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Copy No. C
15 March 1960
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DIA review(s) completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
15 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Argentina: Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan
will follow up his recent visits to Mexico and Cuba.with a
trip to Argentina. for its national independence day celebra-
tion on 25 May,
The USSR may also want to participate in the com-
mercial exposition planned on this occasion,
(Page 1)
*USSR: Khrushchev's illness is apparently genuine. For-
eign Minister Gromyko has informed a Western ambassador
that Khrushchev was indisposed and a. Soviet doctor has told
another member of the diplomatic corps that Ehrushchey
had severe - ri e,
II. ASIA-AFRICA
,
parently in addition to the $250,000,000 credit arrangement
initialed during Khrushchev's recent visit calls for the USSR
ith
i
ser an
d th
ree or
our su
o supp
l
y
I
n
d
ones
i
a w
one cru
f
t
b
-
marines_ according to the Indonesian naval intelligence chief.
5
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United States, Accordingly, the navy will accept only equip-
ment from the USSR, ?y
USSR, and will look to the United States for/
training and for help in building a Sumatran naval base-3 25X1 fG
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Laos: army security sweep, the most ambitious in a
series undertaken throughout the country since January, is
getting under way in southern Laos. These sweeps are designed
to improve security conditions for the 24 April elections. The
Communist insurgents, however, will probably retain a. substan-
tial capability for intimidating voters in the countrysides
l
1
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1
ap-
Indonesia-USSR: A Sukarno-Khrushchev agreement
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Mikoyan Plans to Visit. Argentina in May
Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, following his re-
cent trips to Mexico and. Cuba, now plans to visit Argentina
in connection with its independence celebrations on 25 May,
Argentina is reportedly plan- I
ning an extensive commercial exposition to coincide with the
holiday. There is no evidence thus far that the Argentine
Government has invited a Soviet representative to the cele-
brations, but Mikoyan may plan to open a Soviet exhibit at the
exposition, as he did during his Mexican trip.
The Soviet leaders are apparently convinced that such high-
level visits are an effective means of impressing the Latin
Americans with Soviet technical progress and the advantages
of cooperation with the USSR at least in the economic field.
If he goes, Mikoyan will attempt to discuss with Argentine of -
ficials ways of utilizing the unused $68,000,000 of the $100,000,-
000 Soviet credit extended to the Frondizi government in. 1958.
He may attempt to exploit Argentina's difficult economic posi-
tion with new offers of trade and aid, as Khrushchev did re-
centl in Indonesia.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
USSR to Give Indonesia Naval Assistance
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Under an agreement reached between President Sukarno
and Premier Khrushchev during the latter's visit to Indonesia
and apparently separate from the $250,000,000 economic credit
agreement, the Indonesian Navy will receive a cruiser, four
submarines, a. submarine rescue vessel, necessary base sup-
port for the subs, and merchant ship support. Details are be-
ing worked out with a Soviet naval mission which arrived in
Indonesia in mid-February immediately prior to Khrushchev's
visit. According to the Indonesian Navy intelligence chief, who
has kept the American naval attache generally informed on the
new arrangements, the.agreement will not include training
within the bloc but will cover necessary on-the-job instruction.
1The intelligence chief stated that the Indonesian Navy staff 25X1
wants to accept from the USSR only that support which the US
cannot or will not provide. Accordingly, the navy will accept
only equipment from the USSR, and will look to the United State
for training and for assistance in building a naval base in. Suma-
tra. In 1958 and 1959, however, at least 1,500 navy. trainees
are estimated to have been sent to the bloc
Navy sources believe the ships will be delivered in. 1961. 25X1
These deliveries will constitute. the. first substantial military
assistance arranged directly with the Soviet Union. Previous
bloc military purchases, contracted largely with Poland and
Czechoslovakia, include two submarines. four destroyers,
eight subchasers, and 200 aircraft.
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Laotian Army Securit
Sweep in Southern Laos
CA Laotian Army security sweep which will ultimately
involve 5,000. troops began on 7 March in Laos' three south-
ernmost provinces. This operation, which will last several
weeks, is the most ambitious of a number which have been
undertaken throughout the country since January in prepara-
tion for the National Assembly elections on 24 April. The
several columns of troops participating in the operation will
cover towns, villages, routes of communication, and areas
of known or suspected Communist insurgent activity
[Laotian officials hope that the operation, in addition to
making the area more secure for the elections, will strengthen
the government's control over an area where Communists have
been particularly strong. Army, police, and civil adminis-
trative elements will be permanently stationed in the numerous
subdistricts where such units have not yet been assigned. One
of the central government's fundamental problems in its strug-
gle with the Communists has been its inability to make its
presence felt in the thousands of, isolated villages throughout
the country. Vientiane's tentative efforts to rectify this weak-
ness were interrupted when the Communist rebellion began
last summer
ke army is reportedly coordinating its cleanup campaign
with the South Vietnamese Army, which is engaged in opera-
tions against Vietnamese Communist guerrillas on the other
side of the border. The arrangements for cooperation, which
are said to include the right: of hot pursuit, could add further
fuel to Hanoi's propaganda attacks on the governments in Vien-
tiane and Saigon
fThe operation probably will improve security conditions
in the towns and larger villages. No appreciable inroads on
insurgent hard-core strength are likely to be made, however,
since the Communists will probably have ample time to fade
into the countryside, where they will retain a substantial
capability for limiting the vote in the coming elections or
of delivering it to favored leftist candidates '.1
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of. State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research.
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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