CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500380001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 February 1965X1 '
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15 February 1961
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS 25X1
3. Berlin: East Germans tell Bonn they do not intend to 25X1
honor their previous commitment to relax restrictions
on West Germans traveling to East Berlin . (Page ti)
4 India: Nehru's release of official \ f of al reports on Sino-Indian
border talks underscores deadlock between New Delhi
and Peiping. (page fl) 25X1
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$. Cuba: Communists describe their alliance with Castro
regime as "exceedingly close. (Rage t v)
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*Berlin: The East Germans have in effect formally served
notice on Bonn that they do not now intend to fulfill their previous
commitment to relax restrictions on West Germans traveling
to East Berlin. In a meeting between the East_and.West German 25X1
t
d
ra
e representatives on 8 February the East German official
read a prepared statement citing West German publication of
one aspect of last December's secret agreement as the pretext
for not fulfilling the pact. The. formal statement and the subse-
quent action preventing West German church leaders from at-
tending a meeting in East Berlin last week end appear intended
as a test by the East Germans of West German firmness; the
USSR does-not appear interested in creating a crisis over B
rli
e
n
at this time. East Germans may feel that. Bonn would be reluctant
to terminate again the interzonal trade agreements. A West
German cabinet meeting is scheduled for 1.5 February to cone
side
th
r
new situation and Possible means of reta iation. 25X1
India - Communist China: Nehru's release to the Indian
Parliament on 14 February of official reports on the abortive
Sino?Indian border talks underscores the deadlock between New
Delhi and Peiping. The reports, submitted separately by the
Indian and Chinese experts who compared historical evidence of
their claims in Peiping, New Delhi, and Rangoon from June. to
December 1960, point up the sharp differences between the two
15 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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 IMEMEE
sides and leave little basis for further early efforts toward
a solution. The reports also indicate that Peiping refuses to
recognize India's special rights in Bhutan and Sikkim under
N treaties with those Himalayan states. While reiterating his
refusal to accept Chinese occupation of Indian territory,
Nehru continues to stress a peaceful solution to the dispute.
There now seems even less likelihood that Nehru, who will
come under increasing domestic pressure to take firmer
action against China, will go to Peiping in response to Chou S
'
En-lai
s invitation last April.
Page 6) (Map)
MON,
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Feb 61 DAILY. BRIEF iii
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Cuba: Foreign Communist leaders, in Havana during the
early January commemoration of the second anniversary of
the Cuban revolution, showed particular interest in the modus
operandi of the Cuban Communists and in the part they are
playing in the regime. Cuban Communist leaders reportedly
told I that the alliance be-
tween the Castro regime and the Communists' Popular Social-
ist party is "exceedingly close" and that the party,. with Castro's
consent, controls all the "organizations which direct the masses."
They maintain that the Cuban revolution will play the same role .
in Latin Americaas the Soviet and Chinese Communist revolu-
tions did in Europe,and Asia.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST - INDIAN BORDER AREA
~`..# A N D'
KASHC IIR
~~ lS t n tfiisPu [et
~CFASE F/RE GINi: ? ~'
1 j ,~ nagar
W ST1
PAKI TAN
Boundary S49" ? an recent
C .nese Communist mans
?.... Boundary nova on recent Pakistani maps
Areas in Ahutui claimed by Chinese Como a uuta.
I Illhllil Principal Sipe Nepali areas in dispute
Areas Oceuped by Chinese Communists
II
"SIKKIM
Gangtoy
EAST PAKISTAN
15 -Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -BULLETIN Map Page
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Sino-Indian Border Dispute Remains Deadlocked
The meeting between Nehru and Chou En-lai in April
1960 in New Delhi was a major attempt to repair the. damage
to their relations caused by the border incidents of 1959.
Although the meeting was almost totally unproductive, the
leaders did agree, primarily as a means of buying time and
forestalling further incidents, to a series of meetings by
Foreign Ministry experts to "compare" and "examine" the
documentation upon which each side bases its border claims
in the Indo-Tibetan region. The reports which Nehru has .;
laid before Parliament comprise the findings of those experts.
The major points of difference which emerged from the
.technical talks were: (1) China's refusal to discuss with In-
dia the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan- -Himalayan border
states over which India exercises protectorate powers--
thereby denying India's "special" relationship with these
states; and (2) China's reported refusal to discuss the Ladakh
area except on "the basis of New Delhi's acknowledgment that
Indian sovereignty over Kashmir is still in question)
Peiping will probably counter Indian charges that China's
support for its border claims is "weak and sketchy" .in con-
trast to the "wealth" of Indian. evidence by alleging that In-
dia's claims involve territory taken from China by British
"imperialists" at a time when India was under British rule.
The Chinese will persist in their attempts to blame the bor-
der stalemate on New Delhi. Peiping's propaganda continues
to describe the Chinese. border accords with Burma and Nepal
as evidence that only India's recalcitrance prevents the adop-
tion of a compromise settlement in the Sino-Indian dispute.
The Chinese are now said to be interested in opening negotia-
tions with Pakistan for a demarcation of the Sino-Pakistani
border--at least in the Hunza area. As part of its pressure
tactics, Peiping may also bring. increased pressure on Bhutan
for bilateral discussion of the border.
Nehru faces an increasingly difficult problem. His efforts
over the past year to pave the way for a peaceful solution have
proved futile, a fact which critics inside and outside the Con-
gress party will use with increasing vigor as the 1962 elections
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approach. Nonetheless, in rejecting any course of action
which risks major conflict with China, the Indian leader has
no alternative but to pursue his present dual policy of strength-
ening the country's defense position and maintaining a strong
.tone in official statements, while exerting maximum diplomatic
pressure against Peiping- -especially via Moscowo
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Cuban Communists Explain Their Successes to
Foreign omra es
Leaders of the Cuban Communists' Popular Socialist party
(PSP) appear to derive considerable satisfaction from explain-.
lug the successes of their party over the past two years to rep-
resentatives of foreign Communist parties. They boast that
theirs is the first case of the "victory of the workers and peas-
sants" in a country so far from the centers of Communist power
and that their victory disproves the "theory of geographical
fatalism," 1. e. , that a Communist regime cannot come to power'
in a country in close proximity to the United States.
The Cuban Communists' claim ' that they prepared the way
for and provided decisive support to the Castro revolution in
its fight for power is not true. The Communists' real road to
power came from adroit manipulation of Fidel Castro's revolu-
tionary victory directly and through crypto-Communists and
sympathizers. By posing as the "most revolutionary of the revo-
lutionaries," the Communists became, in Castro's eyes, the most
dependable defenders of his revolution against the "plots of im-
perialism" and the counterrevolutionaries. They also proved
willing work horses for the regime, which has faced a shortage
of skilled personnel in many fields. By causing Castro to react
to US and counterrevolutionary "aggressions" by "retaliations"
such as the confiscation of most large and medium private en-
terprises, the Communists have, in effect, taken the basic steps
toward "building socialism" in Cuba without doing it in the name
of Communism, which would have been politically impossible
before now.
The Communists invariably refer to Castro as Cuba's lead-
er and appear careful never to appear to challenge his authority
openly. ' At the same time, their references to Castro clearly
imply that. they do not regard him as one of themselves.
The Cuban Communists' claim to be in control of all "mass
organizations" in the country is substantially true. They also
exert considerable control over the regular armed forces and
--especially--the militia. These Communist claims, however,
ignore the fact that virtually the. entire upper and middle classes
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as well as significant portions of the lower classes are active.
ly or passively opposed to Castro and the Communists and that
many Cubans who once hailed the revolution as a necessary
though drastic effort to solve the country's basic political and
socio-economic problems'now consider Castro a traitor to
the original ideals of the revolution.
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15 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Pave I It
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department.of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director, The Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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