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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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9 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
agreement. Soviet propaganda has charged that the intro-
duction by the US of new information on the difficulties of
detecting underground nu lear explosions is a further move
to prevent agreement,
United States continued to insist on majority voting in the
proposed control commission The nuclear test talks re-
convened in Geneva on 5 January with a gloomy forecast
by the Soviet delegate in view of the West's refusal to ac-
cept Soviet demands for a permanent and unconditional
Geneva talks: (koyan, speaking with Secretary
Dulles on 5 January, questioned the desire of the United
States to reach agreement on nuclear test cessation and
warned that such agreement would be impossible if the
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e East drought: or the secon consecutive year,
severe ought and locusts seriously threatennfood crops in
Jordan and Israel. Both governments have requested the US
to supply foodstuffs in the very near future. Yemen is also
undergoing food shortages as the result of drought
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Morocco: he situation in the principal areas of Berber
triba ssidence apparently continues unresolved despite govp
ernment claims that the tribesmen are responding to King
Mohamed V's 48-hour ultimatum of 5 January ordering them
xi
0(
to submit to central authority. Berber tribes in the High Atlas
region south and east of the southern Moroccan city of Mar-
rakech now are also reportedly becoming increasingly restive?
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Belgian Congo: Belgian security forces have re-estab-
lished order, and Leopoldville is outwardly calm after three
days of rioting. Some Congolese leaders have been arrested.
Accra, Cairo, and Moscow view the riots as springing out of 25X1
African desire for independence, while the Belgian press pri-
arilv blames economic conditions for the rioting.
Philippines: Ambassador Bohlen notes an increasing re-
in Philippine official thinking toward a re-orientation of for-
?eign policy away from the US and closer to the islands' Asian
neighbors. This nationalistic feeling has been evidenced by
a hardening Philippine attitude in base talks with the US.
III. THE WEST
*France: few Premier Michel Debrd, an ardent Gaulli
is critical of US policies which he regards as frustrating
France's claims to great power status The new cabinet, cam
posed mostly of holdovers, including the minister of foreign
lJ affairs, is expected to follow very closely ,the policy and ad-
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ministrative framework De Gaulle has outlined in recent de-
crees.
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Government. However, major government policies are being-
held in abeyance pen n-g decisions by Castro, who only arrived
in Havana on 8 January.
Lernment, there are signs of feeling against the United States
Cuba: the formative stage of the Castro-Urrutia gov-
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9 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR- -Geneva Talks
With resumption on 5 January of negotiations at Geneva
for an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests, Moscow re-
verted to its insistence on a Western commitment to a per-
manent unconditional agreement before further discussion of
the details of the proposed control system. On 6 January,
the Soviet delegate to the talks took issue with four specific
Western positions: insisting upon majority rule in the com-
mission; linking extension of a one-year test suspension with
progress in other areas of disarmament; giving any party the
right to denounce the agreement when violated by another; and
international staffing of control posts to minimize use of na-
tionals of the host state. At the 7 January session he insisted
on postponing discussion of any other issues until the question
of duration of the treaty is resolved.
Sjeaking with Secretary Dulles on 5 January, Soviet Dep-
uty Premier Mikoyan questioned the desire of the United States
to reach agreement on nuclear test cessation and warned that
such agreement would be impossible if the United States con-
tinued to insist on majority voting in the proposed control com-
mission. At a private dinner on the same day, Mikoyan stated
that the USSR would not give up the veto on such a commission,
since decisions would be meaningless if they were not unan-
imous
Moscow has charged that the new technical information
introduced by the United States delegate on 5 January with re-
gard to the difficulties of detecting underground explosions
was a further Western effort to prevent agreement. Soviet
delegate Tsarapkin rejected a Western request for a three-
power study of this problem, maintaining that the establishment
of such a study would undermine the entire basis on which the
conference was organized, i. e. , the conclusions and recommen-
dations of the Geneva conference of experts.
Moscow's renewed emphasis in the negotiations on its ob-
jections to the Western stand on duration and the link to other
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disarmament measures probably reflects the concern of the
Soviet leadership over the possibility of a stalemate on the
sole issue of Soviet insistence on veto rights in the control
commission.
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MOROCCO
6 GIBRALTAR
(U.K.) GO- MPs
Cana _Pr011.Melilla
CANARY ISLANDS
(sr.)
90JNO'
r
' Tindouf
A. L G E R LA
PRINCIPAL AREAS OF BERBER
DISSIDENCE
MILES
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Middle East Drought
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Iti.despread drought for the second consecutive year threat-
ens to bring disaster to Jordanian agriculture. Winter-wheat
crops have been seriously affected, and Jordan's crop potential
for 1958-59, even if rain falls now, is estimated at 80,.000 tons
in contrast with 242,000 tons produced during the last normal
crop year of 1955-56. Further aggravating the situation is the
lack of fodder for herds, which are decreasing below basic breed-
ing levels. Export blockades of livestock to Jordan by Syria
and Iraq have resulted in a perennial meat shortage. The Jor-
danian prime minister has requested the United States to pro-
vide "not less than 50,000 tons" of wheat in the near future--
10,000 tons immediately. An additional request has been made
for 40,000 tons of livestock feed. Assistance to finance work
relief which would provide 50,000 jobs is also desir7
(y.rael, where the situation is somewhat less serious, has
had almost no rain since last February, and crops sown in the
southern part of the country must be considered lost, according
to the Ministry of Agriculture. Unless the situation radically
changes within the next few weeks, crops will be smaller than
last year's poor production. The water table has been so low-
ered by the protracted dryness that there will be insufficient
water for irrigation. Israel has requested wheat shipment
LLa.rge swarms of locusts in Israel, as well as Jordan, are
an additional menace to agricultural production. However, it
appears that crop losses from this source have been moderate.
An estimated 90 percent of the population of Yemen is said
to be faced with severe famine or starvation as the result of
drought which has cut crop production to one third of normal.
A Yemeni Government representative in Aden has stated that
20,000 tons of wheat will be needed. within the next four months 7
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Situation in Morocco
Available evidence does not appear to justify Moroccan
Government claims publicized on 7 and 8 January that dis-
sident Berber tribesmen in northern Morocco are responding
in large numbers to King Mohamed V's 5 January ultimatum
ordering them to submit to government authority and return
to their homes within 48 hours. Their virtual rebellion is
still directed primarily against the Arab/urban-dominated
Istiglal party, which has been the principal force behind Mo-
roccan governments since the country regained its independ-
ence two years ago. However, they are unlikely to accede to
the King's directive unless they receive firmer assurances
than they have apparently been offered thus far that at least
some of their principal demands will be satisfied. These in-
clude the installation of local inhabitants in local government
posts, more adequate representation in the central government,
greater local autonomy, and measures to relieve the area's
depressed- economic conditions
$,oyal Army elements in northern Morocco continue to be
reinforced and redeployed, but they have apparently not yet
attempted to force the re-establishment of contact by land with
the garrison at the Mediterranean port city of Alhucemas--
reported encircled by armed Berber partisans as of 7 Janu-
ary--nor to move against the dissidents' Middle Atlas strong-
hold near Fez. A clash on 6 January between army forces
based at Alhucemas and the dissidents, which reportedly re-
sulted in over 100 casualties, may have reinforced the King's
reluctance to order an all-out drive by the army despite his
recent implicit threat to take such action. American repre-
sentatives in Rabat reported on 7 January that the troop move-
ments in progress as of that time appeared designed primarily
to secure control of the main lines of communication in the
affected regions and to isolate the Middle Atlas from the Rif--
not to penetrate difficult mountain terrain where the defiant
Berber elements are ensconced. The American Army attache
continues to believe that the Royal Army is almost certain to
be decimated by desertions if ordered to suppress the dissi-
dents and could not in any case cope with a general Berber up-
risi7
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Ceanwhile, the attache reports that other Berber
tribes residing in the traditionally turbulent High Atlas region
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tsouth and east of Marrakech, in. southern Morocco, are also
becoming increasingly restive
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Developing Philippine Nationalism
(Ambassador Bohlen notes increasing sentiment among
Philippine officials for a modification of present Philippine for-
eign policy in the direction of less dependence on the United
States. Filipinos have criticized the level of American mil-
itary and economic aid in the light of what they regard as their
"special relationship" with the United States. Growing nation-
alist feeling has also been evidenced by a hardened Philippine
attitude in talks concerning American bases. Foreign Affairs
Secretary Serrano recently declared that a "redefinition of
the Philippine-American mutual defense concept" would be an
immediate Philippine policy target in 1959. In part this trend
stems from frustration over an unsatisfactory domestic polit-
ical and economic situation
Recently heightened interest in developing closer economic
and political ties with neighboring Asian countries appears to
be a manifestation of this growing nationalist sentiment. The
goal of greater regional cooperation was heavily emphasized
in the joint communique issued on 6 January by President
Garcia and visiting Malayan Prime Minister Rahman. Within
the. framework of a strongly anti-Communist approach, Garcia
discussed the same theme in a major foreign policy address in
December, and he is said to be looking particularly to closer
economic cooperation with Japan
e increased momentum toward a "Filipino First" out-
look is not at this stage indicative of a desire for a major policy
shift, but it may foreshadow further strains in Philippine-
American relation)
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III. THE WEST
The New French Cabinet
Premier Michel Debre's cabinet reflects the strong rightist-
nationalist orientation of the new National Assembly. It includes
most of the leading personalities of the Soustelle-sparked Union
for a New Republic (UNR), which won the largest bloc of deputies
in the October elections. Most of the members are holdovers
from the government formed by De Gaulle last June.
The key posts of foreign affairs and defense went to non-
political "technicians," an arrangement which permits De Gaulle
to exercise close control over those areas in which the new con-
stitution and recent decrees give him special powers. The Min-
istry of the Interior, which had been sought by Soustelle, also was
placed in the hands of a technician. Attachment of Soustelle to
the office of the premier, however, may somewhat mollify his
integrationist supporters among the European settlers in Algeria,
who hoped he would be premier.
Though the Socialists are absent, intending to go into "con-
structive opposition,' the rightist weight of Debre and the UNR
will be tempered both by the presence of the Popular Republicans
and by De Gaulle himself, who has already laid down the guide-
lines of French domestic and external policy and who is expected
to play an active role in his new position as President. Further-
more, at least 50 UNR deputies can be considered leftist in their
social and economic views.
The combination of Debra as premier and De Gaulle as Pres-
ident should provide France with an effective executive team. The
two men hold similar views on most questions. De Gaulle may
occasionally use the outspoken Debrd to set up extreme positions
for bargaining purposes. The most immediately urgent problem
facing the government will be the implementation of the austerity
program announced on 28 December. The program initially
aroused hostility in working-class and trade-union circles, and
the discontent has spread to Finance Minister Pinay's Independ-
ent party as well.
Debre a 47-year-old lawyer, won prominence by his strong
nationalist stand in the Council of the Republic, where he was a
leading Gaullist spokesman from 1948 until De Gaulle appointed
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him minister of justice last June. He has firm ideas about
asserting the authority of the executive vis-a-vis Parliament,
a view reflected in the new constitution, which is largely his
handiwork.
Debrd's excessive nationalism has been frequently appar-
ent in the critical attitude he has taken on American policies
which he considers inimical to FranceTs. international prestige.
He is similarly outspoken in his opposition to submerging
French sovereignty in European integration projects and is
insistent on holding Algeria at all costs, rejecting the federal-
type solution De Gaulle is presumed to consider acceptable.
His sincere attachment to De Gaulle is expected to limit any
early overt friction between them. Nevertheless,, his strong
personality and stubborn attitudes on controversial interna-
tional issues may eventually lead to policy differences with
De Gaulle.
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The Situation in Cuba
are some signs of feeling against the US Government among I
peting rebel groups had awaited his arrival. Meanwhile, there
The arrival of Fidel Castro in Havana on 8 January, after
his triumphal progress from Oriente Province, will assist the
regime of Provisional President Urrutia in its efforts to form a
workable government. Numerous decisions on governmental
policy, on military reorganization, and on relations among com-
members of the new regime and a general desire to speed the
"Cubanization" of foreign-owned industries, particularly sugat
for some years
plantations. At present, about 50 percent of total sugar invest-
ment in Cuba is US capital, The percentage has been declining
The US Army attache found Camp Colombia, Cuba's chief
military base near Havana, completely disorganized on 7 Jan-
uary. The army is undergoing a thorough purge of all officers
guilty of "crimes" under Batista, and at least 15 are reported
already to have been executed. Even the capable Colonel Bar-
quin and other professional officers associated with him in the
1956 attempt to oust Batista have apparently been retired. Of-
ficers of the 26 of July Movement in Havana told the attachd
that the highest army rank will be major and that present officers
of higher rank permitted to remain in service will have to accept
demotions. Many rebel soldiers are expected to be integrated
into the armed forces. These drastic measures may well, in
the long run, create a core of embittered former career officers
dangerous to the regime.
Fidel Castro, who is slated to head the armed forces, is
quoted as belittling the value of the US Military Mission to the
Cuban Army under Batista and claiming that it is no longer
needed. He has also indicated, however, that the government
will not establish diplomatic relations with Sino-Soviet bloc gov-
ernments, or any other dictatorships.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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