WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SOVIET POLICY IN INDONESIA SINCE 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006800070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 17, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Soviet Policy in Indonesia Since 1965
Secret
N2 720
17 January 1969
No. 0353/69B
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The USSR has faced a dilemma as regards its policy
toward Indonesia over the past three years, and the
prospects that it will be able to resolve the situation
satisfactorily are not good. On the one hand, Moscow
cannot afford to be too closely identified with a gov-
ernment that has relentlessly persecuted the once power-
ful Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), while simultane-
ously trying to wean the party away from the influence
of Peking. On the other, Moscow finds it equally un-
desirable to give the government of Indonesia cause,
e.g., by open support of the PKI, to move any further
into the Western orbit or to renounce its large debt
to the USSR. As a result, the Soviets have done just
enough to keep their relations with the government
alive, while quietly cultivating those groups they
hope will ultimately assume power. The Indonesians,
for their part, are nervous about Soviet subversive
capabilities but would still like to have economic
and technical aid from the USSR.
Background
During the night of 30 Sep-
tember - 1 October 1965, the
Chinese-oriented Indonesian Com-
munist Party attempted to seize
control of the government by means
of a coup ostensibly aimed at
protecting Sukarno from a mili-
tary plot against the government.
The PKI hoped to paralyze army
counterreactions by murdering
several top-ranking army gen-
erals, including the army com-
mander.
The army, under the leader-
ship of General Suharto, quickly
crushed the attempt. Taking
advantage of the PKI's leader-
ship of the affair, the army
moved against the party. The
legal Communist organization was
violently dismantled, and surviving
cadre were forced underground.
It was not until the summer of
1968 that party members in East
Java felt confident enough to
undertake a terrorist campaign
against the government. This
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was quickly smashed by army troops,
Although Soviet-Indonesian
relations had deteriorated as
Sukarno had strengthened ties with
Peking, Indonesia at the time of
the coup was still the USSR's
second largest military aid client
in the free world.
Relations with the Government
Soviet-Indonesian relations
have been cool ever since the
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coup attempt. In the immediate
aftermath, the USSR suspended its
economic and military aid, and
cut cultural and informational
activity drastic
Pu is y, e USSA
was circumspect in its criticism
of the new order.
Since late 1966, relations
between the USSR and Indonesia
have had their ups and downs.
As time went on, about the only
source of comfort to Moscow was
the dramatic decline in Chinese
influence. In November 1966,
Moscow agreed to reschedule In-
donesian economic and military
debts of $785 million. The In-
donesians made no immediate move,
however, to ratify the accord.
Then in August 1967, Indo-
nesia touched another sensitive
Soviet nerve by joining with
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand to form the
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). The organiza-
tion was established only to fos-
ter regional cultural, economic,
and social cooperation, but Mos-
cow nevertheless was apprehensive
that Indonesian economic cooper-
ation with such staunch allies
of the US as Thailand and the
Philippines might ultimately lead
to military cooperation and the
abandonment of a nonaligned stance.
Other sources of grievance
to the USSR were Indonesia's
policy of encouraging Western
investment, its continued harsh
treatment of the PKI, and its
failure to condemn US policy in
Vietnam. A Soviet official's
comment at the time that "they
are even confiscating Dostoevski"
illustrated the USSR's gloomy
view of its prospects in Indo-
nesia.
By late summer, 1967, how-
ever, there were also signs that
the USSR had decided to pursue a
more activist policy in an effort
to stem the drift to the right.
On 2 September of that year, the
Soviets finally agreed to provide
some $10 million in military spare
parts to the Indonesian Navy and
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Over the past year, the So-
viets have continued to use the
carrot-and-stick approach. Last
March the Indonesians finally
ratified the debt rescheduling
agreement. Further developments
were forestalled when Indonesia
condemned the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. In October,
moreover, Djakarta again provoked
Moscow by announcing its inten-
tion to execute several top-rank-
ing PKI members. President
Podgorny led the long list of
Communist individuals and groups
protesting. After the executions,
the USSR's propaganda organs
launched a volley of protests.
In mid-December, the en-
dulum began i-n aw; nn h .t'ir
e Soviets initiated is-
cussions with the Indonesians
about implementing phase two of
the spare parts accord. I
Soviet Economic and Military Aid
Soviet-Indonesian economic
relations have been clouded by
the failure of the two sides to
come to terms on debt resched-
uling. Although, the Indonesians
ratified the debt rescheduling
accord, they are still hoping
that the Soviets will defer an-
other $25 million repayment due
next April.
The Indonesians would also
like to secure a resumption of
Soviet aid for their new Five
Year Plan and for jungle clear-
ing and road building. The only
project on which the Soviets are
currently involved is a minor in-
land waterways project involving
the construction of three dredges.
There has been no work on
such prestige Soviet-aid projects
as the steel mill. at Tjilegon or
the phosphate plant at Tjilatjap.
The Soviets are particularly un-
happy that the Indonesians have
done nothing to protect the equip-
ment already sent in 1965 for
the construction of the steel
mill. Although 80 percent of
the equipment for this $35.5
million project had been delivered
prior to the coup, only five per-
cent had been installed. Much
of the machinery has since rusted
or been pilfered.
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The Soviets and the PKI
At the height of its influ-
ence in the early 1960s, the PKI
was the largest nonruling Com-
munist party in the world. The
Soviets began their campaign to
woo the badly decimated PKI away
from Peking about a year after the
gust 1967, a Soviet radiobroad-
cast implied for the first time
that not all Indonesian Communists
were oriented toward Peking. The
Soviet commentator referred to
documents of the Indonesian Com-
munist underground" that indi-
cated the party was examining the
disastrous implications of its
past alignment with the "Mao
Tse-tung group. In November of
that year, when the PKI finally
succeeded in holding its first
plenary session after the coup,
a pro-Soviet "revisionist" faction
reportedly tried and failed to
wrest control of the party from
the more powerful Peking-oriented
faction.
Last June, Moscow resumed
its public wooing of the party
by launching an international
campaign protesting the ill-treat-
ment of political prisoners in
Indonesia. The Soviets were rel-
atively quiet while the Indone-
sians rounded up those members of
the PKI who attempted to launch
an insurgency in East and Central
Java this summer, but were quick
to point out after it was crushed
that the PKI had erred again in
following the Maoist line.
Moscow no doubt
hopes t a i s recent efforts on
behalf of the PKI will strengthen
the hand of the more moderate
faction.
Relations with Leftist Groups
In the latter half of 1967,
there was a noticeable upswing
in the activities of the Soviet
diplomatic establishment in In-
donesia. This was a further in-
dication that the Soviets had not
given up their efforts to culti-
vate the Indonesians. A new So-
viet cultural center was opened
in Surabaya in April 1967, and
Soviet cultural and information
activity began to climb toward
precoup levels. Soviet cultural
officials, athletes, and trade
unionists began traveling to In-
donesia once again, and Indonesian
groups once again received in-
vitationq to visit Moscow.
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Soviet officials in Indo-
nesia began renewing old friend-
ships and cultivating new ties
with members of potentially
powerful political groups. The
principal targets of this overt
and covert effort were students,
various labor groups, Moslem or-
ganizations, pro-Sukarno members
of the Indonesian Nationalist
Party (PNI), and other Sukarno-
ists. The approach was rela-
tively circumspect, however,
and was apparently aimed at test-
ing the attitudes of these peo-
ple toward the government and
quietly encouraging pro-Soviet
attitudes.
The recent propaganda on
behalf of the PKI also made In-
donesian leaders conscious of
the USSR's troublemaking poten-
tial. One of the government's
greatest fears is that Moscow
will encourage the Marxists,
former PKI members, old-line
Sukarnoists, and various oppor-
tunists to unite in opposition.
Conclusion
In recent years, the So-
viet Union has clearly placed
a higher priority on its involve-
ment in Vietnam and its efforts
to establish relations with Ma-
laysia, Singapore, and even the
Philippines than on its rela-
tions with Indonesia. Moscow
evidently believes that the po-
tential benefits from cultivat-
ing the current regime are not
worth the political or economic
cost. Judging from its writings
on Indonesia and the statements
of its diplomats, the USSR does
not expect the present govern-
ment to remain in power indefi-
nitely.
Soviet officials predict
that Djakarta will fail to
solve the serious socioeconomic
problems it faces--large for-
eign debts, unemployment, wide-
spread poverty--and will be re-
placed by a government more to
Moscow's liking. There is no
evidence that the Soviets are
as yet offering more than token
support to the leftist forces
it would like to see dominate
that government.
For the time being, at least,
Moscow appears content to let
things drag along. A Western
observer has described Soviet
policy toward the government as
"thou shalt not kill but need
not strive officiously to keep
alive." If the Soviets did
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The Indonesians have not
given up hope that the Soviets
will ultimately unbend and of-
fer economic and technical aid.
Such aid, Djakarta believes,
would not only contribute to
economic development, but also
would tend to balance their
image as a truly nonaligned na-
tion. Djakarta is not really
counting on this aid, however,
and is particularly reluctant
to give the Soviets an oppor-
tunity to expand their physical
presence in Indonesia to a si -
nificant de ree.
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