CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004000140001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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"27 September 1958
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Yugoslavia: By renewing an offer of 200,000
tons of wheat to Yugoslavia, delivery of which, according
to. the Yugoslavs, had been withheld, the USSR.probably
hopes to discredit Yugoslav arguments that Moscow's trade
carries political strings and to undermine Belgrade's posi-
tion in its current economic negotiations with the US.
USSR-India: The USSR apparently has offered to
construct Inn ia's fourth government-owned steel mill
provided New Delhi agrees to permit beginning of con-
struction in the near future. Moscow's contingent offer may
be an attempt to lmeclude Western construction of the plant,
as Soviet construction of the Bhilai steel mill has been
Moscow's most successfully propagandized. effort in the
underdeveloped countries.
25
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Ins
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Coup in Burma: The Burmese Army has moved to con-
trol the government. Premier U Nu has agreed to resign in
favor of Commander in Chief We Win on 28 October when
Parliament meets. Ne Win is strongly anti-Communist and
25
inclined to cooperate with the West. He was probably per-
suaded to take action because, of the threat of widespread
violence prior to national elections previously expected in
November. He probably equally feared sizable Communist
gains.
Middle East ofl ~.Nasir's expected drive against West-
ern oil interes s in the Middle East apparently has begun.
The relatively amicable .. atmosphere which had character-
ized recent profit-sharing negotiations between Syria and
the American-owned Tapline carrying Saudi oil to the
Mediterranean changed following orders from Cairo. The
introduction of unacceptable demands appears designed
ultimately to move the scene of decisive negotiations to
Cairo, where an over-all Arab oil policy toward Western
oil companies probably is being developed.
,
detached from public affairs, and his continued ability to con-
continued A
trol Soviet influence in Yemen appears doubtful. Anti-American
Crown Prince Badr is indifferent to the deterioration within
DAILY BRIEF ii
58 DAILY BRIEF
27 Sept 58
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Yemen: The Imam of Yemen, who plans to seek medi-
is becoming more
cal treatment abroad in the near future
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overnment; he appears interested primarily in increa
\~ th
e g
b these
ing -USSR and UAR influence in the belief support
powers will ensure his succession.
Baghdad Pact: Pact representatives will meet in
Ankara on 1 October at Turkey's request in an effort to 2
~\
finalize the transfer of the secretariat from Baghdad to An-
ere rom
0 discuss problems xI::-'- \1111mimINERE
resentation: Ambassador Lodge warns \
~, at
25X1 that the Chinese
Chinese UN reprepresentation issue may again be rais
e General Assembly in a matter of weeks if the offshore
comes to the United Nations under circum-
tances question ~\a
tances appearing to threaten war. The ambassador believes
iti
on.
hat the United States may then not be able to hold its pos
He fears a weakening of Latin American support, essential to
aintain.the third of total,.v , s which is deeded to block ~
\
2 I
reintroduction of the issue. \\F
\~s
Cyprus: The British cabinet has decided not to permit
NAT Secretary General Spaak's proposal to delay implemen-
\ tation of Britain's Cyprus plan beyond 1 October. This decision,
E
M
together with the Turkish NATO representative's categorical
4s conference proposal, appears to have de- \\
rejection of "Spaak
I feated the Secretary General's rast- minute efforts to forestall
the expected violent reaction in.:. -reeve and Cyprus when the plan
goes into effects
F
Z'( -Sept ao
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR Renews Offer to Supply Wheat to Yugoslavia
A representative of the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade
has informed the Yugoslav Government that the 200,000
tons of wheat specified by the current trade agreement
are available in Soviet ports, according to Western press
reports on 25 September. Belgrade has been saying for
some time that Moscow was refusing to deliver the wheat,
although Yugoslav officials have admitted privately that
there had been no formal Soviet refusal.
By first stalling and making Belgrade believe the
wheat would not be forthcoming,but later appearing to
reverse its position, Moscow probably hopes to discredit
Yugoslav arguments that Soviet economic aid carries politi-
cal strings. In making the move at this time, Moscow is
probably trying to undermine Belgrade's position in its
current economic negotiations with the US. The Yugo-
slavs have made themselves vulnerable to this by ex-
aggerating to the West the seriousness of the bloc's
economic campaign against Yugoslavia and its probable
effects on the Yugoslav economy;.
Yugoslav .offi.cials have,claim.bd, that both.the. wheat-
and-the ,600,000 tons of coking coal covered by the agree-
ment would be withheld by the bloc this year. With respect
to coal, they say they are "in a very bad way," and this
statement appears to be justified. Without the deliveries
the country's two major coking plants would have to close
down before the end of the year.
Despite the USSR's move on wheat, economic harassmet t
will probably continue as an element in the bloc's anti-Yugo-
slav campaign. A complete economic boycott is unlikely,
but the bloc can be expected to take an equivocal position on
the delivery of vital commodities to Yugoslavia such as coal,
cotton, and oil.
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CHINA
Bokaro4101,
Durgapure
Jamshedpuro Br il~
Caicu
IU~
(girt.) DAMAO,~ I',
NAGAR-AVELI
(Port.)
Bombay
ARABIAN
GOA
(Port.
BtuIai 0 .1 Rourkela
500
J
1N DIA
NEW STEEL MILL
o STEEL MfLL BEING EXPANDED
PLANNED STEEL MILL
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USSR Apparently Offers Another Steel Mill to India
The USSR apparently has offered India another million-
ton steel mill, to be built at Bokaro, provided New Delhi
agrees to allow work to begin in the near future. Moscow
may be trying to preclude construction by any Western
country of the mill India is planning at this site. Soviet
assistance in building the steel mill at Bhilai in central
India is Moscow's most successfully propagandized effort
in the underdeveloped countries.
The Second- Fve-Year Plan calls for completion of the
three government-owned million-ton steel mills now being
built with Soviet, West German, and British assistance and
expansion of three existing mills. This would raise India's
annual production from about 1,500,000 to 6,000,000 tons of
crude steel by 1961.. India's steel expansion program calls
for the construction of at least one additional mill during
the third plan period, and preliminary work has been done
at Bokaro. Because of India's stringent financial position?
it is unlikely to agree to begin construction of the Bokaro
mill in the near future. India may accept this offer in
principle, however, provided acceptance does not rule
out Soviet assistance for expansion of the mill at Bhilai
during the third plan.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Army Coup in Burma
The Burmese Army, under Commander in Chief Ne
Win, in a well-coordinated bloodless coup on 26 September
moved to take control of the government. Formally, the
government remains unchanged for the present, but civilian
politicians clearly are no longer in command. Premier Nu,
acting behind the constitutional facade, has asked President
Win Maung to call Parliament for 28 October, the earliest
possible date under Burmese parliamentary custom. He has
announced that he will then resign and has called upon the
country to support General Ne Win as the new premier.
The army action took place following a welter of coup
rumors and severe political tensions. It appears to have been
touched 'off by alarming evidence of growing Communist po-
litical strength. In addition, Communist insurgents who re-
cently surrendered are known to have cached arms in the
jungle, and the army feared their use for voter intimidation
in the projected November elections. Political fragmenta-
tion among Burma's non-Communists was expected to result
in widespread violence before or during the elections.
General Ne Win, the new leader, is strongly anti-Com-
munist and has long held the power to take over the govern-
ment by force. He has the personal loyalty of the armed
services. However, his distaste for political leadership, fol-
lowing his 1949 tour as deputy premier, has led him to con-
centrate on his military career. Whether he has acted be-
cause of prompting by the opposition AFPFL faction led by
former Deputy Premiers Ba...Swe and Kyaw Nyien or because
of the army's analysis of Burma's political situation, his ac-
tion must have come from a conviction that Burma's prospects
were desperate.
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Middle East Oil Developments
The amicable atmosphere which had characterized recent
profit-sharing negotiations between Syria and the American-
owned Tapline carrying Saudi oil to the Mediterranean has
been changed, apparently on orders from Cairo. Prior to the
return of Syrian Minister of Trade and Economy Kallas from
Cairo, the profit-splitting negotiations were proceeding satis-
factorily from Tapline's point of view.
On his return, however, Kallas demanded application of a
formula involving a..payment of 60 cents a barrel, which
would involve operating at a substantial loss. The unacceptability
of this demand and the take-it-or-leave-it position appear:
designed ultimately to move the scene of decisive negotiations
to Cairo, where an over-all Arab oil policy toward Western
oil companies is being developed. Nasir may also be planning
a substantial victory over Western interests prior to the Arab
Petroleum Conference now scheduled for early next year, at
which Cairo hopes to gain firm control over the petroleum
policies of Arab oil-producing countries.
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Baghdad Pact Representatives to Meet in Ankara ,
On 'l October
Representatives of all the Baghdad Pact countries ex-
cept Iraq will convene in Ankara on 1 October at the in-
vitation of the Turkish Government to finalize the decision
made at London after :the Iraqi coup last July to move the
secretariat from Baghdad to Ankara. The meeting will
open as an informal session in order to make Iraqi attend-
ance unnecessary but may evolve into, a formal meeting.
It will probably consider matters pertaining to the next
meetings- -possibly in January or February at Tehran or
Karachi--of the ministerial council and the Combined
Military Planning Staff.
Pact actvities have been severely restricted since July
because of the uncertainties surrounding the intentions of the
new regime in Baghdad vis-a-vis the alliance. Popular
opposition in Iraq to the pact alignment precludes continuation
of a bona fide membership, but the new government may
delay formal withdrawal in the hope of retaining access to
confidential decisions and documents. No effort is being
made by the other members to force Iraq to withdraw, but
they have no intention of allowing Iraq, by its lack of decision,
to frustrate efforts to go ahead with area defense and other
aspects of regional cooperation.
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III. THE 77E ST
Chinese UN Representation
The Chinese representation question may again, be,
raised at the UN General Assembly in a matter of weeks
if the offshore islands question is brought to the UN under
circumstances appearing to threaten war. Ambassador
Lodge has advised that the United States may then be un-
able to obtain the one-third vote necessary to prevent re-
introduction of the representation issue.
Recent dis.cusSions .'in NYork have reflected growing
distaste for the moratorium formula. Several Latin
American representatives expressed reluctance to go
along with the United States in the future, while one stated
his country considered the policy humiliating to the Latin
Americans, serving only to give the impression that they
were US satellites. The spokesman for Argentina reported
that a majority of the Latin American delegations person-
ally opposed the US position.
In many of the countries, press and radio criticism
of the government's "subservience" to US "pressure" pro-
vides a stimulus for official restiveness. Most influential
Latin Americans, however--except perhaps in the larger
countries--may at least for the near future continue to
share the opinion of Costa Rican delegate Guido Fernandez,
who stated earlier this month that, even in the case of
"erroneous" US foreign policy decision?, Latin America is
bound to the United States and must of necessity follow
its lead.'
Canada, meanwhile, has made it clear that this was
the last year it could be counted on to back the United
States. Belgium is understood to hold similar views. Dis-
sension was reported within the Pakistani delegation on
the issue, and Japan refused outright to speak in favor of
the US resolution.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in-Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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