CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003700150001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For af JF0097l5A003700150001/c~W
0.
17 May 1958
Copy No.
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
nocUMENT NO.
NO CHAN
1 i D ~~. iN CLEFS.
-r..Lt+S6:r-?.
.
CLASS. GI ?ANCED TO: S
NEXT FlE.VIEW DATE:
AU[N
DA
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 t ! ~ : ~ ~~ ~ o~ o ~o~oooooo~o\oo~ ~o~ooo~ ~ ~ o~ ~o~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o o ~ oooooo~ ~ o o ~ ~o~~ ooo~ o ~~~ oo~ ~oooo~o oo~ ~ \\\\\\\\\\\\ ~~\\\\\\\\
Approved For a eq
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25X1
25X1:
17 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
India-USSR: New Delhi ; and Moscow have apparent-
ly completed technical studies called for under the air
agreement reached last February. Soviet Chief Air Mar-
shal Zhigarev, head of Aeroflot, is to arrive in India on
18 May for the final signing of the agreement. Actual
air operations are not expected to begin, before August
1958.
II.. ASIA-AFRICA
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700150001-4
 will be acceptable.
Cyprus: Widespread violence may be sparked by
Britain's -public announcement on 19 May of a "modified
policy" for settling the long-standing Cyprus dispute. In
view of irreconcilable demands on the part of Turks and
Greeks, it is unlike London can offer a plan which
Burma: Tension is mounting as a result of the
strugg a or power among the country's top political
leaders, and could result in an outbreak of violence be-
tween the feuding factions.
been formalized by a royal decree of 12 May establishing
a cabinet system of government with a premier--Crown
Prince Faysal--who is to "guide the general policy of
the state." A provision excluding foreigners from member-
ship in the cabinet will lessen the influence of men on whom
Saud personally relied for his most confidential operations.
The new system is evidently one in which the King is in-
tended to reign but not rule.
b
Saudi Arabia: a egg ion of King aud`s powers
tain two seats in the United Nations.
Iraq-Jordan union: Jordan and Iraq have agreed that
the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Said, will become prime
minister of the Arab Union, while Jordan's cabinet head,
Samir Rifai, will be named deputy prime minister of the
AU and foreign minister for Jordanian affairs. This divi-
sion of offices means that few if any real policy changes
are likely to be introduced., The AU is determined to main-
*Algeerria The, situation is.1ncreasingly .critical. for Paris.
A: top aice.of General Ely says that:. General S:alan canhot resist
for more than a few days paratroop. demands for a "Franco-
type'.oatta.ckon inetropoli.tan Franco, and, that, the extremist
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
21
25X1
25X1
4
z Approved ForIRelease 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00979A003700150001-4
25
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 Approved Fo
Release 2002/08/13: CIA-RDP79T00975A00~
settlers appear to have won the loyalty of the noncommissioned
and junior officers of the French forces in Algiers. The army
continues to tighten its control over Algeria in the hope that it
can effect De Gaulle's return to power.
III. THE WEST
*France: Pflimlin&s political position has been strengthened
by the^ overwhelming parliamentary support given his request
for emergency powers. He faces considerable difficulty im-
plementing them, however, as long as the loyalty of the army
is in doubt. De Gaulle has made no further overt move.
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
National Intelligence Estimate No. 35-58, The Outlook
25X1
for Israel. 29 April 1958.
17 May 58
DAILY BRIEF
111
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700150001-4
25X1
25X
 Approved Fair Release 2002/08/13: CIA-RDP79T00975Aa
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet-Indian Air Agreement
The prospective arrival in New Delhi on 18 May of
Soviet Chief Air Marshal Zhigarev, head of the Soviet
civil air line Aeroflot, presumably indicates the comple-
tion of technical studies undertaken after preliminary sig-
nature of an Indo-Soviet air agreement last February.
Zhigarev is to sign the final document.
The technical studies were apparently concerned
mainly with flight routes and servicing problems. India
expects to fly Super-Constellations via Kabul and Tashkent
to Moscow, while the USSR will fly TU-104's from Moscow
via Tashkentand over the Himalayan massif to New Delhi.
India expects to
ma a an inaugural flight in June. The USSR has already
made at least one direct TU-104 flight to New Delhi.
Actual scheduled operations are not expected to be-
gin before August. At that time, a regular schedule of one
weekly flight in each direction may be instituted. The USSR
will provide hangar space and appropriate aviation fuel for
Indian planes. The two countries will share profits equally.
SECRET
17 May 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 1
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/08/13: CIA-RDP79T00975A
Possible Violence in Burmese Political Crisis
Mounting tension in Burma resulting from the power
struggle among top Burmese political- leaders could result
in armed disorders leading to widespread violence. Heavily
armed irregular home guards are said to have arrived.in
Rangoon to serve as bodyguards for Deputy Premiers Ba
Swe and Kyaw Nyein against Premier U Nu's faction, and
several political assassinations in outlying districts al-
ready have been reported.
Both factions and the armed forces are publicly
pledged to a peaceful settlement. Armed force, however,
has historically been the decisive factor in Burmese poli-
tics, and Burmese political leaders have no tradition for
the peaceful acceptance of political defeat. The mass
political assassination of seven top nationalist leaders,
engineered by a discredited prewar Burmese premier in
1947, ushered in Burmese independence.
The Burmese Army currently is playing a major
role in maintaining order, both through its neutral stand
and security measures it has imposed in Rangoon. Its
continued neutrality, however, is not certain; if the Ba
.Swe - Kyaw Nyein faction appears to be losing, the army
might try to redress such a. situation or might split, with
some elements supporting U Nu.
17 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 25X1
Approved FJ
King Saud to Share Powers With Council of Ministers
The Saudi royal decree on 12 May setting forth the
functions and powers of the Council of Ministers and of
Prime Minister Crown Prince Faysal constitutes a basic
reform in the country's process of government, in that
the Kin must share authority with the Council of Minis-
ters
The new decree provides that the prime minister
shall "guide the general policy of the state:' A cabinet
system of government has been established in which
the prime minister can request the King to dismiss any
minister, and the prime minister's resignation compels
the resignation of the cabinet as a whole. All laws must
be approved by the Council of Ministers, and the King
apparently does not retain authority to overrule a cabi-
net decision. A provision that only Saudi nationals can
be members of the cabinet will affect two Syrians and
two Palestinians of ministerial rank, including Deputy
Foreign Minister Yussuf Yasin and Royal Adviser Jamal
Husayni.
The American consul general in Dhahran, mean-
while, reports that King Saud is ill and that two Aramco
specialists in hypertension were sent to attend him on
15 May.
17 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03VO0150001-4
French -Algerian Situation
General Petit, a top aide of Chief of Staff General Ely,
during a special mission to Algeria told American officials
on 16 May that General Salan, the commanding officer in
Algeria, can only resist for a few more days the mounting
demands of the paratroop commanders who want a "Franco -
type" attack against metropolitan France. These commanders
are categorically opposed to Pflimlin or any similar govern-
ment. Petit is also convinced that the noncommissioned and
junior officers of the French forces in Algeria have been won
over by the extremist settlers and would be undependable in
any showdown between the army and rightist-oriented com-
mittees of public safety.
The army continues to play the key role in Algeria. Both
military and rightist civilian leaders--who have now formed an
all-Algeria committee of public safety--are increasing their
pressure on Paris in behalf of De Gaulle. There is a danger
that they may create incidents involving Morocco and Tunisia,
or, as an ultimate pressure tactic, announce a formal break
with the present French regime.
In Paris, Premier Pflimlin's political position has been
strengthened by the overwhelming support given his request
for emergency powers by both the National Assembly and the
Council of the Republic. He nevertheless faces considerable
difficulty implementing his special powers as long as the
loyalty of the army is in doubt. Pflimlin appears to be moving
closer to a condemnation of Massu and Salan, but such a step
would risk a major upheaval involving commands in France
itself. Reports of the arrest of two air force generals and un-
confirmed rumors that General Ely has offered his resignation
point up the confusion.,
The appointment of tough anti-Communist Jules Moch to
the Ministry of Interior presages an early effort to crack down
on any attempted demonstrations.
17 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
25X1
25X6
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4
 Approved F
25X6
De Gaulle's statement of 15 May has aroused favorable
comment in the right-wing Paris press and one left-center
paper. The general himself has issued no further statement,
but orle of his supporters has stated De Gaulle will not use
fore to come to power.
25X6
25X1
25X6
17 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved For Release 2002/08/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700150001-4