CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000360001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR, I
Khrushchev's visits'
to capitalist countries may be good for Soviet policy but cannot
be useful for the "socialist cam
lit has become China's task to support the an i
imperialist" forces in Africa who are struggling against the
"imperialists" for independence. These remarks and recent
official Chinese statements indicate that Soviet tactics in West-
ern Europe will not inhibit Pei in 's policy of open support to
nationalist movements
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. Communist China, In his .10 4pril foreign policy speech to
the concluding session of the National People's Congress, Pre-
mier Chou En-lai indicated Peiping's opposition to any stabiliza--
tion of the status quo in the Far East. He stated that "up to the
present. there has been no change in the tense situation between
China and the United States" and that, regarding Taiwan, Peiping
will "struggle to the end" to defend "its territorial integrity:'
Referring to Japan, Chou repeated that there could be no possi-
bility of improving relations with the Kishi government. With
.reference to China's disputes with India and Indonesia,Chou
merely called for "reasonable solutions,"
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
U11LV11.V1 0VUu1 1111'1(: t; life Ui1eUUk;Ubb1UL aLLemPL U1 an
English-speaking white farmer to assassinate Prime Minister
Verwoerd will aggravate the domestic situation because of the
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interpretation likely to be given the act by various groups. Al-
though the would-be assassin had no known political backing,
die-hard elements within the Nationalist party will see the at-
tack as proof of a widespread plot to kill government leaders
and will demand further repression of non-Europeans and
liberal whites. The Africans are likely to see the attack as
an indication of support among the English-speaking commu-
nity for their antigovernment effort. They will probably in-
crease their agitation and may stage disorders on 15 April,
Africa Freedom Day.
Somalia - British Somaliland-, ,Somali nationalists of the
Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia and of the Brit-
ish protectorate are planning to bypass official channels and
hold discussions regarding a possible union of the two areas.
Italian and French officials in the area apparently suspect that
these moves are the result of British machinations. Officials
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in the British protectorate fear that disorders would erut if
authorities attempted to contain nationalist enthusiasm.~7II
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Afro.-Asian Conference' The second "nongovernmental" Afro-
Asian People's Solidarity Conference which begins in Conakry,
Guinea on 11 April seems likely to be marked by a struggle for
control of the solidarity movement between Communist partici-
pants and UAR-led neutralists. This conflict and the indifferent
and sometimes hostile attitude of African nationalists toward the
movement will probably continue to limit its prestige and effec
tiveness.
11 Apr 60
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Peiping's View of_Khrushchev's Policies
LKhrushchev'svisits to capitalist countries may be good for
Soviet policy, but cannot be useful for the "socialist camp," 0
by visit-
ing Paris Khrushchev could not help both France and the "anti-
imperialist" movement in Africa, and that it is China's task to
support the movement. These remarks and recent official Chi-
nese statements indicate that Peiping, in pursuit of its policy of
giving open support to nationalist movements in underdeveloped
countries, is determined not to be inhibited by Soviet tactics in
Western Europe. The Chinese apparently feel the bloc should
play a more vigorous role in weakening the position of Euro-
pean powers in Africa
Khrushchev is not a "revolution-
ary" leader like Stalin and that he is trying to do things which are
contrary to the "revolutionary ideas" of Communism. This re-
mark may in part refer to Peiping's preference for a truculent
posture toward the United States. Articles in Peiping's theoret-
ical journal Red Flag are attempting to demonstrate that Khru-
shchev's policy calling for "friendly" East-West contacts and
"mutual concessions" has no historical precedent in Communist
doctrine. The articles insist that the real attitude toward USSR-
US coexistence lies in Lenin's remark, "Let no American cap-
italists touch us. We will not touch them.']
The Chinese view Khrushchev's policy as leading to an un-
desirable stabilization of the status quo and as detracting from
their effort to justify open hostility to the United States. In line
with this effort, Red Flag recently insisted that the "predatory
nature of im-periihi-iri-r6i-ist be expose
I he
United States is turning its attention to small-scale wars--a
"fact proving that American peaceful posturing is feigned:' 0
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Assassination Attempt May Aggravate South African Situation
The unsuccessful attempt of an English-speaking white
farmer to assassinate Prime Minister Verwoerd on .9 April
.will probably have important domestic consequences, although
the would-be assassin probably was not acting for any political
group and may have been demented. The country's tense polit-
ical and racial situation will be aggravated because. of the inter-
pretation . likely to be given to the attack by various elements of
the. population.
Powerful die-hard groups within the dominant white Na-
tionalist party, who have shown no willingness to ameliorate
local racial laws under international pressure, may 'see the at-
tack as proof of a widespread'conspiracy to kill government
leaders. They. will probably demand a further repression of
protest activities by the non-Europeans and liberal. whites, and
will call for a strengthening of official restrictions on.individual
rights during the racial crisis. Traditional animosity between
.the English and Afrikaner communities may be heightened.
Right-wing Nationalist politicians may. redouble their efforts
to weaken South Africa's traditional ties with Britain. by advo-
cating an early proclamation of a.republic and reappraisal of
the Commonwealth connection.
The Africans, interpreting the attack as evidence of English-
speaking. opposition to Verwoerd's policies, will probably be
spurred on in their agitation against the government. African
nationalists may. cause disorders on. 15 April-celebrated widely
as Africa Freedom Day--by a. stay-at-home. campaign and street
demonstrations
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APPROXIMATE AREA OF
PROPOSED GREATER
SOMALIA
I
VLP~E
ERITREA
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Somali Nationalists to Meet to Discuss Union
Somali nationalists in the Italian- administered trust. territory
of Somalia and in the adjoining. British protectorate, of Somaliland
plan to bypass official channels and to hold discussions about a pos-
sible union of the. two areas. A mission of eight government and
legislative. leaders from the protectorate sought and received an
invitation to visit Mogadiscio, capital of Somalia, on .12 April.
Somalia. is slated for independence on.1.July, and pressure is
mounting, for early independence in the British protectorate.]
(The. Italian administrator looks on the. visit as a "plot to ex-
tend British influence" to. Somalia and may attempt to forestall
the meeting. Such action would place, Italy in. the position . of being
an obstacle to Somali. aspirations, but would strengthen Somalia
.Prime Minister Issa and rid him of some of the stigma of being
an Italian stooge by allowing him to appear as champion of a Great-
er Somalia--toward which he. has been somewhat apathetic. The
fact that Issa's government is dominated by the Hawiya tribe while
the. rival Darot tribe is predominant in. the -Somaliland protectorate
may have influenced his outlook toward a close union of the two
arear, i
tAnticipating the arrival of the. protectorate mission, the Somalia
Government is whipping up enthusiasm for association. A govern-
ment newspaper has given extensive coverage to Issa's statements
characterizing the unity of all. Somali territories as his. most press-
ing political problem. Publication of these statements suggests
that the.prime minister either intends to adopt a pro-union line. or
is enabling himself to shift the blame elsewhere in case talks fail.]
official in the. French- Foreign_ Ministry has expressed some
.skepticism regarding British motivations in Somaliland. He believes
the British could put a brake on. pan-Somali developments, at least
until Somalia. becomes independent in July. The. official believe
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British policy endangers Paris' hope that a satisfactory modus
vivendi can be worked . out between the Somalis and Ethiopia-
which is highly suspicious of all pan-Somali activities,`)
In London, a Foreign Office spokesman was skeptical of
the judgment of the Somaliland Government that disturbances
would erupt in the protectorate if the United Kingdom failed to
go along with the legislative council's motion for independence
and union with Somalia. Nevertheless, he did not exclude the
possibility of independence for Somaliland and association with
Somalia by 1 July'.)
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Afro-Asian Conference Opens in Guinea
The second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference--a
"nongovernmental" organization--is scheduled to meet in
Conakry from 11 to 16 April, with approximately 300 dele-
gates. The first conference, held in Cairo at the end of 1957,
provided Nasir and the Communists a joint vehicle for exploit-
ing Asian and African nationalism and furthered Soviet efforts
by adopting a strong anti-Western line. In the past two years,
however, a split between UAR-led neutralists and Communist
elements has developed within the organization, and the Conakry
meeting. seems likely to reflect a struggle for control between
these two groups.
The agenda of the present session will probably include dis-
cussions on the liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, on
independence and unity in Africa and Asia, on coexistence, disarma-?
ment, and economic development, and on strengthening the sol-
idarity movement. Despite the anticipated neutralist attempts to
prevent Communist domination, which. have a reasonably good
.chance of success, the conference will almost certainly have a
pronounced anti-Western. cast.
Enthusiasm for the Conakry conference is markedly less than
that prevailing at the time of the Cairo. session. Most delegations,
with the exception of the Soviet, Chinese. Communist, and UAR
.groups, have little support. from their home governments. The
neutralist-Communist conflict and the indifferent and sometimes
hostile attitude of African nationalists. are likely to continue to
limit the prestige and effectiveness of the solidarity movement,
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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