STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 3 No. 2 , Spring 1959]

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• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
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• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: STUDY

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VOL, NO. 2 SPRING 1959
CENTRAL INTELTIGEWCE AGENCY
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OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
WARNING
41.??=111.011.1100..01??
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITOR
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
Page
Papers from the Conference:
Gencrranhic Intelligence
K C Duncan
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Spy at Your Service, Sir Lowell M. Dunleigh 81
Need for analytic guidance of the clandestine collec-
tion effort. SECRET
Developments in Air Targeting: Data Handling Tech-
niques Outten J. Clinard 95
Adaptation to machine methods of retrieval and ma-
nipulation. SECRET
The Shorthand of Experience . . . . Thomas F. Elzweig 105
True adventures of an extraordinary spy. CONFIDEN-
TIAL
Communication to the Editors
? Nominates the scientist for the scientific collection
vacancy. SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
129
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Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence . . . . 133
Suspect Documents?Their Scientific Examination,
by Wilson R. Harrison. . . .
In Flanders Fields, by Leon Wolff
We Spied Walter Pforzheimer 139
Evaluates additions to the intelligence bibliography
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Difficulties and new proposals
in a dozen
military geographic fields.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
K. C. Duncan
? Geographic intelligence is one of the oldest forms of mili-
tary intelligence, and one of the most important. From ear-
liest times, when man first conspired against man, through
ancient history and mediaeval conflict to the most recent
wars of our own time, an accurate knowledge and apprecia-
tion of geographical factors has been an essential part of
strategy and tactics. But today, instead of merely giving
some simple information on what lies beyond the neighbour-
ing hill, geographic intelligence is required to provide knowl-
edge on a world-wide basis and in infinitely greater variety,
detail, and (above all) precision than ever before.
In the face of unlimited conceivable demands from plan-
ning and operational staffs it is essential that our geographic
activities should be carefully guided and controlled, so that
none may be wasted on aspects which, though previously im-
portant in military thinking, have now lost their importance
in modern strategy and tactics. It is in the light of this thesis
that I propose to examine several fields of geographic intelli-
gence and discuss problems encountered in each.
Cross-Country Terrain
Assessing the suitability of terrain for cross-country move-
ment has been a major problem in modern warfare. Of the
many instances when failure to ? appreciate this factor has
proved disastrous, one is perhaps outstanding. In 1917 Lord
Haig launched his Flanders offensive in disregard of his engi-
neers' warning that the ground would revert to bog under
the necessary preliminary bombardment and his weather ex-
perts' advice that the autumn rains, then due, would further
aggravate conditions. His failure to take into account the
terrain requirements for cross-country movement led to the
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costliest battle in British military history, Passchendaele, in-
volving the sacrifice of some 400,000 men.1
The suitability of cross-country terrain is today in some
ways more critical than ever because of heavier equipment,
increased speed and mobility, and probable need for dispersal
off surfaced roads as a precaution against tactical nuclear at-
tacks. Its assessment, however, is a most difficult matter,
involving a matching of the characteristics of various types
of military vehicle to a wide range of detailed information on
the terrain?local or seasonal variations of bearing capacity,
width and depth of water obstacles, height and steepness of
their banks, and the effect of day-to-day or seasonal climatic
influences. The task is rendered especially difficult when no
practical precedent exists: take for example the movement
of tanks across ricefields.
The military geographer really has two major tasks?first,
to acquire and collate the necessary mass of factual data on
the terrain, and second, to apply those data to foreseeable
military operations on the basis of proved vehicle perform-
ance. For both, I suggest, careful liaison with planning staffs
is essential. It is beyond our resources to acquire and collate
detailed information on all areas; we must concentrate on
areas where the planners consider movement most likely to
occur. And we must keep aware of movement plans for par-
ticular vehicles in order to spot the need for experimental
maneuvers as basis for an adequate assessment of the prac-
ticability of these movements.
Ports and Beaches
An outstanding feature of World War II military opera-
tions was the extensive use of beaches for landing troops with
their arms and supplies. New techniques led to operations of
this kind on a far greater scale than had previously been
thought possible. It became the policy to by-pass the sea-
ports in the opening stages of a campaign, relying on the
beaches until harbors were captured and reopened to the use
of conventional vessels. It was found possible to land stores
and equipment on beaches and clear them inland at remark-
able rates, averaging 2,500 tons per day per mile of beach.
Thus performance over a good beach compares favorably with
1 Cf . Leon Wolff's In Flanders Fields, reviewed on pp. 134-138 of this issue.
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that of a medium-sized seaport, and in some cases can be bet-
ter: on the basis of the wartime formula a two-mile stretch
of beach west of Tourane, in South Vietnam, would have a
capacity of 5,000 tons per day, as against only some 500 for
the port.
The importance of beaches for military operations has prob-
ably increased since the war. Modern weapons seem likely to
damage seaports more effectively and thus delay their rehabil-
itation for longer periods, while improved equipment for beach
landings will probably permit the movement of tonnages far
in excess of the figures achieved in World War II. In these
circumstances, I suggest that our organizations should con-
sider carefully whether they are over-concentrating on de-
tailed studies of ports and their capacities to the neglect of
beaches.
We should at least aim at a high standard in respect of
those beaches which the planners consider may be used in op-
erations. Experience in Melbourne indicates that accumu-
lated beach intelligence is generally sufficient as a guide to
planners, but lacks the detail required for mounting specific
Operations with confidence. It is a fallacy to suppose that
observations made years ago are necessarily accurate today
and adequate for present requirements. The characteris-
tics of some beaches can change surprisingly overnight in a
storm, and the heavier equipment available today poses prob-
lems not previously encountered. Factors such as bearing
capacity (involving assessment of the sub-strata), slope at
various tides, variations of surface and slope at different sea-
sons, effects of tide and local currents on inshore ap-
proaches?these are typically deficient in our present infor-
mation.
These deficiencies could be reduced, I suggest, by carrying
out special technical reconnaissance, whenever practicable,
in respect of those beaches which are of interest to our mili-
tary planners on the evidence of present information. Where
this reconnaissance is not possible (e.g., beaches in potential
enemy territory) our procurement channels should be acti-
vated far more than at present. If this is not done, we can
only continue to plan on imperfect data, risking uncertainties
and perhaps jeopardizing the success of vital amphibious op-
erations.
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Railways
An important problem in the study of railways is the as-
sessment of route capacities. In ideal circumstances this
assessment would be made by analyzing the physical charac-
teristics of the lines?gauge, number of tracks, weight of
rail, length and spacing of passing loops, speed or weight re-
strictioris, and so on?to arrive at a theoretical physical ca-
pacity. The practical operational capacity would then be
determined by such factors as size and type of locomotive
and rolling-stock park, fuel availability, quality and location
of repair shops and engine sheds, etc.
In foreign countries, however, particularly those which are
behind a "curtain," acquisition of all the detailed information
necessary for these analyses is most difficult, and present as-
sessments of the practical capacities of railways in those
countries can at best be regarded as approximations based on
very imperfect data. Unfortunately, there is little prospect
of obtaining the detailed information required to fill our gaps,
and it is therefore worth considering whether some short-cut
method might improve our assessments.
One such method might be to make an all-out effort to ac-
quire working timetables of those lines which have impor-
tance in planning. These working timetables?not to be con-
fused with passenger timetables?contain details of all classes
of traffic, both passenger and freight, and are available in
one form or another on all railways. An analysis of them
in conjunction with other textual and photographic infor-
mation might give reasonable accuracy in the assessment
of practical capacities. It would not be easy, but if our agen-
cies agreed on a standard approach it seems likely that the
assessments achieved would be more soundly based and ade-
quate at least for the purposes of war potential appreciations.
Roads
The great effort devoted to reporting on roads has amassed
a considerable amount of information, which, however, is de-
ficient in certain technical aspects critical for accurate as-
sessments of road potential. This deficiency is due chiefly to
the fact that reports come from nontechnical observers, but
a contributing cause is that reporting officers not unnaturally
tend to judge the condition of roads in foreign countries on
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the basis of road standards in their own, so that their assess-
ments tend to vary inversely with these standards.
The effect of inaccurate reporting can best be shown by a
practical example. Let us take a road across undulating coun-
try with an overall width of 20 feet and a waterbound mac-
adam surface in bad condition. Applying the standard NATO
Road Capacity Table to these details, we arrive at an estimated
capacity:
550x-30x1000-132 vehicles per hour.
100
If 3-ton vehicles are used for a 10-hour running day, the esti-
mated capacity becomes 3,960 tons per day.
But if the reporting officer, because of the bad condition of
the surface, mistakes the waterbound macadam for crushed
rock, our calculations would be:
280x-25x-80 ?56 vehicles per hour.
100 100
With 3-ton vehicles and a 10-hour running day, the estimated
capacity is only 1,680 tons per day. A simple mistake on the
nature of the surface has thus resulted in an error of 57%
in the capacity of this particular road. Cumulative errors
in the NATO Table factors, applied to a number of roads in a
given area, might seriously affect logistic planning.
But the full assessment of a road's potential requires also
consideration of the maximum live-load capacity, i.e. the
weight of the heaviest vehicle that can use it. This involves
Other technical reporting, in particular on the strength of
bridges and culverts, which not infrequently impose strict
limits on traffic. In the example we gave just now I assumed
that 3-ton vehicles were used, but planners might well want
to know whether they could move 10-ton trucks or even 50-ton
tanks along a given road. This problem is one of educating
reporting officers so that the technical details they supply
are far more accurate than at present, or of obtaining this
necessary information in some other way.
A secondary problem in this field, as in many others, is to
ensure that procurement and research are conducted in ac-
cordance with the priorities of planning requirements, for
the potential areas to be covered are so vast that with the
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limited resources available we cannot hope to achieve detailed
results on everything. If this control is not exercised, there
is a real danger that essential work will be neglected.
Inland Water Transportation
Compared with railways and roads, inland water transporta-
tion is being neglected by intelligence. This, I believe, stems
largely from a natural tendency to think first of rail and
road transport for military movement because of their greater
speed. Moreover, railways and roads, being able to traverse
natural obstacles such as mountain ranges, can link widely
separated regions and provide local access in any direction.
Rivers and canals cannot provide the same through access or
choice of direction, and the capacity of rivers normally de-
creases as one proceeds upstream. Another reason for the
preoccupation with rail and road transportation systems has
been the relatively large reporting on them in connection
with Western aid to backward countries, in which the con-
struction or rehabilitation of these systems has loomed large.
This neglect of waterways has meant that we have acquired
insufficient detail to permit a rational reconsideration of the
validity of our preferential emphasis on railways and roads.
The situation, in short, presents a vicious circle. The vulner-
ability of rail and road transportation networks, particularly
around major cities and ports, to modern techniques of attack
suggests that greater attention should be paid to the capabili-
ties of waterway systems as a means of moving supplies inland.
They merit at least sufficient procurement and research that
their role may be more accurately assessed in those areas
which have the highest priority in over-all planning.
Airfields
The basic problem of airfield intelligence is the assessment
of the capabilities of a given airfield, i.e. to decide what aircraft
can operate from it, and in what circumstances. Before this
assessment can be made it is necessary to know in detail such
physical characteristics of the airfield as the dimensions, sur-
face, and weight-bearing capacity of the runways, taxi-tracks,
and dispersals, the nature and disposition of supporting facili-
ties, the location and height of obstructions to the approaches,
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the altitude, and the temperature. It is necessary to know,
too, the seasonal variations in some of these factors.
Except when photoreconnaissance and detailed reporting
are available, it is extremely difficult to get this information
with the required accuracy, and even then a full knowledge
of bearing capacity is practically impossible. Detailed tests
have been conducted at a negligible proportion of the airfields
in which we are interested, and we are therefore compelled to
base our opinions largely on a knowledge of what aircraft have
operated from the fields, without any real means to assess
their surplus of bearing capacity. In addition, we all too often
have no knowledge of how a runway will stand up to inten-
sive or prolonged usage, or of how its capacity will vary at
different seasons.
The rated requirements of aircraft which use the field,
moreover, may bear only a very indirect relation to opera-
tional requirements. For example,
ublications state that the MIG-17 requires only 2,640
feet to take off and clear 50 feet. Yet intelligence research
shows clearly that the Communists, having built their run-
ways for these aircraft to an original length of 6,560 feet,
subsequently lengthened them to at least 7,200. For the
MIG-19 the technical handbooks give a requirement of 2,240
and 3,000 feet whereas research indicates that
the Communists are lengthening some runways for these air-
craft from 7,200 feet to at least 8,200. There is thus a wide
margin between the minimum length of take-off run and the
length of the runway itself.
There is no easy solution, but I feel that considerable im-
provement would be achieved if our respective air forces and
airfield intelligence could reach some agreement on the total
lengths of runway from which enemy or friendly forces would
be prepared to conduct both sustained and limited occasional
operations. If lists could be agreed, showing on a country-by-
country basis the full runway requirements for the operation
of various aircraft likely to be used by that country, then the
airfield intelligence branches would at least have a basis for
their assessments and could write with far greater unanimity
than at present.
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Climate
Climate of course affects most other aspects of geographic
intelligence, but some applications of its study in modern war-
fare may not yet be generally appreciated. For example a full
knowledge of local wind variations is necessary for the study
of the movement of radioactive fallout from nuclear explo-
sions. Important as this is in strategic nuclear attack, it is
even more so in tactical applications, when friendly forces
are relatively close to the point of impact or may have to ad-
vance towards it. The same principle applies to chemical or
bacteriological warfare. The study of local temperature in-
versions and local rains will also be very important should
gases be used by either side in a future war.
You will note my repetition of the word "local." Intelli-
gence is on the whole fairly well provided with generalized data
on climate, normally based on long periods of observation,
which gives a reasonably accurate basis for regional apprecia-
tions. What is lacking?and I suggest it is the main defi-
ciency in this branch of geographic intelligence?is informa-
tion on local peculiarities or variations within the broad re-
gional pattern.
Mapping
The need for accuracy in mapping has always been impor-
tant, but today this need is greater than ever before. Whereas
minor inaccuracies can reasonably be corrected by visual ob-
servation in conventional air operations, the concept of
guided-missile warfare highlights problems which have hith-
erto been only marginal. One of the greatest limitations to
ICBM accuracy is the present inadequacy of intercontinental
geodetic survey. The use of any guided missile which is not
equipped with some terminal-guidance system requires precise
knowledge of the relation between launching point and objec-
tive, and though some margin of error may be allowed where
area damage is acceptable, no such margin is permissible if it
is desired to hit a single objective with the minimum of dam-
age to surroundings. If a terminal-guidance system is fitted
to the missile, a prerequisite is often a knowledge of the radar
return from the target area. In peacetime or in the early
stages of a war, when it may not be possible to acquire this
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knowledge by prior reconnaissance, the only alternative is the
simulation of the return by a careful analysis of maps.
Since mapping represents graphic collation of many as-
pects of intelligence, it is pertinent to examine briefly our role
vis-a-vis that of the map-producing authorities. Procedures
no doubt vary between our countries, but certain fundamen-
tal principles are valid irrespective of their detailed applica-
tion. First, there must be a system for feeding our informa-
tion to the map producers, and for checking their drafts. This
assumes particular importance when no recent photography
is available to the mappers, but even when it is, there is in-
evitably a time-lag between it and the map compilation, and
in that interval changes may occur. A map becomes out of
date all too quickly; we must at least ensure that it is as ac-
curate as possible when issued.
Second, there must be a system for informing the mappers
of inaccuracies detected after issue, and for letting them know
when certain series or individual sheets have become obsolete.
Many of us, noting inaccuracies on maps, have done nothing
to draw attention to them because there was no routine pro-
cedure for doing so. Third?and this applies primarily to
areas over which peacetime photoreconnaissance is not prac-
ticable?there must be a system whereby doubtful map de-
tails noted in everyday research are recorded, so that procure-
ment agencies may be briefed to check them.
Fourth, there must be a system whereby mapping priori-
ties are related to planning. This is primarily a matter for
liaison between planning staffs and the mappers; the respon-
sibility of intelligence organizations lies mainly in drawing
attention to the deficiencies and inaccuracies in existing maps
of the priority areas so that new editions may be put in hand.
Photography
Photography is a basic requirement in mapping, in most
forms of intelligence research, and in operational planning;
and any deficiencies of photography must adversely affect
these activities. Of the two forms of photographic coverage,
print coverage and negatives backing it up, the need for the
former is well recognized, but the need for film is not so gen-
erally appreciated. Film is required to meet the demands of
various sections and organizations in peacetime and in war,
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and the alternative of copying from prints, besides being
slower and more costly, does not provide first-class quality,
especially when, as frequently, the original prints have de-
teriorated through age.
It seems somewhat illogical that whereas the exchange of
textual information between our agencies has been developed
to a high degree, the exchange of photographic prints and
film has been comparatively neglected. In addition to the
direct advantages of such an exchange to peacetime intelli-
gence research, we should not overlook its importance in
those "hot" situations which occur from time to time and in
the period of extreme military activity which would imme-
diately precede the next war. At such times it is clearly a
complicated and inefficient procedure to be obliged to signal
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photographs and film, and then to await their arrival "by
best possible means." Once the war had started, it is reason-
able to suppose that fresh photographs would become avail-
able, but in the pressure periods in the meantime we have to
depend on existing holdings.
One appreciates, of course, that clauses in peacetime re-
connaissance contracts may preclude the exchange of the
resultant photography, but this restriction applies to a very
small proportion of overall available holdings and does not
invalidate my thesis that much more could, and should, be
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Geographic Names
Much painstaking work has been done by the U.S. Board on
Geographic Names
towards the standardization of place
names and generic terms, and this has been of particular
value where transliteration from a non-roman to a romanized
form is required. Difficulties are still encountered by the in-
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telligence community, however, in applying the authorities'
decisions.
The main difficulty arises from the fact that the decisions,
being based on academic principles, are sometimes ahead of
popular usage, and in such cases the "preferred" (or decision)
name tends to make the text less readily intelligible to the
non-specialist reader. In current intelligence reporting, it
is desirable to use a style which permits the easiest compre-
hension by a wide range of usually high-level generalists; any
irritant which interrupts their concentration on the subject
matter is undesirable, and might even result in failure to
appreciate the importance of the intelligence. A few examples
of what I term irritating preferred names are Krung Thep
(Bangkok), Kuang-chou (Canton), Chin-men Tao (Quemoy
Island), Sulawesi (Celebes), Shen-yang (Mukden) and Hsia-
men Tao (Amoy Island); there are many others which, being
less common, are perhaps all the more irritating when they
are encountered.
The problem is complicated by the fact that some of these
preferred names may, in course of time, become more com-
monly accepted in daily usage throughout the world. This
raises the question whether we are to concentrate on ease of
comprehension at the present time or should tolerate irritat-
ing names with the object of gradually educating ourselves
and our readers to accept the academic decisions. The deci-
sions of the two boards are progressively being incorporated
in new map series, and therefore confusion is likely to arise
in basic or long-term reporting if we do not adhere rigidly to
them. One can imagine, for example, the frustration of a
commander in the field when he realizes that he has the task
of reconciling the "preferred" names used on his basic maps
and the "conventional" names used in a detailed study of the
region's topography.
Another aspect of the decisions which brings complications
is the retention of many indigenous generic terms for such
topographical features as capes, rivers, islands, mountains and
lakes. The topography of foreign lands is sufficiently diffi-
cult for generalists to comprehend without the added diffi-
culty caused by the use of these terms, and there would ap-
pear to be a strong case for the substitution of English-lan-
guage equivalents. Although we, the peacetime elite of
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intelligence activities, can perhaps overcome the difficulties
by acquiring familiarity with new terms, the problem would
assume increased significance in wartime, when a large body
of untrained recruits would be unfamiliar with our nomen-
clature.
Air Targeting
While the production of air targets material is primarily
a Service responsibility, the intelligence organizations must
provide the basic information required and play an important
part in writing the appreciations on which the priority of
target systems and individual targets are based. It is there-
fore relevant to examine whether we are devoting our resources
to any non-vital aspects of targeting, or on the other hand are
neglecting others of importance.
Let us look first at strategic targeting. In World War II
the basic documents for operations were detailed information
sheets and annotated photographs of individual targets, and
similar, usually more generalized, graphics on important con-
centrations of targets. These were necessary for attacks by
manned aircraft, since visual recognition of the target and of
the selected detailed aiming point within it played a major
part in such attacks. With the concept of nuclear and guided-
missile strategic attack, it should be examined whether it is
still necessary to devote a major part of our targeting ac-
tivity to detailed graphics on individual targets; in view of the
area damage attainable by modern weapons, should a greater
proportion of effort be devoted to urban and industrial com-
plexes?
There is probably no aspect of aerial warfare on which more
has been written than target selection. It is fairly easy to
be wise after the event, as we have seen from the spate of criti-
cisms of allied bombing policy published since World War II.
It is very difficult to be equally wise before the event, and to
be sure that the golden role of targeting is observed?hit the
enemy where it hurts him most. In a future war, because
of the striking power of weapons likely to be held by both
sides, it is more than ever essential that target selection be
right, and from the very beginning of hostilities. There may
be no opportunity to experiment with priorities as in the last
war. We in intelligence have, therefore, a responsibility to
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Geographic Intelligence
ensure that our recommendations in this field are based on
sound principles.
The discharge of this responsibility is rendered more diffi-
cult, in my opinion, by the lack of any sound system for as-
sessing the relative priority of complexes as targets. This is
quite a different task from assessing the priority of a single
installation relative to others of like function. One complex
may, for example, contain a transportation target of major
importance to the country's war potential, a steel plant and
oil refinery of medium importance, and so on. How can the
priority of this complex be determined in relation to that of
other complexes which contain various other combinations
of installations, each with their own relative importance
within their functional systems? This is too critical a mat-
ter to be left to haphazard methods, and merits some close
examination.
I have long felt that the solution may lie in some sort of
point system. What I have in mind is that within each coun-
try for which strategic targeting is undertaken a factor
should be agreed on for each functional system (e.g. oil-refin-
ing, transportation, steel industry, administration), the fac-
tor being based on the characteristics of the war potential
of the particular country. Then within each system a factor
should be agreed on for individual installations in accordance
with their various degrees of importance. A combination of
the two factors would give a points value for each installation,
and the sum of these values would give the total value of
each complex, thus providing an indication of its relative
priority for attack. It would, of course, be necessary to keep
all the factors under periodic review, and to adjust them in
the light of changes in the war potential of the country con-
cerned. While this method would not be without its difficul-
ties, it provides the basis for a positive approach to the matter
and should, I suggest, be investigated.
One important aspect of graphics on complexes is a repre-
sentation of the anticipated radar return from the various
installations, buildings and natural features. In the absence
of actual radarscope photos?and this must at present apply
to vast areas which might be attacked in war?it is necessary
to simulate the return, basing the simulation on an analysis
of such factors as the height of buildings, their type of con-
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Geographic Intelligence
struction, their lay-out, the density of built-up areas, and the
configuration of such features as rivers, lakes, and woods.
All this information must be provided by the intelligence
agencies.
I doubt whether our procurement policies take sufficient ac-
count of this requirement. Are we equipped to provide such
Information with the degree of detailed 'accuracy which is
required? In respect of a country such as China, for example,
I am fairly sure we are not, particularly when the constant
development of existing and new centers is borne in mind. I
suggest that this deficiency is worth examination, with a view
to the better briefing of procurement agencies active in the
field.
In World War II probably as much activity was devoted to
tactical targeting as to strategic, and the allied tactical air
forces played an important part in the victory. Today, the
tendency to talk in terms of a short, decisive nuclear attack
or at least an air offensive conducted at long range with
guided missiles has given rise to a feeling that in the next
war little in the way of tactical bombing will be needed. But
this is not necessarily so. In some areas where our forces
might be engaged it is still probable that for various reasons
tactical attacks would be required, even if they did not actu-
ally predominate. Because of this, some effort directed
towards the preparation of tactical target material can still
be Justified, but we must ensure that the effort is commensu-
rate with the use that will be made of the material, bearing
In mind that on the outbreak of war photoreconnaissance
would quickly 'provide completely up-to-date information.
Conclusion
The field of geographic intelligence, as we have seen, is a
very wide one, affecting either directly or indirectly most
forms of military operations and planning. If there is any
common factor in the problems I have indicated, I believe it
to be this: priorities for procurement and research must be
more closely related to planning requirements than they are
at present, not only in respect of the degree of detail but also
In respect of the areas covered. For geographic intelligence
Is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end--military opera-
tional efficiency.
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SECRET
A clandestine requirements of-
ficer reveals to the intelligence
analyst a magic formula to
summon and command the
powerful ginni of last resort.
SPY AT YOUR SERVICE, SIR
Lowell M. Dunleigh
"The obtaining of intelligence by covert means is an ineffi-
cient, expensive and unsatisfactory business. No secret in-
telligence is worth collecting unless it is absolutely certain
that the intelligence is genuinely and urgently required by
some executive authority. . . . The art of being an executive
in a secret service (and it is an art, not a science) consists
largely of seeing that the operating case officer knows exactly
what intelligence he is required to obtain, or what? target he
has to attack. . . . The further the best brains of a secret serv-
ice divorce themselves from this basic problem, the less effi-
cient the service will be."
So writes a distinguished British colleague, crystallizing
these nuggets of wisdom from his wide experience and the
long traditions of his service. It is the duty of headquarters,
he adds, "to see that the customers don't ask the field damn
fool questions." To this negative thumbs-down on foolish
questions we would add an outstretched palm begging for
good ones, questions calculated to produce the highest yield
of essential information.1
Putting the right questions to the covert collector in order
to get the right answers is not simply a matter of professional
neatness, it is imperative to the performance of the intelli-
gence function. Clandestine assets for the collection of in-
formation are limited, and in the progressive complexities of
the modern world we must be sure we are aiming them at the
pivotal factors of power. On the other hand, the flooding of
'See William P. Bundy, "The Guiding of Intelligence Collection,"
Studies in Intelligence III 1 (Winter 1959), p. 49, for a review of
guidance problems in clandestine collection as presented to the
Melbourne Research Methods Conference.
SECRET
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SECRET Spy At Your Service, Sir
the information channels is already acute and may soon
become overwhelming. Every day more than 1,000 classified
documents are poured into the intelligence stream. How
many are brightly illuminating, how many of low candle-
power? That depends not entirely on the validity of their
information, but on what questions they answer.
Process and Rapport
From the viewpoint of the collector, the whole intelligence
process has four phases, represented by quadruple R's?Re-
search, Requirements, Reports, Reaction (or evaluation). The
third phase is the collector's own, but is dependent on the other
three, which belong to the analyst.
The analyst or producer must approach his analysis of the
past or present and his estimate of the future through re-
search?the assembling and collation of raw information. He
usually finds that he needs more information than he has on
some phases, or perhaps current coverage of a developing
situation. So he levies a question on the collector, overt or
covert. The question is answered by an information report.
Then if the system is working properly, the analyst will react,
evaluating the report to let the collector know whether he is
on the beam. So the intelligence wheel turns: Research, Re-
quirements, Reports, Reaction. Whether it turns smoothly
or develops an eccentric wobble depends very considerably on
the relation between analyst and collector. This relation-
ship is the key to a pair of most critical and sobering prob-
lems?how to get the indispensable information, and con-
versely how to avoid choking the intelligence stream with
the luxuriant water hyacinth of trivia.
In simpler days the operations of the quadruple R's could be
combined in one man. In the fifth century B. C., Thucydides
both reported and analyzed the Peloponnesian War, ranging
the fields of politics, economics, military action, psychological
and subversive warfare. He set down a creed that can be
warmly embraced by modern practitioners of the intelligence
arts and sciences:
And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of
the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first
story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own
general impressions; either I was present myself at the events
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Spy At Your Service, Sir
which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-
witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much
thoroughness as possible. Not that even so the truth was easy
to discover: different eye-witnesses give different accounts of
the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side or the
other or else from imperfect memories. . . . It will be enough for
me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those
who want to understand clearly the events which happened
in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will,
at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated
in the future. . . .
I do not think that one will be far wrong in accepting the
conclusions I have reached from the evidence which I have
put forward. It is better evidence than that of the poets, who
exaggerate the importance of their themes, or of the prose
chroniclers, who are less interested in telling the truth than
in catching the attention of their public. . . . We may claim in-
stead to have used only the plainest evidence and to have
reached conclusions which are reasonably accurate.
Alas, no modern Thucydides is competent to undertake
alone the full reportorial description and the analytic evalua-
tion of the Cold War; they are a task for many men and
many minds. And, perhaps unfortunately, the stylus and
papyrus which limited even the prodigious industry of the
phenomenal Greek have been replaced by a boundless pro-
liferation of paper and the ever faster writing machines of
today. But let us waste no time in tears for the past, for we
cannot become our own ancestors; we have no choice but to
seek some contemporary means of elevating the quality and
reducing the quantity of information which now pours into
the intelligence hopper.
I believe the way lies in a closer integration of the question
and answer process, a better understanding between producer
and collector as to their functions and mutual responsibil-
ities, a realization that they are parts of the same body, lobes
of the brain of a master institutional Thucydides. To the
superficial observer there is no problem here. Machinery
exists, and generally it is good machinery. With minor ad-
justments it would win a good rating from management ex-
perts. The river of paper, properly diked and leveed, flows
smoothly from port to ordained port. There is a procedure to
SE
C 83 RET
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