moumie, were conspic-
uously absent from Cameroun's
independence celebrations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
All of Ahidjo's adversaries
can be expected to exploit the
expected early employment--at
Ahidjo's request--of French
Army units in direct, overt
support of Cameroun's overtaxed
security forces. Heretofore,
French troops, whose strength
in Cameroun is apparently soon
to be increased from 2,000 to
about 3,000 men, have been of-
ficially restricted to border
asaland and Kenya.
Prime Minister Mac-
millan on 5 January
began a month-long
tour of Ghana, Ni-
geria, South Africa,.
and the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land which will help
formulate government
decisions on several
African questions
which have become
major domestic polit-
ical controversies.
Macmillan's visits
to Accra, Lagos, and
Pretoria are in the
nature of a good-will
Commonwealth tour,
complementing a simi-
lar tour to South
Asia and the Far East
two years ago.
London is engaged in a re-
study of its approach to the
reconciliation of the clashing
interests of the Africans and
white settlers in Rhodesia-Ny-
In the Federa-
tion of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, London's
stated aim has thus
far been to hold the
settler-dominated
federation together.
The recently estab-
lished Monckton Com-
mission will begin
its investigation
soon in preparation
25X1 for a constitutional
PORT. GUINEA ~
control operations. While the
resulting stepped-up military
action may contain the violence,
it is also likely to impede
Ahidjo's efforts to promote a
national reconciliation in bad-
ly divided Cameroun and may
hurt him in the crucial
legislative elections he has
promised to hold in late
February or early March.
review conference scheduled
for October.
On the eve of Macmillan's
visit, the clash of local
xw~ "RO N To
CO EM.TH COIN RES
OF AfW
Independent MWOWS
at the cwaoamm
Dependent of th
swa is in 1960
Ma of the Union
of Send Atrico
"'t r
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
interests has been heightened
by Federation Prime Minister
Welensky's demand for independ-
ence in 1961 and by the deci-
sion of African leaders to boy-
cott the Monckton Commission
when it visits the Federation.
The British Labor party
has offered increasingly mili-
tant opposition to the govern-
ment's moderate approach to
African problems, and has re-
fused to participate in the
Monckton Commission. Since
losing the October elections,
the party has focused on Af-
rican policy, in the absence
of any agreement on a domestic
line. It now plans to make
1960 an "African year" and to
stage a massive propaganda cam-
paign in Britain that will
probably encourage African
recalcitrance.
Regardless of this pres-
sure, London may be preparing
a policy shift toward the Afri-
cans' viewpoint. The Colonial
Office is already contemplating
letting overwhelmingly African-
populated Nyasaland secede from
the Federation. The new colo-
nial secretary, Lain Macleod,
during a familiarization tour
of East Africa in December,
was unusually persistent in
seeking to meet African leaders
and to increase his under-
standing of African demands.
Macleod is planning to visit
the Rhodesias later this year,
and is evidently considering
early negotiations with im-
prisoned Nyasaland nationalist
leader Dr. Hastings Banda. If
Macmillan talks to Banda, it
will be a strong indication that 25X1
the government's basic approach
to its African problems has
changed.
Tension between Ethiopia
and its Somali neighbors has
increased as a result of a
series of clashes in Ethiopia
between Ethiopian authorities
Asmara,
ERITREA
The Horn of Africa
Approximate area of proposed
Greater Somalia
and nomadic tribesmen from the
British protectorate of Somali-
land. Since 30 November more
than 20 persons have been killed,
and relations between Addis
Abada and London have deteri-
orated. Addis Abada, desirous
of 'extending its jurisdiction
over the tribesmen, has demanded
that Britain disarm them before
they enter Ethiopia, but London
is reluctant to comply in view
of their claims that if unarmed
they would be slaughtered by
the Ethiopians.
With the Italian-admin-
istered trust territory of
Somalia slated for independence
next July, the dominant long-
range problem in the Horn of
Africa is Ethiopia's hostility
toward Somali nationalism, par-
ticularly the concept of a
Greater Somalia which would
unite Somali tribes from Kenya
to Djibouti and include a con-
siderable area of Ethiopia.
Addis Abada is extremely sensi-
tive to any suggestion of Somali
expansionism and is likely to
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7 January 1960
see athreat in Britain's plan
for accelerated political evo-
lution in Somaliland. Follow-
ing legislative elections
there in February, Somalis will
be given some ministerial re-
sponsibility in a new govern-
ment in preparation for inde-
pendence, possibly by 1963.
Additional aggravation of
the situation may arise from
the activities of the pan-
Somali movement led by Mahmoud
Harbi, the former nationalist
premier of the overseas ter-
ritory of French Somaliland
who was ousted by Paris in
November 1958. Its conference,
however, recently held in Mo-
gadiscio with the official,
although reluctant, backing of
the moderate government of
Somalia, broke up because of
tribal factionalism.
Another attempt to hold a
similar conference later this
year is expected. Ten political
resolutions were to have been
introduced, including proposals
for an economic and cultural
boycott of Ethiopia and France
and a demand that Somalia refuse,
after it gains its independence,
to enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with nations opposing the
pan-Somali movement.
Harbi is now expected to
establish an office in Cairo to
promote Somali nationalism and
may later seek Afro-Asian support 25X1
for a visit to several capitals,
including Conakry, Accra, and
New Delhi.
ALGERIAN REBELS CONFER IN TRIPOLI
Reports emanating from the
meeting in Tripoli, Libya, of
the Algerian rebel Revolutionary
Council, now in its third week,
indicate that a government re-
organization strengthening the
influence of military figures
will be announced shortly.
While the rebels have denied
reports that Premier Ferhat Ab-
bas will step down, there is
considerable sentiment for the
abolition of several ministries.
Foreign Minister Lamine-Deba-
ghine, who has long been at odds
with his colleagues in the pro-
visional government, may be re-
placed.
Algerian spokesmen indicat-
ed in mid-December that one
purpose of the conclave would
be to develop policies in re-
sponse to De Gaulle's self-de-
termination proposals. Accord-
ing to Defense Minister Belkacem
Krim, most council members favor
negotiations despite mistrust
concerning the good faith of
French military commanders in
Algeria. The meeting may re-
sult in the naming of a new
group of negotiators for talks
with the French, although the
rebels are still reluctant to
take the initiative concerning
a cease-fire, lest they give
the impression of capitula-
tion.
The elevation of military
figures to key ministries would
place in positions of power the
"men who fight" to whom De
Gaulle's cease-fire proposals
were addressed, while simulta-
neously dramatizing the rebels'
willingness to continue the war
if a satisfactory'-.peace :cannot
be arranged. In a conversation
with the Libyan official, Krim
stated that a majority of the
council is opposed to any re-
quest for further Sino-Soviet
aid, despite a general belief
that such aid would enable the
rebels to continue the war "in-
definitely." He conceded,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
however, that a major problem
facing the Algerians is the
failure bf Arab League nations,
except for Iraq, to deliver
their aid commitments.
Friction between the rebels
and Tunisian President Bour-
guiba--which was probably re-
sponsible for the convening of
the Revolutionary Council in
Tripoli rather than in Tunis--
has prompted discussion of
whether to relocate rebel op-
erations now based in Tunis,
especially those of the govern-
ment. One result of the Tripo-
li meeting may be the nominal
transfer of certain ministries
into Algeria proper--a move pre-
sumably designed to improve
liaison between the government
and rebel military units while
implying rebel control of ex-
tensive areas of Algerian terri-
tory.
FRENCH LABOR UNREST GROWS
French labor unions, frus-
trated by the Debrd government's
refusal to grant more than
token wage increases, have re-
cently stepped up the number
and scope of short protest
strikes in public services and
the nationalized industries
such as Air France and the
railroads. While the govern-
ment has shown no inclination
to compromise in response to
such strike action, it must
expect increasingly effective
union pressures as a result
of the new willingness of non-
Communist unions to cooperate
with Communist-led organiza-
tions, especially at the local
level.
Dissatisfaction among
railroad employees has been
smoldering since June, when
Premier Debrd quashed a sched-
uled 24-hour railroad strike by
threatening to draft striking
workers. The government has
held firm to its offer of a 3-
percent wage increase effective
1 January 1960, while unions
demand an 11-percent increase
promised them during the Fourth
Republic.
A series of 8- to 24-hour
strikes in various nationalized
industries and public services
such as the telephone and tele-
graph system during the late
fall culminated on 2 December
in the most widespread work
stoppages since De Gaulle came
to power. Between 60 and 90
percent of the public service
workers participated in a 24-
hour strike protesting the gov-
ernment's refusal to increase
the 1.5-percent wage rise planned
for 1960. The three major la-
bor confederations--the non-
Communist Workers' Force and
Christian Workers' Confedera-
tion, as well as the Communist-
dominated General Labor Con-
federation (CGT)--all supported
the strike.
While the national leaders
of the non-Communist unions
continue to oppose in principle
unity of action with the Commu-
nists, plant-level cooperation
has spread rapidly. The CGT
has made unity of action easier
for the non-Communist unions by
stressing legitimate labor
goals. One of the non-Commu-
nist Unions stated in a recent
announcement that "up to now
the government has counted too
much on our patient good be-
havior; hereafter it Must count
on our combativeness." This
statement reflects rank-and-file
pressure for more union adtivity
that will probably foster a
greater degree of labor unity
and new clashes with the govern-
ment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
Premier Segni's Christian
Democratic minority government
is threatened by intraparty
dissension over pending major
legislation and by the possible
loss of parliamentary support
from the right-wing parties,
which fear a Christian Democrat
deal with the Nenni
Socialists in Sicily.
The last-minute post-
ponement of President
Gronchi's trip to the
USSR is probably the
result of domestic
pressures as well as
reasons of health,
and suggests that po-
litical crisis may be
imminent.
Nevertheless, the Liberals,
Monarchists, and neo-Fascists,
recognizing that they exert
more influence as supporters of
the government than as part of
the opposition, have recently
softened their criticism of the
Christian Democrats, Further-
ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS(PSDI)
UNITED MOVEMENT OF,
SOCIALIST INITIATIVE- 5
Important ele-
ments in the right-wing Liberal
and Monarchist parties, opposed
Gronchi's trip to Moscow, fear
ing that any resulting improve-
ment in Italy's relations with
the bloc would tend to benefit
the Nenni Socialists, who have
been Italy's chief proponents
of a detente.
These rightist elements
were also disturbed in December
when the Christian, Democratic
national directorate urged the
formation of a N'enni Socialist-
Christian Democratic government
in Sicily to replace the alli-
ance of Silvio Milazzo's in-
surgent Christian Democrats with
rightists, Comm'tiliistS,, and i li
Socialists.' The, rightists fear
that the Christian Democrats
may be tempted to reopen nego-
tiations with the Socialists
if the unsteady Sicilian gov-
ernment falls again.
-VALDOSTAN UNION(UVD)
LIBERALS(P LI)
NED-FASCISTSIMSI)
7JANUARV,1960
more, $e ni's concessions to
nationalism in his conduct of
the South Tirol dispute with
Austria appear to have mollified
them. They would prefer to
leave it to right-wing elements
within the Christian Democratic
party to dump Segni, as these
elements did Premier Fanfani in
January 1059.
Meanwhile, conflict contin-
ues within the Christian Demo-
cratic party itself. The party's
national council will discuss
on 20 January a controversial
antitrust bill, and it will prob-
a.bly also take up the problems
of public versus private control
over nuclear energy and of ways
to finance a new $g00,0o0,000
agricultural plan, In addition,
the party is torn by the proposal
to oust the present editor of
I1 Giorno, the daily supported
By oil tycoon Mattei. All are
the subject of acrimonious cabi-
net debate.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
Tactical moves by the dis-
sident Social Democratic fac-
tion of the Finnish Confedera-
tion of Labor (SAK) are weaken-
ing the position of the mod-
erate SAK leadership and are
greatly increasing the danger
of eventual Communist domina-
tion of the organization. The
danger is probably greater now
than at any time-during the
past decade. The dissidents
appear prepared to enter into
a tactical alliance with the
Communists, who with their
sympathizers already consti-
tute an estimated 40 percent
of SAK's 240,000 members.
The controversy between
the two Social Democratic trade
union factions results largely
from personal feuding, but
there are also sharp ideologi-
cal differences. The moderate
faction, under SAK Chairman
Reino Heinonen, feels that'the
trade union movement should
not play an active role in
party politics. Heinonen's
moderates shun cooperation with
the Communists. The dissident
group, under the opportunistic
Vice Chairman Vihtori Rantanen,
inclines to the view that a
militant trade union organiza-
tion should "lead" the Social
Democratic party. Rantanen is
capitalizing on these divisions
to advance his prospects for
replacing Heinonen as SAK
chairman in 1961. He now ap-
pears willing to cooperate with
the Communists in order to
achieve this goal.
In late November Rantanen
announced that the six dissi-
dent Social Democrats on SAK's
17-member executive committee
would no longer caucus with
the eight other non-Communist
members to work out differences
prior to meetings of the full
committee. By cooperating
with the three Communists, the
six dissidents could obtain a
majority, but probably at the
price'of'dventual Communist
domination of SAK. The Rantanen
faction and the Communists are
already working to build
strength among delegates to
the 1961 SAK congress and ap-
pear to be well supplied with
funds, which are generally con-
sidered to come from the Finnish
Communist party and the Soviet
Union.
Domination of SAK by such
an alliance would greatly com-
plicate any government's efforts
to stabilize the economy and to
provide for an orderly program
of industrial expansion. The
morale of the Social Democratic
party would also be affected,
and such a development would
probably raise new obstacles
to renewed cabinet cooperation
25X1
between the governing Agrarians
and the Social Democrats.
5X1
Continued anti-US agita-
tion and demands for further
US concessions regarding the
Panama Canal are expected to
characterize the campaigning
now getting under way for Pana-
ma's May 1960 presidential
election. Leaders of nine
legally inscribed parties are
jockeying for party endorsement
and public support.
Panama's demands for in-
creased economic benefits from
the canal are being emphasized
by most political aspirants for
major office. Candidates are
expected to include in their
campaigns perennial Panamanian
demands for a larger share of
canal revenues and claims that
the United States has failed to
live up to its treaty agreements
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7 January 1960
regarding purchasing practices
and wage policies of Canal Zone
agencies. New canal issues,
such as the current dispute over
water rates paid by Panama City
to the Canal Zone, may also be
exploited. Political opportun-
ists may attempt to incitevola-
tile Panamanian students and
other nationalistic groups to
create new anti-US disorders
during the campaign.
The position of the Na-
tional Patriotic Coalition
(CPN), which has controlled
the government since 1952, has
been weakened by the withdrawal
of four splinter parties and
dissension among remaining mem-
bers over the choice of Ricardo
Arias as the party's presiden-
tial candidate. Arias, a for-
mer president and now ambassador
to the United States, is viewed
by many as the personification
of the corrupt oligarchy which
has ruled Panama during its
entire 56-year history. Presi-
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dent de la Guardia and the par-
ty rank and file are cool to-
ward Arias' candidacy.
Panama's numerous opposi-
tion parties have had little
success in their attempts to
capitalize on CPN disunity be-
cause of their own inability to
form a single political organi-
zation. Personal political am-
bitions of individual party lead-
ers have thwarted attempts to ac-
complish this, but the eight op-
position parties may 'yet merge
into several coalitions later on.
In any case, opposition leaders
are expected to step up their
attacks on the wealthy en-
trenched minority represented
by the present government,and
antiadministration incidents
may occur at any time during
the remainder of President de
la Guardia's term.
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7 January 1960
De Gaulle is apparently
increasingly concerned that
Peiping is the major long-
range threat to world peace and
has publicly characterized Com-
munist China as a "yellow peril"
which is particularly threaten-
ing the "white, European" USSR.
The French are also increasing-
ly impressed by divergent Mos-
cow and Peiping tactics toward
the Algerian problem and be-
lieve that in underdeveloped
areas there is a general So-
viet-Chinese rivalry which can
be exploited. De Gaulle's
suggestion of "nonintervention"
and joint East-West aid to un-
derdeveloped countries as sum-
mit topics is connected with
his concern over Peiping, since
he maintains that these topics
offer the best chance for gen-
uine cooperation between Mos-
cow and the West as
a prelude to a new
world equilibrium.
Meanwhile, how-
ever, the question of
France's bilateral
relationship with
Communist China will
depend largely on
purely national con-
siderations, and De
Gaulle's recognition
of the Peiping regime
at a tactically ad-
vantageous time is a
distinct possibility.
China as a "Threat"
De Gaulle con-
siders that nations
and their national
interests are the en-
during elements in
history, and he is con-
vinced that interna-
tional ideologies
such as Communism,
which claim to ignore
this reality, are
transient phenomena. He has
said that eventually the Soviet
Union will have to make common
cause with other white nations
against the non-European peo-
ples, particularly the Chinese
Communists.
The "return" of the Soviet
Union to cooperation with the
West would, in De Gaulle's view,
produce a new world equilibrium
which would prevent the catas-
trophe of a nuclear war and
guarantee the survival of West-
ern civilization. To hasten
this new equilibrium, the West,
he feels, must meanwhile stop
all Communist advances, par-
ticularly into underdeveloped
areas.
Last May, De Gaulle raised
the possibility of an East-West
The two camps (Etzat and West) would perceive that they resemble
each other, that regimes don't make any difference, that they are
white men on both sides, that they are civilized people who possess
great means, great resources, and that consequently their duty is
the same.
--De Gaulle, in reference to his proposal
for joint East-West aid to underdeveloped
areas, 8 May 1959.
Doubtless, Soviet Russia, although having helped Communism become
established in China, realises that nothing can happen to prevent her,
--Russia, a white European nation which has conquered parts of Asia
and which, in short, is quite well endowed with land,mtnea, factories,
and wealth--nothing can prevent her from having to reckon with the
yellow multitude which is China--numberless and wretchedly poor, in-
destructable and ambitious, building by dint of violent efforts a
power which cannot be kept within limits and looking around her at
the expanses over which she must one day spread.
--De Gaulle at 10 November 1959 press con-
ference.
Can Soviet Russia be blind to the terrible danger to which she
is exposed by the presence of so powerful a neighbor as China on her
Eastern flank? Is fear of this danger not already the real key to
her policy and the explanation of her frantic efforts to dispose of
the question of security on her western frontier by the diatntegra-
tion of NATO and the neutralisation of the state she considers to
represent the greatest military threat to her existence, namely Ger-
many? .... It is conceivable, ... in the face of the serious menace of
China, that Russia may come into the Western camp, an occurrence which
would suffice to establish the future equilibrium we are seeking.
--General Paul Ely, Chief of Staff of Na-
tional Defense, in National Defense Re-
view, February 1959.
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7 January 1960
detente based on cooperation
between the "white men" on both
sides. He said his March pro-
posal for joint East-West aid
to underdeveloped areas was a
way to begin. He elaborated
on this theme at his 10 Novem-
ber press conference by char-
acterizing Peiping as "the
yellow peril" when he speculated
on Soviet motivations for a de-
tente. Thus De Gaulle's propos-
al to include aid to underde-
veloped countries in East-West
summit discussions appears to
be directly connected with his
view that Peiping is a problem
for Moscow as well as for the
West.
De Gaulle and other French
officials, who see the retention
of French Africa as an essential
requirement for France's bid
for great-power status, have
repeatedly stressed that the
principal immediate danger to
the West lies in the expansion
of Communism into Africa. De
Gaulle told Secretary Herter
last April that the USSR's real
interest was "not Iraq but
Africa" and that the present
Soviet actions were designed
only to open a corridor to the
latter. Hence French proposals
for the southward expansion of
NATO responsibilities.
De Gaulle's belief in the
possibility of some arrangement
with the USSR probably accounts
in part for his efforts to con-
vince Moscow that France can
exert a moderating influence in
the Western alliance. Moscow's
present moderate line toward
France has been reciprocated
by De Gaulle's statements that
Germany must be confined within
its present borders, by his
continuing display of French
independence of the "Anglo-
Saxons" within NATO, and his
demands for a veto on Western
nuclear strategy.
French officials contrast
Peiping's recognition of the
Algerian provisional government
and ostentatious promises of
aid to the Algerians with Mos-
cow's cautious endorsement of
De Gaulle's Algerian policy.
De Gaulle has stated publicly
that as the Algerian rebels
fail to gain their objectives,
they will turn increasingly to
Communist China, not to the So-
viet Union. Growing contacts
between China and new African
states will spur De Gaulle to
new efforts to hamper bloc ex-
pansion in Africa.
De Gaulle's proposal that
the Big Four discuss noninter-
ference in the affairs of others
is also aimed at the bloc's
African policy. His reported
suggestion to Adenauer that
East and West try to reach an
agreement to refrain from sup-
plying arms to neutral states
suggests he may be hoping to
play on Soviet-Chinese friction
to induce Moscow to cooperate
with the West in controlling
arms shipments to the Middle
East and Africa.
Recognition of Peiping
De Gaulle's investiture
in June 1958 brought a flurry
of rumors of an imminent French
move toward closer relations
with Peiping, but the Foreign
Ministry reiterated its posi-
tion that Paris did not intend
to recognize Peiping "for the
moment." The Americam Embassy
reported in May that many
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 January 1960
important segments of French
public opinion view recognition
of Peiping favorably.
Proponents argue that
(1) a viable government func-
tions in Peiping, and recogni-
tion does not imply approval;
(2) a country of 650,000,000
people cannot be ignored;
(3) nonrecognition forces Com-
munist China into dependence
on Moscow; (4) improved Sino-
French relations would con-
tribute to the normalization
of East-West tensions; and
(5) improved relations would
open up a vast market for
manufactured products. Some
rightist proponents of rec-
ognition argue that France
should act independently and
not kowtow to the United
States.
De Gaulle apparently as-
sured the Chinese Nationalist
foreign minister over a year
ago that France intended no
new moves toward Communist
China in the near future, but
refused to raise French dip-
lomatic representation at
Taipei to ambassadorial level.
The French Foreign Ministry
said such a move might strength-
en the "great pressures for
recognition of Peiping from
left to right." In March 1959,
De Gaulle told the Japanese am-
bassador he did not intend to
recognize Peiping because he
saw nothing to be gained by a
move which the British ex-
perience discouraged and which
would provoke an adverse Amer-
ican reaction.
While the odds may be mo-
mentarily against closer French
relations with Peiping, De
Gaulle is a prime exponent of
stubbornly maintaining what he
conceives to be French national
interests, and he has not been
particularly concerned with
American opposition td his
other proposals to enhance
France's status as a major pow-
er. The question of France's
bilateral relationship to Com-
munist China will therefore de-
pend largely on purely national
considerations, and De Gaulle's
recognition of the Peiping re-
gime, at a tactically advanta-
geous time, is a distinct pos-
sibility.
De Gaulle may estimate that
ultimate French recognition of
Peiping would be a necessary
ingredient of any possible fu-
ture arrangement with Moscow.
Furthermore, he may estimate
that his tactics toward the
USSR--immediate firmness coupled
with long-range conciliation--
are equally applicable to the
problem of Communist China.
Particularly if he feels that
direct contact with the West
will lessen Peiping's depend-
ence on Moscow, De Gaulle could
be expected to work for general
Western recognition of Peiping
and its admission to the UN as
prerequisites for a long-range
and durable East-West detente.
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25X1
In 1949, shortly after
their conquest of the mainland,
the Chinese Communists began
to develop a naval force based
on a miscellaneous collection
of antiquated ships left behind
by the Nationalists and manned
with personnel from ground
troop units. Initially this
organization, a branch of the
People's Liberation Army, had
no military capability, but by
drawing on Soviet aid,:using
former Nationalist officers,
and selecting crews from fish-
ermen and other Chinese with
seagoing experience, it was
soon capable of minor opera-
tions.
By 1953 the navy had a
formalized organization struc-
ture based on that of the So-
viet Union, had established a
professional officer corps,
had acquired and improved a
number of base facilities, and
had developed an extensive
training program. During the
next two years a large number
of warships were transferred
from the Soviet Union, includ-
ing destroyers, submarines,
and minesweepers. In 1955, with 25X1
substantial Soviet assistance,
China embarked on a considerable
construction program
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7 January 1960
25X1
Chinese Communist naval
shipbuilding was heavily de-
pendent, initially, on Soviet
assistance for most components
and for direct supervision of
the construction processes.
Increasing Chinese sophistica-
tion in shipbuilding techniques
and the growth of Chinese
heavy industry, however, con-
siderably reduced this de end-
enc
Communist China has the
fourth largest submarine fleet
in the world--after the USSR,
the United States, and Britain
--a large and effective motor
torpedo boat force, a large
number of smaller units for in-
shore operations, and compara-
tively numerous and well-de-
veloped harbors and shore
facilities. In the short pe-
riod since its beginning in
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to the strongest and potential- 25X1
ly the most effective navy of
any Asian nation.
1949, this navy has grown in- 25X
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INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNNARY
7 January 1960
COMMUNIST BLOC ACTIVITY IN NON-ARAB AFRICA
The USSR, in concert with
other bloc countries,hAs moved
rapidly to expand diplomatic,
economic, and cultural ties
with Guinea and Ghana and to
exploit the "breakthrough" rep-
resented by Haile Selassie's
acceptance of economic aid dur-
ing his mid-1959 visit to the
bloc. The USSR is attempting
to establish relations with
Liberia, pave the way for dip-
lomatic and economic ties with
Cameroun and four more African
territories which are scheduled
for independence in 1960, and
woo nationalist leaders and
movements throughout non-Arab
Africa, including colonial and
trust areas.
SENEGAL--f
??"f ~?-^? ?
Although the ideological
basis for cooperating with na-
tionalist leaders and movements
from underdeveloped areas was
given formal approval by Khru-
shchev at the Soviet 20th party
congress in February 1956, it
was not until Ghana and especial-
ly Guinea became independent
that bloc policy-makers apparent-
ly saw opportunities to score
significant gains in the area.
At':the 21st party congress
in February 1959, it wad de-
clared that the "nationalist
liberation movement" had en-
tered a "new stage," particu-
larly in Africa. During 1958
and 1959, the USSR, laying the
Bloc Activity in'Non-'A'rab Africa
PORT.'.. ???^~'1?' VOLTA ;/ BR.-
CAM
.i
GUINEA- GUINEA ..4 D HOMEY
r.. ~~ NIGERIA
SIERRA LEONE e IVORY
w? C?.SrG i
CENT. AFRICAN S
^REly.,---\
SENEGAL and 5O''D.AN I? i h, FEDERATION OF MALI RIO-?? UGAND
~no~rv
RUA1
Independent countries at the end of 1959
] Territories to become independent during 1960
I Diplomatic or consular ties with one or more
Sino?Soviet bloc nations
L IANGAN YIKA
ANGOLA ` r'~??~,
AND
?~,./~ NYASALAND: `?. S MOZAMBIQUE
RHODESIA