THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002000010081-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: June 2, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
112
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Information as of 1600
2 June 1967
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US Marines continue to encounter heavy enemy
resistance in the northern.p.rovinces of South.
Vietnam.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
US Marines of Operation CIMARRON are continuing
their efforts to drive Communist troops from stra-
tegic hills overlooking allied positions south of
the DMZ (Paras. 1-2). Other Marine units launched
a new operation--BEAR BITE--in the coastal flat-
lands east of Quang Tri city (Para. 3). US Marines
encountered heavy enemy contact in Quang Tin (Para.
4). An ARVN unit reportedly killed 150 enemy
troops just north of Quang Tri city while losing
only one killed and 40 wounded (Para: 5).
e o
disrupted because of allied operations in Quang
Ngai Province (Paras. 9-10).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The
Provisional National Assembly (Constituent Assembly)
was scheduled to review completed upper house election
laws on 2 June (Paras. 1-2).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
A destroyed major road and rail bridge near Hanoi was
replaced by a permanent structure in about 20 days (Paras.
1-3)
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Two lead-
ing Communist military figures have authored articles
dealing with the military situation in the South
(Paras. 1-7). The USSR has protested the alleged
strafing of a Soviet ship near Haiphong (Paras. 8-11).
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VI. Other Major Aspects: An unusual number
of river cargo craft have been observed on the
Se Kong (river) in southern Laos (Para. 1).
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OPERATION t . e Demilitarized Zone
-gb'b G~1ARR:ON {~.~ 4i+3angTrl
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\S ava n na k net
Saravane
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(:IUSNG NAPA \
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.Qt(ang Ngai
THLL `. N.
?P~an
SOUTH VIETNAM
25 5C ;5 100 MCCS
0 25 50 75 100 K,ion eters
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1, In their continuing effort to drive the
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars from strategic
hilltop positions near the allied outpost at Con
Thien just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
in northern Quang Tri Province, US Marines of Op-
eration CIMARRON have reported sporadic contact
with enemy forces in well-prepared defensive posi-
tions several miles southwest of Con Thien. From
one of these hilltops, both Con Thien and the 175-mm.
artillery positions at Camp Carroll could be seen.
2. Casualties in this two-day-old operation
already total 12 Americans killed and another 98
wounded. Cumulative Communist casualties reported
thus far are seven killed, but should go higher
when body counts are completed in the areas that
have been subjected to intense air and artillery
bombardments.
3. US Marines launched a new offensive--code
named BEAR BITE--against NVA regulars in the coastal
flatlands of northernmost Quang Tri Province on
2 June. A battalion of US Marine Special Landing
Team A made an amphibious assault on the coast about
seven miles east of Quang Tri city to seek out the
3,000 enemy soldiers believed to be within the
sweep area. No contact with the enemy has yet been
reported.
Enemy Contact in Quang Tin Province
4. Two US Marine companies in Operation UNION II
made heavy contact with an enemy force 33 miles north-
west of Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province on 2 June. Pre-
liminary casualty reports state that 71 of the enemy
have been killed while the Marines have lost 55
killed and 100 wounded. At last report the action
was continuing.
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5. Farther north a South Vietnamese airborne
battalion engaged an estimated battalion-sized NVA
force about three miles north of Quang Tri city on
2 June. The enemy force withdrew following heavy
allied air and artillery strikes, leaving 150 dead
soldiers and 30 weapons behind, according to ARVN
field reports. Friendly casualties were reported
as one killed and 40 wounded, including two Ameri-
cans.
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Communist "Combat Village" Concept Upset in Quang
Ngai Province
9s I Icaptured
recently during Army Operation MALHEUR, states
that the "combat village" system in Duc Pho Dis-
trict, Quang Ngai Province, had been destroyed by
allied operations since February 1967. US Marines
conducting operations DE SOTO and DECKHOUSE IV
in February and March reported encountering elab-
orate bunkers and tunnels in enemy-controlled vil-
lages in this area.
10. also stated that
the Communists had not implemented a military draft
in Duc Pho this year, citing the fact that there
are some 50 youths of military age in his native
village who have not been drafted,
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Constituent Assembly, now called the
Provisional National Assembly, completed debate
on the upper house election regulations on 29 May
and was scheduled to review them on 2 June. The
assembly should decide the date for the presiden-
tial election and the method of nominating presi-
dential candidates, as requested by the Director -
ate, today or during its next few sessions.
2. In the meantime, Police Director Loan has
continued to act as the GVN's liaison contact with
the assembly, holding dinners with selected assembly-
men on 22 and 25 May, In sharp contrast to his pre-
vious meetings with military deputies from the as-
sembly, Loan's approach during the most recent meet-
ings was politically in a low key. During the dinner
on the 25th, which was attended by approximately 40
civilian deputies, most of whom were from the pro-GVN
Democratic-Alliance Bloc, Loan did commeht that the
GVN would like the presidential and upper house elec-
tions on the same day. The matter apparently was not
pursued, however. It appears that Loan has taken
the alleged advice of Bui Diem to soften his tone in
dealing with potentially significant political
groups. Assembly deputies had indicated in private
conversations with government leaders that such an
approach would prove effective.
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HANOI AREA - Canal des Rapides Replacement Bridge
2 JUNE
0
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Yen Vien
Hanoi railroad- highway bridge
- Completed replacement bridge
'--Second replacement brid e
,gyp ,\\\\ under construction ~t Q
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1. The North Vietnamese
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ment 'bridge- over the Canal des Rapides about 20
days after the original was destroyer. by US air
attacks in late April.
2. 1 a
700--foot all steel truss railroad and vehicular
bridge was in operation just to the east of the
original bridge. The approaches and piers for the
replacement bridge had been in place for some time.
The steelwork presumably had been assembled and
hidden nearby as an emergency measure.
3. The original Canal des Rapides Bridge was
one of the longest in North Vietnam. The North
Vietnamese probably calculated that a bridge of
this size on the main land supply route from China
required a permanent replacement rather than the
usual makeshift repairs. Another alternate rail
bridge is under construction down river from the
newly completed bridge. No preparations for a per-
manent replacement have been noted, however, for
the even longer Paul Doumer Bridge on the same rail
line.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Again this year leading Communist military
figures in South Vietnam have authored articles
dealing with the military situation in South Vietnam.
These articles were written by politburo member
Nguyen Chi Thanh and a leading South Vietnamese Com-
munist military figure who writes under the pseudonym
Truong Son. They suggest that the controversy over
the conduct of the war which was evident in a similar
pair of evaluations done for the same period at this
time last year has been resolved and that the pro-
tagonists concerned in last year's debate presently
view the military situation in the same light.
2. The latest articles, published in late
May, lacked any of the polemical overtones which
characterized those written in 1966 and focused
rather on the present "advantageous" military and
political situation of the Communist forces in the
South. In particular, on the question of the
interrelation of the three forms of military in
the South--main force, local force, and guerrillas--
which was a point of controversy in the 1966 assess-
ments, the articles declared that all three kinds
of armed forces have been "fostered and developed in
a planned way, evenly, proportionately, and in con-
formity with the practical conditions on the battle-
field."
3. Truong Son's article offered a relatively
sober, detailed, and confident analysis of the
situation in the South. Son characterized the
present US military situation as "a period of serious
stalemate." This, he claimed, was the result of the
failure of the US strategy which he described as one
designed to break up main force units through re-
peated search-and-destroy operations, which were
intended to be followed up by an intensive pacifi-
cation effort designed to gain control of large
segments of the population and to shrink the Commu-
nist area of control. He admitted that at first,
2 June 1967
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the Communist military leaders in the South did
not know how to cope with this US strategy and
pointed out that if the Americans were able to
scatter the main force units thereby forcing the
Communists to return to guerrilla warfare the US
would "strategically speaking" have won victory
and would have been able to end the war by launch-
ing major attacks.
4. Gradually, however, according to Truong
Son, Communist forces in the South evolved a way in
which to fight the Americans, and claimed that this
counterstrategy was proving successful. According
to Son, this strategy began in the fall of 1966 with
simultaneous attacks and counterattacks designed
to force the US to fight on Communist terms. This
would split and scatter the US forces and by stretch-
ing them thin allow the Communists to "strike the US
in all places while keeping sufficient forces with
which to attack the enemy everywhere, and when nec-
essary to concentrate forces in the key areas."
Major efforts were to be made to prevent the US
from fighting its own way in pitched battles.
5. This strategy, Son thought, had been
particularly advantageous in the past few months and
had forced the US to adopt a defensive policy and
had also led to increasingly heavy US casualties.
To bolster this last point, Son quoted statistics
on US casualties which, while somewhat exaggerated,
did reveal that the Communists have a fairly accurate
assessment of growing US losses in the South.
6. Son described the Communist manner of
fighting as "flexible, multiform and highly effi-
cacious" ranging from ambushes to large operations.
In fact, Son stated, some of "our battles" do not
bear a very great military significance but have a
great political and economic value. He pointed to
the VC attack on Quang Tri city in early April as an
example of a battle that had only minor military
significance but one which created serious political
consequences for the US and for the Saigon govern-
ment.
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7. General Thanh's article, published on 31
May, differed in no significant way from Truong Son's
but lacked detailed insights into Communist think-
ing about the war. Rather, like much of the general
propaganda that has been turned out on the "dry season
campaign," Thanh's article appeared to be primarily
a propaganda device designed to bolster Communist
claims of "impending victory" in the South.
Soviets Protest Alleged Strafing of Ship Near Haiphong
8. Moscow TASS international has announced that
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed the US charg4
a note protesting the alleged stafing of a Soviet
ship by US planes on 2 June--in the harbor of Cam Pha
port, 50 miles north of Haiphong.
9. TASS quotes the stiffly worded message as
demanding strict punishment for those responsible
and stating that in the event of a recurrence of
such actions the USSR "will be compelled to take ap-
propriate measures to ensure the safety of its ships."
It further stated that the Soviet Government is await-
ing assurances that there will be no recurrence of such
actions.
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11. The Soviet Union has twice before formally
protested to the US alleged near misses or direct hits
on Soviet shipping in Haiphong, but did not claim any
injuries. These incidents occurred in the summer of
1966. The present note is couched in stronger language
than its predecessors and is the first to state that
the Soviet Union will be compelled to take measures
to ensure the safety of its ships if such attacks re-
cur.
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LAOS PANHANDLE
NORTH VIETM
Cua Rao
MU Grp
PA SS
2)
TONE SAP ~^ .
Road
Track or trail
h Linh
Demilitarized Zone
akhet Muong
Phine
Muong
S Hang Efie Nong
Chavane ',%.
LATEAU 1
DES
BOLOVENS ,? y. 9 1 i
Buong Long
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1. An unusual number of river cargo craft have
been observed in southern Laos. Between 27 and 29
May trained observers along the Se Kong (river)
northeast of the Bolovens plateau reported 146
loaded small boats--dugouts, skiffs, and rubber rafts--
moving south.
2. In addition to cargo, each boat reportedly
carried a small number of armed soldiers. Although
the soldiers and supplies may be destined for South
Vietnam, it is possible that they are intended to
bolster Communist forces that recently opposed
Laotian Government clearing operations around the
rim of the Bolovens plateau.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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