CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004500090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 21, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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USSR-Albania: Khrushchev plans to pay his first visit to
Albania from25 May to 6 June? The timing of the visit to
coincide with the original Soviet 27 May deadline on Berlin
suggests that he wishes to play down the importance of the
deadline and reassure the West that no unilateral Soviet ac-
tion will be taken during East-West negotiations. While in
Albania,Khrushchev may further define the bloc's attitude
toward Yugoslavia.
Watch Committee conclusion- -Berlin: No significant
indications bearing on the possibility of hostilities.I
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USSR-KGB: For the second time in two years, the Soviet
state security apparatus (KGB) has taken a public oath of fealty
to Khrushchev and the party. This pledge, an outgrowth of the
recent state security conference in Moscow, was probably
prompted by continuing party distrust of secret police activ-
ities. Its language also suggests that the regime has ordered
the KGB to step up its counterinteliige;pce'actiVitleS,
21 May 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Rumania-Israel: ewish emigration from Rumania to
Israel will resume shortly, at least on a reduced scale. The
Rumanian Foreign Ministry has asked the Israeli Legation
to revalidate "some 130 Jewish emigre documents" which
were issued before emigration was suspended at the end of
February. A strong Arab reaction can again be expected-.I
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 Christian tension, may occur in mid-June, when the emergency
powers of the Karami government expire. Some of the more ex-
treme politicians favor new parliamentary elections this year,
but moderates, including President Shihab, believe the elections
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Lebanon: A change of cabinet, and possibly new Mos em-
1) should be postponed until next spring when they hope prospects
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for a peaceful campaign will be better.
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Watch Committee conclusion- -Middle East: Situations sus-
ceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet b7oc action which
would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particu-
larly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the area remains pre-
carious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is
unlikely in the immediate future.
Iraq: The Communists pursue their course toward control
of Iraq. Qasim shows no signs that he is taking resolute anti-
Communist action, although he has not as yet appointed Commu-
nist party members to the cabinet nor yielded to the Communist
21 May 59
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demands for the "legalization" of political parties.
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Ceylon: The resignation of two extreme leftist cabinet
ministers and the withdrawal of some ten other leftist mem-
bers of parliament from Ceylon's ruling coalition probably will
not cause Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government to fall in
the immediate future. However, his prospects for remaining
~r in office until the next national elections, which must be held
by 1961, do not appear very promising at this time.
Laos-KMT: Approximately 500 Chinese Nationalist irreg-
ular troops, fleeing from Burmese forces, have occupied two
Laotian villages on the frontier. The foreign minister, prob-
ably fearing that the presence of these troops will further com-
plicate relations with Laos' Communist neighbors, has asked
the US to request Taipei to order their removal. Last March
Communist China charged Laos with complicity in border in-
cursions made by other Nationalist troops "based in Laos."
Burma: The refusal of the. Soviet Embassy in Rangoon to
allow the arrest of a TASS representative to ensure his appear-
ance for a libel trial will be generally viewed by the Burmese
? as a heavy-handed flouting of the law. This incident may delay
Burmese acceptance of the new Soviet ambassador's creden-
tials and could have -repercussions in Southeast Asia. I
South Korea: The Rhee government has provided itself
with another strong weapon for intimidating the opposition
Democratic party by invoking and expanding the requirements
of a long-dormant ordinance of the former US military govern-
ment requiring detailed reports from all political parties.
Such reports must include membership lists, details of income
and expenditures, and data on party plans and activities.
E
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III. THE WEST
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Cuba: A man with a long record of Communist associations
has been named executive director of the agrarian reform ma-
chinery established by cabinet decree on 17 May. Land reform
is the key to the country's economic and social development, and
penetration of its administration would provide the Communists
with the means of building up considerable political strength in
rural areas.
21 May 59
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev to Visit Albania
Radio Moscow announced on 20 May that Khrushchev will
head a party-government delegation which will visit Albania from
25 May to 6 June. The trip, according to the announcement, had
originally been scheduled for last year, No Soviet leader of Khru-
shchev's rank has previously visited Albania. The timing of the
visit suggests a deliberate attempt by Khrushchev to play down
the importance of the original 27 May Berlin deadline and to re-
assure the West that the USSR will take no unilateral action dur-
ing high-level East-West negotiations.
Khrushchev will probably use the visit to press home new
attacks on NATO. He may be joined by East German Premier
Otto Grotewohl, who arrived unexpectedly in Tirana on 15 May
for a vacation of indefinite length. Greece and Turkey--on NATO's
southern flank--have been criticized recently by Albania and. Bul-
garia for having concluded bilateral military agreements with
the US. Khrushchev may also further define bloc policy toward
Yugoslavia, a favorite target for Albanian propaganda.
On his way home, Khrushchev may visit Bulgaria. Moscow
announced in March that a "party-government" delegation would.
visit Bulgaria this year. Khrushchev has also said he would at-
tend the 40th anniversary celebrations of the founling of the Pol-
ish United Workers (Communist) party in Warsaw in the latter
half of July, and he is already committed to tour Scandinavia
from 10 to 25 August. A central committee meeting is scheduled
in Moscow on 24 June.
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Soviet Secret Police. Reaffirms., Loyalty to Regime
In a communique following the recent general conference
of state security workers in Moscow, the Soviet secret police
(KGB) again swore complete loyalty to the Khrushchev regime
and promised. an all-out struggle against foreign intelligence
services. The meeting, one of a series called by various or-
ganizations to discuss the work of the 21st party congress,
was attended by party presidium member Aleksey Kirichenko,
who is probably Khrushchev's second-in-command for party
affairs. As on the 40th anniversary of the security services
in December 1957, assurances were given that the days of
arbitrary police power are irrevocably over and, that the KGB
is controlled at all levels by the party.
This second oath of fealty to the regime in two years was
probably prompted by continuing party distrust of the secret
police, which may have accounted for the unexplained ouster
of KGB chairman Ivan Serov last December. The American
Embassy in Moscow has suggested that the KGB may have
been quietly trying to increase its prerogatives and to justify
its continued existence on a grand scale. In recent months,
Khrushchev has indicated his intention to reduce the role of
the police in the Soviet Union and to transfer some of its func-
tions to "public" organizations.
Moscow's accounts of the conference suggest that the re-
gime has ordered the secret police to intensify its counter-
intelligence efforts. Khrushchev's_ call at the 21st congress
for a consolidation of state security organs was interpreted
at the conference as a demand from the party for greater
vigilance against the external enemy.
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Exodus of Jews From Rumania to Resume
LJewish emigration from Rumania to Israel apparently is
about to resume. The Rumanian Foreign Ministry in the past
week has submitted "some 130 Jewish emigres documents" to
the Israeli Legation in Bucharest for revalidation of the Israeli
visas issued before emigration was suspended on 27 February
in response to Arab protests:
(Cut of a total of 17,916 Rumanian Jews who have migrated
to Israel since July 1958, 3,360 arrived in March; most of them,
however, had actually left Rumania by the end of February. Dur-
ing the month of April there were only 25 immigrants. Registra-
tion for emigration continued during the period of actual suspen-
sion, at least for a time. Some 14,000 fully documented Jews still
await permission to leave Rumania
The lack of any publicity on this apparent resumption indi-
cates an attempt by Rumania to forestall the expected strong re-
action from the Arab states, which are already aroused by the
mere prospect of renewed immigration into Israel. Arab pro-
tests against the previous immigration have been. and continue to
be directed to the Soviet Union, as well as Rumania. On the'basis
of an Arab League Council decision in March, Arab diplomats have
urged other countrtes to oppose the movement of Jews into Israel.
On 17 May, Jordan said it had received agreement from five Arab
countries to convene an Arab League summit conference to discuss
plans for halting Jewish emigration from Eastern F.urnnc lI
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Change in Lebanese Government Likely in June
The political situation in Lebanon, which has been rela-
tively calm during recent months, may soon become more
tense. The emergency powers of the Karami government
expire on 13 Junes and concurrent changes in the cabinet are
likely. The resulting political maneuvering may cause re-
newed Moslem-Christian conflicts.
Two members of the four-man cabinet.--Raymond Edde
and Husayn al-Uwayni--have already indicated they intend. to
resign by mid-June. A program of administrative reform
has been undertaken by the cabinet which has imposed a con-
siderable strain on the four ministers. The fatigue result-
ing from lengthy daily cabinet sessions may also have con-
tributed to the obviously strained relations between the two
Christians in the cabinet, Edde and Pierre Gemayel, leader
of the extreme rightist Phalange. Gemayel is said to be-
lieve Edde is too conciliatory toward the Moslems who, he
claims, repeatedly ask for concessions without taking any
cognizance of Christian demands. Gemayel also resents
President Shihab's "silent neutrality" amid these disputes.
An additional unsettling factor is the timing of new par-
liamentary elections. Gemayel agrees with Saeb Salaam,
the extremist Moslem leader, in favoring elections this
year. Moderate leaders, including President Shihab, how-
ever, prefer that they be postponed until next spring. They
hope that prospects will be better at that time for a com-
paratively peaceful change from the present predominantly
pro-Western assembly to one more in line with Arab neu-
tralist sentiment and more representative of the influence
of local magnates.
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Ceylon
The resignation of two leftist cabinet ministers and the
withdrawal of some 10 representatives from Ceylon's ruling
coalition on 18 and 19 May probably will not cause Prime Min-
ister Bandaranaike's government to fall in the immediate future.
While the government presently commands only 45 votes in the
100-member Parliament, it probably will be able to regain a
majority with the support of opposition members who do not
wish to face new national elections at this time. Five independ-
ent opposition representatives reportedly have already offered
Bandaranaike their support. Furthermore, the opposition does
not now appear sufficiently unified to vote the government out.
Bandaranaike's prospects for remaining in power until 1961
are now seriously threatened, however, as he has failed for the
first time to control and outmaneuver the rival factions in his
government. Under mounting pressure from 10 moderate cab-
inet ministers to oust leftist ministers Philip Gunawardena and
William de Silva or face a breakup of his cabinet, Bandaranaike
compromised by curtailing the two ministers' powers but attempt-
ing to retain them in the cabinet. His willingness to yield to the
moderate majority and to risk Gunawardena's and de Silva's resig-
nation probably stemmed from his determination to retain office
rather than from any change in his political outlook.
Bandaranaike's authority over a newly constituted government
will be increasingly difficult to maintain, both because he may have
to bargain for parliamentary support and. because he has proved
susceptible to pressure. Moreover, a government composed pri-
marily of diverse conservative elements is likely to stiffer.from as
much dissension as the previous coalition.
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C H I N A
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Chinese Nationalist Irregulars Enter Laos
The entry into Laos of 500 Chinese Nationalist (KMT)
troops fleeing a Burmese Army push is likely to aggravate Laos'
strained relations with Communist China and North Vietnam.
Laotian concern is apparent in the foreign minister's request
on 19 May that the United States intervene with Taipei to order
removal of the troops.
Laos is already under propaganda attack from its Commu-
nist neighbors as a result of attempts to integrate former Com-
munist Pathet Lao battalions with the Laotian Army and the house
arrest of Pathet leaders. Peiping on 20 May charged that these
developments were a prelude to a military coup and the destruc-
tion of the domestic Communists and called for "immediate" re-
activation of the International Control Commission (ICC) for Laos.
Last March Communist China's propaganda charged Laos
with complicity in border incursions by Chinese Nationalist
forces from Laos. Peiping can be expected to revive these
charges to add urgency to Communist bloc requests that the ICC
be reconvened. During April, Chinese Communist patrols entered
Laos in search of KMT troops as well as refugees who had been
crossing into Burma and Laos in large numbers.
Burmese military operations against the Chinese National-
ists probably reflect Prime Minister Ne Win's concern over indica-
tions of a Taipei-supported build-up of the irregulars for possible use
in future guerrilla attacks against Chinese Communist border posts.
The onset of the annual monsoon rains will soon force the curtail-
ment of Burmese military pressure on the irregulars until next
October. F_ I
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.11W -MOMPT
Rhee Administration Imposes New Restrictions on Political
Activity
The Rhee administration has imposed additional restric-
tions on political activity in South Korea, probably as a further
step in the campaign to assure President Rhee's re-election
next year. The government information director on 19 May is-
sued a memorandum requiring all political parties to submit re-
ports covering their activities, membership lists, future plans,
sources of funds, and details of their expenditures. Ambassador
Dowling in Seoul observes that the measure will provide the ad-
ministration with a strong weapon to harass the opposition Demo-
cratic party and to intimidate persons affiliated with or sympa-
thetic to the opposition.
The order is based on American military government ordinance
55 for the regulation of political parties, which the government has
not previously enforced. Requirements that ten days' advance notice
be given of party meetings, that results of such meetings be reported
within five days, that personal histories of party officers be turned
in, and that future party plans be reported were not specified in the
original ordinance. Invocation of an American-promulgated meas-
ure, as in the suppression of the large pro-opposition newspaper
Kyonghyang Sinmun, could be an attempt to deflect criticism.
Acting under the terms of the new Local Autonomy Law, which
provides for appointment rather than election of -,officials, on 13
May the government announced the most extensive change of pro-
vincial governors in the republic's history, which resulted in ad-
ministration stalwarts' gaining most of these posts. The govern-
ment also took "steps to consolidate its? control at the grass-
roots level by appointing local officials. These moves will under-
cut the opposition Democrats at the important lower echelon of
political organization and bring administration influence to bear
on almost every aspect of the private citizen's daily life,
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III. THE WEST
Communists Expected to Exploit Cuban Land Reform
Communist penetration of rural Cuba may be facilitated
by the appointment of Antonio Nunez Jimenez as executive direc-
tor of the Agrarian Reform Institute. The institute was estab-
lished to implement the Agrarian Reform Law promulgated on
16 May. Nunez has a long record of Communist associations
and may even be a member of the party. He is a widely known
geographer and intellectual, and has been influential in the rev-
olutionary army and ministry of education, both apparent Com-
munist targets. Prime Minister Fidel Castro retains the title
of president of the institute, but his numerous other duties may
keep him from giving it close direction. There is a report that
"Che" Guevara, a pro-Communist revolutionary military leader,
may take over the program.
The Communists have already shown considerable activity
in some rural areas, particularly in Oriente Province where they
have staffed "revolutionary schools" designed to instill revolu-
tionary fervor in the masses. They have also been involved in
the formation of an armed civilian militia in Oriente. A dearth
of trained and effective labor leaders without the stigma of coop-
eration with Batista has given the Communists opportunity to
gain influence in many provincial labor unions ostensibly led by
26th of July revolutionaries, mo9t of whom are young and inex-
perienced.
The long-awaited Agrarian Reform Law pis' the keystone of
Castro's still vague program of rapid economic and social d::vel.-
opment. Overconcentration on sugar production and of land own-
ership has kept a very large portion of the rural population al-
most without purchasing power. Several embassy sources feel
the program may be of great benefit in the long run, but the law
itself is so complex that it will require skilled and disinterested
technological and administrative direction to succeed.
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 Approved I{
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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