MC&G STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A000400020041-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 9, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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DATE: 14 May 1968
TO: Chairman, COMIREX
SUBJECT: MC&G Study
I I has prepared
the atTacnea s udy in response to a
request from the Director. Before
sending it forward he has requested
comments from the Intelligence
Directorate.
Please forward your written
comments as soon as possible to
the ADDI.
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I ` he attached study, requested by the DCI, concerns
MC'*t? C and tlu- reinti.on5hip of the DCI to activities associated
r(114soa, I sho.dd n )I)reciate:your comments prior to finalization
f:vr. wri. L ili.n to the 1)L 1.
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A
STUDY OF
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
May 1968
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It. Conduct of Study
III. Conclusions and Recommendations
IV. Discussion
1. Establishment of Requirements
a. General
b. Requirements for Improved Geodetic Accuracy
c. Mapping Accuracy Requirements
d. Map Production Requirements
2. Inputs to Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
a. Essentiality of Aerial and/or Satellite Photography
(1)
(2)
(3)
Global Geodesy
Mapping and Charting,
Geodetic Control for Map
b. Global Geodetic Network
(1) Overt Programs
(2) Covert Programs
c. Geodetic Control for Map Production
d. Photographic
(1) Reconnaissance Aircraft
(2) Specially Equipped Aircraft
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(3) Satellite
e. Hydrographic
f, Other Intelligence
g. Nonintelligence
3." Mapping, Charting and Geodesy-associated R&D
a. General
b. R&D Activities Within DOD
c. R&D Activity Within the NRO
4. Costs Associated with Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
a. Overall
(1) CIP
(2) NRP
5. Intelligence-associated Costs Involved in the Overall
Program
a. CIP
b. NRP
c. Relative Costs of Conventional Aircraft and Satellite
Photography
d. CCP
6. The Gap Between Data Collection and Map Production
and its Relationship to the Fulfillment of Emergency
Military Requirements
a. Development of an Adequate Data Bank
b. The Map Production Program
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7. Future Needs
a. General
b. Accuracy Requirements
(1) Map Control
(2) Geodetic Control
c. Coverage Requirements
d. Civilian
(1)
0
(2) NASA Earth-Oriented Space Applications Planning
8. Mechanisms Available to the Director for Monitoring
the MC&G Effort
a. USIB-COMIREX
b. Participation in Review of the NRP
c. Participation in Review of the CIP
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1. Introduction
Authority
This study was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Purpose
To establish more precisely the degree of need for overhead
photography as an input for mapping, charting and geodesy, the coverage
necessary to meet the mapping and charting need at a reasonable rate,
and the costs associated therewith.
The guidance given for the conduct of the study included, but did not
limit it to, the following major points:
a. To what degree is'the worldwide mapping and charting pro-
gram an intelligence requirement?
b. Are the photographic inputs to this program essential to the
final product?
c. Is photographic coverage for this purpose being produced at
a rate which is compatible with productive utilization?
d. Will the introduction of a new high-resolution wide-area
photographic capability produce a requirement to cover the world
again for mapping and charting purposes?
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II. Conduct of the Study
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The four basic functions associated with mapping, charting and geodesy
considered by this study are: Establishment of Requirements, R&D,
Collection, and Production.
The focus of the study is on the DOD MC&G program. The other govern-
ment agencies, such as the Geological Survey of the Department of Interior,
which have an assigned mission to produce maps and charts, and NASA,
which is in the early stages of developing capabilities having to do with
assessments of earth resources through overhead reconnaissance, are
not considered in full detail as their programs are either complementary
to, or do not have an important impact on, the MC&G programs of the DOD.
President, is considering the utilization of satellite photography for earth
resources studies.
The course which the NASA program will follow is not yet clear. The
study group, operating under the aegis of the Scientific Advisor to the
The inherent difficulty of obtaining the necessary background informa-
tion has limited the scope of the study in several areas. This is most
noticeable in the area of costs and R&D effort; however, the gist of these
aspects has been presented.
The quantitative figures used in this study reflect a currency as of the
summer of 1967, unless otherwise specified.
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Conclusion 1. Accuracy criteria for worldwide geodetic positions,
both horizontal and vertical, for either targeting or for internal map con-
trol constitute the major factor in the determination as to whether or not
the photographic products of a particular satellite system are suitable for
specific MC&G purposes. In the past, in approving new accuracy require-
ments, there has been insufficient attention given to the possible impact
such action would have on collection resources. This problem can be
resolved by:
a. The USIB's requiring a thorough analysis prior to approving
any more stringent MC&G accuracy criteria to meet operational
needs than is demonstrably within the capability of operational
systems; and
b. The USIB's establishing a policy that whenever more
demanding accuracy criteria are requested to meet military
operational needs, such criteria be justified on an operational
basis and the USIB not comn-iit itself as the approving authority.
NOTE: This would negate the present system by which
USIB approves a request and then that approval is used
as the justification for the development of new and
costly resources. F_ I
That the DCI/USIB adopt a. above for those criteria aimed at
intelligence objectives and b. for those accuracy criteria which are
of a military operational nature.
Conclusion 2. The concept of maintaining as a data bank up-to-date
coverage of extensive areas of the world with photography suitable for
MC&G purposes rather than limiting collection to tha. ~?equired to meet
map production schedules is the primary reason for i. high volume of
the collection underway and projected for the future. The data bank con-
cept is based upon the understandable desire of the MC&G community to
respond to commanders' needs rapidly in emergencies when quality maps
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do not exist for an area of concern. While the concept is a reasonable
one, excessive resources can be devoted to the fulfillment of this objective,
unless it is very carefully monitored as to the extent of areas to be covered
and the criticality of the need for re-coverage. Two possible actions to
assist in this endeavor are:
a. The DCI can point out to the DOD that the demands for
photographic coverage for MC&G purposes of a considerable
portion of the world are based upon the data bank concept with
responsiveness to the JSOP.being the controlling factor and that
any action which could more precisely limit the areas of possible
emergency need would result in collection as well as processing
and storage savings.
b. The Chairman of USIB can require COMIREX to review
carefully requests for re-coverage for MC&G on the basis of
critical need versus a useful-to-have concept.
Recommendation
Approval of a. and b. 'above.
Conclusion 3. The actual. cost of producing satellite photography for
the MC&G program is not now fully identifiable because:
a. A system has not been devised for identifying all of the
developmental and programming actions which are primarily in
support of MC&G.
b. An accounting system has not heretofore been utilized to
allocate the cost that should be charged to MC&G in relation to
the coverage provided on each satellite mission.
c. The "free ride" philosophy which has generally been
associated with the collection of satellite photography for MC&G
purposes has contributed to this lack of a systematized account-
ing of costs, attributable thereto.
d. There has been some logic in the free-ride approach in
the past, but now, because of the increased focus of attention
on.the intelligence budget, it seems desirable that a specific cost
accounting procedure be established. To reflect realism in the
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costing procedure, it must be recognized that both the S/I camera
system and the primary camera system collect photography that is
used for MC&G purposes. In order to take account of the two sys-
tems in arriving at a reasonable cost allocation, the cost of the S/I~..
camera system could be subtracted from the total mission cost.
Each of the subtotals could then be subjected to the following criteria:
Determine the percentage of the total film supply of each camera
system that was expended for the satisfaction of M.C&G require-
ments. The collection cost for MC&G could then be determined on
the basis of the.appropriate percentage slice of the mission cost of
each of the two systems. Additionally, the cost of film exposed
solely for MC&G purposes and that associated with the production
of dupes or prints for MC&G'should also be allocated to the MC&G
community.
1. That the DOD and the NRO be asked to identify clearly those
programs in the research and development area and the costs
associated therewith which are for MC&G purposes.
2. That the NRO be asked to calculate MC&G collection, film
and processing costs for each photographic satellite mission in
accordance with the procedures outlined in paragraph d. of the
Conclusion.
Conclusion 4. Since the total map production requirement and the
priorities ascribed thereto are established primarily to meet current
and planned operational needs of the military forces, the validation of
the requirement and priorities is by the JCS and the DOD. The magnitude
of the intelligence requirement associated therewith is of a very secondary
nature. However, because the program is included in the CIP, the DCI is,
in some quarters, expected to exercise influence on the amount of resources
that should be programmed. This problem can be addressed in either of
two ways:
a. Require, either through executive order or agreement, that
the DCI have an authoritative voice in establishing the requirements
for all types of map coverage as well as in controlling the resources
to develop and maintain such coverage. In other words, establish
MC&G, without quesion, as an intelligence mission; or
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b. Require that the MCzG program be so presented in the CIP
that those elements which are clearly of a military operational nature
are identified as such so that the DCI may be associated with only that
part which is of an intelligence nature, (This, at least initially,
would probably have to be done in somewhat gross terms as there
is obviously some overlap in definition. ) The TOD exercise might
be a means by which a clear determination between the two aspects
of MC&G eventually could be developed.
That the DCI adopt procedure b. above, and
(1) Request the DOD to establish a procedure for identify-
ing that part of the MC&G program which should be identified
with intelligence and that part which should be identified with
military operations. The resources chargeable to the operational
aspects of the program should then be considered as non-add
items in the C. I. P. insofar as the intelligence aspects of that
program are concerned.
(2) Request the TOD group to develop reporting guidance
which would distinguish between the intelligence and the opera-
tional aspects of the MC&G budget line items in the CIP.
Conclusion 5. The study in Part IV, paragraph Z. a. , definitely
establishes photography, particularly satellite photography, as an essential
input to the mapping, charting and geodesy program and it undoubtedly will
continue to, be so. Furthermore, with the growing demand for highly
accurate maps and the improvements underway and possible in photographic
products, the potential for contributions by photography will increase.
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1.. Establishment of Requirements
a. General. Of the four general classes of MC&G require-
ments -- collection of photography by satellites, collection of
material by other means, map production, and R&D -- the DCI
and the USIB are directly involved only in the establishment of
satellite collection requirements.
DIA establishes the requirements for nonsatellite survey data
which are levied on the military departments. CIA manages a
collection program to obtain locally produced maps and related
source materials. Map production requirements are generated
within the Department of Defense and are validated by the DIA and
JCS and are not subject to USIB or DCI review. R&D requirements
associated with satellite collection are normally assignee to the
NRO and those identified with nonsatellite collection programs and
with map production are the responsibility of the DDR&E.
From the above it may be seen that there is only a limited
involvement of the DCI or of the USIB in the establishment or con-
trol of requirements relating to mapping and charting.
b. Requirements for Improved Geodetic Accuracy. Aside
from the scientific desire to determine the exact size and shape
of the earth, the most demanding requirement for geodetic
relationships between points on the earth is that necessary to
permit accurate ICBM targeting.
Global geodetic requirements based upon the targeting need
were stated in USIB-D-41. 14/295 (COMOR D-13/65) 11 July 1966
and furnished to NRO for guidance. This USIB memorandum set
forth the criteria for geodetic measurements to be accu; -ate to
450 feet on the horizontal with 90 percent assurance ra ive to
the World Geodetic System. For the Sino-Soviet bloc this is stated
as being required to be accomplished by 1970. Target elevations
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throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc were expressed as required to be
accurate to 300 feet with 90 percent assurance, again relative to
the World Geodetic System.
c. Mapping Accuracy Requirements. The most critical map
accuracy is that required by modern artillery and is expressed in
USIB-D-41. 14/295 (COMOR-D-13/65), 11 July 1966. These accur-
acies are planned for incorporation in a large-scale map at 1:50, 000.
Preliminary thinking in the USAF is that large-scale maps with
similar accuracies will be needed by 1970 to support the tactical
non-nuclear strike capability being planned for the F-111's which
incorporates a highly sophisticated target identification and weapons
aiming system.
The intelligence community does not require map accuracies
as demanding as those needed for military operations, 'although
no specific statement as to what those accuracies are has been
made.
d. Map Production Requirements. The controlling factor
in the development and production of maps, charts and geodetic
data is the fulfillment of operational requirements of the JCS and
the Unified and Specified Commands. The requirements are
validated within the DOD as Annex G of the Joint Strategic Operations
Plan (JSOP) which is developed for a 5-year period but is refined
and approved by the JCS in an annual review.
When these priorities are being given their annual DIA review,
the CIA submits its priority interests to DIA where they are con-
sidered along with military command requirements. After adjust-
ments, these are consolidated by DIA into a production package and
submitted to the JCS for approval. CIA ad hoc requirements are
reviewed and approved by DIAMC in the context of the overall pro-
gram. Under this arrangement the DCI does not have a voice in the
final decision-making process as to the production rriorities which
are established by DIAMC.
2. Inputs to Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
a. Essentiality of Aerial and/or Satellite Photography.
Overhead photography is an essential input to the mapping, charting
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and geodetic programs. It is used in various ways, either as original
source material or to supplement or verify data obtained through
other means. Its primary contribution is covered in the following
subparagraphs:
(1) Global Geodesy. In nondenied areas, through the coop-
eration of friendly governments, various overt nonphotographic
satellite programs are producing geodetic positioning which
permits a programmed extension of the world geodetic network
with a high degree of accuracy, as described in paragraph Z. b.
below. Calibrated satellite photography, combined with orbital
or precise tracking data, has provided the only means of
extending this world geodetic system beyond those areas for
which Russian triangulation and other reliable control exists
(such as European Russia). This type of control extension
has in the past provided the means by which targeting for
current weapons systems has been accomplished. However,
increased accuracy requirements will require improved systems.
(2) Mapping and Charting. Photography provides a totality
of visible terrain information wh* -h makes it a unique source
for map and chart production. Overhead photography, after
rectification to a horizontal plane, provides not ofy the identi-
cation but also the correct shape and size of natural and man-made
features in their relative position and elevation with respect to a
network of reference control points established for a given area.
It is an essential ingredient for map programs of the extent
being conducted by the DOD.
(3) Geodetic Control for Map Production. A dense network
of reference control points is required for map and chart com-
pilation. Before aerial photography was available, these con-
trol points were provided by ground surveys. The use of the
airplane to collect photography, combined with the development
of photogrammetric methods, not only afforded significant
economies but overcame barriers of physical inaccessibility.
These methods are now being applied to satellite photography,
which in denied areas is the only means that can provide the
required control data.
b. Global Geodetic Network. Prior to the advent of the earth
satellite, the establishment of a global network of primary reference
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points was severely limited by the oceans. Now, however, satellites
are being utilized in both overt and covert programs to extend and
relate existing geodetic datums which ultimately should result in a
complete world geodetic system.
(1) Overt Programs. Several of the overt programs should,
result in the establishment of a primary network of reference
points to an accuracy of 15 meters (90% assurance) in nondenied
areas. For these points this accuracy will exceed original pro-
gram objectives and should be adequate for any military or other
known requirements in the foreseeable future. The National
Geodetic Satellite Program (NGSP) being conducted jointly by
NASA and DOD will establish a 43-point global network by
photographing sun-reflecting satellites against a star background.
In addition, the DOD is conducting the following overt programs:
SECOR (Army) is a radio-ranging program (signal transmission
to and from a transponder on the satellite) designed to tie
different datums, furnish base measurements to t _e NGSP net,
and provide data for an interim DOD World Geodetic System.
The Navy DOPPLER program is a range-rate system utilizing
the Doppler effect of a satellite.- carried radio beacon to (a) deter-
mine center-of-mass positions at each of the NGSP points, and
(b) obtaining gravity data at altitude. The USAF is conducting a
PC-1000 camera program to obtain geodetic positions by
photographing a satellite-borne flashing light against a star
background.
In keeping with NASA policy, material produced by the
overt programs will be UNCLASSIFIED and will be made avail-
able to any nation, including the communists. Since none of -the
U. S. overt programs, which require ground facilities at geo-
detic extension points, are operated in communist areas, we
are currently dependent upon covert satellite photography for
these vital data. 'T'his is accomplished by taking the control
points that have been derived from the overt program and
tying them to geographic features which are subsequently
identifiable on satellite photography. From these control
points geodetic positions are then extended into denied areas.
(2). Covert Programs. The KH-5 program was
the only covert photographic satellite system that was designed
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and flown primarily for MC&G requirements. It was a joint
venture between the intelligence and MC&G communities and
was the initial exposure of the USIB to the mapping and charting
program. The intelligence community divided the program's
responsibilities between the Air Force and-CIA. The CIA had
technical and operational responsibilities for the payload, while
the Air Force was responsible for the booster, spacecraft,
launch, tracking and recovery operations. The Department
of the Army and later DIA monitored the program on behalf of
the MC&G community. The primary camera system consisted
of a stellar camera coupled to a 3" focal length terrain (Index)
camera to provide photography which, together with orbital
data, enables the positioning of features anywhere in the world.
Four completely successful and two partially successful KH-5
missions have provided 48, 000, 000 square miles of useable
photography which is still in process of exploitation. While
providing much useful data, it has not been possible to meet the
current accuracy requirements with the product.
Additional Stellar-Index photographic coverage is being pro-
duced by other satellite programs and is being utilized to meet
existing requirements'in areas not covered by KH-5 data. The.
major gap in which the required coverage has not been met is the
generally cloudy equatorial belt.
c. Geodetic Control for Map Production. The KH-5 data, as
well as frame photography produced by the S/I camera of the KH-4,
7, systems are used to provide supplemental photogram-
metric control (Point Position Data) for the compilation of medium
and small-scale maps and charts, and missile target data sheets.
None of the photography available to date is adequate to provide the
map control accuracy required for large-scale topographic maps
(1:50, 000).
d. Photographic
(1) Reconnaissance Aircraft. Although much aerial
photography has been acquired from approximately 80 different
covert air reconnaissance projects, it is not a_; :?eadily useable
as satellite photography. Its utility is limited because of certain
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technical factors, such as the somewhat erratic nature of flight
lines, excessive tip and tilt and/or obliquity of the photography
which present major technical problems in establishing stereo
models and geodetically positioning these models with the required
degree of accuracy. Also, the limited area of coverage per frame,
as compared to satellite photography, makes the formating more
difficult. However, this coverage frequently is the best and most
recent available of many areas for updating and supplementing
map detail.
Most of the U-2 coverage acquired for intelligence purposes
has been authorized for removal from the Talent Control System
and has been released with varying degrees of controlled access
to permit utilization in intelligence reporting, target material
production, and for MC&G products. Recent U-2 coverage in
Southeast Asia and Cuba has not been included in the Talent
Control System and is used as source material for the prepar-
ation of target materials. U-2 photographic macerals provide
supplementary information on ground features and installations
in the preparation of large-, medium-, and small-scale maps
and charts.
(2) Specially Equipped Aircraft. Aside from the photography
collected by special reconnaissance aircraft, the DOD has a
capability to collect photography by other aircraft such as the
RC-130 and the RC-135 which have been particularly adapted
for photo mapping. These aircraft are used in peacetime in
photo mapping of nondenied areas, particularly of underdeveloped
countries where the U. S. has cooperative agreements, and for
U.S. missile site and other airborne electronic surveys, The
wartime mission is concerned with quick response photo mapping
of critical areas of importance to the war effort. The RC-135
USQ-28 systems now coming into operation have the capability for
producing photo mapping suitable for large-scale maps more
economically and efficiently than the present RC-130s-
(3) Satellite. Photographic satellites provide the easiest
access to the total surface of the earth. In many areas of the
world, they provide the only collection capability with an acceptable
political risk. When compared to conventional collection methods,
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the collection process is expedient and very effective except for
the equatorial belt which has a persistent cloud cover. Satellite
photography is more easily reduced for mapping purposes at less
man-hour costs than photography collected by conventional means.
In the equatorial belt, where heavy cloud cover is present
throughout most of the year, the collection of useable photography
by the use of satellites is an extremely lengthy and costly pro-
cess. Unlike aircraft, satellites do not have the quick reaction
capability necessary to take advantage of short-range weather
forecasts, nor are they, when programmed for a priority area
of intelligence interest, usually over the mapping target area at
the optimum local time for mapping photography.
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g. Nonintelliger_ce. The DOD participates in cooperative map-
ping, charting, and geodesy agreements with some 48 countries.
Through these programs the.U.S. has been able over a period of
many years to initiate new mapping or accelerate previously initiated
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native mapping programs of areas of interest that otherwise might
have remained unmapped and could have become an added burden on
the covert programs.
Some of these agreements were with regional treaty organiza-
tion countries, others were the result of a division of activity
between the U. S. and the U. K: A number of agreements have been
arranged under various foreign military as well as economic assist-
ance programs. The'oldest of these, the Inter-American Geodetic
Survey, has been primarily military-funded on'the U.S. side although
some U. S. foreign economic aid has been allocated to some of the
Latin American countries.
The rate of survey and map production from these cooperative
agreements varies widely. Those with advanced treaty organization
(NATO, SEATO, CENTO) countries are most productive in coverage
since the mapping of these countries is already well advanced or the
capability exists to become so. Agreements with backward countries
are the most expensive and some programs become very drawn out.
For example, after more than 20 years the cooperative programs
under the Inter-American Geodetic Survey have yielded little in map
coverage because of the lack of local funds and lack of trained
indigenous personnel. Coverage has been completed only for Cuba
(under Batista), Haiti and El Salvador.
Prospects for an increase in the rate of coverage under the
cooperative programs are not likely to improve significantly over
the present level- unless much greater U.S. investments are made,
3. Mapping, Charting and Geodesy-associated R&D
a. General. A research and development effort is conducted by
the government and industry toward the initiation and perfection of
instruments and techniques to acquire and process cartographic,
geodetic, and geophysical data with greater speed, accuracy, and
economy.
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siderable research is underway on the development of automated
cartographic systems that will be capable of producing maps and
charts in a timely manner from a variety of sensor inputs,
o keep pace with in-iproved capabilities in ciata acquisition, con-
b. R&D Activities Within DOD, Within the DOD the proposals
of the military departments are subject to coordination and review
by DDR&E. Requirements and proposed funding are submitted by
the military departments to the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
RDT&E Coordinating Committee for recommendation to DIA. After
a joint DIA/DDR&E Program Review, DDR&E provides a final
budget recommendation to the OSD.
c. R&D Activity Within the NRO. Within the NRP R&D activi-
ties associated with MC&G are usually limited to collection devices.
The NRO maintains liaison with the military departments because
there are often parallel development efforts being conducted simul-
taneously by the NRO and the Services. For example: As a follow-
on to the KH-5 frame camera, the Army began a series of studies
which indicated the need for the development of a frame camera
capable of meeting the large-scale map requirement. One study in-
cluded the evaluation of two 18-inch focal length frame cameras and
their testing in aircraft. (It is understood that two such cameras
were developed but detailed information thereon was not obtainable. )
This camera system was given up in preference for a 12-inch frame
camera, the development of which was be un by NRO in support of
USAF geodetic interests.
4. Costs Associated with Mapping, Charting and Geodesy.
a. Overall. Costs associated with the Mapping, Charting and
Geodesy program include those required to support the R&D effort,
the collection process and the production of maps and charts.
Present cost accounting procedures do not always facilitate the
identification of costs chargeable to mapping and charting separately
from those chargeable to intelligence. There is a large grey area
of overlapping requirements and associated costs.
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6. The Gap Between Data Collection and Map Production,
and its Relationship to the Fulfillment of Emergency
Military Requirements.
a. Development of an Adequate Data Bank: U. S. military
commanders, charged with meeting the growing communist threat
after World War II, were confronted at that time with a lack of
adequate large- and medium-scale maps of most of the USSR,
China, and the backward regions of the earth. Because of the
vastness of the postulated worldwide mapping requirement, MC&G
planning and operations were scaled to a 20-25-year time frame.
Conventional methods of collecting photography and ground survey
data are very time-consuming as well as expensive. Operations
are additionally restricted by problems of physical and political
inaccessibility. Even where access is possible, the consummation
of activity from field operations to final map production for any
sizeable area had. to be reckoned with in terms of a decade. As a
result, prior to the earth satellite, map coverage was expected to
be lacking for large areas for years to come. Emergency needs
for maps and charts in the, gap areas were accommodated by a
shift of compilation resources from established production schedules
to the emergency area on a crash basis. The adequacy of such a
response capability was inevitably limited by the inadequacies of the
source materials in library holdings. These consisted of an accumu-
lation of many years of a wide assortment of foreign maps, aerial
photography, files of foreign geodetic, gravometric and geomagnetic
data, and a collection of geographic and geophysical publications.
These varied widely in date and technical quality. For vast areas
there was little or no information.
(1) After DOD established the value of covert satellite
photography for mapping, charting, and geodesy, their col-
lection requirement, approved by the USIB, for KH-4 and KH-5
photography included not only photo coverage for current annual
production needs but also included the acquisition of photography
for a mapping data bank. The objective of the latter was to
develop a 60-90 day emergency production, response capability
for any gap area in the JSOP coverage requirement. The com-
pletion of the data bank for emergency requirements would
presumably occur when once-over photo coverage of the map
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and chart requirement area would be completed. The USIB, in
April 1965, (USIB-D-41. 14/229), approved a requirement for
KH-4 coverage for MC&G purposes. This requirement has
been substantially met except for the Equatorial (Cloud) Belt
as shown in the following tabulation:
April 1965
Requirement
Completed
To Be
Covered
Sino Soviet Bloc
8,
513,
000
8,
471,
000
42,
000
Equatorial (Cloud) Belt
6,
081,
000
1,
277,
000
4,804,
000
Remainder of the World
12,
158,
000
10,
871,
000
1, 287,
000
Total
26,
752,
000
20,
679,
000
6, 133,
000
NOTE: Above figure
s are in
squ
are n
autica
l m
iles
and r
eflect
a currency
of 1 Marc
h 19
68.
(2) The completion of the existing USIB-approved requirement
for KH-4 coverage, however, will not preclude the future demand
for covert satellite photography for two reasons.
(a) First, maps, charts, and photography become obsolete
in time. The obsolescence rate varies from 5 to 20 years
depending on the level of cultural development of an area and
its rate of developmental change.
(b) Second, USIB has approved (USIB-D-41. 14/295) the
collection of approximately 7 to 10 million square statute
miles (5. 2 to 7. 5 million nautical miles) annually for medium-
and large-scale map production. When this approval was
granted no details of the production plan were provided, Sub-
sequently, it has been disclosed that the total large-scale
production plan amounts to 6. 7 million square miles (5. 05
million nautical miles). This is dependent on satellite
photography. The additional photo coverage is desired by
DIA as insurance 'to be used in meeting emergency require-
ments for large-scale maps of areas noz: included in the
scheduled production program and to produce the remaining
required coverage for medium-scale maps and charts more
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nearly accurate. The large-scale photo coverage will also
be used for the maintenance up-to-date of all small- and
medium-scale map products,
b. The Map Production Program. The DOD map and chart
production program is highly complex in nature because of the
diversity of the products involved, the large number of product
units (sheets) programmed, and the extensiveness of the area
covered. More than fifty different products make up the pro-
duction program. Some understanding of the magnitude of this
program can be gleaned from the fact that five of the major
large- and medium-scale series which provide continuous
coverage will number-over 102, 000 map sheets, which, when
taken together, will cover a total of 105, 800, 000 square miles
of area. Coverage of the whole earth is additionally produced
in the small-scale series totaling 868 sheets. Two other major
products are the airfield sketches, which number 22, 000 units,
and the Tactical Target Illustrations (TTI), which number 31, 574
units. Therefore, at any point in time a significant number of
these products are being processed varying only in area and rate
of production according. to government priorities existent at that
time. This means that photo coverage anywhere in the world may
be required for one program or another at any one point in time.
(1) The five-year program beginning with FY-67 calls
primarily for the stereo photogrammetric production of new
sheets as well as for the recompilation by stereo photo-
grammetric methods of previously existing maps which
earlier had undergone an updating of cultural detail only.
A major production goal in this program period is the
completion of the medium-scale coverage of 90 percent
of the earth's surface. To achieve this coverage, total
medium-scale map production is scheduled to rise from
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3, 700, 000 square miles in FY-67 to 9, 300, 000 square
miles in FY-68, and to level off at about 8, 000, 000 square
miles annually in the early 1970's. A major deterrent in
fully achieving this goal, however, will be the unavailability
of photo coverage for the cloudy equatorial belt of the
earth--representing about 3, 000, 000 to 5, 000, 000 square
miles,
(2) After 1973, the medium-scale coverage will enter
a maintenance phase, to keep the map coverage up-to-date.
In addition, some stereo photogrammetric recompilation
will be required on sheets that were produced from the
early satellite photography where the product accuracies
were below acceptable standards.
Large-scale map production is scheduled to remain at
a minimal level during the FY 67-73 period unless photog-
raphy collected by a longer focal length frame camera
becomes available. Production is now scheduled at the
rate of about 300,.000 square miles per year, and will be
limited to (a) the production accomplished by the NATO and
other cooperating countries, (b) the utilization of con-
ventional photography as it becomes available, and (c) the
revision of cultural detail of existing large-scale coverage
from satellite photography.
a. General. The identification of future MC&G needs is com-
plicated by rapid technological advancements as well as by institu-
tional changes which are difficult to predict. For example, the
Mark XVII Minuteman weapon system, upon which current approved
geodetic accuracy requirements are predicated, has been displaced
by the multiple warhead delivery system. The 1965 USIB statement
of the geodetic accuracy requirement is therefore affected, but the
impact of this change has not been reflected in a re-statement of the
earlier accuracy requirement. A review within DOD of the priority
that should be given to the procurement of a camera system designed
for the covert collection of photography for the large-scale map
requirements resulted in a decision that such a system would be pro-
cured but that the cost of the program would have to be borne by
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diverting funds from other MC&G programs. Some trends affecting
covert satellite operations are perceivable. Changes in military
weapons system capabilities generally are reflected in the require-
ment for improved mapping accuracies. In the past, for example,
whenever a new collection capability was evaluated, it generally lead
to worldwide re-coverage requirements. Finally, the currently
emerging interest in the utilization of covert satellite photography
by civilian agencies and departments points to a host of wider appli-
cations that may greatly affect covert satellite planning and operations
as well as the exploitation of the photography and the related security
controls.
b. Accuracy Requirements
(1) Map Control. Current large-scale map accuracy require-
ments, which are the most stringent of all mapping requirements,
are established on the basis of providing map accuracies which
will be commensurate with the advanced artillery which is pro-
jected to be in the military inventory for 1975 and beyond. Future
advances in artillery development beyond this time frame are
most likely to be directed toward increased range. This would
lead to a requirement for an extension of the vertical map accura-
cies in contiguous sheet coverage beyond the current 20-kilometer
radius criteria. This, in turn, could require additional coverage
by improved camera systems.
For areas outside the continental limits of the United States,
future civil accuracy requirements appear unlikely to exceed
those established for the military services.
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Navy, Air Force, CIA, and NSA serving as members. Because
most of the requirements are in support of military operations,
they usually have been accepted in the past without stringent valida-
tion procedures. Requirements forwarded to COMIREX by the
Working Group are scruitinzed primarily from the standpoint of
possible impact on priority intelligence targets rather than from a
validity standpoint. They are generally accepted as supporting the
needs of the military departments. In some cases, however, the
USIB channel is not followed.
b. Participation in Review of the NRP. Within the NRP, the
DCI, as a member of the executive committee, expresses himself
as a monitor of the NRP budget and of the procurement of hardware
in support of collection requirements. At times documents are
received from the NRO which lack sufficient detail for close exami-
nation. The budget is not broken down in a manner in which MC&G
costs can be easily identified and evaluated. In addition, a response
is often requested within a time frame that does not permit a detailed
examination to be made and a position to be properly staffed and
presented. Under these circumstances the DCI is placed in a position
of making judgments involving large sums of money without adequate
opportunity for the evaluation of the information.
c. Participation in Review of the CIP. The Consolidated
Intelligence Program of the DOD is a principal arena in which the
mapping, charting, and geodesy resource requirements are spelled
out in considerable detail. This programmatic presentation, which
includes related data on costs and manpower, encompasses most of
the major aspects of the military resources devoted to MC&G. For
fiscal 1969, this proposed program amounts to
in the CIP, and is exclusive o NaP
costs for MC&G. The review process for the CIP takes place within
the Defense Department; the DCI is represented in the review by a
member of the NIPE Staff. The DCI has further opportunity to com-
ment on the CIP directly to the Secretary of Defense, who is the
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recipient of the CIP Review Group recommendations, to the extent
he may desire. The problem that arises in regard to making com-
ments on the MC&G area is that, while it is presented as an intelli-
gence program, the proposals are predominantly a reflection of
military operational requirements. Furthermore, except for the
once-a-year activity of the CIP Review Group, there has been no
vehicle through which the DCI can evaluate the contributions that
the varied and complex systems and programs make to the overall
MC&G effort, or where the CIP and NRP programs can be inter-
related. For these reasons, the DCI representative on the CIP
Review Group can have only an instinctive feel for the appropriate-
ness of the MC&G line item in the CIP.
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