CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

~iZiZi
0~
Approved For Release-R,9i3OP . 975A00550E 55fl001-1 0/
7GV- /
0 23 February 1961
25X1
0/0,00 F-- I
Copy No. C
~
OV,
/
/
Gy~~STgTES OF P~~`PGp
25X1
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 \ \ \ \ O \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \\\\ \\\\\\\ \\\\
Approved For Release 003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A 0550040001-1 25X1
23 February 1961
25X1
1100
101
,mMEMEM
lin and a German peace treaty. (Page 0
5. Burma: Leftist-led riots may lead to further demon-
strations. (Page ntt)
6. North Vietnam, Premier Pham Van Dong relinquishes
)
Foreign Ministry portfolio. (Page M)
Portugal: Defense minister demands Salazar effect
reforms in Lisbon's African colonies. (Page tv) 25X6
9. Ghana: President Nkrumah endorses Western aid
for
Volta River hydroelectric project. Page t v.)
0. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page v)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
USSR - West Germany: Moscow's 17 February memo-
randum to Bonn repeats call for free city in West Ber-
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 OV,
IF
co
UAW enera rea o p 25X1
(Backup, Page
m
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
M?R
USSR-Germany: The Soviet memorandum of 17 February
to Bonn p o a y is a reminder to the West that the Berlin and
German questions remain. unsolved. It may have been timed to
influence Chancellor Adenauer's talks with Prime Minister
Macmillan on 22 February. Although the memorandum asserted
that negotiations cannot be further deferred, it avoided estab-
lishing an explicit deadline. Moscow makes no new proposals
and reaffirms its long-standing positions on establishing a free
city in West Berlin and concluding a German peace treaty. The
memorandum does not exclude the possibility of an interim so-
lution of the Berlin question under a definite time limit,. and
nclude a se agate sacs treaty?
1 th t t
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 ~~o~o~~~oooooooo~oooooooo~~ooooooo~~oo~oo~o\o~\~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\.
Approved For Release 03/04/17. CIA-RDP79T00975A 055005 001-1 25X1\
25X1
ImENEMEN'
-murlinl
. Ine rioting in angoon on a ruary was the
most v io e t anti-American demonstration ever held in Burma;
well planned and directed, it probably has set the stage for fur-
ther disturbances. The leaders were leftist students and rep-
resentatives of groups in the pro-Communist National United
Front who had received police permission to demonstrate CD ~~
against the murder of Patrice Lumumba and against the supply
of American materiel to the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in
northeastern Burma, They were forbidden, however, to approach
the American Embassy. Although a number of police and demon-
strators were injured and two deaths have been reported, thus
far no Americans have been hurt and property damage has been
limited to smashed windows in the embassy building and at the
Pan American Airways office. 25X1
*North Vietnam: Premier Pham Van Dong will no: longer
hold the Foreign Ministry portfolio, although he retains the pre-
miership. According to a 22 February announcement, Hanoi's
new foreign minister is Ung Van Khiem, a fast rising former
guerrilla leader who has been linked with the current intensified
drive to overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem. Khiem is
a close associate of party First Secretary Le Duan. Over the past
year, several of Le Duan's guerrilla colleagues have moved up in
the party and government structure, suggestin that Le Duan is 25X1
g
reinforcin is position as Ho Chi Minh's most likely successar.
23 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1
 Approved For Release 003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A005 004001-1 25X1
nNEENE111
Portugal: Defense Minister Botelho Moniz claims he
has given Premier Salazar a virtual ultimatum that imme
diate economic and social reforms must be undertaken to
alleviate the deteriorating situation in Angola and the other
25X1 African provinces. Moniz told Salazar a few days ago that
action had to be taken before the UN General Assembly re-
convenes on 7 March and that his ministry would "take the
matter into its own. hands" if Salazar did not comply.
In northern Angola the leading non-Communist Angolan
nationalist organization, which is based in Leopoldville, re-
portedly plans to launch a terror campaign about 15 arch
in an effort to.focus world attention on Portuguese Africa
1 s 25X1
while the N Gen r
*Ghana: President Nkrumah, in his address to t 25X6
he Ghanaian
parliament on 21 February, endorsed the Volta River hydroelec-
tric project being developed under Western auspices. He men tioned, but did not emphasize, the recently concluded agreement
with the USSR for the construction of a smaller dam. There had
been a report that Nkrumah, in an emotional reaction to devel-
opments in the Congo, might denounce American aid because of
his disagreement with the United States' policies, which he feels
are frustrating his an-African ambit' 25X1
23 Feb 61 \
iv
'ammENEEMEN, DAILY BRIEF
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1
 Approved For Release ~003/04/17 CIA-RDP79TOO975A~055OW001-1 25X1
1~1 ^?.TI"TATT
WATCH COMMITTE )STONS
25X1
the basis of findings by it~
c waten Committee,"The
United States Intelligence Board concludes thaQ
A. ENo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the imme-
diate futur:3e.
E B.' [No Sino'-Soviet bloc country intends delibe-ri'ate to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US al-
lies or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate fu-
ture~
C. (Communist forces in Laos continue the active defense of
their base area in the Plaine des Jarres. The bloc shows
no inclination toward a political settlement except on. its
own terms. The Communist forces in Laos retain the
capability to increase somewhat their military efforts in
N support of their political objectives-.7
NO D.. CE-ffective implementation of the strengthened UN mandate
in the Congo will probably tend to arrest the disintegration
of the Gizenga regime, to inhibit the military activity of
Mobutu's forces, and to raise a serious possibility d
clashes between UN forces and the Katanga arm 25X1
23 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF v
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05500450001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 Approved For Release
Moscow's Memorandum to Bonn Restates Position
On Germany and Berlin
de Soviet memorandum of 17 February probably rep-
resents the first of a series of diplomatic moves to reactivate
the Berlin question and test the Western attitude toward a re-
sumption of high-level negotiations on Germany and Berlin.
The move was apparently in response to Adenauer's private ef-
forts, acting through the Austrian and Norwegian foreign min-
isters last fall, to gain some clarification of the Soviet position.
Furthermore, in reply to Adenauer's statement to Smirnov in
early January that the disarmament question should be given
priority over the Berlin and German problems in East-West
talks, the memorandum calls for negotiations on Berlin with-
out further delay and describes the "working in" period for. the
new US administration and the need to await the West German
elections as a "train of delaying arguments,
EA-s the first formal and complete recapitulation of the Soviet
position since the Paris summit, the memorandum reaffirms
standard proposals but does not insist on immediate implemen-
tation of the free city and refers to a possible interim solution
with a fixed time limit. This approach is similar to the last
Soviet proposal=-made on 9 May, before the abortive summit
meeting--when Moscow offered a two-year interim solution, at
the. end of which the four powers would be committed to estab-
lish a free city and sign a peace treaty with both German states.
The memorandum also repeats the Soviet claim that a separate
treaty, which would be signed either at the end of the interim
period or in the event that West Germany refused to participate
in the peace settlement, would liquidate the occupation of Berlin
and force the Western powers to negotiate access to Berlin with
East Germany.]
In dealing with the interim solution, Moscow asserts for the
first time that Bonn has no authority to participate in negotiations
on such an agreement. This position ignores the fact that.both
East and West Germans participated as observers at the Geneva
foreign ministers' conference discussions in 1959, which-cov-
ered an interim agreement. It also contradicts the Soviet note
of 2 March 1959, proposing that both German states participate?
25X1
25X1
25X1
23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1
 Approved For Release
Fin negotiations on the questions of West Berlin and a peace
treaty with Germany. The new gambit is probably designed
to elicit a West German claim to take part in any discussions,
which the USSR could use as an argument for including the
East Germans, or to draw a West German refusal, which the
USSR would then represent as an acceptance of its position
that West Germany has no legal. relationship to West Berlin
he remainder of the Soviet memo reaffirms that unifi-
cation and a peace treaty are separate issues and charges that
West German "revisionism" over border questions necessitates
the conclusion of a peace treaty. The memo also indicates the
USSR will consider West German counter-proposals if they are
based on the "present situation," meaning the existence of "two
Germanies:'
. CFollowing an easing of Moscow's propaganda attacks on West
Germany last fall, Adenauer has sought to exploit the "improved
atmosphere" in hopes of forestalling any sharp tension over Ber-
lin at least until after the West German national elections in
September. Adenauer also continues to favor reducing tensions
through an agreement on disarmament before tackling the Berlin
and Germany problems. However, if talks on Berlin are unavoid-
able, he will press for Bonn's participatio7
E rushchev's letter to Adenauer dealt only with the question
of repatriation of German nationals in the USSR. Khrushchev re-
turned to the official. Soviet position of early 1960 that formal
repatriation ended on 31 December 1959 and henceforth would
proceed only in the framework of Soviet law. In a private talk on
17 October Khrushchev told the German ambassador that any Soviet
citizen was free to leave and that the matter. could be reopened in
official talk
he repatriation of Germans from. the USSR has had consid-
erable domestic significance in. West Germany. Nearly 10,000
German war prisoners were released in 195556 in connection
with the 1955 agreement to establish diplomatic relations between
25X1
25X1
23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1
 Approved For Release
2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A005500 001-1
(Bonn and Moscow, and their return enhanced Adenauer's pres-
tige. On the basis of a 1958 agreement., approximately 13,000
Germans went from the USSR to West Germany, but Bonn claims
that there are still 10,000 eligible Germans in the USSR seeking
to emigrate.
25X1
25X1
25X1
23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 Approved For Relea~e 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1 25X1
Rioting in Rangoon
The anti-American demonstrations in Rangoon were
professionally led and clearly intended to result in violence.
Supplies of bricks and stones--and,
Molotov cocktails intended for burning a embassy-were stored in the park across the street before
the demonstrators arrived. Order was restored only when
the army reinforced the. 200-man police guard at the embassy
and fired into the mob.
The leaders--left-wing students from the pro-Communist
Rangoon University Student Union and -the All-Burma Federa-
tion of Student Unions, as well as representatives from the
Communist-dominated Burma Trade Union Congress and the
National United Front--flouted police orders to stay away
from the embassy. s soon as the mob turned violent, a
number of the student demonstrators returned to the univer-
sity c mpus to pass resolutions condemning the "police bru-
talit 11Such a move has in the past preceded expanded student
strikes and demonstrations and, although Rangoon remained
quiet on. 22 February, there were widespread reports that new
violence aimed primarily at the police would be undertaken.
Student-led demonstrations have long been major political
weapons, and only the army-led administration of General
Ne Win was uninfluenced by them. Now provided with "mar-
tyrs"- -two dead and 33 injured, according to the latest re-
ports--as well as the emotionally charged issue of American
materiel captured from the Chinese Nationalist irregulars,
student demonstrators may again become a significant influ-
ence on government policy.
. The popularity of the demonstrators' cause. is under-
scored by a statement issued by the ruling Union party on
22 February which sympathized with the demonstrators'
"strong spirit of nationalism" and appealed to the people to
"observe restraint" but failed to condemn the mob violence.
Although responsible government officials have not sought to
stir up anti-American sentiment, their own handling of the
irregulars issue has served to promote the violence. T
23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 Approved For Release 003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A005500
0001-1 25X1
Portuguese Defense Minister Demanding Changes
In Lisbon's African Policy
25X1
]
______________________________
Upefense Minister Moniz
and 1is staff reportedly believe
that Lisbon must: choose between two courses of action in
Africa: (1). either trying to hold on to Angola by military
force and having it eventually turn into another Congo, or
.(2) improving living and working conditions sufficiently that
the African provinces will be willing to remain with Portugal
in a voluntary political relationship. They are demanding that
Salazar cancel all industrial monopolies in Angola and issue
orders providing social benefits, minimum wages, and similar
reforms, in return for which Moniz.is said to have assured
Salazar the complete support of the Defense Ministry
(The defense minister expects further difficulties in Africa
soon, and reportedly is putting into effect a 13 February or-
der giving his ministry control over the security forces in
Angola. Portuguese military leaders are said to be more con-
cerned over the "extremely serious" situation in.the Angolan
district of Malange than they are over the recent Luanda dis-
turbances. The powerful industrial. combines are exploiting
native labor in Malange under conditions of virtual slavery.
Military authorities report difficulties with their white ..troops,
who observe the w- the colony is run and realize government
propaganda is fats
.e~/
The chief non-Communist Angolan nationalist organization,
the-Union of the Angolan People (UPA), which has its headquar-
ters at Leopoldville in the Congo, apparently is concerned that
a majority of Angolan youths are. becoming pro-Communist. Its
leaders believe it must launch a terrorist campaign to spearhead
the struggle for independence, but it is hampered by a shortage of.
funds and limited military equipment. The UPA allegedly has.
some 100 rifles
~and a small 25X1
F
number of submachine guns, hand grenades, and land mines. Be-
cause of the recent disorders in Luanda and pressure from . adher-
ents in. Angola, the UPA reportedly now is reversing the policy
of restraint it has followed heretofore,. and about 15 March will
start a campaign of attacks on white-owned plantations and other
civil disturbances in an area between Luanda and the Congo bor-
der. 25X1
23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO055p0450001-1
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500450001-1
 Approved (Release 2T0P7 :SECRET A005500450001-1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500450001-1