CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003800310001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 July 1958
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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24 July 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR--Summit Meeting on Middle East: While Pre-
mier rushchev ostensibly agrees to erican and British
proposals for a UN Security Council session at the heads-of-
government level, he attempts to construe the Western pro-
posals as an acceptance of his 19 July call for a five-power
summit conference on the Middle East. Khrushchev's aim ap-
parently is to ensure that all the important discussions will
be conducted in a subcommittee of the full council composed
of the five heads of government--the Big Four and India--plus
representatives of "interested Arab states:' The letters are
cast in deliberately ambiguous terms in order to maintain the
maximum freedom of maneuver on such issues as agenda,
participants, and procedure.
Watch Committee conclusion--Sino-Soviet Bloc (as of
1600E. T, 23 July):
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos-
tilities against the continental US or its possessions in the
immediate future.
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NOTE: It is not believed that the USSR would intentionally re-
sort to general war to expand or preserve its recent gains in
the Middle East. It cannot be assumed, however, that the
Kremlin will avoid all risk of war, and a Soviet miscalculation
of the risks remains a possibility.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to
initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US
allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate
future.
NOTE : While the USSR has placed some of its forces in posi-
tions of readiness, the Soviet Union has not taken many of the
measures which would be considered necessary to prepare for
aggressive action in the Middle East or elsewhere.
Soviet military activity in Bulgaria, the Black Sea, and in
the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts is cer-
tainly intended to tntimidate the West and its allies, particularly
Turkey, to back up vigorous Soviet bloc diplomatic, propaganda,
and "popular" demands for the withdrawal of US and UK forces
from Lebanon and Jordan and to support strong Soviet declara-
tions to restrain Western and Turkish interference with the new
Iraqi regime.
This activity also has the effect of ' ving the combat
readiness of Soviet forces in the area.
24 July 58
DAILY BRIEF
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
A,~ Sudan: Prime Minister Khalil appears determined to main-
tain his control of the Sudanese Government and said on 22 July
that he is making his preparations for establishing an army-
backed. dictatorship in order to "rid the country of subversive
elements." He is probably not as certain, however, of the
24 July 58
DAILY BRIEF
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Communist China: Serious floods may be developing in
China's two largest river basins--the Yellow and the Yangtze,
where at least half of China's food grain is produced. At
present the more serious flooding appears to be along the
course of the Yellow River, which reportedly burst its dikes
of Chengchou.
on 22 July and damaged the important rail bridge just north
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loyalty of the army as he appears. He may also encounter
difficulty in maintaining parliamentary adherence to his pro-
Western stand in the debate scheduled for 24 July on Amer-
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An effort on the part of the UAR to break the UK-Kuwait
f alliance, through agreement with the Ruler or through internal
revolt appears likely in the near future.
EDT 23 Ju y Although critical tensions exist at a number
of points in the Middle East, a deliberate initiation of open
hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.
US forces in Lebanon continue to be confronted with a
likelihood. of clashes with Lebanese rebel forces, and possi-
ly also fedayeen.
P
has made key German officials critical of American
24 July 58 DAILY BRIEF iv
Watch Committee conclusion- -Middle East (as of 1600
III. THE WEST
&(a West Germany: Bonn's desire to maintain its economic
can and British intervention in the Middle East.
NOTE: The presence of UK troops in Jordan has temporarily
bolstered the weak Jordanian regime.
Watch Committee conclusion- -Indonesia (as of i600 EDT 25X1
23 July): The situation in Indonesia continues to favor local
Communist exploitation. Sino-Soviet; bloc military involvement
is unlikely.
interests and preserve its political position in the Middle East
and British
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lieves that the Western powers have never made a "wise"
policy in the area. While Chancellor Adenauer supports in-
tervention in Lebanon and Jordan as "honoring obligations,"
he feels other countries share his concern over the "unpre-
dictability" of American and British policies. He also be-
assessment of Nasir's character.
(Page 6)
coup attempt might be precipitated.
leaders of the general strike which began on 23 July should
demand further changes in the top military command, a new
*Venezuela: The threat of a coup in Venezuela seems to
have abated temporarily with the resignation from the cab-
inet of Defense Minister Castro Leon, principal leader of
opposition to the Larrazabal regime. The split in the armed
forces, the added prestige of the Communists and other leftist
groups resulting from Xastro's.resignatiop, and civilian-mil-
itary differences are factors for continued instability. If the
24 July 58
DAILY BRIEF V
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Floods in China
Early reports suggest that a serious flood may be devel-
oping in China's two largest river basins--the Yellow and the
Yangtze, where at least half of China's food grain is produced.
The upper reaches of the Yellow River received three times
as much rainfall as normal in June, while Kiangsi Province,
in the Yangtze basin, is reported to have received 23.6 inches
of rainfall so far during July. The Han River, an important
Yangtze tributary, was reported in flood on 19 July, the Yangtze
on 22 July.
At present the most serious flooding appears to be along
the course of the Yellow River. The Yellow, which is espe-
cially prone to disastrous floods, was reported on 22 July by
the Reuters correspondent in Peiping to have burst its dikes,
inundating large areas of the North China plain. The critical
Yellow River bridge just north of Chengchou is apparently un-
usable, necessitating the rerouting of through traffic on the
Peiping- Hankow line via Shanghai.
The floods do not yet appear sufficiently bad to warrant
comparison with the catastrophes of 1933 or 1954, but the sit-
uation is still developing and it appears entirely possible that
Peiping's hopes of a bumper late harvest to go with the favor-
able early crop will not be realized. This, in turn, would
seriously affect this year's "leap forward" and strengthen the
hand of those party members who have opposed acceleration
of the economic program and are admittedly waiting for the
fall harvest to settle accounts. It will also mean that vast num-
bers of the irrigation and water conservancy works, built at
such a great cost in labor last winter, will have to be rebuilt.
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III. THE WEST
Bonn's Views on Middle East
West Germany's desire to maintain its economic interests
and preserve its political neutrality in the Middle East is re-
flected in a public attitude of reserve together with sharp
private criticism of Anglo-American policy. The German
press reported that in a two-hour interview with the UAR am-
bassador on 2i July, Chancellor Adenauer probably expressed
a desire to continue mutually satisfactory relations.
On the same day, Adenauer informed American Ambas-
sador Bruce that he supports US-British intervention in the
Middle East but has disagreed with Western policy in the area
since 1955. He feels that Bonn is "not alone" in its concern
over the "unpredictability" of American policy. Adenauer also
stated that the Western assessment of Nasir's character has been
"unwise," a view which probably reflects the opinion of some
German diplomats who believe that Bonn can work effectively
with Nasir.
Bonn officials have suffered a severe case of nerves over
possible Western intervention in Iraq. The Foreign Ministry
informed British and American officials on 18 July that such a
move would cause Bonn to re-examine its polic of sympathy
and understanding for the Western position.
[the
chancellor pointed out to Ambassactor Bruce that' some Ger-
mans" have maintained good relations with influential members
of the new Iraqi Government since the pro-Nazi coup in 1941.
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24 July 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Situation in Venezuela (Information as of 0100 EDT 24. July)
The threat of a coup in Venezuela seems to have abated
temporarily with the resignation from the cabinet of Defense
Minister Castro Leon, principal leader of opposition to the
Larrazabal regime. However, the split in the armed forces,
the added prestige of the Communists and other leftist groups
resulting from Castro's resignation, and civilian-military dif-
ferences are factors for continued instability, If the leaders
of the general strike which began on 23 July should demand
further changes in the top military command, a new coup at-
tempt might be precipitated.
I the situation in
the Barcelona- Puerto La Cruz area where the Socony and
Menegrande petroleum companies operate is chaotic, with
mobs having taken over and no police or military authority
effective. Officers at the Maracay air force base have re-
fused to obey the orders of the new defense minister, General
Lopez Enriquez.
During the crisis on 22 July, President Larrazabal called
on the populace for support. Many of the students, who are
Communist led, are said to have small arms and Molotov cock-
tails and are ready to fight against any take-over by the army.
Other civilian groups who were severely repressed by the Perez
Jimenez, dictatorship will also fight to assure a return to consti-
tutional government and democratic elections, now tentatively
scheduled for November. It may have been in the face of such
strong civilian opposition that Castro Leon decided to resign
instead of making a stand at this time. An attempted army coup
would probably lead to a bloody civil war.
The Communist party will probably gain still further as a
result of the present crisis and as long as President Larrazabal
continues his soft attitude toward Communists.
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