CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300350001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 February 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The Soviet leaders will probably resume their
attack on the antiparty group when the party congress re-
convenes on 2 February after a one-day recess. It is still
not clear whether the congress will take any further action
against the members of the group. Two former top leaders,
M. G. Pervukhin and M. Z. Saburov, first linked publicly
with the group on 29 January, have not since been mentioned
in this connection, but Pervukhin, Soviet ambassador to East
Germany, has apparently been removed as a candidate member
of the party pr#sidium.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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to change his mind
Iran-USSR: Ghe Shah on 30 January confirmed that he was
seeking to conclude a nonaggression pact. with the USSR; nego-
tiations with the Soviet officials who had come to Tehran were
continuing. He insisted that he must do this to secure a respite
from Soviet pressure and stressed the inadequacy of American
military and budgetary aid. The Shah gave no indications that
he was prepared to reconsider his decision. Meanwhile on 31
January an Iranian Foreign Ministry official appealed to a US
Embassy official to provide him with indications of American
willingness to supply more aid with the hope of inducing the Shah
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Pakistan: Release of the final communique of the Baghdad.
Pact meetings has occasioned a bitterly critical outburst in the
Karachi press. It voiced deep resentment over American un-
willingness to guarantee Pakistan against aggression from any
quarter. Several papers, noting the "benefits" accruing to neu-
tralist countries, called for a reappraisal of Karachi's foreign
policy. While the press may not precisely express the govern-
ment's view, President Ayub probably is willing to use such
criticism in the controlled press to increase pressure on the
US to make stronger commitments to Pakistan in defense ar-
rangements.
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III. THE WEST
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FOR
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Italy. he resignation of Amintore Fanfani as secretary
general of the Christian Democratic party on 31 January, fol-
lowing his resignation as premier last week, further indicates-
the complexity of the Italian Government crisis and suggests
an extensive struggle before formation of a new government or
recourse to national elections. Fanfani probably feels that the
Christian Democrats will eventually be forced to turn back to
him to solve the problem
leaders are reported planning hostile demonstrations against
president Frondizi on his 3 February return from his visit to
the United States. The Communists probably see this as an
unusual opportunity to try to promote their priority objective
of weakening American influence. The police plan strong secu-
Argentina: The Communists an some per nis or
rity measures.
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2 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Shah of Iran Seeking Earliest Possible Nonaggression
Pact With USSR
he Shah of Iran said on 30 January that he wants to
conclude a nonaggression pact with the USSR as quickly as
possible. He said that in the absence of what he considers
adequate US aid and guarantees against invasion, he had.
initiated negotiations with the USSR in order to gain a respite
from Soviet pressure. According to the terms of the Iranian
proposal as outlined by the Shah, Iran will guarantee not to
sign the pending bilateral treaty with the United States. In ex-
change, it will ask that the new pact with the USSR not modify
the 1921 and 1927 treaties but complement them in the light of
changed conditions since their conclusiori~
Clf the Iranians conclude a pact barring the pending bilateral
agreement with the United States, this will have serious effects
on Pakistan, which appears not to be aware of how far the Shah
has gone in the direction of a pact with the USSR
CThe Shah seems to have rationalized all objections to a
nonaggression pact and had a ready answer for all counter
arguments presented by a US official. He apparently has
convinced himself that depositing a nonaggression pact with
the UN will exert moral pressure on the USSR to honor the
treaty,)
(The Shah's new course appears to have been influenced by
his belief that Iran is being treated less favorably than other US
allies such as Turkey. He placed great stress on US unwilling-
ness to supply missiles and train Iranian officers to use them,
remarking that Iranian officers are not donkeys, incapable of
learning
CAmir Khosro Afshar-Qasemlu, a high-ranking Foreign Min-
istry official, also stressed the Shah?s disappointment over mis-
siles and training in a meeting with Counselor Wilkins on 31 Jan-
uary. Afshar sought assurances of further US aid in the hope.
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2 Feb 59
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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f using them to influence the Shah toward a course of continuing
cooperation with the US:',
COn 31 January an Iranian senator complained that Iran re-
ceived less US aid than neutralist countries. This appears to
be the start of an effort by the government to prepare the pub-
lic for the negotiations now going on.-
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Pakistani Press Criticizes US and Baghdad Pact
The final communiqud of the Baghdad Pact meetings in
Karachi has been used by the Pakistani press as a peg for an
especially bitter attack on American policy toward Pakistan
and on the effectiveness of the pact. While critical comment
has increased in recent weeks as differences between Washing-
ton and Karachi over the proposed bilateral defense agreement
have become known, the current outburst is the most unre-
strained criticism of Pakistan. pro-Western orientation since
Ayub's military regime took over on 27 October.
Several papers, recommending the "benefits" of a neu-
tralist course, called for a reassessment of Pakistan's for-
eign policy. In addition to expressing deep disappointment with
the progress of the Baghdad Pact, the editorials criticized the
United States for its refusal to guarantee Pakistan against ag-
gression from non-Communist as well as Communist sources.
Particular stress was placed on charges that US officials had
announced a willingness to defend India against aggression from
Pakistan but had refused a similar commitment to its ally.
The demand for a reorientation of foreign policy probably
does not precisely reflect the views of Ayub's government. Its
failure to restrain the controlled press, however, suggests
that Ayub hopes to increase pressure on the US to commit it-
self more firmly to the defense of the Baghdad Pact countries.
Ayub may also feel that continued popular support for his
government requires acknowledgment that the majority of the
Pakistani public favors a more independent foreign policy.
Karachi's recent effort to improve relations with Cairo appar-
ently is an attempt to.associate the government more closely
with support of Arab nationalism.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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