CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500410001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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18 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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.3e Ghana may ask Soviet assistance for Volta River
project, (page tt)
\ \t
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5. King Savang will reaffirm Laotian neutrality in
broadcast on 19 February. (Page M)
t)
6m Demonstration against US - South Korean aid agree-
scheduled for 19 February in Seoul. (Page i t t)
ment
7. West Berlin officials skeptical on new East German
pass procedures. (Free tv)
8. Liberal ministers resign from Belgian cabinetp (Page tai)
11
ImmEMEMN
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Ghana: 'Nkrumah's regime is reported to be so aroused
against the West that it has decided to issue a public state-
ment inviting the USSR to finance and supply technical as-
sistance for the, huge Volta River power-aluminum project.
The report went so far as to state that the Nkrumah regime
would reject any further technical aid from the United States.
uled appearance before the Ghanaian parliament on 21 Feb-
ruary. A Western consortium's negotiations concerning the
project now are in the final stages.
addendum to his state visit to Guinea. Nkrumah may make
some announcement on the Volta project during his sched-
now is in Ghana on a visit arranged on short notice as an
it acquires some plausibility in
View o rum s highly emotional. and anti-American ap-
proach _ to the Congo situation. Soviet President Brezhnev
18 Feb 61
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Laos: King Savang will make a broadcast on 19 February
N
reaffirming Laos' neutrality and appealing for internal unity
and noninterference from abroad, according to General Phou-
mio Formal invitations to Burma, Cambodia, and possibly
Malaya to form a neutral nations commission in Laos will
either be contained in the King's speech or issued at a follow-
up press conference to be. held on. the same day by the Boun
Oum cabinet. General Phoumi's mission to Phnom Penh to
consult with Prince Sihanouk.and to induce Souvanna Phouma
.to return presumably will be undertaken within a few days of
the King's speech. Whether Souvanna can be persuaded to be-
come associated in any capacity with the Boun Oum government
is doubtful']
South Korea: Growing domestic criticism of the recently
negotiated US South Korean bilateral aid agreement is be-
coming. a serious problem for the Chang Myon government.
Charges of American interference in South Korean internal
affairs are being fanned by the conservative opposition,. left-
ist groups, nationalistic student elements, and some sections
of the press. Student opposition to the agreement appears to
be led by a small group which.has sponsored public forum dis-
cussions on unification with the North and a.neutralist solution
to Korea's difficulties. A large-scale student demonstration
18 Feb 61
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against the aid. agreement is reportedly scheduled for 19 Feb-
ruary in Seoul. Such activities may improve the climate for
North Korean overtures for the withdrawal of American troops
from the South and unification on terms favorable to Pyong-
yang.
Berlin: West Berlin government officials are taking a
skeptical view of the new, "simplified" procedures--announced
by. the. East Germans on 15 February--for the issuance of
passes to West Germans entering East Berlin, The-officials
point out that while the new procedures mean less inconven-
ience.for the individual, the East Germans are continuing to
exercise illegal controls over free movement within the city
and in effect to demonstrate sovereignty over East Berlin,
Mayor Brandt announced publicly on 16 February that any
pass requirement is incompatible with four-power Berlin
agreements. The change in procedures was only a minor
technical concession in. response to Bonn's insistence that the
East Germans fulfill their commitment to relax the intersec?
tor. travel controls in return for Bonn's agreement on 29 De-
cember.to reinstate its trade agreement with East Germany.
The West German cabinet met on 16 February to consider the
situation.
Belgium: Resignation of the Liberal party ministers from
Premier. Eyskens' Social Christian (Catholic) m Liberal coali-
tion government appears to be a tactical move in preparation
for the national elections expected to take place on 26 March.
Eyskens' cabinet would have resigned next week in any case, but
by this move the Liberals may hope to avoid the onus of recent
developments in the Congo and thus enhance their electoral
prospects. The Liberals, who represent conservative busi-
ness interests, had demanded cuts in. the social welfare serv-
ices as part of the. government's recently enacted austerity
program, a move which would also have been embarrassing
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to Eyskens and the Social Christian party, which includes a
large Catholic labor organization. Both the Social Chris-
tians and the Liberals are expected to make gains in the
elections at the expense of the Socialist party, which has
lost po ort as the result of the recent strike vio-
lence.
18 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF v
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Ghana's Neutralism Increasingly Favorable to Communist
World
(Although. Ta res naug Tana's estab-
lished policy of "positive neutrality," the Nkrumah regime
has over the past 18 months moved away from exclusive
reliance on the West: and become progressively more re-
ceptive- toward contacts and tactical. collaboration, with the
Sino- Soviet bloc. Since last summer this shift has accel-
erated greatly as a result of what Nkrumah and other top
Ghanaian leaders regard as Western- -especially US--re-
sponsibility for the frustration of Accra's pro-Lumumba
Congo policy. Following the ousting from the Congo of
Ghana's chief diplomatic representative and the seating of
the Kasavubu delegation in the UN last November, Nkrumah
was reliably reported as being in. a "rage" against the US,
which.he then, for the first time, publicly accused of abet-
ting Belgian "attempts to regain control over the Congo."
A vitriolic, anti-American campaign
drawing heavily upon bloc propaganda materials was
launched. by the government-controlled press and continued
at a high pitch until just prior to the inauguration of the new
US administration. At the same time, more extreme
Ghanaian leaders--such as labor chief John Tettegah--in-
stituted.a policy of shunning contacts with American repre-
sentatives in Ghana.
Meanwhile, Nkrumah, encouraged by influential leftist
officials in his own regime, has become increasingly re-
ceptive toward involvement with the bloc. Since last Au-
gust, Ghana has accepted a $40,000,000 Soviet economic
aid credit, purchased =Soviet IL-18 aircraft on.favorable
terms, and entered other agreements providing for trade,
technical assistance, and cultural cooperation with the USSR
and some of its European satellites. In December a protocol
was signed with the USSR specifying a wide range of develop-
ment projects to be carried out by the Soviet Union. over the
next several years. In addition, various plans for Soviet-
Ghanaian cooperation in the military field reportedly are also
under active consideration. As a result of these. arrangements,
the number of Soviet technicians in Accra has already risen
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above 100 and more are expected as individual projects get
under way. That these expanded ties reflect a basically
softer attitude toward the USSR is strongly suggested by
such private Nkrumah. statements as his recent assertion
that there is more "democracy" in the USSR than in any
other count
The recent announcement of Lumumba's death has again
provoked bitter and unrestrained denunciations of Western
"imperialists" in Ghanaian newspapers, but at least initially
specific attacks were focused on Belgium., Hammarskjold,
and NATO with little reference to the US except for an un-
complimentary allusion to former President Eisenhower.
In fact, President Kennedy's and Ambassador Stevenson's ex-
pressions of regret were given greater prominence than Mos-
cow's.
CC7 the other hand, Nkrumah did name the US as one of
Belgium's allies which "must answer questions" regarding
the arming of Lumumba's adversaries, and the US Embassy
was a principal target of the regime-sponsored demonstra-
tions in Accra on 15 February, On 16 February Nkrumah
presented Ambassador Russell with an aide-memoire taking
strong exception to President Kennedy's press conference
interpretation of the constitutional role of Congolese Presi-
dent Kasavubu. These developments may presage an early
revival of an all-out campaign against the US. However, the
aide-memoire and the related press announcement released
on 17 February were couched in essentially legalistic terms
and neither they nor the atmosphere of the ambassador's in-
terview with Nkrumah contained any hint of an impending
major shift in Ghana's aid policies such as would be involved
in the substitution of Soviet for Western aid in connectio
the. $350,000,000 Volta project
18 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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Th-,
THAILAND
Government forces
Governm.~nt
Antigovernment
,e,: t Antigovernment concentrations
Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces
Main route number
Road
Trail
A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
18 Feb 61
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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.-Situation in-Laos
Or rib wn on
CG-eneral Phoumi, in outlining
_16 February plans for the King's speech and his own mis-
sion to Phnom Penh, stated that the question of reorganiza-
tion of the government had not yet been decided. Much ap-
parently depends on whether Souvanna agrees to participate
in an. expanded government. Numerous politicians from var-
ious geographic regions of Laos stand ready to ?participat
[Tension between the French and Laotians arising from
the incident in Vientiane involving the AFP correspondent
who has been hiding out in the French Embassy appears to
be abating. Laotian troops which had surrounded the em-
bassy have been withdrawn, and Boun Oum has expressed re-
gret for this diplomatic impropriety. However, a new and
possibly more serious incident may develop at Seno military
base. In a follow-up to its "symbolic take-over" of Seno
earlier in the month by occupation of two vacant buildings,
the Laotian Government, through local military authorities,
has requested the French commander at Seno to yield cer-
tain other buildings. Paris has instructed the latter to re-
fuse and to oppose force by force. Although expressing will-
ingness to negotiate with Laotian officials on differences
concerning the Sena base, the French have stated they will
not do this under duress.
Kong Le - Pathet'Lao forces defending the western
approaches to. the. Plaine des Jarres area reportedly have
forced the retreat of forward elements of. the government
force inching its way along Route 7 a few miles from the
Phou Khoun crossroads. Enemy tactics still appear in gen-
eral to be defensive, but the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
might exploit any significant local success to regain con-
rol of...the Junction with ..Route 13.
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Opposition to South Korea - US Aid Agreement
The April revolution generated national pride in Sou
Koreans, particularly among young people who expected a
quick improvement in their political and economic situation.
Although the ouster of Rhee improved United States - South
Korean understanding, the new nationalism is sensitive to
any alleged infringements on Korean sovereignty. South
Koreans have been particularly sensitive over the adminis-
tration of. the United States. aid program and over the lack
of. a status-of-forces agreement which would give them ju-
risdiction over off-duty American military personnel.
Much of the criticism by students, opposition legisla-
tors, and the press appears to be based on misinformation.
Ignoring the existing situation, one. legislator has argued
that free import privileges for US aid mission personnel
would permit a flood of ,foreign luxury goods that could dis-
rupt the nation's economy. Another has speculated that a
secret annex to the agreement contains terms more disad-
vantageous than those made public. A leftist politician,
prominent in the most extreme overt political opposition,
has led the formation of a "joint struggle committee" to op-
pose the agreement. Although there is no evidence as yet
that student opponents of the agreement are Communist di-
rected, they are an obvious target for Communist subver-
sive efforts, particularly where, as in the present instance,
their activities can be disguised as nationalistic protests
Prime Minister Chang. has publicly expressed his con-
fidence that the legislators will agree there are no unfavor-
able aspects in the agreement once they fully understand the
situation. However, should public opposition. to the aid agree-
ment. continue to increase, Chang might become reluctant to
force the assembly.. to ratify it. Chang's party has a major-
ity, but many members are reluctant to support what they
feel to be an unpopular measur 3
jnce the revolution and the almost total demoralization
of the national police, any public agitation raises the pros-
pect that demonstrations will get out of hand. Although the?
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police promptly dispersed a small group of students who as-
sembled in Seoul's Pagoda Park on 14 February to debate
the assistance agreement, it is questionable how effective
they would be against a large demonstrations]
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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